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ABSTRACT 
This thesis constitutes a new approach to the study of labour movement opposition 
and resistance to Conservative Government policy and practice toward local 
government in the 1980s. In contrast to previous analyses, for example, this 
exploration of labour movement activity considers trade union involvement, does not 
use artificial frameworks, such as New Urban Left, or evaluate subject matter against 
a priori standards. Examination of the campaigns studied is undertaken within the 
framework of society as a whole, so that the development of campaign practices and 
conceptual principles, identified in relation to campaign aims of defending local 
government services, jobs, and local democracy, are subjected to reciprocal processes 
of interrogation. 
This is achieved by examining events within an historical context, that begins with 
the expansion of local service provision and employment in the 1960s, includes 
retrenchment of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and concludes with labour movement 
campaigns against rate capping in the mid-1980s. This period also includes: changes 
in local democratic practice, in both constitutional and labour movement terms; 
developments in the composition, organisation, and outlook of constitutive labour 
movement bodies; and, labour movement responses to attempts to reduce public 
expenditure, local government service provision, and local government employment. 
The interrelations between these factors, changing socio-economic developments, 
conceptual principles and practice within the labour movement, and government 
policy and practice are all identified and explored as part of this thesis. 
Similarly, an integral part of this process involves the consideration afforded to 
interrelations between labour movement officers, leaders, activists, members, and the 
broader populace; in terms of conceptual principles, the use and development of 
labour movement structures, and democratic practice. Thus, by exploring the 
interrelations between the areas identified, as opposed to imposing dichotomous or 
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INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter provides an outline of the research programme 
undertaken, defines and explains the preferred means of theorising and critique used, 
and details the structure of the thesis. To achieve these objectives the chapter is split 
into four sections entitled: Research Aims, Research Practice, Research Programme, 
and, Thesis Development. Additional clarification of the epistemological approach, 
informing this thesis, is provided in Appendices One and Two, under the respective 
titles: Abstraction; and, Theoretical Processes. Reading of this chapter is therefore 
recommended in conjunction with, or at least in reference to, these Appendices. ' 
The first section, as its title suggests, outlines the final research aims and compares 
them to those presented at the start of the programme. The similarly eponymous 
second section outlines the conceptual parameters of the research programme and 
practice and comprises three sub-sections. These are of a conceptual nature, 
discussing: 'methodology', 'practically reflexive theorising' and 'immanent critique'. 
Each discussion undertaken demonstrates the relevance of these concepts to my 
research practice, and form part of an on-going clarification of my epistemological 
stand-point. The Research Programme section identifies the sources investigated, 
describes how and why they were used, and thereby introduces the material which 
fuels the modes of theorising and critique employed through out the thesis. This 
section also includes a discussion of the problems encountered in the execution of the 
research programme. Finally, an outline of the overall structure and therefore 
development of the thesis is provided in the last section. 
Appendix One considers the epistemic significance of the formulation and use of abstractions in 
theoretical and critical processes. The discussion is illustrated through references to the use and 
understanding of abstraction that are evident or appropriate to the subject matter of this thesis. 
Similarly, Appendix Two highlights the epistemic relevance of theoretical processes which rely on a 
separation of theory and practice. The processes discussed, and illustrated in reference to particular 
examples, relate to the dangers involved in the use of causal explanations, models, and frameworks as 
means of theorising. 
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RESEARCH AIMS 
This thesis examines campaigns mounted by sections of the British labour 
movement to oppose and resist central government attempts to restrict local authority 
spending and centralise governmental decision making in the 1980s. The labour 
movement is therefore the primary focus of the thesis. In keeping with the 
epistemological approach that informs this thesis, however, the campaigns and 
associated labour movement activity are studied in the context of society as a whole, 
as opposed to artificially constructed frameworks or models. 
This approach was only partially developed when the original research aims were 
formulated and presented; in line with registration requirements for the degree of 
MPhil with transfer possibility to PhD. They were therefore presented in general 
terms, and identified three main objectives: to study, within the context of 
developments in local government over the period 1960 to 1987, the campaigns 
mounted against central financial restriction by Labour local authorities in the 1980s; 
to identify the nature and effects of trade union involvement, locally and nationally, in 
the said campaigns; and, in explaining the reasons for the above, to assess the 
consequences for the British labour movement in general. 
Little qualitative difference exists between the final research aims and those 
identified at the start of the research programme. If anything has changed it is that the 
means of interrogating and explaining the events under study have become more 
certain and more clearly defined. In other words, the final research aims reflect the 
theoretical and epistemological development that accompanied, and was engendered 
by, the research process. First of all, the campaigns and associated labour movement 
activity are studied within the historical context 1960 to 1987, but not just in relation 
to developments in local government. On the contrary, the developments experienced 
by local government and the labour movement took place not only as a consequence 
of their own interactions, but in the context of broader societal processes. Their 
respective development should therefore be understood in this context. 
Secondly, to avoid an application of external critique, a reciprocal evaluation of the 
practice and conceptual principles of the campaign is undertaken. The conceptual 
principles are indicated by the claim to be defending, jobs, services and local 
democracy, but are not interpreted externally in relation to the values of the 
researcher. On the contrary, they are defined in reference to historical practice, and 
their development during the period studied recognised. 
A further research aim is to be aware of and identify, where practicable, the impact 
of and interaction between positions adopted by the various geographic and functional 
strata evident in the structures, organisation, and practices of the labour movement; 
especially those employed as part of the campaigns studied. In other words, 
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examination of the reciprocal interrelation and interaction between local, regional and 
national structures and between activists, councillors, full-time officers, leadership, 
membership, parliamentarians, and general public is also a research aim. The 
essential difference between this thesis and other attempts at explanation, lies with its 
rejection of causal, dichotomous or dualistic, and therefore external, interpretations of 
the way these elements relate to and influence each other. 
Approaches founded on causal, dichotomous or dualistic premises, for example, 
fail to explore or recognise the interaction and interrelation between local and national 
structures; whereby individuals are involved in both at the same time. The problems 
encompassed by such approaches, and the means by which they are overcome, receive 
detailed analysis in the Research Practice section of this chapter and also in 
Appendices One and Two. They are also addressed as part of the main body of the 
thesis. 
Finally, one further research aim can be identified as a prerequisite, if superficiality 
is to be avoided in analysing the phenomena identified above. Namely, that the 
analysis acknowledge and identify, the reciprocal interaction between those involved 
in the labour movement and the ideological forces pervading British society, during 
the historical period studied. ' Recognition of the development and influence of 
theoretical perspectives over the period covered is therefore an integral part of this 
thesis. The acceptance or rejection of such forces, their promotion as orthodoxy, 
doctrine, or dogma, and their impact on the campaigns are constant themes running 
through this thesis. Such analysis is, however, only possible where society itself 
forms framework within which events are studied. The means by which these 
epistemic research aims are fulfilled is explained as part of the Research Practice 
section, whereas the realisation of broader research aims is addressed in the sections 
entitled: Research Programme; and, Structure. 
RESEARCH PRACTICE 
This section identifies and explains the research practice adopted for this thesis and 
the reasoning behind it. The task requires more than a mere description of research 
methods employed, however, because such a limited exercise would be inadequate 
and misleading. Research which seeks to identify the play of ideological forces in 
society should, for example, also acknowledge the influences exerted on the research 
programme and on the presentation of its findings by: the value system(s) of the 
2 In this context, and throughout this thesis, the term 'ideology' refers to theoretical perspectives which, 
as a consequence of separating theory and practice, fit Schrayer's description of. belief systems which 
maintain their legitimacy despite the fact that they could not be validated if subjected to rational 
discourse. [Held, 1980: 2561 See, for example, the discussions of hypostatisation and theoretical 
equivalence in Appendix One. 
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researcher; the dominant value system(s) of the society in which the researcher 
operates; and, interactions between the two. As Horkheimer argues, there is no 
objective reality upon which social theorists can reflect, because social theorists are 
part of the societal process analysed. [Held, 1980: 191] The account and explanation 
of research undertaken should therefore include details of the author's epistemological 
and methodological understanding, of her/his approach to the question of academic 
research, and of her/his value system(s) and truth claims. 
This section identifies and explains how and why research can, without the 
acknowledgement of the researcher, be influenced by dominant and other value 
systems. For a comprehensive elucidation of the thinking that informs this thesis, 
however, this introductory chapter needs to be read in conjunction with Appendices 
One and Two. Read in such a fashion, the discussions serve to explain how and why 
the impact of dominant value systems can affect the practice of research. They also 
provide solutions to the problems discussed, and offer an insight into the value system 
and truth claims brought to this thesis by the researcher. 
To consider the manner in which the above problems can be identified and 
overcome, the section considers the practical relevance to this thesis of: 
'methodology'; 'practically reflexive theorising'; and, 'immanent critique'. Each 
concept is discussed and explained in a separate sub-section. As was indicated above, 
these sub-sections serve to demonstrate, the understanding and usage of the concepts 
mentioned, their relevance to the research programme, and their implications for 
research in general. Neither of the explanations should be viewed in isolation, 
however, as the discussions demonstrate how the interaction and interrelation of the 
concepts form the basis through which the impact of ideology can be overcome. 
Methodology 
Formulating a precise definition of the term 'Methodology' involves several 
difficulties. These problems stem from the common practice of defining and using the 
term in an ambiguous fashion. In this sub-section the causes of, and solutions to, the 
problems which engender ambiguity are identified and explained. This is achieved by 
providing specific examples of ambiguity, and by discussing and relating them to 
academic and other forms of research. This process is important because it informs 
the explanation of how theory and practice can be united as part of the research 
process, and how the impact of value systems can be recognised and overcome. 
The ambiguous nature of the term 'methodology' can be traced to a variety of 
sources. Eagleton, for example, considers all words ending in 'ology' to have 
ambiguous meaning and usage. [1991: 63] Not only can such words be taken to mean 
the study of a given phenomenon, but also: 'by a curious process of inversion "ology" 
5 
words end up meaning the phenomenon studied rather than a systematic knowledge of 
it. '[loc. cit. ] Thus: 'To say you are examining Max Weber's methodology probably 
means that you are considering the methods he uses, rather than his ideas about 
them. '[loc. cit. ] This use of the term represents the most consistent source of 
ambiguity in academic and other circles? 
Gunn[1989] and Silverman[ 1993] both provide examples of how ambiguity 
manifests itself in practice. In talking about 'Structuralist Marxism' and 'Rational 
Choice Marxism' as 'methodological schools', for example, Gunn[op. cit: 88] uses the 
term in a similar fashion to Silverman when he talks about positivist and qualitative 
methodologies. [op. cit: 2] Such usage is ambiguous because it can, and probably 
does, refer at one and the same time to the methods used by the schools, and to their 
ideas about them. 
In spite of this ambiguity, however, Gunn also provides a more precise definition 
and use of the term methodology. This interpretation is not only unambiguous, it also 
provides the basis for the robust critique that the research aims and subject matter of 
this thesis require. Thus, in construing methodology as external meta-theory, that is 
as a separate process for validating methods, Gunn is quite definitely employing a 
literal understanding and use of the term. [op. cit. ] In this context, methodology 
allows for the categorial validation of methods to take place, separate to their 
application, and therefore pertains to the study of method as a separate process. This 
interpretation is unambiguous and is therefore used in the remainder of this section 
and thesis, but its significance is explicable in reference to the concepts of 'practically 
reflexive theorising' and 'immanent critique'. 
Practically Reflexive Theorising 
Establishing a workable understanding of the term methodology is a first step 
towards identifying forms of theorising and critique that facilitate a rigorous 
interrogation of subject matter and value systems. Thus, by establishing a form of 
theorising that meets these requirements, this sub-section complements the 
conclusions of the previous discussion. This is achieved by first of all identifying 
pitfalls in the way orthodox approaches to theorising seek to validate their categories, 
and by explaining the consequences of such practices in terms of the impact of value 
systems. The process is then completed through the identification and justification of 
practical reflexivity, defined by Gunn[1989], as a mode of theorising which is 
equipped to overcome those flaws identified in the orthodox approaches. 
3 The same arguments also apply to the use of the term 'Ideology', but this matter has already been 
addressed in footnote 2. Similarly, the term epistemology is used in this thesis to refer to my 
understanding of the nature and structure of knowledge, as opposed to knowledge itself. 
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Problems occur in the validation of categories if the process is attempted where 
empirical or first order theory is maintained as an entity which is separate and distinct 
from philosophical or second order meta-theory. This statement is made for two 
reasons. First of all, because any form of theorisation, no matter how empirical, 
employs categories[loc. cit. ] and, secondly, because it is in the process of validation 
that the impact of value systems can be identified. Thus, where the two levels of 
theory are separate and distinct, two options exist for the validation of the categories 
employed. A given level of theory can either presuppose the validity of its own 
categories, or it can seek recourse to a meta-theory for the purposes of validation. [loc. 
cit. ] 
According to Gunn, however, 'If first order theory were to undertake the 
justification of its own categories then theory couched in some set of terms would 
have to validate those same terms .... 
it would presuppose what it was supposed to 
show and vicious circularity would result. '[ibid: 89] To escape such circularity a 
given level of theory can employ an external meta-theory as a means of validating its 
categories, but in such circumstances the validation of the meta-theoretical categories 
remains an issue. In such instances circularity is avoided at the risk of a process of 
'infinite regress', whereby each level of meta-theory requires recourse to an additional 
level in order to validate its own categories. [loc. cit. ] If a process of theorisation does 
not seek to be answerable for its own categories, however, the outcome is a relativist 
position that any conceptual perspective is as good as any other. [Gunn, ibid: 90] 
Separation of the two forms of theory is the crucial point at issue here, because it is 
the process of separation that prevents a reflexive interaction between the two. Thus, 
when they are understood as separate entities, meta-theory is unable to validate its 
categories in reference to the practical social world represented by empirical theory. 
First order empirical theory, on the other hand, is also unable to challenge the validity 
of the categories employed at that level because their validity is either presupposed or 
validated externally[Gunn, ibid. ]. In such circumstances, the separated levels of 
theory are not equipped to take account of what Silverman terms 'the social 
construction of meaning'[1993: 21] or, put another way, the dominant value systems 
operating within the society that the theory seeks to interpret. 
Second order theory, for example, is unable to offer a credible challenge to 
dominant value systems of the society it seeks to interpret, because it operates in a 
manner that is external to the practical social world. There is therefore no means of 
validating the meta-theoretical categories through which it seeks to challenge the 
categories of a dominant value system. First order theory, on the other hand, avoids 
challenging the validity of its categories through a tautological assumption that 
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appearance and reality are one and the same thing in the practical social world. [Gunn, 
op. cit. ] 
In the interests of brevity, just two examples of this process are used to illustrate 
the above points. Harding, for example, notes that in Hunter's study of community 
power structures in Atlanta: 'the basic data employed to "prove" the power of 
individuals is their reputation for having that power'. [1995: 38] Similarly, Judge 
identifies a process in Dahi's study of New Haven whereby "issue areas" were selected 
because they involved "important decisions requiring the formal assent of local 
government officials. "[ 1995: 17] The authors were charged, therefore, with 
predetermining their findings by presupposing the validity of the categories they 
sought to investigate. In other words, by restricting theorising to the empirical level 
they fell prey to the circularity described above; validating 'power' and 'issues' in 
terms of their appearance. Thus, by employing a descriptive empirical approach they 
risked portraying, as universal and immutable, those values which are inherent within 
the processes studied. 
In other words, Hunter and Dahl were guilty of separating theory and meta-theory. 
By failing: 'to place powerful individuals within a local economic, political and social 
context'[Harding, op. cit: 39], for example, Hunter rejected a reciprocal validation of 
the meta-theoretical and empirical categories of power that could have identified and 
challenged the values inherent to the processes studied. It would be wrong to assume, 
however, that the age of these examples serves to undermine their relevance. On the 
contrary, Harding defends Hunter by arguing that: 'it is difficult to see how any 
researchers, whatever their methodology, could begin exploring power without using 
some sort of working hypothesis about who is powerful and why'[ibid: 139]. The key 
words here are 'methodology' and `hypothesis'. The significance of the first, and the 
solution to Harding's problem, is explained in this and the following sub-section, 
while problems associated with the second word are discussed in Appendix Two. 
The exposition and interrogation of inherent value systems requires a form of 
theorising which is both theoretical and meta-theoretical at the same time. For this to 
be the case, the validity of empirical categories must be challenged through recourse 
to meta-theoretical categories, and at one and the same time the validity of meta- 
theoretical categories interrogated by their empirical equivalent. In the case of 
Hunter, for example, philosophical and empirical questions about power need to be 
addressed at the same time and at the same level of theorising. The theory needs to 
reflect from an empirical perspective on the question of validity, or justification for, 
its own philosophical categories about power, while reflecting simultaneously and 
reciprocally from a philosophical stand-point, upon the practice of power at the level 
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of the practical social world i. e. in an economic, political, and social context. Gunn 
terms this form of theorising 'practical reflexivity'. [op. cit: 92] 
By engaging both philosophical and empirical concepts at the same time, 
practically reflexive theorising recognises its own presence in society, and is therefore 
equipped to challenge dominant value systems and the social construction of meaning 
evident within the society it seeks to interpret. It refuses to accept, at face value, the 
way society presents categories, such as power for example, as being beyond reproach 
and enjoins an interaction between their philosophical and empirical aspects. For this 
thesis the process of reciprocal empirical and meta-theoretical interrogation is 
undertaken in relation to labour movement identification of jobs, services and local 
democracy as categories worthy of defence. To illustrate this process, the following 
sub-section explains how practical reflexivity operates in the form of critique. 
Immanent Critique 
This discussion of the nature and value of immanent critique develops the 
arguments presented in the previous sub-sections in two ways. First of all, an analogy 
is drawn between the use of methodology as a meta-theoretical means of validating 
methods, and the use of meta-theory to validate empirical categories in the theoretical 
process. Secondly, the sub-section explains what impact this approach to 
methodology and methods has on the practice of critique, and how the problems 
identified are overcome through immanent critique. By proceeding in this manner the 
relation between immanent critique and practically reflexive theorising is made clear. 
The analogy between methodology as meta-theory and methods as first order 
empirical theory, bears elucidation because problems that afflict theorisation are liable 
to have a similar impact on the critical process. Rosen, for example, describes a 'post 
festum paradox', affecting methodologically based critique, whereby evaluation of the 
results of a critique depends on the validity of the same results. [Gunn, 1989: 104] In 
other words, the process employs a circular evaluation of method by outcome, and 
outcome by method. [loc. cit. ] The similarity between this process and the attempt of 
first order theory to validate its own categories is apparent. Similarities do not end 
there, however, because to avoid circularity in a methodologically based critical 
process there has to be an external application of standards and criteria that are 
presumed to be beyond reproach. [Gunn, ibid. ] In such circumstances, methodology 
would be used to validate methods, in the same way as a separate and un-reproachable 
meta-theory is used to validate empirical categories. 
This analogy can be taken one step further to consider the practice of external 
critique. In the case of methodologically based, or external critique, for example, the 
values and categories interrogated are measured against pre-given conceptual 
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criteria. [Gunn, ibid. ] Thus, although the critical approach refuses to take appearances 
at face value, external critique amounts to a form of meta-theoretical validation. In 
instances where the values, categories or truth claims of the critic are not at issue in 
the critical process, the outcome is doctrine, dogma and orthodoxy. In other words, 
the critic's truth claims are not open to challenge, and their value system is therefore 
allowed to remain intact. 
This approach is evident in Thompson and Allen's critique of the socialist practice 
of Liverpool City Council's Labour administration, first elected May 1983. [ 1986] 
Starting from the contention'that there are three major dimensions of socialist practice 
in the local state': 'client relations', 'participation' and 'mobilisation', Thompson and 
Allen proceed to measure Liverpool's performance against these presupposed 
criteria. [ibid: 8] Their argument rests on the assertion that: the administration placed 
'a minimal emphasis on participation'[loc. cit. ]; that such an approach undermined 
attempts at mobilisation[ibid: 10]; and, therefore flawed its Urban Regeneration 
Strategy. [ibid: 11 ] 
Thompson and Allen's position is openly opposed to that of the Labour 
administration, but the conceptual principles of the latter are not subjected to a 
rigorous interrogation against performance. Instead, they are merely depicted as 
errant and juxtaposed to the ideal of 'participation' which never receives extensive 
articulation, over and above the involvement of housing co-operatives, tenants 
organisations, community and voluntary groups. [loc. cit. ] The validity of Thompson 
and Allen's conclusions, that Liverpool failed because of its 'minimal emphasis on 
participation'[ibid: 8] are therefore based on the validity of their own assumptions. 
Those assumptions are not, however, engaged as part of the critical process and 
therefore remain in tact. Thus, by excluding their own conceptual criteria from the 
critical process, and thereby preserving them as beyond reproach, Thompson and 
Allen leave themselves open to charges dogmatism. 
In contrast to the approach adopted by Thompson and Allen, 'immanent critique' 
interrogates and challenges all conceptual criteria and categories from within the 
critical process. This is achieved, as Horkheimer explains, by confronting 'the 
existent in its historical context, with the claims of its conceptual principles, in order 
to criticise the relation between the two and thus transcend them'. [Held, 1980: 183] 
Thus, the Research Aims section of this chapter has already signalled the intention to 
subject the practice of the campaigns and their aims and conceptual principles to 
reciprocal interrogation. This reciprocal interrogation also takes place in a specified 
historical context, between 1960 and 1987, and covers related developments in local 
government, the labour movement, and in society at large. 
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In contrast to external critique, there is no application of presupposed meta- 
theoretical validity against which the success or failure of the campaigns can be 
measured. Within the critical process adopted here, the meta-theoretical categories of 
the campaigns are also explored at the empirical level, and both are interrogated 
simultaneously and reciprocally. Jobs, services and local democracy, for example, are 
interrogated as conceptual principles worthy of defence, and as practically existent 
categories. The type of jobs, services, and democracy defended are therefore 
identified and explored, and the conduct of their defence interrogated in reference to 
the democratic practice of the labour movement. There is therefore no circularity of 
presupposing the conceptual or empirical validity of jobs, services, and democracy as 
categories, nor a validation of them or their defence through recourse to a separate 
meta-theory. 
The compatibility of practically reflexive theorising and immanent critique lies in 
the shared practice of each asking after the validity of all categories, while recognising 
their existence in the practical world. In other words, both investigate the social world 
in the course of its development. [Gunn, op. cit. ] Beginning with the conceptual 
principles of an object, their implications and consequences are unfolded and then re- 
examined and re-assessed in the light of these implications and consequences. [Held, 
1980: 184] By proceeding in this fashion, practically reflexive theorising is empirical 
and meta-theoretical at the same time, and the methods and methodology of immanent 
critique are forced to interact reciprocally and simultaneously without either being 
reduced to the other. 
Practically reflexive theorising and immanent critique therefore operate as a 
totality of theory and meta-theory, and are therefore non-methodological. Thus, the 
evaluation of labour movement campaigns to defend jobs, services, and local 
democracy is conducted through a reciprocal interrogation of labour movement 
conceptual principles and practice. By evaluating performance and principles in this 
way, theorisation and critique are cognisant of their existence in the practical social 
world. The categories and areas of exploration are therefore selected by the subject. 
There is no opportunity for a separate methodology or meta-theory to be used as 
validation, nor for a circular presupposition of categories. 
RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
This section provides an overview of the conduct of the research programme by 
discussing sources used, and by explaining how and why they were chosen for 
interrogation and data collection. In so doing, the section demonstrates how the major 
methods of data collection in qualitative research were employed in a manner 
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consistent with the assertions made in relation to research practice. ' The discussion 
therefore contributes to the on-going explanation of how the concepts introduced in 
the Research Practice section are evidenced in the execution of the research 
programme. 
This overview is divided into three sub-sections. The first summarises the practice 
of identifying and interrogating, within a specific historical context, the development 
of campaign aims, values, tactics and organisation. A separate sub-section discusses 
the interview process, and explains how the in-depth interviews were used to 
corroborate information and conclusions drawn from other sources. Finally, attention 
is afforded to problems, encountered during the research programme, which were 
significant enough to influence the scope and direction of the research. In sum, this 
discussion demonstrates how. categories, both meta-theoretical and empirical, were 
identified and subjected to reciprocal interrogation in the given historical context. 
Texts and Documents 
The primary purpose of the research programme was to conduct, within the 
specified historical context, a rigorous interrogation and analysis of labour movement 
campaigns to defend jobs, services and local democracy in the 1980s. The 
investigation was designed, therefore, to identify and understand factors and events 
that helped shape the environment in which the campaigns took place. In other words, 
the campaigns were recognised as factors influencing, and influenced by, the general 
socio-economic environment. To this end, the years 1960 to 1987 were identified as 
encompassing a period which witnessed the rapid expansion of local government 
spending and responsibility, and also its dramatic demise. 
In particular, the historical context, within which the campaigns are understood and 
explained, encompassed changing attitudes to government in general, and to local 
government in particular. An examination of relevant factors therefore required a 
critical review, from mainly secondary sources, of the dominant theoretical 
approaches, both academic and otherwise, that attempted to explain the role and 
nature of the state in Britain. The research programme was also designed to identify 
the interaction between such ideas, and the policy and practice of government, 
political parties, trade unions, or all three. 
One of the most vivid conclusions to emerge from this exercise, was that 
theoretical approaches react to socio-economic fortunes. Thus, the realisation of 
Silverman, identifies these methods as: observation, analysing texts and documents, interviewing, 
and. recording and transcribing. [ 1993: 8-9] Analysis of text and documents and interviews are 
recounted below. The recording and transcribing activities pertain to the interview process and 
observation is based primarily on my trade union activism and the insight gained therein of practice 
and procedures. 
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fundamental problems facing the British economy, for example, was accompanied by 
an increasing acceptance of fundamentalist fiscal analysis. Such prescriptions were 
evident in the 1970s when, as Chapter Three records, the Labour Government and 
PLP introduced a version of the monetarist approach that was gaining credence within 
the Conservative Party. 
As indicated above, however, the investigation of theoretical categories was not 
conducted in isolation from practical developments. The two were explored 
reciprocally, with findings from the review of developments in the Labour Party being 
compared to the corresponding theoretical categories identified. For instance, the 
development of the campaign for democracy within the Labour Party, discussed in 
Chapter Two, is a case in point. 
As the thesis demonstrates, the research programme utilised both primary and 
secondary sources to identify, explore, and explain practical developments in, among 
other things: local government finance and functions; the internal and external politics 
of the Labour Party; the Labour Party's approach to local government; the 
membership and outlook of trade unions organising in local government and the 
public sector; central government approaches to the practice of local government; and, 
the changing outlook of the Conservative Party. Furthermore, as part of this process, 
the interrelations between the categories were examined and, where identified, new 
sources for theoretical, and or practical accounts, were explored. 
The overwhelming majority of the secondary sources that address the political 
activity of trade unions, focus on the national level and, more particularly, on relations 
with the Labour Party when in government. Similarly, secondary accounts of local 
Labour councils and their attempts to resist central government policy rarely 
investigate the roles played by local Labour parties, Labour groups, and local 
authority trade unions. Such accounts usually concentrate on the role of councillors 
and Labour groups rather than local labour movement. 5 
Consideration of the campaigns mounted by the broader labour movement in the 
1980s therefore required a concentration on primary accounts and sources. This part 
of the research programme provided an insight into the development of the 
organisation, tactics, aims and values at local and national levels. Once again, 
information was cross referenced with that already held, and used to supplement 
secondary accounts. Where appropriate, therefore, newly discovered sources were 
investigated, gaps in information addressed, and meta-theoretical and empirical 
categories interrogated and validated reciprocally. 
Most of the primary sources were obtained from Liverpool City Branch of the 
National and Local Government Officers Association(NALGO), where unrestricted 
5 Accounts which fit this description include: Blunkett and Jackson[1987]; and Livingstone[ 1987]. 
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access was allowed to records. The information available included: minutes of local, 
branch, and national committees; local and national publicity material; local and 
national items of correspondence; minutes and circulars from the National Local 
Government Campaign Unit(LGCU), and, similar documentation from the Trades 
Union Congress(TUC). Other information included reports and minutes of national 
conferences convened by activists to develop national co-ordination of local 
campaigns. 
This information was supplemented through access to personal papers of I Lowes 
(Convenor of Liverpool Branch 5 of the General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied 
Trades Union - GMBATU) and to those of Tony Byrne (Former Chairperson of 
Liverpool City Council's Finance Committee). These papers included: documents 
relating to the National Local Authorities Co-ordinating Committee (NLACC); an 
almost complete set of minutes of the management and strategy committees of the 
LGCU; and, correspondence between that body and the Secretary of State for the 
Environment. ' 
Through the range of primary sources accessed it was possible to build a broad 
picture of the scope of involvement in the campaigns. Similarly, the documentation 
available indicates the interaction between those involved in the local campaigns as 
activists and full-time officers, and their interaction with: the Labour Party nationally; 
central government; and, with national trade union structures. Of particular interest 
are the activities of NALGO at full-time officer and national level, and therefore the 
responsive nature of NALGO's activist led structures. In particular, the activities of 
NALGO, a trade union not affiliated to the Labour Party, is of interest because of its 
willingness to consider industrial action as an extra-parliamentary means of achieving 
campaign aims. 
Interview Process 
The original intention was to conduct in-depth, semi-structured interviews of six 
people who were involved in, and had knowledge of, the campaigns at both local and 
national levels. Three of the people chosen for interview were known to me. Graham 
Burgess and Peter Cresswell were Chairperson and Secretary of Liverpool NALGO, 
respectively, during the period under study, and while I was active as a shop steward 
in NALGO. Ian Lowes was, and still is, a Convenor for GMBATU Branch 5. 
All three were also involved to varying degrees in the Liverpool Joint Shop 
Stewards Committee(JSSC) and, at various points, held representative posts at 
national and regional levels within their respective unions. Their views and 
experiences were therefore considered to be of value in providing an insight into local, 
6A complete list of primary sources is attached as Appendix Three. 
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regional, and national issues. Similarly, as a prominent figure in the Liverpool labour 
movement, a member of Liverpool City Council, and a delegate to the LGCU, Tony 
Byrne's contribution was expected to add a different dimension to the local and 
national perspectives obtained from the trade unionists. ' 
I had intended to interview two prominent people from outside Liverpool, to 
provide a broader perspective and to corroborate or refute the views of the Liverpool 
activists. To this end, David Blunkett and Ken Livingstone were identified as 
prominent figures who also had experience at both local and national levels during the 
period studied. Although neither was available for interview David Blunkett proved 
to be extremely co-operative, and agreed to provide answers to written questions. 
Livingstone, on the other hand, was less forthcoming and after several approaches 
deigned to return my questions with cursory responses. The questions to Blunkett and 
Livingstone were intended to clarify points or omissions from their respective books 
and, on the whole, the interviews and questionnaires proved useful in supplementing 
and validating previous findings. Most of the questions asked covered shared areas, 
and the main questions are attached as Appendix Four. 
Research Problems 
The length of time taken to complete the research programme, and to write and 
submit the thesis is reflected in the dates of the sources used. This is due, in part, to 
the academic pre-occupation with contemporary issues, and so the more recent 
literature available has had little relevance to my area of study. In fact, this point is 
supported by the references recorded in more recent texts that can be considered to be 
relevant to the study. ' This state of affairs serves to compound the problem signalled 
earlier, whereby much of the secondary literature available, focuses on the national 
arena, or does not address the political activity of trade unionists in the same context 
as this thesis. 
In addition, attempts to keep a track of recent contributions by searching the 
British Humanities Index, has necessitated access to a wider range of sources than 
those held in the Libraries of the Liverpool J. M. University. The Sidney Jones 
Library at Liverpool University was therefore accessed as a day reader. Similarly, 
Liverpool City Council's Central Library, and the Library at the Merseyside Trade 
Union and Unemployed Resources Centre(MTUURC) were also accessed to 
supplement the range of sources available. 
' Each of the four in-depth interviews were taped, semi-structured, lasted about an hour, and 
conducted at various locations. All the interviews were conducted in an informal and relaxed manner, 
with each participant showing a willingness to be questioned, and also great patience with points of 
minutiae. All four interviews were later transcribed in full. 
8 See, for example, Judge, Stoker and Wolman[1995]. 
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The prosecution of the research programme, outlined above, indicates how the 
methods of data collection were used to identify the categories controlling the 
programme, and those categories interrogated at the meta-theoretical and empirical 
levels. This was not a one way process, however, as the various sources were cross 
referenced, on an on-going basis, to identify shortfalls in the information accumulated 
and to validate, reciprocally, both levels of category. Questions raised by empirical 
findings were therefore addressed to the meta-theoretical conclusions, and vice versa. 
By proceeding in this manner, allowing the findings and the subject to control the 
direction and extent of the research undertaken, the imposition of external 
methodology is precluded, because methodology and methods interact 
reciprocally. [Gunn, 1989] 
THESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In addition to introductory and concluding chapters, this thesis comprises seven 
chapters. As a means of clarification an overview of the theoretical and critical 
development of the thesis is provided here, together with an explanation of how the 
chapters relate to each other. The structure of the thesis is thereby indicated, and the 
progressive elucidation of analysis outlined in reference to the modes of theorising 
and critique employed. This last undertaking is, together with Appendices One and 
Two, intended to assist those who are unfamiliar with the epistemological approach. 
The first three chapters establish the broad historical context within which the 
conceptual principles espoused by the campaigns against Conservative Government 
policy and practice toward local government in the 1980s, can be interrogated. In 
other words, the thesis begins with an examination of particular historical conditions 
that shaped the events studied. Chapter One identifies and explores the categories that 
were, in the 1980s, identified as worthy of defence. Thus, the rapid expansion of local 
government service provision, fluctuating employment levels, changes in the 
organisation and practice of local government, and therefore the practice of 
constitutional local democracy in the 1960s and early 1970s, are validated as 
historical, empirical, and meta-theoretical categories. As part of the process, the 
Chapter also considers the outlook, practice, and therefore conceptual principles of the 
labour movement in these areas; as exhibited by the practice of Labour Governments 
between 1964-70 and 1974-76, and of the TUC during the period analysed. 
Chapter Two complements its predecessor by addressing developments in labour 
movement composition, outlook and practice over a similar period. In this sense the 
chapter contributes to a primary aspect of the historical context outlined in Chapter 
One. By considering: the growth of activism in trade unions and Labour Party; the 
recovery of Labour Party membership; and, the struggles for democracy and 
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accountability within the Labour Party, the chapter identifies and validates areas 
within which the practice and conceptual principles of the campaigns of the 1980s are 
interrogated and explained. 
Chapter Three completes the broad historical context, by discussing examples of 
labour movement defence of jobs, services and local democracy in the 1970s. The 
chapter cuts across the periods and topics of its predecessors, however, and therefore 
adds a new dimension to the historical context established by preceding chapters. 
Thus, an interrelation is identified between the areas discussed in previous chapters, 
through considering the aims, organisation, practice, and tactics evident in the 
examples of local labour movement resistance in Chapter Three. As part of this 
process, the chapter also: highlights the practice and conceptualisation of local 
democracy in terms of local mandates and the variation of local service policy and 
provision; verifies service areas identified, in Chapter One, as important to the labour 
movement; and, records the Labour Government's conversion to monetary theory. 
Chapter Four provides the first analysis of opposition and resistance mounted in 
response to the Conservative Government's approach to local government between 
1979 and 1984. The events studied cover a broad range and differ from earlier 
chapters by virtue of the motivations and intensity of the Government's approach to 
local government. In this sense, the subject matter of the chapter differs from those 
which contributed to the broad historical context described above. Given the separate 
attention afforded to the Rates Act 1984 and the labour movement opposition and 
resistance it engendered, however, the chapter still constitutes an historical context for 
the interrogation of later events. By considering the impact of individual areas of 
Government policy and practice, on jobs, services, and local democracy, and by 
examining labour movement responses, the chapter develops the historical context 
and reciprocal processes of validation and interrogation, through the identification and 
analysis of conceptual principles, practice, structures, organisation and tactics which 
are analogous to previous and subsequent resistance. 
Chapter Five considers the organisation, practice, and tactics of the campaign for 
more resources conducted by the Liverpool labour movement between November 
1983 and July 1984. In particular, attention is focused on the historical, 
organisational, and tactical similarities and differences between the Liverpool labour 
movement campaign and those explored in Chapter Four. The examination of 
Liverpool therefore forms part of the historical context developed by earlier chapters, 
and within which the subsequent campaigns to oppose and defy the Rates Act 1984 
can be understood and interrogated. Furthermore, consideration of the similarities and 
differences between the role of activists in the Liverpool labour movement and those 
elsewhere, and of the approach of the parliamentary leadership to the Liverpool 
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campaign, contributes to the reciprocal process of validating labour movement 
categories and practices. 
Chapters One to Five serve a dual purpose. First of all, they constitute an 
historical context for the analysis of labour movement campaigns to defend local 
democracy, jobs, and service provision between 1970 and 1984. Secondly, the 
analysis and context provides an empirical and meta-theoretical grounding from 
which to interrogate the practice of the campaigns against rate capping in terms of 
their conceptual principles. Stated more specifically, local democracy, jobs, and 
services are identified and explored as both philosophical and empirical categories. 
This is achieved by identifying and exploring the ideals and practice of those involved 
in the labour movement and, in later chapters, those of the Conservative Government 
and Party. 
The campaigns against rate capping amount to a culmination of opposition, 
resistance, and broader developments identified and explored in the first five chapters. 
In contrast, however, the campaigns against rate capping exhibit a degree of co- 
ordination and organisation that is absent from the earlier, more disparate attempts at 
opposition and resistance. Thus, chapters Six and Seven reflect this enhanced co- 
ordination and organisation by focusing on a the broader scale of operation as 
opposed to individual, isolated examples. Opposition and resistance to rate capping 
was ultimately a two stage affair: a campaign against proposed legislation, and 
resistance to the provisions of the Rates Act. For this reason, analysis of the 
campaigns is spread over two chapters. 
Chapter Six involves reciprocal analyses of the Conservative's justification and 
practice, and of the aims and practice of the campaign to oppose the Rates Bill. As 
part of this process the chapter identifies and explores: the development of labour 
movement structures in the process of struggle; the respective involvement and 
positions adopted by parliamentary leaders, councillors, full-time officers, activists, 
other sections of the movement, and the wider populace. In particular, this involves 
the immanent interrogation of the campaign practice and conceptual principles in 
reference to the categories identified and explored in earlier chapters. 
Chapter Seven builds on the conclusions of its predecessor by analysing the 
campaign of resistance in reference to the specific campaign aims identified in 
Chapter Six, but also in terms of the context delineated by previous chapters. Once 
again the subjects considered are evaluated in relation to the conceptual principles and 
practice identified and discussed in preceding chapters. In other words, the outcome 
of the campaign is evaluated in reference to, and therefore as a consequence of, the 
historical context and societal developments that shaped and were shaped by the 
principles and practice of the labour movement in the areas investigated. 
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Finally, a concluding chapter summarises the theoretical and critical processes, 
their findings, and cross references them to the research aims. Thus, over the 
historical period, the consistency of labour movement practice with the aims and 
values, espoused through the defence of local democracy, services, and jobs, is 
evaluated. Overall, the campaigns are explored and explained in reference to the 
reciprocal interrelations between national and local levels, full-time officers and 
activists, economic, political, and societal factors. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SERVICES, JOBS, AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: CONCEPTUAL 
PRINCIPLES IN AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
As the final section of the Introduction explained, this chapter forms part of the 
historical context that facilitates a reciprocal interrogation of the principles and 
practice exhibited by the labour movement campaigns to defend jobs, services, and 
local democracy in the 1980s. Stated briefly, the chapter considers the effects exerted 
on these categories by the changing socio-economic functioning of elected local 
government during the fifteen or so years that preceded the retrenchment of the 1970s. 
A survey of this period is a prerequisite for any meaningful study of the campaigns, 
because it encompasses: the rapid expansion of local government service provision 
and employment; changes in the structure, organisation and therefore democratic 
practice of local government in England and Wales; and, the changing economic 
fortunes that precipitated the retrenchment of the 1970s and 1980s. ' 
The chapter therefore identifies and explores historical and empirical aspects of the 
conceptual principles evinced through the campaign aims of defending services, jobs, 
and local democracy. Thus, the conceptual principles are validated in reference to 
changing socio-economic and democratic functions of local government, and these 
functions validated in reference to the conceptual principles. By proceeding in this 
manner, the breach between ideas and reality is overcome[Held, 1980: 183], and 
allows for the impact of these developments upon the values, outlook, and practice of 
the later campaigns to be explored in subsequent chapters. In sum, the analysis is 
undertaken within the framework of society, and through a reciprocal validation of the 
empirical and conceptual aspects of those categories identified as worthy of defence. 
In accordance with the areas promoted and defended by the labour movement in 
the 1980s, the chapter is divided into sections entitled: Service Provision; 
Employment; and Local Democracy. The first of these sections considers 
Notwithstanding the validity of the critique expounded by Bonefield[1987], the Fordist treatise, for 
example, identifies the late 1960s and early 1970s as signalling the end of expansion therefore 
contraction of the keynsian welfare state. [loc. cit; Painter, 1995] 
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developments in the nature and extent of local government service provision during 
the period. Similarly, the second section catalogues the changing levels and nature of 
employment in local government, and in the economy at large. The final section 
provides a brief review of the question of local democracy as it was understood and 
practised through the local state during the period considered. In keeping with the 
labour movement emphasis, however, the phenomena discussed reflect the urban 
focus of the campaigns, and therefore concentrates on what later became known as 
metropolitan areas. 
SERVICE PROVISION 
This section catalogues the expansion of local government service provision up 
until the mid 1970s, and offers an explanation for that growth in terms of labour 
movement demands. Thus, the identification and exploration of expanding areas of 
service provision employs empirical data to demonstrate the growth of service areas, 
and at the same time, indicates the values that informed the provision and growth of 
particular services, and their defence by the labour movement in the 1980s. There is, 
however, no single coherent account that is relevant to this area. References to the 
developments considered here are disparate, though the most useful sources are those 
texts which explore the changing approach of central government, most evident from 
the mid 1970s, to public expenditure in general and to local government finance in 
particular. Newton and Karran[1985] provide the best example of this type of 
approach, and their work is therefore used as a point of reference for the following 
account. 
The discussion of services within particular sub-sections is somewhat misleading 
as the categories are interrelated and therefore over-lap. In order to allow exploration 
and validation of the concepts involved, however, the section is divided into four sub- 
sections entitled: Personal Services; Local Infra-structure; New and Improved 
Services; and Reasons for Expansion. Without seeking to imply trichotomous 
categorisation, the first three sub-sections afford respective consideration to 
demographic, infra-structural, and generalised examples of expansion. Similarly, the 
final sub-section offers an explanation for expansion in political and economic terms 
that avoids dichotomous understanding. Taken as a whole, the four sub-sections 
identify the role of local government as part of the welfare state, and demonstrate the 
interrelated economic and social aspects of local service provision. 
Personal Services 
The literature that addresses local government, in either financial or general terms, 
exhibits a consensual view that the provision of services to young, old, ill, and 
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disabled people became one of its primary functions. Responsibilities in this area 
were enacted by the Labour Governments of 1964-70 and include: the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969; the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970; and the 
Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. [Byrne, 1985; Elcock, 1982; Gough, 
1975; Hampton, 1987; Labour Party 1966-1984,1970; Newton and Karran, 1985] 
Changes in the provision of services to these groups are therefore identified and 
discussed here. 
First of all, the introduction of new or expanded responsibilities in the area of 
personal services should be understood in the context of changes in the composition 
of the groups identified above. [Gough, op. cit; Newton and Karran, op. cit] Between 
1950 and 1978, for example, the percentage of people over the age of 65 increased 
from 10 to 14.5%, and by 1980 there were 1,500,000 more retired people than there 
were in 1960. [Newton and Karran, op. cit: 53] Increased rates of longevity therefore 
resulted in increased demand for the home helps, home nursing, and residential 
accommodation provided under the auspices of the legislation identified above. [loc. 
cit. ] 
At the other end of the spectrum, the numbers of young people increased in 
absolute terms, though not as a proportion of the national population. Between 1951 
and 1971, for example, the number of school children increased from 5,400,000 to 
9,600,000. Given the rise in actual numbers, there was a corresponding increase in 
demand on the education system[Newton and Karran, ibid: 54], and on associated 
services such as school meals. ' Similarly, improved infant mortality rates also 
resulted in increased demands on schools. [Hampton, op. cit. ] These increases were 
therefore compounded by the increase in the school leaving age to 16 in 1972. [Elcock, 
op. cit; Hampton, op. cit; Newton and Karran, op. cit. ] 
The numbers of children in care and in local authority homes also increased over 
the period. Between 1951 and 1978, for example, the proportion of children in care 
rose from 1.4 in every thousand to 2.1 and, over the period 1951 to 1971, the numbers 
resident in local authority homes rose from 5.6 per thousand to 6.4. [Newton and 
Karran, op. cit: 54] Thus, by 1972-3 90,000 minors were in local authority 
care. [Elcock, op. cit: 128] Although these examples indicate an expansion in local 
government service provision they are not explained by Newton and Karran's 
assertion that the expansion in service provision was primarily the result of growing 
affluence. [op. cit. ] The ability to pay for such facilities through an expanded tax base 
does not, for example, explain why they were provided, nor how socio-economic 
prosperity missed such groups. 3 
2 Between 1963 and 1968, for example, the number of school children receiving school meals 
increased from 3,849,000 to 5,000,000. [Labour Party, 1966-1984,1969: 74] 
3 This and related points are explored in the final sub-section. 
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As intimated earlier, improved standards of care had the cyclical effect of 
increasing life expectancy and therefore demand among the groups discussed and 
those categorised as ill, disabled, or afforded special status. Similarly, the broadening 
of definitions to include more people within the above categories required expansion 
of service provision. Between 1951 and 1977, for example, the number of people 
registered as blind rose at a rate of 1.3% per annum and those categorised as deaf, 
dumb or hard of hearing by 3% a year. Over the period 1961 to 1978 the numbers of 
people categorised as physically disabled increased by 12% a year, while those 
categorised as mentally disabled rose by 4% per annum. Finally, between 1960 and 
1970 the number of people in local authority residential homes who were categorised 
as disabled increased from 84,000 to 179,000 and local authority registers grew by 8% 
per year. [Newton and Karran, ibid: 55] 
The preceding figures indicate changes in categorisation of particular groups, as 
well as demographic changes. Improved longevity, for example, affects population 
composition, but also explains increases in other categories such as blind, deaf, etc. 
Furthermore, by recognising and addressing the needs of such groups, the levels and 
diversity of local government provision increased. By improving services and 
increasing their effectiveness, for example, more people became dependent on, or at 
least users of, the facilities available. [loc. cit. ] That such groups did not appear 
spontaneously, implies that the new responsibilities were allocated to local 
government in accordance with new political and administrative objectives. To this 
end, the Labour Governments of the 1960s, and the development of the welfare state 
as part of the post war settlement between capital and labour were contributory 
factors, and receive consideration in the final sub-section. 
Local Infra-structure 
As the introductory paragraphs of this section note, the topics discussed in each 
sub-section overlap. Thus, of the three areas discussed here, education provision is 
mentioned in previous and subsequent sub-sections. Similarly, the categories of 
housing and transport are considered here and in the following sub-section. 
Dichotomous or dualistic categorisation and interpretation, whether in terms of 
political, economic, or structural delineation would therefore be superficial and 
obfuscatory. Discussion of education, housing and transport under the heading of 
local infrastructure is undertaken to illustrate the interrelated dimensions of service 
expansion and provision, and as a contribution to the reciprocal validation of the 
services category. 
In historical terms, education was the largest single service sector of local 
government, accounting for nearly two thirds of local authority expenditure and 
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almost half of its employment. [Elcock, 1982: 117] Although education services focus 
primarily on the young and therefore responsive to demographic changes, they should 
not be categorised exclusively as a personal service, as such functions also serve 
economic requirements by providing a trained work-force. [Newton and Karran, 1985: 
56] Education therefore forms part of the local and national infrastructure, and 
constitutes a response to a variety of demands and needs; including those of capital 
and labour. ' 
In addition to the changes outlined in the previous sub-section, the numbers using 
further and higher education facilities provided by local authorities increased from 
38,000 in 1948, to 108,000 in 1973. An integral aspect of this expansion involved the 
creation of polytechnics in the 1960s[Hampton, 1987: 89]; with 26 out of 30 proposed 
institutions being designated by 1971, and serving 162,914 students. [Labour Party 
1966-1984,1971: 87] Furthermore, many local school buildings were of Victorian 
vintage, and in need of renewal and repair. In 1945, for instance, 60% of all primary 
schools and 21% of secondary schools in England had been built before 1902. Thus, 
a programme of renovation and renewal had, by 1974, provided 7,000,000 new places 
in primary and secondary school buildings. [Newton and Karran, op. cit: 58] 
Another dimension of local infra-structural expansion involved the increase in 
motorised transport. By 1977, for example, the number of vehicles on the road had 
increased to 18,000,000, compared to 2,500,000 in 1945, and this contributed to the 
demand for road building, maintenance, planning, traffic management systems, and 
policing. [Newton and Karran, ibid: 57] A significant factor in the rise of road traffic 
was the increasing rate of individual access to a motor car, as indicated by Table 1.1. 
Similarly, increasing consumerism contributed to an increase in road freight from 
1,400,000 lorries in 1960, to 3,100,000 in 1978. [loc. cit. ] Thus, as local government 
had responsibility for the renewal and maintenance of sewers and bridges, again of 
Victorian origin, and not designed for such levels of motorised traffic, activities in this 
area also increased. Overall, the combination of the above factors required the 
provision and maintenance of 184,000 miles of local roads by 1974. [loc. cit. ] 
A final area of increasing infra-structural activity and responsibility of local 
authorities involves the provision of housing. Between 1945 and 1965, for example, 
local government was responsible for the building of 2,900,000 houses; exceeding 
private sector output by 1,000,000. By 1978, however, 8,900,000 units, nearly half 
the housing stock of Britain, had been built since the second world war, and local 
government managed around a third of the total housing stock. [Newton and Karran, 
op. cit: 59] Similarly, the proportion of housing stock owned by local authorities in 
4 Motions submitted to the Labour Party Annual Conference(LPAC), and to the TUC, for example, 
indicate the demands of organised labour. [Labour Party 1966-1984; TUC 1960-1987] 
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England and Wales rose from 25% in 1961, to 30% in 1976[Hampton, op. cit: 59], 
and in Britain as a whole from 27% in 1960, to 32% in 1976. [Dunleavy, 1980: 72] 
These figures are all the more remarkable if considered in the change of emphasis, 
after 1965, from new build to rehabilitation and renewal of existing buildings; even 
though both approaches required extensive housing management services. [Newton 
and Karran, op. cit: 59] 
Table 1.1 
Car Ownershi 
Proportion (%) of households 
with 
or without access to cars in: 
1961 1966 1971 1976 
No Car 84 55 48 44 
One Car } 16 39 44 46 
Two or more cars 68 10 
Source: Dunleavy, op. cit: 72 
The growth in housing provision is also illustrated by Kam's description of central 
government's attempt to increase public sector activity through the advocacy of a 
comprehensive housing service which urged local authorities to become involved in 
urban renewal, home ownership and public sector construction. [ 1985: 164] Table 1.2, 
for example, demonstrates the growth in housing construction between 1964 and 
1968, but illustrates the gap between the Labour Government's target of 500,000 per 
year; exacerbated by a fall in construction during 1969 and 1970. [Coates, 1975 : 114] 
Table 1.2 
New Houses Completed 1964-1968(Great Britain 











Total 373,676 382,297 385,589 404,356 413,715 
Source: Labour Party 1966-1984,1969: 103. 
The economic requirements for the renewal of an ageing infra-structure and the 
Labour Government's plan to improve the welfare state, contributed to the expansion 
of local authority infrastructural activity. This point is explored from another angle in 
Chapter Three, where the impact of the Callaghan Government's cuts programme is 
considered in a macro-economic perspective. At the local level, however, the 
expansion of local infra-structural provision is equally indicative of the internal 
relation between capital and labour. In other words, the provision of education and 
housing facilities address simultaneous economic and social needs; of people as 
private citizens and as workers and employers. As has been noted, however, the 
demands and perceptions of the labour movement form the focus of this thesis, and 
therefore receive further attention in the final sub-section. 
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New and Improved Services 
In keeping with changing demands and expectations, a series of legislative 
decisions bestowed new responsibilities upon local government. Thus, in the 1960s 
and 1970s new obligations in relation to health, social services, housing, planning, 
environmental control, and consumer protection were created for local 
government. [Newton and Karran, 1985] The expansion of local government during 
the post-war period was, however, restrained by the loss of responsibility for: major 
roads, hospitals, public assistance schemes, rates valuation, gas, and 
electricity. [Dearlove, 1979; Dunleavy, 1984; Saunders, 1984; Thomson, 1982]. 
As well as acquiring new responsibilities, local authorities were required to 
improve the standards of services already provided. In the area of personal services, 
for example, the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 added to and improved the 
requirements laid down by the Children's Act 1948. The 1948 Act had specified 
responsibilities for the care, maintenance and supervision of neglected children, and 
these responsibilities were expanded by subsequent legislation. [Newton and Karran, 
op. cit: 62] 
In addition, the Local Government Act 1972 facilitated the expansion and 
improvement of service provision by removing limits on local authority expenditure 
for leisure interests such as theatres, and on the promotion of festivals and 
shows. [Byrne, 1985: 83] Similarly, the Fire Precautions Act 1971, and the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 increased local authority responsibilities by requiring Fire 
Brigades to inspect and award fire certificates to premises used for residential, 
educational, leisure, and employment purposes. [Byrne, ibid: 71 ] 
Local authorities also acquired new and improved responsibilities in the field of 
housing. These included the introduction of. the fair rent system with the Rent Act of 
1965, and its revision in 1968[Labour Party 1966-1984,1966 and 1968; Newton and 
Karran, op. cit]; rate rebates for domestic payers on low income, under the Rating Act 
1966[Labour Party 1966-1984,1966: 97]; and, Parker-Moms minimum standards for 
new local authority housing to improve service provision. [Elcock, 1982; Labour Party 
1966-1984,1969] The improvement grants scheme was also revised, and an 
obligatory systematic appraisal of housing introduced by the Housing Act 
1969. [Newton and Karran, op. cit, Labour Party 1966-1984,1969] Similar 
developments also affected education, where the Employment and Training Act 1973 
required Local Education Authorities(LEA) to provide vocational and training advice 
for pupils and students receiving LEA education, and an employment service for those 
who had recently left school or college. [Byrne, op. cit: 78] 
New powers allocated to local government, between 1968 and 1975, also included: 
pollution control; reclamation and conservation of land; preservation of wild creatures 
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and flowers; provision of camping and picnic sites; removal of dangerous industrial 
tips; control of dangerous litter and poisonous waste; and, regulation of listed 
buildings. [Newton and Karran, op. cit] These responsibilities were also accompanied 
by: policing the sale of dangerous goods, under the Consumer Protection Act 1961; a 
requirement, under the 1973 Fair Trading Act, for local authority consumer protection 
departments to pass on complaints to the Office of Fair Trading; and, powers provided 
by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, for local authorities to regulate the provision of 
credit and to prosecute offenders. [loc. cit. ] The increasing involvement of local 
government in the provision of environmental and consumer protection services is 
also indicative of the effects of increased road traffic, and the rise of 
consumerism. [loc. cit. ] 
Reasons for Expansion 
The intention here is not to provide a definitive explanation of why local 
government service provision expanded in the ways outlined. Instead, attention is 
focused on welfare service provision, and consideration afforded to the issue 
and implications of the state's role as 'a mode of existence of labour in 
capitalism'. [Bonefield, 1993: 120]5 In other words, expanding local government 
service provision is understood not only as concessions won by the working class6 
[Cockburn, 1977: 54-6], but as a consequence of the internal relation of capital and 
labour. 
There is, for example, a superficiality about Newton and Karran's attempt to 
explain the expansion of service provision in terms of. increasing affluence, rising 
expectations, or as a response to the needs and demands of an affluent society. [ 1985 : 
66] Similarly, Hampton's equation of increases in the general wealth of society with 
a proportionate increase in spending on services provided by local government[ 1987: 
89], is equally unsatisfactory. The simple assumption that as the economy grows 
basic living needs are met more easily, and that extra resources are available for the 
services provided by local government, fails to explain why the extra resources were 
used in a particular way. This discussion therefore addresses reasons why 'central 
government allocate responsibilities to local government in accordance with criteria 
that meet political and administrative objectives of the centre at a given 
time'[Hampton, ibid: 68], and why certain political responses are made to economic 
and other factors. [Newton and Karran, op. cit: 74] 
5 See Appendix One for further consideration of this issue. 
6 The term 'working class' has an ambiguous and often emotive usage. Texts of an orthodox academic 
orientation use the term to refer to people employed in manual occupations. Unless attributed to a 
particular author, therefore, the terms is used in this thesis to refer to all those who sell their labour- 
power in order to live; notwithstanding the determinations that constitute the whole. 
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Such an explanation is fraught with difficulties, however, if focused on the 
'complex and heterogeneous relationships that result in the local state pursuing 
policies which the centre finds inappropriate'[Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 89] or the 
'inter-governmental flows of influence in urban policy change'. [Dunleavy, 1980: 108] 
The present discussion therefore explains one aspect of such processes, namely: how 
and why the state's role as 'a mode of existence of labour in capitalism'[Bonefield, op. 
cit: 120] equates to labour movement demands for improved welfare provision. 
The existence of such demands are evident in the annual reports of the LPAC and 
the TUC. In its report on the Social Contract 1976-7, for example, the General 
Council states: 'The TUC has always considered the steady growth of public 
expenditure as part of the social wage? and part of the development of a socially just 
society'. [TUC 1960-1987,1976: 412] Furthermore, the motions submitted by 
member trade unions, and the activities the official bodies of the TUC indicate that 
many of the services provided by local government, and the welfare state in general, 
correspond to the demands of organised labour. [TUC 1960-1987] Such coincidences 
do not, however, explain why concessions were allowed. 
One superficial reason is the existence of a government favourable to the demands 
made. Thus, the majority of advances in welfare provision, described in previous sub- 
sections, were enacted by the Labour Government's 1964-70. The parliamentary 
report sections of the LPAC Reports for the period 1966-1971, for example, catalogue 
such developments. Similarly, motions submitted to the LPAC and TUC during the 
period demonstrate the demand for expanded services. In 1969, for example, both the 
LPAC and TUC approved motions calling for the early implementation of the 
Seebhom Report recommendations on Social Services. [TUC 1960-1987,1969; 
Labour Party 1966-1984,1969] 
As argued in Appendix One, and demonstrated in this and subsequent chapters, the 
provision of welfare services were not made for the sole benefit of organised labour. 
Stated in simple terms, such provision also constitutes an indirect subsidy to the 
reproduction of labour[Painter, 1995: 284], and an integral part of the wage level of 
the working class, and therefore a subsidy to capitalist production. [Gough, 1975: 76 & 
83] In other words, the collective provision of social welfare amenities reduces 
demands on employers for wage levels to cover the cost of alternative arrangements, 
and therefore subsidises, indirectly, capital accumulation. 
Conversely, concessions are not allowed simply because they are of benefit to 
capital accumulation. On the contrary, the processes at work can only be understood 
properly, in terms of the internal relationship of capital and labour i. e. capital's 
' For the purposes of this discussion the term 'social wage' is taken to mean goods and services 
provided collectively to all or those unable to afford them privately. [Painter, 1995: 248] 
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dependence on labour for its continued existence, and therefore of class struggle. 
Thus, the welfare provision demanded by those who sell their labour-power in order 
to survive, constitutes a collective subsidy from capital to labour through the state. 
Due to the internal relation between capital and labour, however, capital also benefits 
through the indirect subsidies described earlier. A final affirmation of this internal 
relationship is evident from the intention of other labour movement policies and 
demands to secure capital accumulation as a means of financing welfare provision. ' 
The identification of labour movement demands for, and Labour governments 
implementation of, expansion and improvements in particular areas such as education, 
housing and social services constitutes empirical and meta-theoretical validation of 
the services category; identified as worthy of defence by the labour movement 
campaigns of the 1980s. Aspects of service provision identified and discussed here, 
for example, correspond to those identified as worthy of defence by the Labour Party 
National Executive Committee(NEC) in the 1980s, and discussed in Chapter Four. 
The reciprocal process of validation is therefore developed in subsequent chapters, 
where the values attached to particular aspects of service provision are interrogated in 
reference to the levels and types of services provided in later years, as well as those 
described here. Thus, the values exhibited through the practice considered here, are 
explored in reference to the examples of resistance discussed in Chapter Three, and 
subsequent chapters. 
EMPLOYMENT 
This section considers two important general trends, evident in the decades that 
preceded the campaigns of the 1980s, and thereby helps to explain why the issue of 
job protection formed an integral part of the campaigns. In broad terms, these 
developments can be identified as the apparently concomitant circumstances of public 
sector expansion and private sector contraction. They are important to the extent that 
parallels can be drawn between the 'overload thesis" which developed in reaction to 
these perceived circumstances, and those aspects of government policy and practice 
which engendered the campaigns studied. Specific attention is paid to these aspects of 
government policy and practice in Chapters Three and Four, but for the moment the 
discussion focuses on three factors that help illustrate the growing importance of local 
authority employment: the expansion of local government employment; attempts at 
economic regeneration; and, the rise in overall unemployment. 
8 Chapter Three considers labour movement variation from this equation in the form of the AES, and 
the acceptance of fiscal and 'overload' theories by the Callaghan Government 1976-79. 
9 The term 'overload thesis' is taken from Dunleavy[1980: 64] who identifies Brittan[1975], 
King[1975], Rose[1976] and Bacon and Eltis[1976] as subscribers. 
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The discussion is divided into three sub-sections, each dealing with one of the 
above factors. The first sub-section, for example, is entitled Local Authority 
Employment and outlines its growth, the reasons for it, and the type of employment it 
involved. Economic Regeneration is the subject and title of the second sub-section, 
where consideration is afforded to: the growing importance of regeneration projects 
for the creation and preservation of jobs; the main schemes employed; and, the role 
played by local authorities. The final sub-section provides a brief synopsis of general 
employment trends that developed in the 1970s, including the rise in post-war 
unemployment, and explains the importance attached to local authority employment 
levels in this context. 
Local Authority Employment 
As part of their contribution to the 'overload thesis' Bacon and Eltis produced 
figures to show that employment outside what they described as the industrial sector 
increased by 40% between 1961 and 1975. This figure was broken down to show 
increases of 26.5% in central government employment, 69.7% in local government, 
and 10.5% in other services. [Newton & Karran 1985: 22] The proclaimed increase of 
69.7% in local government employment, however, contained two major flaws. First 
of all, the figure was based on estimated employment levels for 1975, and the source 
on which the figures were based produced revised figures in 1982 showing a 66.9% 
increase. [Newton and Karran, ibid: 27] Secondly, and perhaps more seriously, Bacon 
and Eltis adopted, uncritically, the practice of counting part-time employees as a 
whole job. [loc. cit. ] Corrected figures produced by Newton and Karran show a still 
substantial increase in local government employment of up to 45%[loc. cit. ], but this 
example demonstrates problems that stem from a separation of theory and practice. 
Elsewhere, the increase in local government employment is chronicled as a 
proportion of the national work-force and, in spite of the different base years used, 
several commentators provide strikingly similar figures. Cockburn, for example, 
records an increase in totals employed from 1,500,00 in 1954 to 2,500,000 in 1974, 
with the latter figure accounting for 11% of the national work-force. [ 1977: 62] 
Similarly, for the period 1960-1974, Taylor records an increase from 1,821,000 to 
3,000,000, equating to 7.5 and 12.1% of the national work-force respectively. [ 1978: 
30] Meanwhile, Walsh shows local government employment doubling, between 1952 
and 1975, from 1,450,000 to 2,900,000, and therefore from 6.2 to 11.3% of the 
national work-force. [1985: 100] If there had been no movement of jobs from local 
government to the health service and water authorities, however, local government 
would have accounted for 13% of all employees. [Dunleavy, 1980: 60] 
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Figures relating local government employment as a proportion of the public sector 
also indicate its growth. Between 1958 and 1980, for example, local employees 
increased from 1,656,000 to 3,000,000 and therefore from less than 25% to 40% of 
the total public sector work-force. [Newton and Karran, op. cit: 86] These totals are 
similar to those provided by Thomson who records total local authority employment 
rising from 1,870,000 in 1961 to 3,013,000 in 1980, and from 32% of the public 
sector in 1961, to 41.2% in 1979. [1982: 111 ] 11 Given these figures, it seems safe to 
conclude that, in spite of the over-estimation by Bacon and Eltis, there was a 
significant rise in local government employment in gross numbers, and as a 
percentage of national and public sector employment. 
The evidence that local government employment increased during the period up to 
1975 may be convincing but it does not explain why it increased. Simplistic, 
monological explanations equate expanding service provision with increased levels of 
employment. The rise in employment was not just a reflection of the increase in 
service provision, however, but also of the nature of those services. In other words, 
many of the services performed by local government, education, policing, social 
work, and local health, were geared to dealing with people and their problems. They 
therefore offered limited scope for technological development, and the use of capital 
intensive machinery. [Gough, 1975; Newton & Karran, op. cit; Thomson, op. cit; 
Walsh, op. cit. ] 
This view reflects the values and approach prevalent at the time of service 
expansion and improvement. The quality of service provision in the areas identified 
was, for example, measured more in terms of labour intensity than outputs that were 
difficult to quantify. [Newton and Karran, op. cit: 86]" Thus, improvements in social 
services were reflected in the increased in the number of home helps from 6,000 in 
1949, to 11,000 in 1975. [Newton and Karran, ibid: 53] Likewise, overall numbers of 
teachers rose from 344,000 in 1961, to 477,000 in 1971 [Newton and Karran, ibid: 54], 
and after the school leaving age rose to 16 in 1972, the years 1973 and 1974 witnessed 
increases in the numbers of secondary teachers of 6.7 and 6.2% respectively. [Newton 
and Karran, ibid: 69] Improvements in the standards of provision therefore 
contributed to higher levels of employment, due to the nature of the service areas 
improved and expanded; essentially personal services. 
Although local government was labour intensive, the expansion in employment 
was not accompanied by increased labour costs; as 'the relative price effect'(RPE) 
predicts, and the overload thesis maintained. According to the RPE, for example, 
10 No percentage figure is given for 1980. 
In contrast, the adoption of monetary theory led to a valuation of service provision in terms of 
abstract exchange values. This process of abstraction 
is discussed further in Appendix One, and the 
practical implications of its acceptance 
described in chapters Three and Four. 
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labour costs of labour intensive enterprises are expected to increase in line with 
increases in more capital intensive areas. In other words, the capability of the latter 
area to pay higher wages in return for increased productivity through the use of 
technology is assumed to create demands for higher wages in labour intensive areas 
due to pressures of comparability and inflation. [Walsh, op. cit: 100] Local 
government was able to avoided an explosion in labour costs, however, due to the 
increased use of low paid, part-time women workers. [Newton and Karran, op. cit: 
84-9] 
This group of workers are portrayed as slowly and reluctantly unionised and 
therefore difficult to organise for political and trade union action[loc. cit. ]; such as 
wage increases. The implication that women or part-time workers are inevitably anti- 
union should not, however, be accepted at face value. Many part-time jobs were and 
are located in isolated units, and include school secretaries, school meals workers, 
office cleaners, and carers working in social service centres. Isolation and attachment 
to clients accounts for the absence of militancy and organisation, [Cresswell, 1994] 
more than a person's sex or employment status. Nevertheless, the rise in part-time 
employment helps explain why local government wages and salaries accounted for a 
similar proportion of local current expenditure in 1978 as they had in 1958. [Newton 
and Karran, op. cit: 88-9] 
Table 1.3 
Local Authority Employment, 1952-72 (thousands 
Male Female Male and Female 
Full Part Full Part Full Part 
time time time time time time 
1952 798 44 395 211 1193 255 
1972 1089 125 667 703 1756 828 
Percentage 
increase 37 184 69 233 47 225 
1952-72 
Note: These figures relate to UK local authority employment. 
Source: Stoker, 1988: 11. 
Table 1.3, for example, details the increases in local government jobs according to 
employment status. Thus, between 1952 and 1972, there was an overall increase in 
part-time employees of 224.7% compared to 47.2% for full-time employees. [loc. cit. ] 
Almost half of the increase in full-time employment occurred between 1962 and 1972, 
however, when numbers increased by 20%. [Newton and Karran, op. cit: 27] In 
contrast, part-time female employees rose, between 1950 and 1980, from 15 to 33% of 
the local government work-force, while full-time male employment decreased from 55 
to 37%. [loc. cit. ] By 1980, only 64% of total local government employees were full- 
time, and divided 58% to 42% between men and women. In stark contrast, and 
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confirmation of Newton and Karran's claim, 91% of part-time workers at this time 
were women. [Thomson, op. cit: 110] 
In addition to explaining the fairly stable labour costs of local government, the 
developments in part-time and full-time employment provide an indication of 
problems encountered by trade unions and others involved in the campaigns of the 
1980s. They represent problems in terms of organising and mobilising a fragmented 
work-force, but also with regard to the type of job and conditions of service that the 
campaigns were trying to defend. In other words, the campaign to save jobs, of 
whatever nature, emphasises the defensive nature of the campaigns. Granted that 
trade unions were, as part of their day to day business, trying to improve the 
conditions and wages of their members, but as subsequent discussions demonstrate, 
this aspect of their struggle tended to be lost in the drive to create and protect jobs of 
any status, and therefore as an abstract category. 
Economic Regeneration 
A striking level of agreement is evident among analyses of local authority attempts 
at economic regeneration in the decades preceding the 1980s. The similarity between 
accounts is all the more striking because they cover several areas. A consensus exists 
over: the reasons why local authorities became involved in economic regeneration; the 
type and intensity of activity; and the use of powers conferred through legislation. In 
outlining central government attempts to encourage economic regeneration, the 
following discussion recognises that powers were conferred to local authorities 
through legislation, but that the use of such powers depended on local determination. 
The account should not, therefore, be understood as indicating a universal or 
homogeneous approach by local authorities. On the contrary, such concern and 
activity was most evident in those areas affected by the ravages of economic decline 
and even then variations exist between the levels and directions of the initiatives 
undertaken. Significantly, however, many of the areas considered here, were 
prominent in the campaigns of the 1980s. 
In a broad sense, the mere existence of a local authority can act as a stimulant to 
the local economy; as perhaps the largest employer in a given area, or a major 
consumer of goods and services, such as insurance, new technology, stationery, 
building supplies, equipment, and food for school meals. [Mawson & Miller, 1985; 
Newton and Karran, 1985; Walsh, 1985] Similarly, a local authority's infra-structural 
responsibilities, discussed in the previous section, are carried out through 
its capital 
programme, and represent a major form of local investment, providing work 
for the 
local building industry and other contractors. [Benington, 1985: 5] More specifically, 
however, local authorities undertook small scale activities in the 1960s that are 
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analogous to the later more determined attempts at economic stimulation. Under the 
auspices of the Local Authority (Land) Act 1963, for example, local authorities were 
allowed to acquire land, build factories on it, and provide loans to private developers 
worth up to 75% of the capital value concerned. [Chandler and Lawless, 1985; Boddy, 
1983] 
Until the 1970s, however, local authority attempts at economic regeneration were 
focused on assisted areas, and aimed at supplementing the regional industrial policy of 
central government which rested on industrial incentives and location 
controls. [Boddy, 1983; Mawson and Miller, op. cit. ] Then, in the early 1970s, a rapid 
expansion of economic initiatives took place. [Boddy, 1984a: 160-5] In addition to the 
provision of sites for industries, already identified, efforts were also made to promote 
specific localities, to market specific sites and premises, and to provide property lists 
and information for business advice services. Firms were also financed through 
favourable loans or grants for the acquisition of sites and premises, plant machinery, 
or operating costs. [Boddy, ibid. ] This new approach was achieved, in part, by taking 
advantage of various pieces of legislation, whether designed for the purpose of 
regeneration or not. 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1971, for example, was used in ways that 
exceeded traditional land use concerns. [Hampton, 1987: 211] Thus, under section 
112 of the Act, local authorities were allowed to acquire, sell or develop 
land. [Chandler and Lawless, op. cit: 225] Similarly, section 123 of the Local 
Government Act 1972 allowed authorities interested in regeneration to let land on a 
free or reduced industrial rent, on either a short term tenancy or with the consent of 
the secretary of State. [loc. cit. ] Section 122 of the same Act also allowed local 
authorities to transfer land from one use to another, e. g. from housing development to 
industrial estate. [loc. cit. ] Finally, section 137 of the 1972 Act, allowed authorities to 
spend the equivalent of 2p for every pound raised in rates, on projects considered to 
be of benefit to the locality. Such initiatives were inevitably small scale, however, as 
central government permission was required for major investment in public service 
infrastructure. 
Concern over the effects of unemployment, precipitated by the decline in the 
manufacturing sector and the high interest rates which followed the oil crisis of 
1973[Boddy, 1983 and 1984a; Mawson, 1983; Young and Mason, 1983], were 
reflected in legislation intended to facilitate local authority activity in the area of 
economic regeneration. The Community Land Act 1975, for example, provided 
local 
authorities with the power and finances to acquire land for industrial development, 
and to fund the provision of infra-structure before sale or lease to the private 
sector. [Boddy, 1983; Lawless, 1979; Chandler and Lawless, op. cit. 
] Similarly, the 
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Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 is described by Boddy as recasting the Urban Programme 
from a concern with welfare to regeneration. [ 1984a: 162] 
Under the 1978 Act, local authorities were allowed to spend a greater proportion of 
funds on the regeneration of urban infrastructure. [Mason, 1983: 51 ] In particular, the 
Act allowed specified authorities to declare industrial or commercial improvement 
areas. [Chandler and Lawless, op. cit: 98] All those involved were eligible for central 
grants up to at a rate of 75 percent of expenditure in improvement areas approved by 
the DOE, and within two years of the Act, 60 such areas were declared by 30 local 
authorities. [loc. cit. ] The Inner Urban Areas Act took many of its characteristics from 
the Tyne and Wear Act of 1976 which, as a private act of parliament, had addressed 
specific local problems. [Chandler and Lawless, ibid; Storey, 1983] 
Individual authorities practised a variety of initiatives under the legislative 
provisions identified, including the development of older commercial and industrial 
premises in Nottingham, Southwark and West Yorkshire. [Chandler and Lawless, op. 
cit: 96] Southwark, for example adopted policies in 1975 aimed at countering 
unemployment, including a preferred industry policy intended to strengthen local 
manufacturing activity, and in 1978 created an Industrial and Commercial 
Development Fund financed under the auspices of section 137 of the 1972 Local 
government Act. [North and Gough, 1983: 156] Wandsworth and Southwark also 
received designated area status under the Inner Urban Areas Act, and the docklands of 
Southwark and Hackney were granted partnership status. [North and Gough, ibid: 
156-7] 
Elsewhere, Calderdale established an Economic Regeneration Advisory 
Committee in 1976; as the initiative of councillors, the local Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Trades Council. [Mawson, op. cit: 98-101] Similarly, West Yorkshire 
Metropolitan District Council established an Economic Development Sub-Committee 
in 1977. [Chandler and Lawless, op. cit: 192] Finally, a number of authorities 
included specific measures in their capital accounts for economic regeneration: 
Sunderland Borough Council's capital expenditure on industrial land acquisition, site 
development and factory construction averaged £600,000 per year from 1977-8 to 
1979-80; for 1978-9, Sheffield City Council's capital programme identified industrial 
development expenditure of £3,600,000 for the period 1974 to 1980, of which 
£2,900,000 was for factory development; and, Lewisham Borough Council 
in London 
produced a capital programme for 1979-80 to 1983-4 which 
included £3,200,000 for 
industrial development. [Boddy, 1983: 34-5] 
Because local authority attempts at economic regeneration were property led, 
however, the creation of jobs became a secondary focus in the aim of economic 
development. [Boddy, 1984a] Thus, the type of activity described earlier, attempted to 
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attract expanding or relocating firms with the hope of promoting new business in the 
area. Employment creation was therefore overshadowed as local authorities competed 
with each other for 'new' investment, rather than developing existing firms. [Boddy, 
ibid: 163-4] Furthermore, the focus of local authority assistance on capital 
expenditure, such as the provision of premises, plant and machinery, served to reduce 
the cost of capital investment relative to that of labour. If local authorities wanted to 
increase employment, therefore, a more appropriate subsidy would have been directed 
at the cost of labour. [Boddy, ibid. ] 
Furthermore, the emphasis on small firms, though considered to be dynamic and 
therefore offer the potential for rapid expansion, developed as a consequence of the 
reserves available to local authorities, and the local orientation of small firms. [Boddy, 
ibid: 163-4] Between 1975-6 and 1977-8 Cleveland County Council's £3m 
expenditure is dwarfed by £269.5m Regional Development Grant allocated over the 
same period. [North and Gough, op. cit: 191] The small scale of local investment also 
meant that one large employer, or in some cases whole industries, closing down in the 
locality wiped out employment equivalent to many small firms. In Tyne and Wear, 
for example, the 35 nursery factory units built and let by the end of 1976 produced 
only 139 jobs. [Storey, op. cit: 205] Similarly, while the 147 firms receiving grants 
and loans from Tyne and Wear County Council increased employment by 81%, this 
amounted to only 967 jobs. [Storey, op. cit: 205] The scale of this problem is 
illustrated further in the following sub-section, where the scale of job losses over the 
period is identified. 
In addition, the epistemological truth claim outlined in the introductory chapter, 
that circular processes of validation serve to obfuscate reality, is illustrated by 
Boddy's argument that the success of economic regeneration schemes was measured 
in their own terms. By interpreting economic regeneration as the provision of sites 
and premises, and measuring its success in terms of the numbers made available, for 
example, the espoused aim of creating jobs was obscured. Similarly, the number of 
jobs created or retained, or the number of jobs lost by or to other areas, were also 
excluded from the process of measuring the success of local regeneration 
schemes. [Boddy, op. cit: 163-4] Instead, the creation of industrial sites 
became the 
objective, and the attraction of employers to those sites became more 
important than 
the overall quality or numbers of jobs in the locality or elsewhere. 
Local authority attempts to regenerate the local private sector, and the extent of 
private sector employment stimulated by local authorities, contrasts with 
the level of 
local authority employment described in the previous sub-section. 
The small scale of 
the schemes, and their limited success, also serves to provide a context 
in which to 
understand the importance attached to local authority 
jobs themselves, especially in 
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relation to the move toward long-term mass unemployment discussed in the next sub- 
section. Thus, to the extent that local authority jobs, albeit increasingly low paid and 
part-time, were more abundant than those stimulated in the private sector, they were 
considered to be worth defending. This point is developed in Chapter Four were 
attention is afforded to negotiated reductions in service conditions in favour of saving 
jobs. 
Employment Levels In Perspective 
The increase in local government employment, described in the first sub-section, 
acquires greater significance when understood in terms of the steep rise in 
unemployment. Between 1964 and 1974, for example, unemployment levels rose 
from 393,000 to 600,000, or from 1.7 to 2.6% of the national work-force, including a 
jump from 260,000(l. 1%) to 600,000(2.6%), between July 1966 and February 
1967. [Middlemass, 1979: 437] By 1976, however, unemployment stood at 1,276,000 
the equivalent of 5.3 percent of the work-force. [King, 1980: 368] Furthermore, and in 
keeping with the view that the levels of unemployment resulted from a collapse of 
manufacturing industry, Mason records that between 1960 and 1980 the number of 
manufacturing jobs fell by almost 2,000,000. [1983: 54] 
This overall demise is illustrated graphically in reference to local developments in 
urban areas. Manchester, for example, lost 20% of its manufacturing base between 
1966 and 1971 [Lawless: 1979: 154], and between 1966 and 1972 lost 35,000 jobs 
while only 11,000 were created. [Young and Mills, 1982: 88] Similarly, 20% of 
Islington's jobs base of 1961 had disappeared by 1971. Between 1951 and 1971 
Wandsworth also lost about half of its manufacturing labour force, and in 1975 
Liverpool had 70% more unemployed males than it had in 1971. [Lawless, op. cit: 
154-5] Furthermore, Lawless's assertion that London's employment base was reduced 
by about 500,000 between 1961 and 1974[loc. cit] reflects the views expressed in the 
Greater London Labour Party(GLLP) Manifesto for the Greater London 
Council(GLC) election of 1981. Thus, the GLLP argued that: 'over the past twenty 
years the capital has lost some 500,000 jobs, a pace of decline that outstrips any other 
region in the country'. [Chandler and Lawless, 1985: 27] The 100,000 office jobs 
created in London during this period are therefore put into perspective, and their 
impact on unemployment levels reduced because they were not necessarily 
compatible with the skills of those who were losing their jobs. [Lawless, op. cit: 159] 
The developments described here, demonstrate the inadequate scale of local 
attempts at regeneration when compared to the collapse of whole industries. In South 
Yorkshire, for example, the Sheffield cutlery industry contracted from 30,000 
employees in the 1950s to 5,500 by 1977. [Chandler and Lawless, op. cit: 
142] 
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Furthermore, Sheffield City Council estimated that between 1971 and 1983: 
employment in Sheffield's steel industry fell from 45,000 to 18,000; the total number 
of steel jobs lost between Sheffield and Rotherham amounted to 35,000; and, 110,000 
steel jobs had been lost in Britain during the period. [Chandler and Lawless, ibid: 
148-9] 
In the context of growing unemployment and the limited impact of local authority 
responses, it is not surprising that the defence of local authority jobs became a major 
issue. One of the reasons local government employment was so important for the 
campaigns of the 1980s was because, in many cases, local authorities were the largest 
sector of employment, or the biggest single employer in their particular 
area. [Chandler an Lawless, op. cit: 160] 12 Thus, in the context of the continuing 
economic decline that blighted the 1970s, and even accelerated in the 1980s, local 
authorities were the main source of local jobs. As Thomson argues, for example, the 
increase in local authority jobs was not only a means of expanding local government 
services, but also a way of absorbing some of the jobs lost to the manufacturing 
sector. [ 1982: 110] 
Furthermore, LPAC and TUC reports during the period demonstrate a growing 
labour movement concern at the levels of unemployment, and also identify local 
authority activity with attempts to address local unemployment. In 1971, for example, 
the TUC organised a campaign involving nine demonstrations in cities across Britain, 
and culminating in a mass lobby of Parliament on 24.11.71. [TUC 1960-1987,1971 
and 1972] Three motions on the issue were also submitted to the Labour Party 
Conference in 1971 and three to the TUC in 1972. [loc. cit. ] A significant element of 
the motions submitted to the TUC in 1972, and other years, is their identification of an 
interrelation between economic growth, employment and social and welfare 
provision. Composite motions in 1964,1971,1972 and 1976, for example, all make 
such a link in calling for a planned approach to economic policy. [TUC 1960-1987, 
1964; 1971; 1972; and 1976] The significance of this approach lies in the acceptance 
of Keynsian assumptions, which linked welfare provision with economic growth, and 
sought a solution to unemployment through the latter. In other words, redistribution 
of wealth and full employment are premised on a healthy capitalist economy, and not 
identified as an end in itself to be achieved through a transformation of economy and 
society. 
Finally, the importance attached to local authority involvement in economic 
regeneration can be demonstrated by referring to two examples. First of all, at a 
meeting between the TUC General Council, the Prime Minister and other Ministers in 
December 1971, the Secretary of State for the Environment stated that the 
12 See Chapter Four for examples of the employment levels in the larger authorities. 
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Government was encouraging local authorities to use slum clearance and housing 
improvement schemes as means of regenerating local economies. [TUC 1960-1987, 
1972: 250] Secondly, in February 1972, the General Council illustrated the 
significance it attached to the role of local authorities in employment creation by 
recommending that Trades Councils consider creating Unemployment Committees. 
Among other duties, such committees were expected to press local authorities to 
expand local employment through slum clearance, housing improvement schemes and 
through local authority house building programmes. [TUC 1960-1987,1972: 51 ] 13 
The discussion and identification of changes in employment patterns, at the public 
and private sector level, and within local authorities provides an explanation for the 
importance attached to local authority employment in the 1980s. Thus, consideration 
of the move toward mass unemployment, attempts at local regeneration, and labour 
movement demands for remedial action identifies labour movement concerns and 
attempts to address the problem. As with the discussion of services in the previous 
section, therefore, the category of jobs is therefore validated in empirical and meta- 
theoretical terms, and the process continued in subsequent chapters where the value 
attached to local authority employment, the type and conditions of jobs, and the 
practice of defence are interrogated in reference to the historical context initiated here. 
LOCAL DEMOCRACY 
By considering the constitutional practice of local democracy in the decades prior 
to the 1980s, this section completes the preliminary stages of the historical context 
within which the conceptual principles and practice of the labour movement 
campaigns of the 1980s can be interrogated. In other words, the section explores the 
concept of local democracy in reference to the practice of the local state, and thereby 
helps to identify what the labour movement campaigns were defending. As part of the 
process, the practice of constitutional local democracy is explored and validated in 
reference to the questions of autonomy and centralisation. Thus, those aspects of 
constitutional democracy threatened by the financial restrictions, penalties and rate- 
capping imposed by the Conservative Government in the 1980s, are identified and 
explored. 
13 The reference to motions adopted at national conferences is a reflection of local activity as well as 
general concern in the movement. The Liverpool NALGO Branch records shows, for example, how 
motions to the national conference and the TUC were debated, amended and proposed at branch level 
through Branch Executive Councils and Departmental Steward Committees. [Liverpool NALGO BEC 
1979-1987] Similarly, and not withstanding the changes in membership and activity discussed in the 
following chapter, within the Labour Party motions are discussed at Ward and District Party level 
before reaching conference. The composition of motions also demonstrates a wide interest in 
particular topics as, of course, does their adoption by national conferences. 
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At this juncture the question of local democracy is addressed in constitutional 
terms. By identifying and considering issues and categories related to this practice, 
however, the section facilitates their reciprocal interrogation validation with the 
practice of democracy within the labour movement. This process is developed in later 
chapters, where questions of representation, delegation, and the mandating of 
representatives are considered in relation to the practice of labour movement bodies 
involved in the campaigns. Thus, the influence of constitutional practices on the 
organisation and practice of the labour movement is identified and subjected to 
interrogation. 
The areas identified in the opening paragraphs of this section are explored in sub- 
sections entitled: Autonomy; Centralisation; and, Organisation. The first discussion 
addresses the concept of local autonomy in terms of local tax raising powers, the 
legislative orbit of local government, and consequent variations in local policy, 
spending, and service provision. This theme is then developed in the second sub- 
section through the exploration . of arguments that 
local authorities became 
increasingly dependent on central grants as opposed to local rates, and that such trends 
amount to a process of centralisation. Finally, debates concerning the organisation 
and structure of sub-national government, the level of government to which functions 
are allocated, and the reasons offered as explanations for re-organising local 
government are considered as interpretations of democratic practice. 
Autonomy 
In his analysis of theories that address the issue of sub-national and city 
government autonomy, Goldsmith defines the concept as one of independence or self- 
government. [ 1995: 228] The two categories should not be understood as separate 
entities, however, as both interpretations are evident in Miliband's assertion that local 
government can act as agent of, and obstacle to, the centre. [ 1969: 49] In other words, 
the extent to which local government can be an obstacle to the centre depends on how 
far it acts as government or administrator, and therefore on the amount of 
independence exercised in the formulation and practice of its policies. This 
discussion explores the extent to which local authorities were able to exercise a degree 
of autonomy during the period analysed, and identifies the relevance of such factors to 
the campaign aim of defending local democracy in the 1980s. 
In common with others, Cockburn[ 1977] identifies a shift in the practice of local 
government in the 1960s from administration to government. [Gyford, 1985; 
Hampton, 1987] This development is considered to have accompanied the 
rediscovery of urban poverty and attempts to solve such problems at the local 
level. [Cockburn, op. cit: 18] She does not accept, however, that local government 
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represents an extension of an ancient right of self-government. On the contrary, the 
local state is considered to be subject to national government and, given Cockburn's 
view that the state in capitalist society is an instrument of class domination, arguments 
over a perceived decline in local democracy are held to be misplaced. [ibid: 2& 46] In 
fact, Cockburn portrays the local electoral process as a one way system of 
domination. [ibid: 48-9] The problem with such a rigid approach is that it fails to 
recognise, let alone explain, how the local state's role as elected local government can 
bestow not only an appearance of self-government and independence, but also a 
practice of it as well. Furthermore, it overlooks the extent to which the electoral 
process serves to legitimise the demands and activities of localities. [Duncan & 
Goodwin, 1988: xii & 41] 
In addition to the consideration of electoral processes, undertaken in the final sub- 
section, the perception of local autonomy and local democracy is explored here in 
reference to two areas of local government practice: the ability of local authorities to 
raise and collect a local tax; and, the related option to vary the level and quality of 
service provision above certain minimum standards. Thus, even though local 
government was politically and economically subordinate[Newton & Karran, 1985: 
77], there was enough room for local authorities, such as Clay Cross and South 
Yorkshire discussed in Chapter Three, to pursue policies which were premised on the 
validity of local mandates. 
Until the 1980s, local authorities retained the right to set their own spending and 
taxation levels via the rating system, and therefore experienced a degree of political 
and financial autonomy. [Duncan & Goodwin, op. cit: 96] Furthermore, as has been 
recorded in the economic regeneration sub-section, the provisions of section 137 of 
the 1972 Local Government Act allowed local authorities raise extra revenue for 
anything, unless specifically forbidden, considered to benefit the locality. The Act 
therefore served to acknowledge and extend the autonomous role afforded to local 
government. [Duncan & Goodwin, ibid: 97] In these areas local government spending 
was effectively outside central control and provided for a self reinforcing linkage with 
political autonomy. [Duncan & Goodwin, ibid: 98] 
In addition to, or at least consistent with, their revenue raising powers local 
authorities were also able to vary policy and therefore levels of service provision. 
Due to the way local government is founded in statute, for example, local authorities 
were restrained by centrally imposed statutes, but only to the extent that they had to 
provide minimum standards in certain areas. They were free to improve upon 
standards in areas of their choice. [Boaden & Alford, 1969: 206] Similarly, Duncan 
and Goodwin describe local government law as being concerned primarily with power 
rather than duties, and as establishing a legal framework within which local 
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authorities are given discretionary powers to act. [op. cit: 5] Any such autonomy was, 
and is, limited to the extent that local authorities could act only in those areas allowed 
by central government. Viewed in retrospect, and especially from the dystopia of the 
1980s, however, the combination of such flexibility with local revenue raising powers 
appears as a favourable practice of local self-government. 
The nature of local government autonomy described above goes some way to 
explaining how or why local government could be understood as a vehicle which 
could be steered in any direction. [Cockburn, op. cit: 1-2] In other words, the 
successful struggle for improvements in service provision at both local and national 
levels reinforced the view that local government entailed an element of autonomy. 
Indeed, Duncan and Goodwin see such autonomy as a necessary means of dealing 
with uneven development in capitalist society, and as a consequence giving local 
groups access to state power. [op. cit. ] Thus, while Cockburn's argument rejects the 
idea that long-term gains could be made for the working class by individual councils, 
short-term gains contributed to the development and legitimacy of local government. 
The significance of this paradox lies in the assertion, made by Crouch and others, 
that in order to survive and develop, capitalism allows access to state power and 
authority to groups that are potentially hostile to it. [Flynn 1983; Panitch, 1980] Thus, 
in this context the potentially hostile groups, represented by the labour movement, 
were able to make limited gains through the tax raising powers and policy variation 
allowed at local state level. Advances in welfare, for example, were explained earlier 
in reference to national initiatives, but the consideration of local attempts at economic 
regeneration, and the areas considered in chapters Three and Four, also provide 
examples of variations in local policy and practice. When understood in this context, 
it is possible to appreciate how and why advocates for labour were motivated to 
defend as local democracy, what others perceive to be repressive institutions. 
Centralisation 
In contrast to the conclusions of previous discussion, a number of commentators 
argue that the period studied here encompasses a move toward centralisation through 
an increasing reliance of local authorities on central grants, and therefore a reduction 
in their relative autonomy. Newton and Karran[1985], for example, commenting 
in 
retrospect from amidst the developments of the 1980s conclude that the drift toward 
centralisation, declining local autonomy, and financial dependence had 
been a long 
term trend. While some commentators, like Alexander, equate centralisation with an 
increased central contribution to the financing of local government[ 1982: 89], others 
recognise the existence of local discretion. Ashford, for example, argues that the 
heavy financial dependence of local authorities on central government did not produce 
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demonstrable effects on policy choice in the sub-national system. [ 1974: 21] 
Similarly, Rhodes[1980] notes that some local authorities chose to accept government 
directives while others accepted some or none at all. 
In addition to the centralisation thesis, premised on increasing financial 
contributions to local government from the centre, a predominance of so-called 
national issues in local elections, led some commentators to postulate a 
'nationalisation' thesis whereby local politics was believed to be increasingly 
dominated by national factors which limited the room for local manoeuvre. [Bristow, 
Kermode, Mannin, 1983] In keeping with other centralisation theses, however, such 
monological approaches fail to acknowledge or explore the interrelations between 
local struggle and national policy. They are also guilty of a form of circularity 
whereby an issue receives an a priori classification as 'national', and based on this 
classification its identification as a factor in local elections is used to support the 
thesis that local politics are dominated by national issues. In the context of the 
previous sub-section, however, it is difficult to pinpoint the moment when local 
unemployment becomes a national issue. The reality is that there is an interaction and 
interrelation between each level, as opposed to a domination of one by the other. 
Attempting to distinguish increasing financial centralisation and a retention of 
autonomy in the local determination of policy and service levels holds a potential for 
confusion, especially as current perceptions may be influenced by the experiences of 
the 1980s and 1990s. The necessary distinction is illustrated, however, by referring to 
the DOE's 1972 decision to alter the manner in which local transport was funded. In 
this instance, the funding system was transferred from a 'specific' to a 'block' grant 
scheme; a move designed to reduce central government's detailed project control, 
associated with specific grants, and increase its strategic control of resources and 
policy. [Skelcher, 1985: 155] Thus, by allocating a block grant, central government 
allowed a given local authority the discretion to devise its policy and programme, 
albeit with the proviso of a central veto, and therefore allowed a degree of autonomy 
within overall limits. Similarly, detailed control over local authority capital 
expenditure was relaxed in 1970, with the introduction of an annual block 
loan 
sanction. This replaced the previous practice of central government approving 
individual projects, though direct control was retained in the key areas of education, 
housing and social services. [Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974: 106-7] 
As is noted above, the evidence presented in favour of centralisation rests on the 
monological assumption that an increased reliance on central 
funding reduces local 
autonomy. A variety of figures and formulations are presented 
in support of this 
view, but they are not wholly convincing as a means of 
demonstrating greater 
centralisation prior to the 1980s. Newton and Karran, 
for example, claim that during 
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the 1970s for every one pound raised by rates local authorities received two pounds in 
central grant[op. cit. ], and Alexander corroborates these figures by citing the 
proportion of local services paid for from local rates as 25% in 1973-4 compared to 
nearly 50% financed from central government grants. [op. cit: 86-88] Similarly, 
despite the fact that there is some slight variation in the dates and figures and that they 
are not presented as evidence of centralisation, Table 1.4 provides comparable 
evidence of a move from local to central finance between 1953 and 1976. 
Table 1.4 
Local Authority Income Sources, 1953-76 (Current Expenditure) 
Percentage of Income Central 
Made by: Rates Government Miscellaneous 
Grants 
England & Wales 
1953-4 33.4 35.4 31.4 
England 
1958/9 32.7 36.1 31.2 
1966/7 34.2 36.5 29.3 
1975/6 23.9 46.8 29.3 
Source: Stoker, 1988: 11. 
Duncan and Goodwin, on the other hand, recognise the shift in the proportions 
involved in local finances, but argue that in spite of a 'strong sense of he who pays the 
piper calls the tune' the limits on local government spending, set since the 1960s by 
the Public Expenditure Survey Committee, were often exceeded. [ 1988: 96-7] Thus, 
as Duncan and Goodwin point out, and the developments of the early 1980s show, 
local authorities could still finance overspending through revenue raised from local 
rates. Attempts to understand the relation between central grant and local policy and 
practice in monological terms, as one determined by the other, are therefore not only 
naive but are demonstrably false. Indeed, attempts by the Callaghan Government of 
the 1970s to influence local spending, discussed in Chapter Three, support the view 
that prior to the 1980s central government had little direct means of control. 
Local authorities may have used central funding as opposed to rates to pursue 
projects, but this does not necessarily imply a form of central control. On the 
contrary, local authorities could have spent further if they so wished by raising rates, 
and as Rate Support Grant(RSG) was calculated on previous years spending 
local 
authorities were able to influence the next years contribution. Thus, while 
Henney 
argues that Labour governments in the 1960s and 1970s pursued a 
deliberate political 
programme of expanding local spending while minimising costs to the 
local tax 
payer[1984: 113], this was a process of encouragement as opposed to coercion or 
control. 
The distinction, outlined earlier, between strategic control and detailed policy 
control is the crucial issue. If outright centralisation was 
desired central government 
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could have moved to specific grants which provide direct stimuli for particular 
functions, and therefore a source of control for central government. By 1973, 
however, specific grants involved only 47 areas and accounted for 10% of grant 
aid. [Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, op. cit: 109] The move toward block grant and the 
absence of any concerted attempt to control the levels of local rates allowed local 
authorities room for manoeuvre and a perception of local autonomy. There appears to 
be a double temptation, in the literature covering the period, to view developments 
either through a perspective of control conditioned by the 1980s and 1990s, or to 
assume a causal relation that increased central government spending implies increased 
control over local government. The relation between the two is not so simple and the 
subtleties need to be appreciated if the perception of autonomy and local democracy is 
to be understood. 
Organisation 
The re-organisation of local government in England and Wales that took place in 
the early 1970s served to shape the organisation and practice of constitutional local 
democracy defended by the campaigns of the 1980s. This sub-section therefore 
identifies and discusses those areas of contention that were raised before, during, and 
after the re-organisation, and thereby outlines the local democratic and governmental 
form considered to be worthy of defence. In broad terms, the practice of local 
democracy during the period preceding the 1980s is indicated through an exploration 
of. the structure of elected and un-elected local government; the distribution of 
functions between levels of government; the issues of size, efficiency, and councillor 
calibre; and the internal workings of local authorities. 
Before considering matters that relate to elected local authorities, it is worth 
recognising that not all government is in fact elected. Thus, although there were over 
440 elected local authorities in England and Wales after re-organisation in the 
1970s[Stoker, 1988: 30-1], there were also a number of un-elected quasi-autonomous 
governmental agencies(QGA). By 1975, for example, the number of QGAs had 
increased to 85, and their creation usually involved the transfer of powers from local 
authorities. [Dunleavy, 1980: 103] This process was particularly evident 
in the post 
war years with the industry nationalisation of gas, electricity, and 
health removing 
related responsibilities from the orbit of local government. [Dunleavy, 
1984: 54-5] 
A similarly broader trend can also be identified whereby contentious 
local 
government responsibilities were transferred 
from the local electoral sphere to 
un-elected local, regional, or national agencies. 
Examples of these transferrals 
include: unemployment benefit administration to the 
Unemployment Assistance board 
in the 1930s; the appointment of Regional Hospital Boards and 
Hospital Management 
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Committees in the 1940s; and the creation of Regional Economic Planning Councils 
to by-pass local structures in the 1960s. [Dearlove, 1979: 250-1] In similar fashion, 
Saunders argues that while the reasons for the creation of regional Water Authorities, 
Health Authorities, and Economic Planning Boards may vary, the effect was to 
remove them from the electoral arena, as the preserve of central government, 
professionals, and private sector interests. [ 1984: 35] 
Recognising that aspects of government are un-elected is one thing, but to assume 
that elected local government is democratic simply because elections are held 
annually, is to confuse appearance with reality. Such an assumption is based on one 
or two premises: an electoral chain of command theory whereby local elections pass 
policies from voter to councillor, - and into practice via officers; and or, that popular 
participation is evidence of the democratic nature of elected local 
government. [Dearlove, op cit: 29-30] There are, however, a number of issues that 
question the validity of such monological theorising. Taking the second premise first, 
there is general acknowledgement that voter participation in local elections is low in 
comparison to turn-out in general elections. Between 1973 and 1978, for example, the 
average turn out in contested Metropolitan County elections was 39%, and 52% the 
highest average turn-out in Welsh District elections. [Stoker, op. cit: 44] These figures 
are in sharp contrast to a post 1951 average turn-out of 76% for general elections. 
Both sets of figures are misleading, however, as they are percentages of those who 
bothered to register to vote. [loc. cit. ] Local government was not a thriving example of 
participatory democracy, therefore, and claims to legitimacy based on universal 
franchise are questionable; though individual authorities may witness higher and 
lower levels of electoral participation at particular times. 
In relation to the broader issue of local democratic practice, a clear trend is evident 
in the 1960s and 1970s whereby many of the approaches to, and prescriptions for, 
local government became concerned with the technical needs of service delivery, 
rather than democratic participation. [Dearlove, op. cit; Keating, 1995] In particular, 
the re-organisation of the 1970s sought to address issues relating to the optimum size 
and efficiency of local authorities, and councillor calibre. [Dearlove, op. cit; Duncan & 
Goodwin, 1988; Goss, 1988; Keating, op. cit; Stoker, op. cit. ] The parameters of this 
debate were shaped by two main inquiries and reports produced during the 1960s: the 
Maud Commission in 1967, and the Redcliffe-Maud Commission in 1969. [Redcliffe- 
Maud and Wood, 1974] 
The case for increased local authority size discussed by the Redcliffe-Maud 
Commission, for example, equated local authority size with improved democratic 
practice, improved technical proficiency, and professionalism. 
While the categories 
of democracy and efficiency are not mutually exclusive, the practice of 
bigger 
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authorities exercising greater powers, financial competence, and exerting greater 
control over local policy[Keating, op. cit: 119] had the effect of reducing the levels of 
councillor influence, participation, and therefore electoral representation. [Cockburn, 
1977; Dearlove, op. cit; Keating, op. cit. ] Furthermore, others argued that local 
authorities became too big, too political, and subject to vested interests. [Henney, 
1984: 381] There is, however, a paradox in Henney's advocacy of business votes, or 
scrutiny committees representing local business[ibid.: 129], and his complaint that 
local government was subject to vested interest. Nevertheless, Henney's argument 
illustrates how the terminology used to justify local government reform concealed a 
real concern to curtail working class representation on locally elected 
bodies. [Dearlove, op. cit. ]14 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, developments in the internal organisation and 
practice of local authorities also eroded the extent to which back-bench councillors, as 
elected representatives, could affect the formulation and practice of policy. In 
particular, this process involved the introduction of new management techniques 
described variously as: Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems; Policy Planning; 
Corporate Planning; and, Corporate Management. [Dearlove, op. cit: 143-4] 
Cockburn, for example, describes how the introduction of Corporate Management in 
Lambeth involved the removal of detailed policy decisions from the council chamber 
to committees and, ultimately, to a top level policy committee. [op. cit: 49] An 
analogy is therefore drawn between this process and the recession of power at the 
parliamentary level, into cabinet and civil service, that accompanied franchise 
extensions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries[loc. cit. ], and is in keeping with 
the Maud Committee's proposals to introduce cabinet style government into local 
authorities. [Dearlove, op. cit: 133]. 
The effect of introducing new management techniques also excluded back-bench 
influence and participation from the decision making process, vesting power in 
the political leadership and senior officers, and thereby reducing 
accountability. [Cockburn, op. cit; Dearlove, op. cit. ] As was indicated earlier, many 
of the changes were outlined in the Maud Report of 1967, and are in keeping with 
attempts to remake local authorities in a corporate image. [Cockburn, op. cit: 15] 
Thus, the concern with administrative efficiency and the introduction of distinct 
management techniques, sought to structure local authorities in the image of the 
private firm[Dearlove, op. cit: 188-9], and were responsible for reductions 
in 
accountability and democratic practice. 
14 On occasion, the advocacy of fragmenting working class representation on 
local authorities is quite 
open, such as in WA Robson's oral evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Local Government in 
London, 1959. [Goss, 1988: 64] 
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The changes outlined above served to abstract decision making from society and, 
perhaps surprisingly, engendered little overt opposition from the labour movement; 
apart from isolated examples of local resistance such as in the case of the re- 
organisation of London County Council in the 1960s. [Goss, op. cit: 67-79] In general 
terms, labour movement organs were favourable toward the processes. Opposition to 
the creation of the GLC in 1963, and the Conservative Government's proposals in 
1972, for example, rested on fears that the moves would break up the Labour Party's 
urban power base by merging the existing authorities with the suburbs. [Keating, op. 
cit; Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, op. cit. ] In similar terms of self interest, the general 
acceptance of the moves by trade unions, and of white collar unions in particular, can 
be understood as a consequence of the regradings and enhanced career opportunities 
that often accompanied re-organisation. [Fellows and Grimes, 1984; Redcliffe-Maud 
and Wood, op. cit. ] 
The lack of Labour Party opposition can also be understood in terms of a declining 
commitment to, and interest, in local democracy. The Labour Party in Government 
under Wilson, for example, were exponents of 'technocratic collectivism', extolling 
the virtues of efficiency and professional competence; a view associated with the 
Fabian traditions of the Party. [Basset, 1984; Coates, 1975] There should therefore be 
little surprise that many of the re-organisation proposals and the practices which 
reflect these approaches, emanated from inquiries that had been given a remit by the 
Labour Government's of the 1960s. Neither should there be surprise at the composite 
motion moved at the 1969 LPAC, by NUPE and South Dorset Constituency Labour 
Party, welcoming the Redcliffe-Maud report, and recognising the need for 
restructuring local government to combine efficiency of operation with `effective' 
democracy. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1969: 150] The TUC, on the other hand, 
though generally in favour of the re-organisation proposals, still valued a degree of 
autonomy for local authorities. This view is demonstrated by the 1970 annual 
statement of the TUC's National Advisory Committee for Local Government Services, 
which welcomed the reorganisation proposals for unitary and metropolitan areas, but 
called for the greater financial independence of local authorities. [TUC 1960-1987, 
1970: 233-4] 
The discussions undertaken in this sub-section validate the meta-theoretical 
categories of local democracy and autonomy in reference to the ability to raise local 
taxes and vary local service provision. Particular examples of these practices are 
discussed in chapters Three and Four, where empirical and meta-theoretical categories 
are validated and interrogated further. Thus, the constitutional practice of local 
democracy and autonomy is explored here in terms of the implications of increased 
central funding for the practice of local government, and in later chapters through 
its 
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decrease. Similarly, identification and consideration of issues pertaining to 
democratic practice and the organisation of sub-national and local government 
facilitate a later comparison with, and therefore exploration and validation of, the 
practice of democracy within the labour movement. 
The discussion of service provision, employment patterns, and the democratic 
practice of elected local government, provide a basis for the interrogation of 
categories and conceptual principles identified as worthy of defence by campaigns of 
the 1980s. Subsequent chapters contribute to the processes of validation and 
interrogation by relating the developments identified in this chapter to later demands 
and practices of the labour movement. In particular, the areas considered in this 
chapter indicate the character of urban local government as an 'historically emerging, 
changing, and contradictory class relation'[Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 33], and 
therefore provide a preliminary validation of relevant labour movement practice and 
conceptual principles. The following chapter develops this process by identifying and 
discussing changes in labour movement organisation, outlook, and practice over a 
similar period. Thus concomitant and interrelated developments that occurred within 




FORMATIVE LABOUR MOVEMENT DEVELOPMENTS: 
CHANGING COMPOSITION, OUTLOOK, 
AND PRACTICE 
To complement the context developed in the previous chapter, the following 
discussions provide an historical overview of labour movement developments that are 
related to local government, and to the campaigns of the 1980s. Of particular interest 
are developments in labour movement composition, organisation, outlook, and 
practice that exerted a formative influence on the later campaigns; in terms of practice 
and conceptual principles. Furthermore, the chapter goes beyond the historical ambit 
of its predecessor to consider developments up to the end of the 1970s. By 
proceeding in this manner, another dimension is added to the historical context within 
which labour movement campaigns of the 1980s, and the events discussed in Chapter 
Three, can be subjected to reciprocal interrogation. ' 
Consideration of these developments involves the reciprocal validation of 'labour 
movement', as meta-theoretical category and as empirical elements that form the 
whole. In general terms, this means that the TUC, trade unions, Labour Party, and 
their respective constituent elements are categorised as comprising the labour 
movement, while the latter is categorised in reference to those same organisations and 
constituent elements. Stated more succinctly, the process involves the identification 
and reciprocal interrogation of the values and practices of the constituent elements 
identified and discussed. This approach allows the campaigns of the 1980s to be 
analysed in reference to their conceptual principles and practice within the specified 
historical context established here, and developed within a broader context as the 
thesis progresses. 
Developments in labour movement composition, organisation, outlook, and 
practice are identified and explored in two main sections entitled: Local Government 
' By identifying and analysing related examples of labour movement resistance from the 1970s, 
Chapter Three completes the preliminary stages of the historical context within which the ideas and 
practice exhibited by the campaigns of the 1980s are interrogated. 
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Trade Unions; and, Labour Party. A third section entitled New Urban Left, affords 
critical consideration to theorists' use of that category. The separate treatment of trade 
unions and the Labour Party is undertaken for purposes of analysis, and should not be 
taken to imply or affirm the notion of a political and economic dichotomy pertaining 
to the activity of the labour movement. As far as this thesis is concerned, these 
organisations act, and have interests in, the political and economic spheres of society. 
In addition to trade union representation at the LPAC, on the Labour Party NEC, and 
through the sponsorship of MPs[Marsh and Locksley, 1981: 20], numerous other 
examples of activity in both spheres are considered throughout the thesis. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRADE UNIONS 
The period considered here, roughly from 1960 to 1979, encompasses a broad 
range of developments that affected not only the practice and perceptions of trade 
unionism in Britain, but also those of the Conservative Party which held office 
throughout the 1980s. [Marsh, 1992; Moran, 1979] Several high profile cases can be 
cited, for example, to demonstrate that the period was one of 'strong, confident, 
mobile and innovative trade unionism'. [Wainwright, 1987: 36] These include: 
opposition and resistance to, the Labour Government's incomes policies and proposed 
imposition of `In Place of Strife' in the 1960s[Panitch, 1976]; the struggle against the 
provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 [Marsh and Locksley, 1981; 
Middlemass, 1979; Taylor, 1993; Wainwright, op. cit. ]; campaigns against 
redundancies and factory closures, ranging from the less well known campaigns 
against the closure of Surrey Docks in 1971 [Goss, 1988: 84], to more famous 
examples such as the occupation of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in 1971 [Blunkett 
and Jackson, 1987: 87], and the Lucas workers alternative economic plan developed 
in 1976[loc. cit; Wainwright op. cit. ]; the Miners strikes of 1972 and 1974[Taylor, op. 
cit. ]; events surrounding the Grunwick strike of 19762; and the rebellion against 
incomes policy toward the end of the 1970s, which culminated in the 'Winter of 
Discontent'[Dorfman, 1983]. For the purposes of this discussion, however, attention 
is focused on trade unions that were active in local government; though the unions 
considered here are recognised to have influenced, and been influenced by, the events 
described above. Particular consideration is afforded to: the rapid growth of 
membership and membership density of unions recruiting in local government during 
Z The campaign for trade union recognition and improved wages and working conditions at Grunwick 
Processing Laboratories in London, staged between November 1976 and July 1977, raised issues and 
involved tactics that reflected the outlook and perceptions of trade unionism in Britain at the time. The 
postal workers boycott of mail to and from Grunwick was, for example, challenged in the courts 
by the 
National Association for Freedom. [Rogaly, 1977] Similarly, the mass picketing during June and July 
1977, and the support it attracted from Yorkshire and Scottish Miners, from MPs and 
Cabinet 
Ministers[loc. cit. ] is evidence of the outlook and practice of the labour movement. 
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the period; their organisational development; and, their changing outlook and 
practice? 
Membership 
Between 1973 and 1979 membership of trade unions in general rose from 
11,456,000 to 13,289,000, but within this trend, unions recruiting in local government 
and the public sector exhibited striking patterns of growth. During the period 1960- 
77, for example, the membership of NUPE almost trebled from 240,000 to 670,000, 
while between 1964 and 1977 NALGO's membership doubled from 338,000 to 
690,000. [Taylor, 1978: 9] The growth rates of these two public sector unions 
exceeded that of trade unions in general; a trend that can be demonstrated further by 
considering the period 1970 to 1978. During this time, trade union membership 
increased overall by 21 %, but the TGWU increased its membership by 26%, NALGO 
by 66%, and NUPE by 91%. Of the five largest local government unions only 
GMBATU showed a less than average increase at 13%. [Marsh, 1992: 152] Table 2.1 
provides a further comparison of the growth in membership exhibited by the five 
largest unions operating in local government. 
Table 2.1 
Local Government Trade Union 
Membership 1960-80 (thousands) 
1960 1970 1980 
NUGMW 796 853 916 
NUPE 200 373 699 
NALGO 274 440 782 
NUT 245 311 232 
NASUWT (23) (57) 124 
Source: Hampton, 1987: 139 
Note: The NASUWT was formed in 1975, therefore membership figures for 1960 
and 1970 refer to the NAS. NUGMW is now GMBATU and is referred to as such 
throughout this thesis. 
Unfortunately, the table does not recognise the fact that the recruitment practice of 
each of the unions identified was not restricted to local government, but included 
other parts of the public sector. An indication of the local government involvement 
of these unions can obtained by looking at the year 1982, when NUPE and 
GMBATU 
members equated to 38 and 16%, respectively, of national local government union 
membership. [Laffen, 1989: 46] The third largest manual trade union, the 
TGWU 
equated to 1 1 %, and NALGO, the predominant representative of white collar 
local 
government employees, accounted for 72% of union members 
in that category. [loc. 
The trade unions active in local government also recruited in the wider public sector. 
Many of the 
references to those unions are made in terms of their overall membership 
but, where possible, specific 
references are made to local government activities and membership. 
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cit. ] Union membership among teachers was more fragmented, however, with the 
NUT representing 50% of union members, NASUWT 25%, AMMA 15% and PAT 
10%. [loc. cit. ] 
The public sector in general, exhibited a comparatively high density of union 
membership. [Hampton, op. cit; Laffin, op. cit. ] Referring specifically to local 
government and education, for example, the proportion of employees belonging to a 
trade union increased from 69.4% in 1948, to 77.5% in 1979. In contrast, however, 
only 32% of white collar employees in the manufacturing sector belonged to a trade 
union in 1974[Hampton, op. cit: 137], and in 1978 the TUC as a whole represented 
only 54.5% of the national work-force. [Marsh, op. cit: 152] This increase in 
membership density implies an increase in union membership over and above the rise 
in the numbers employed, described in Chapter One, or any increases in individual 
union membership that resulted from mergers with other unions. ' 
Explanations provided for growing levels of membership and density include a 
posited causal link between a presumed willingness on the part of governments 
to recognise unions, and the assumption that because many senior officers 
in local government belonged to unions they were therefore favourably 
predisposed. [Hampton, op. cit: 137] The high level of membership exhibited by local 
government trade unions may, however, be explained in terms of prior arrangements 
which afforded little benefit to the union membership. [Lowes, 1994] Such 
arrangements began to change with the growth of stewards movements in local 
government trade unions, but in the 1980s full-time officials in Sheffield and 
Doncaster, were still conducting all the main negotiations between the manual unions 
and the council. [McLaverty, 1989: 19] As is indicated by the reference to shop 
stewards movements, the growth of local government trade unions was accompanied 
by changes in their organisation, outlook and practice. These developments and their 
interrelation with membership growth and density are therefore considered over the 
next two sub-sections. 
Organisational Development 
During the 1970s the growth of local government unions was accompanied by the 
development of local authority based trade union organisations which revolved around 
shop steward systems. [Terry, 1982; Burgess, 1994; Cresswell, 1994; 
Lowes, 1994] 
Following the 1964 Amalgamation Act larger unions benefiting from mergers with their smaller 
counterparts offers a partial explanation for the rapid growth of 
individual unions during the 
period. [Hampton, 1987; Marsh, 1992] This process continued 
in the early 1980s with the number of 
unions falling to 393 by 1983, but was accompanied 
by a fall in overall levels of union membership to 
11,338,000. [Coates and Topham, 1986: 8] While the membership of other unions 
declined, however, 
NALGO and NUPE continued to rise by 4 and 2% respectively, 
between 1979 and 1982. [Coates and 
Topham, ibid: 10] The growth of public sector unions was also a source of tension within 
the TUC 
where diminishing private sector counterparts 
felt threatened. [Cresswell, 1994. ] 
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The shop stewards movement was characterised by the control of local bargaining and 
decision making by rank and file activists, developed in the private sector in the 
1960s[Marsh and Locksley, 1981], and permeated local government in the following 
decade[Beaumont, 1992: 55]; after the official recognition of union stewards by local 
government employers in 1969. [Marchington and Armstrong, 1982; Taylor, 1978] 
NUPE, for example, held its first shop stewards elections in 1970, and its system of 
steward representation was considered to be the norm by 1974. [Terry, op. cit: 1] 
Thus, whereas 39% of NUPE branches had no shop steward in 1970 and only 21% 
five or more, 48% had five or more by 1974 and only 11 % had no steward. [Walsh, 
1982a: 58] Between 1971 and 1977, the estimated number of NUPE stewards 
therefore rose from 1,800 to 10,000. [Terry op. cit: 1] Similarly, NALGO adopted the 
principle of a shop steward system in 1974, and put the system into practice in 
1976. [Marchington and Armstrong, 1982: Burgess, op. cit. ] The NALGO system was 
therefore 'pretty much in place by the end of the decade'. [Cresswell, op. cit. ] 
The introduction and increase in shop steward systems is indicative of a general 
move toward greater lay involvement in local negotiation and activism. Unions used 
to operating in the private sector, like the TGWU and UCATT for example, afforded 
more power to their stewards, though local government unions like NUPE and the 
GMBATU were more content with the principle of negotiation by full-time 
officials. [Walsh, op. cit: 59] Thus, although the number of GMBATU stewards 
trebled between 1968 and 1978[loc. cit. ], the 1974 conference introduced a new 
District Official and thereby increased the number of full-time officials. [Undy, Ellis, 
McCarthy and Halmos, 1981: 288] This is reflected in the ratio of full-time officials 
to shop stewards in GMBATU which fell from 1: 4974 in 1968 to 1: 4807 in 1976 and 
1: 3809 following the introduction of District Officers. [Undy, et al, ibid: 289] In 
general terms, however, the changing ratios accompanied an increased lay 
participation and independence in local bargaining which replaced the domination of 
full-time officials evident prior to the 1960s. [loc. cit. ] 
The introduction of shop steward systems and decentralisation of power in local 
government trade unions can be seen as a response to, and reason for, new levels 
activism and militancy at rank and file, and branch levels. [Walsh, 1982b: 6& 15] 
Suddaby, for example, describes how strengthening the shop stewards organisation in 
the Camden branch of NUPE contributed to an increase in membership and a 
successful campaign for improved pay and conditions. [ 1979: 
87] Similarly, the 
emergence and development of shop steward organisations 
in local government is also 
associated with dissatisfaction over wages and conditions, and with the actions of 
management under economic pressure to change their approach 
to the work- 
force. [Terry, op. cit: 15] Several authors identify a link between incomes policies, 
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applied to state employees with more vigour, and the development of 
militancy. [Beaumont, op. cit; Hampton, 1987; Laffin, 1989; Panitch 1976; Taylor, 
1993] In contrast, however, the ex-NALGO officers interviewed considered incomes 
policy to have had less of a radicalising effect on their union. [Burgess, op. cit; 
Cresswell op. cit. ] 
The development of union organisation was also assisted in practical terms by the 
re-organisation of local government. This acted as a catalyst for NALGO to dissolve 
and reconstitute its local branches; a process which afforded the removal of previous 
modes of leadership and practice. [Sharron, 1985: 20] In other words, because 
NALGO organised it branches on an authority wide basis, the amalgamation of 
smaller authorities would require similar processes at branch level. Such a process 
would not have been restricted to NALGO, however, as the local branches of other 
unions would also be required to merge. 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed an increase in activism, militancy, and local 
control of negotiation and decision making through the growth of shop stewards 
organisations. Such developments were influenced by the struggles against public 
expenditure cuts in the late 1970s, and these are considered in Chapter Three. Thus, 
the historical context: considers of the introduction of activist structures, in this 
Chapter; covers their growth and development in the late 1970s, in Chapter Three; 
and, explores the role and function of activists in the campaigns of the 1980s, in 
chapters Five, Six, and Seven. For the moment, however, consideration is afforded to 
the interrelation of this burgeoning activism, and the changing outlook and practice of 
local government trade unions. 
Outlook and Practice 
The growth of shop steward systems within local government trade unions, 
together with other organisational developments, influenced and were influenced by 
changing outlook and practice. NALGO, for example: introduced strike procedures 
in 
1961 [Beaumont, 1992; Hampton, 1987; Walsh, 1982b]; witnessed its first strike by 
officers in 1964[Hampton, op. cit: 140]; held its first official strike 
in 1970[Beaumont, 
op. cit; Burgess, 1994; Laffin 1989]; conducted, its first 
industrial action in support of 
a wage claim in 1974[Beaumont, op. cit: 52]; and, mounted 
its first national 
demonstration in 1977. [Burgess, op. cit. ] Similarly, the first national teachers strike 
was held by the NAS in 1961 [Hampton, op. cit: 139], and the 
NUT undertook its first 
industrial action in 1967. [Laffen, op. cit: 51] Furthermore, 
1969-70 also saw the first 
ever local government strike over pay, involving teachers, ambulance workers 
and fire 
brigades. [Taylor, 1978; Hampton, op. cit. ] In general terms, therefore, there was an 
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increase in blue and white collar industrial action in local government in 1960s, 
culminating in 1970s with the Winter of Discontent. 
The period also witnessed the migration of white collar unions into the TUC: 
NALGO, for example, affiliated in 1964; the NAS in 1968; and, the NUT in 
1970. [Leopold and Beaumont, 1982; Hampton, op. cit; Laffin, op. cit. ] Of the 
various reasons given for local government unions joining the TUC, the most 
common is the desire to gain access, via the TUC, to the various centres of 
government policy, and to decision making during a period of incomes 
policy. [Leopold and Beaumont, op. cit: 49] The TUC's membership of the National 
Economic Development Council(NEDC) from 1962, for example, is depicted as a 
major incentive after the government had rebuffed attempts by NALGO, the NUT and 
sixteen other white collar trade unions to gain membership of the NEDC as a non- 
TUC constituency. [Hampton, op. cit: 138] Similarly, the sharp increase in the 
affiliation to the TUC of white collar unions is depicted as concomitant feature of the 
TUC's increasingly corporatist role. [Minkin, 1978: 465] 
In a similarly broad context, Wainwright argues that in the early 1970s new kinds 
of resistance such as occupations and work-ins were developed, and that direct forms 
of work-place organisation and practice spread through national and international 
stewards organisations. [1987: 36] This view is supported by the examples of activity 
provided at the start of this section, which are considered to have contributed to a 
general radicalisation of the labour movement. [Burgess, op. cit. ] Similarly, the 
refusal to accept public expenditure cuts, discussed in Chapter Three, is depicted as 
breeding activism and radicalism[loc. cit. ], and contributing to the changing outlook 
and practice of local government trade unions. 
The radicalisation of local government trade unions in the 1970s also coincided 
with their growth, and therefore the introduction of new forces. [Burgess op. cit; 
Lowes, 1994] In NALGO, for example, the radical affects of the late 1960s, and the 
impact of people who were active in student politics during that era, contributed to the 
radicalisation of the union. [Burgess, op. cit. ] This view is similar to the thesis that 
educated radicals were drawn to local government and the public sector[Laffin, op. 
cit. ], and that such people played a prominent part in the 'New Urban Left'. [Gyford, 
1985; McLaverty, 1989] Finally, a further factor in the 'generational' explanation of 
growing radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s, involves the absence of discipline equated 
with conscription into the armed forces, and to the absence of fears created by the 
memory of the 1930s, among workers who joined local government in the years of 
expansion. [Walsh, 1982b: 12-13] 
The radicalisation of local government trade unions, through the 
introduction of 
new members, has other complementary explanations that have their roots 
in the 
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changing employment patterns of the 1970s. Thus, Taaffe and Mulhearn's view that 
the influx of youth normally destined for blue collar work contributed to the 
radicalisation of white collar unions[1988: 73], finds a resonance in the view that 
those: 'who formerly may have worked as skilled craftsmen in engineering or on the 
docks, were now... . working 
in local government and white collar local government in 
particular'. [Burgess, op. cit. ] Similarly, many of the stewards active in Liverpool 
NALGO were noted to have families with labour movement backgrounds. [loc. cit. ] 
A comparable process can also be identified with regard to manual trade unions 
whereby the 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a migration of industrial workers into 
local government. Such recruits were primarily from a manufacturing background 
and drawn to local government due to the absence of employment opportunities, a 
recorded in Chapter One. Some of these recruits also had experience of trade union 
organisation, and used their knowledge and experience to help organise local 
government trade unions. [Lowes, op. cit. ] Suddaby, for example, describes a strong 
trade union consciousness among those who had worked in industry before joining 
Camden council in the 1970s. [1979: 88] S 
One final development, indicative of the changing outlook of the trade union 
movement, was the TUC's decision to re-organise its committee structure in the early 
1970s. This was achieved by establishing 'industrial committees' which were intended 
to provide a structure for the development of common policies between unions 
covering all grades of workers within a given sector. Thus, the new Local 
Government Committee(TUCLGC) replaced the low profile National Advisory 
Committee for Local Government, which had only met infrequently and pursued a 
narrow range of objectives. [Leopold and Beaumont, op. cit: 51-2] As is demonstrated 
in later chapters, the role played by the TUCLGC developed in response to the 
policies pursued by the Conservative Government first elected in 1979. In particular, 
the TUCLGC played a significant, if as yet unacknowledged, role in the campaigns 
against the Rates Act 1984. 
The preceding discussions identify those trade unions recruiting in local 
government and consider developments affecting them during the specified period. 
In 
particular, membership growth and composition, changing organisation, and 
developments in outlook and practice exhibit interrelations with developments 
discussed in Chapter One, and therefore indicate the origins of the conceptual 
principles and practice evident in the campaigns of the 1980s. 
The reciprocal process 
5 The developments described in this sub-section are more applicable to cities than the shire counties. 
Thus, Walsh identifies London, Liverpool, and Sheffield as notable examples of militancy and 
predicates militancy in shire counties, such as Cleveland and 
Avon, on the existence of urban areas 
within them. [1982b: 8] 
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of validation and interrogation are therefore evident in relation to trade unions, but are 
also continued in the next section were developments in the Labour Party are explored 
in a similar fashion. Exploration of these areas here, allows examination to be 
undertaken in Chapter Three of how such factors contributed to, and were developed 
by, campaigns to defend services in the 1970s, and therefore facilitates the 
development a broader historical context within which to examine the campaigns of 
the 1980s. 
THE LABOUR PARTY 
Whereas the previous section discussed developments affecting local government 
trade unions, the following account considers the transformative changes experienced 
by the Labour Party over a similar period. This approach provides a balanced account 
of labour movement development, facilitates the drawing of analogies between the 
two areas, and allows shared experiences to be identified. By proceeding in this 
manner, the section contributes to the historical context of formative labour movement 
experiences, initiated in the previous section, through which the principles and 
practices of the campaigns conducted in the 1980s can be understood and interrogated. 
The section is therefore split into two sub-sections which address areas of change 
affecting local Labour parties in the 1960s and 1970s. First of all, the loss of 
councillors in the local elections of the late 1960s, the effects of the re-organisation of 
local government in the 1970s, and the change in membership levels and patterns are 
considered as facilitating change within the Party. Secondly, the progress made by 
campaigns for greater democracy and accountability within the Party, at both national 
and local levels, are considered in reference to the changes identified above. 
Facilitators of Change 
Three main developments assisted or augmented change in the organisation, 
outlook, and practice of local Labour parties in the 1960s and 1970s. The first of 
these, chronologically speaking, was the catastrophic performance of the Labour Party 
in the local elections of 1967 and 1968, when the Party lost more than 3,000 council 
seats. In 1967, for example, elections to the GLC, county councils, provincial 
boroughs and urban districts saw over 1,500 seats lost to the Conservative 
Party alone. 
A further 1,602 seats were also lost in the London borough, provincial borough, and 
urban district elections of 1968. [Gyford, 1985; Seyd, 1987] 
For the London boroughs of Islington, Lambeth and Wandsworth the catharsis of 
1968 resulted in the election of many new councillors 
in 1971. [Gyford, op. cit: 26] In 
Lambeth, for example, only 12 of the 51 Labour councillors had served on the council 
before. [Livingstone, 1987: 20] These new councillors favoured a more open style of 
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government than their predecessors, but fell short of the approach espoused by those 
that followed later in the 1970s and early 1980s. [Gyford, op. cit: 26] Furthermore, 
many of the old Labour Group cliques and hierarchies were undermined by these 
events. In Islington, for example, the electoral debacle triggered an internal struggle 
for control of the local party, and of selection procedures for council candidates. [loc. 
cit. ] 
The process of change, initiated in local Labour parties in the late 1960s, received 
new impetus with the re-organisation of local government in the mid 1970s. Stated 
simply, the reduction in the number of elected local authorities from approximately 
1,300 to 400[Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974: 52], and the amalgamation of the old 
authorities into larger units, required a comparable re-organisation of local parties to 
reflect the new district and county structures. [Gyford, op. cit: 27-8] Local Labour 
parties were therefore forced to embark on a process of internal re-organisation and 
re-structuring that resembles concomitant changes, identified in the previous section, 
affecting local government trade unions. 
In particular, internal party workings were affected by the size and procedures of 
the new authorities. The running of new larger authorities and the adoption of 
committee structures and practices, described in Chapter One, for example, meant 
greater responsibilities for leading councillors. These new responsibilities made it 
difficult, however, for leading councillors to hold office in the local Labour Party; as 
had been the established practice. [Goss, 1988: 79] In other words, it was no longer 
practicable for the Leader of the Labour Group to be chairperson of the District 
Labour Party(DLP) as well. Local party leadership was therefore fragmented, the 
potential for boss politics and cliques diminished, and the likelihood of differences 
developing between DLP and Labour Group enhanced. 
The new Metropolitan authorities were also required to hold elections for all their 
seats in 1973[Seyd, op. cit: 138-9], and this heralded a comprehensive selection 
process for candidates. Thus, although local parties had to find a greater number of 
candidates than normal, there was keen competition for winnable seats. [Gyford, op. 
cit; Seyd, op. cit. ] Taken together with the abolition of the position of alderman, who 
were nominated by councillors[Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, op. cit: 
60], the 
combination of developments, described above, served to remove the 
last vestiges of 
leadership cliques that pre-dated 1968. [Gyford, op. cit: 27] 
Finally, the introduction of the two tier system of local government also affected 
the number and nature of local candidates. Previously, there 
had been only one 
authority for a given district, and employees of that authority were 
barred from 
standing for election to it. Under the new arrangements, 
however, those employed in 
local government could now stand for election to the 
different tier of local 
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government in the area were they lived and worked. [loc. cit. ] A new dimension was 
therefore added to the insight and motivations of local councillors. 
Much has been made of such 'institutional interest' in the 1980s, when in urban 
areas people employed by one authority acted as councillors in a neighbouring one. 
In 1982, for example, 55% of Labour councillors with identifiable jobs in Lewisham, 
and 48% in Camden, were either teachers, local government officers, or employed by 
housing associations or voluntary groups. [Kogan and Kogan, 1983: 180] Elsewhere, 
David Blunkett was employed by Barnsley College of Technology[Boddy and Fudge, 
1984: 242] and therefore Barnsley Metropolitan District Council, but held office in 
the neighbouring Sheffield Metropolitan District Council. Similarly, Derek Hatton 
was employed by Knowsley Metropolitan District Council, while acting as a 
councillor in Liverpool Metropolitan District Council. [Hatton, 1988] 
The developments described above, took place at a time when the Labour Party 
was experiencing significant changes in the levels and composition of membership. 
Between the years 1964 and 1979, for example, the Party lost 164,025 members; an 
overall reduction of 20% that includes the loss of 150,000 members between 1964 and 
1969. [Seyd, op. cit: 41] The provision of accurate figures for this period is 
impossible, however, due to the requirement for Constituency Labour parties(CLP) to 
have a minimum of 1,000 members in order to affiliate to the national Party. [Seyd, 
ibid; Wainwright, 1987; Whitely, 1982. ] As a consequence of this rule CLPs were 
given an incentive to over-estimate the levels of membership in order to secure 
representation at the national level. 
Nevertheless, a decline in membership over and above such minimum levels is still 
apparent. Between 1955 and 1977, for example, the number of CLPs with over 3,000 
members fell from 45 to 6. [Seyd, op. cit: 42] Similarly, in the six years from 1964 to 
1970, the number of CLPs with 2,000 or more members fell from 66 to 
22. [Wainwright, op. cit: 27] This trend is in stark contrast to the growth of local 
government trade unions over the same period, and explained, at least 
in part, by the 
pursuit of political and other goals through the strong, confident, mobile and 
innovative trade unions, described earlier. 
Of the reasons given for the haemorrhage of members from the 
Labour Party, 
disillusionment with the Wilson governments of the 1960s is cited most often. 
[loc. cit; 
Livingstone, op. cit; Seyd and Whitely, 1992] Other explanations 
include the 
dissolution of trade council links and therefore organisational structures[Goss, op. cit: 
148], and a decline in working class politics and 
identity. The latter thesis was 
premised on a study of the Liverpool Labour 
Party by Hindess[ 1971 ], which 
concluded that wards consisting mainly of manual working class members 
displayed a 
tendency toward decline while 'middle class' wards were expanding. 
[loc. cit. ] The 
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conclusions drawn were based solely on a study of Liverpool Labour Party, however, 
and Hindess later acknowledged the dangers of generalising from one study. [1983: 2] 
Forester's study of Brighton Kemptown CLP[1976], for example, reached different 
conclusions to Hindess. Furthermore, the decline in Conservative Party membership 
over the same period[Seyd and Whitely, 1992: 17] suggests a disillusionment with 
the political process in general[Forester, op. cit: 80], and contrasts with the growth of 
local government trade unions over a similar time period. 
There are also problems in attempting to present a general picture from varying 
local party experiences. The Liverpool Labour Party of the 1960s, for example, is 
described as: organisationally and politically bankrupt[Parkinson, 1985: 24]; as 
experiencing a drop in membership after the 1967 local election[Davies, 1987: 158]; 
and, as lacking full-time agents in all of its constituencies in 1970. [Davies, ibid: 159] 
Similarly, Southwark, Peckham, Bermondsey and Dulwich lost full-time agents in late 
1960s and early 1970s, as there was an absence of new members to replace retiring 
personnel[Goss, op. cit: 94], and Leeds had no full-time agents in 1969. [Forester, op. 
cit: 80] In contrast to the experiences of other local Labour Parties, however, 
Sheffield suffered no lost generation of the 1960s and 70s. [Wainwright, op. cit: 108] 
On the contrary, as a consequence of the local links maintained between trade unions 
and the Labour Party, the Party in Sheffield was not by-passed by militant trade union 
committees or community politics, but was drawn into industrial and community 
militancy of the late 1960s. [loc. cit. ] 
In general terms, however, the Labour Party's membership levels began to recover 
or at least stabilise in the 1970s. [Forester, op. cit; Seyd, op. cit. ] Thus, although the 
London Labour Party lost members between 1963 and 1969 some returned as a 
response to the effects of the Conservative Government of the early 1970s. [Kogan & 
Kogan, op. cit: 157] Similarly, following community conflicts in Southwark and 
neighbouring areas, new people began to join local parties from tenants associations, 
community groups, and voluntary organisations. These new members 
included public 
sector professionals and, a factor excluded from the New Urban 
Left framework, 
'working class' radicals alienated by the closed politics of the old Labour Party. 
[Goss, 
op. cit: 95] Similarly, Seyd describes the recovery of Party membership 
in 1970s as 
consisting of young, educated public employees, 'working class' militants, and radical 
feminists. [op. cit: 44] Another factor, analogous to the backgrounds of 
NALGO shop 
stewards identified in the previous section, is that these young educated public sector 
employees often emanated from a 'working class' parental 
background. [Seyd, ibid: 46] 
An absence of national data prevents a conclusive 
demonstration of an influx of 
trade unionists into local parties, but Seyd argues that 
his studies of Lincoln and 
Sheffield Brightside CLPs provide evidence of such a trend. [ibid: 
47] Similarly, in 
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Liverpool people are described as moving into the Labour Party from the trade union 
movement in the 1970s as they began to realise that the isolated struggles over factory 
closure and redundancies required broader strategies. [Parkinson, op. cit: 25] 
Furthermore, a concerted effort was mounted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to 
encourage local authority workers to become involved in the Liverpool Labour 
Party. [Lowes, 1994]6 The extent to which the introduction of new members, from 
local government trade unions and community politics, coincided with a rise of 
activism within the Labour Party, is explored in the following sub-section, and 
analogies with the experience of local government trade unions developed. 
Democracy and Accountability 
Changing patterns of membership and discontent with the performance of the 
Wilson Government were responsible for, and indicative of, a shift in the attitudes of 
Labour Party members. [Kogan & Kogan, 1983: 12] Seyd also considers the industrial 
militancy of the 1970s to have exerted a radicalising influence on trade unions and the 
Labour Party. [ 1987: 47] These developments also coincided with a greater air of 
toleration inside the Labour Party during the 1960s and 1970s, and this resulted in a 
proliferation of internal rank and file organisations that would have been banned in 
the 1950s. [Seyd, ibid: 8] Such groupings are characterised as having an extra- 
parliamentary emphasis in their attempts to wrest control of policy making from the 
Parliamentary Labour Party(PLP), and to make it accountable to the Party at 
large. [Kogan & Kogan, op cit: 14] In other words, those campaigning to make the 
PLP accountable, rejected the view that elected representatives acted on behalf of all 
the electorate, as opposed to the activists who sponsored, voted, or worked for their 
election. MPs were therefore viewed as delegates of the Party mandated to act 
according to manifesto pledges. 
In 1968, for example, Socialist Charter became the first extra parliamentary group 
to be formed as an internal opposition to the Wilson government. [Kogan & Kogan, 
ibid; Seyd op. cit. ] The effectiveness of such groups is questionable, however, if their 
success is measured in terms longevity. Socialist Charter, for example, aimed to 
stimulate and develop the work of activists in CLPs, but was succeeded by the Young 
Chartists in 1972, who, in turn, evolved into London Labour Briefing. [Kogan & 
Kogan, op. cit: 22-3] Other groupings of a similar ilk, included: the Labour Co- 
6 The increase in the number of public sector workers joining the Labour Party, and an emergence of 
issues relating to public expenditure and service provision should not be misconstrued as representing a 
dichotomous shift from 'production' to 'consumption' politics. On the contrary, the Keynsian 
prescriptions of the TUC and Labour Party premised the existence and expansion of welfare provision 
on economic growth. Furthermore, as is described in Chapter One, the internal relation of capital and 
labour means that production and consumption are not separate entities, they are interrelated parts of 
the whole. 
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ordinating Committee(LCC) founded 1978; the Socialist Campaign For a Labour 
Victory(SCLV) also founded in 1978; and the Rank and File Mobilising 
Committee(RFMC) founded in 1980. [Kogan & Kogan, ibid: 16] 
The emergence of such groups are an indication of, and a spur to, the development 
of activism in the Labour Party. With an average membership of 1000, for example, 
the LCC's espoused aim was to develop the Labour Party as a campaigning 
organisation, and not just an electoral machine. Of most significance to the 
organisation and practice of the campaigns mounted in the 1980s, however, is its 
promotion of alliances between local Labour parties, community groups, tenants 
associations, and local trade unions. [Seyd, op. cit: 92-3]' Furthermore, an analogy can 
be drawn between the rank and file organisation and practice of such groups within 
the Labour Party and the growth in activism, through the introduction and 
development of shop steward systems, experienced by trade unions during the same 
period. 
Perhaps the most durable activist group, and indicative the internal democratic 
practice of the Labour Party, was the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy(CLPD). 
Formed in 1973, the CLPD is portrayed as a response to Wilson's rejection of the 
Labour Party's 1973 programme. [Kogan & Kogan, op. cit; Wainwright, 1987] 
Ultimately, its main aims were to make the PLP accountable to the LPAC, and that, as 
the sovereign body of the -Party, the LPAC be responsible for the development of 
policy and manifesto commitments. [Kogan & Kogan, op. cit: 26] In the context of 
this discussion, however, the CLPD's importance lies in its indication of changing 
attitudes and activity among party members at the local level. Thus, Seyd criticises 
Kogan and Kogan's description of the CLPD as a small London based group, and 
argues that a wide base of support existed throughout the Party. [op. cit: 127] 
Before discussing similarities between the demands of the CLPD and 
developments in party democracy and accountability at CLP and DLP levels, 
however, the attitude of trade unions to the CLPD needs to be noted. The growth 
in union support for CLPD, for example, is linked to two factors: the 
imposition of public expenditure cuts associated with the International Monetary 
Fund(IMF)[Wainwright, op. cit: 30]; and, the persistence with incomes policy that 
contributed to the defeat of the Labour Government in 1979. [Kogan & Kogan, op. cit: 
48] Thus, from a starting point of no affiliations in 1974,36 branches or other trade 
union organisations were affiliated in 1977, and 161 in 1980. [Kogan & Kogan, ibid: 
' Conspicuous absences from this discussion are Militant Tendency and the issue of entryism. The 
omission is deliberate and reflects the localised significance of the group. As is argued in Chapter 
Five, much of the reputation attached to the group's role in Liverpool was a consequence its own 
propaganda and its demonisation by opponents; both of whom sought to over emphasise its 
significance. 
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36] Similarly, re-selection motions at conference did not receive trade union support 
until 1977, but T Sawyer who led NUPE's industrial action in the North East during 
the Winter of Discontent 1978-9, identifies those aspects of government policy and 
practice that produced the Winter of Discontent, as the impetus for trade union 
support of CLPD. [Wainwright, op. cit: 30] 
During the 1970s and early 1980s local Labour parties conducted a similar struggle 
to make Labour groups accountable to the wider membership. Chapter Five, for 
example, recounts developments in the Liverpool Labour Party during the 1970s, 
where the Labour Group voted against DLP policy. Similarly, the leadership of 
Labour groups on the GLC, in Manchester, and in Sheffield are depicted as cutting 
services, raising rents, and ruling Group and Party with a heavy hand, in the 
1970s. [Wainwright, ibid: 136] In contrast, however, those councillors and party 
activists who were insisting on internal party democracy and on the accountability of 
the Labour Group were the same people who were campaigning against cuts and rent 
increases. [loc. cit] 
In Manchester, for example, the DLP adopted a similar line to that of 
Liverpool[Cresswell, 1994], described in Chapter Five, setting up groups of experts to 
formulate policy. CLPs and trade union branches were allowed to discuss and amend 
the findings of such working parties, and the outcome of the process formed the 
party's programme, its manifesto and therefore the policy of the Labour 
Group. [Wainwright, ibid: 118] The Conservative victory in the GLC elections of 
1977 also presented the GLLP with the opportunity to introduce procedures for the re- 
selection of councillors and new methods of electing the party leader. [Kogan & 
Kogan, op. cit: 161] 
A distinct approach to democracy and accountability is identifiable in certain local 
parties in the late 1970s and 1980s, and comparable to the demands of the CLPD. 
This approach viewed party representatives as delegates acting on behalf of, or 
authorised to act by, the local Labour Party. [Goss, 1988: 152] Manifestos were 
considered to be binding and party representatives were mandated and made 
accountable directly to the local party organisation. Significantly, this type of 
approach was adopted in the policy and practice of two local parties that mounted 
determined campaigns of resistance to government policy in the 1970s: Clay Cross, 
and South Yorkshire. 
Consideration of their resistance forms part of the following chapter, but is referred 
to here to illustrate the contrasting approaches to, and practices of, representative 
democracy within the Labour Party. The PLP, Labour Government, and old style 
Labour groups, for example, practised and promoted the approach whereby elected 
representatives where supposed to represent all their constituents. In contrast, those 
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demanding accountability within the Labour Party, viewed MPs and councillors as 
delegates of the Party, implementing manifesto commitments as mandated by the 
Party and electorate. The implications of these approaches and practices for the 
campaigns of the 1980s are considered and developed in forthcoming chapters. 
As part of the previous discussion, analogies were drawn between the experiences 
of, and developments in, local government trade unions and local Labour parties 
during the period considered. In both cases, the categories of labour movement, 
Labour Party, and trade unions are validated in reference changes in membership 
levels and composition, changing organisation, and developments in outlook and 
practice. These developments included the growth of the shop steward movement in 
trade unions, and the growth of activist led groups in the Labour Party; both of which 
were effects of, and vehicles for, activist control of policy and practice. Thus, as later 
chapters demonstrate, these developments are important for the interrogation of 
campaigns aims and practice in the 1980s, and therefore form part of the on-going 
reciprocal process of validation. 
NEW URBAN LEFT 
The preceding sections concentrated on particular developments within the labour 
movement that had a bearing on the policy and practice of the campaigns of the 
1980s. Examples of such developments are provided in support of the views 
expressed, but should not be taken to represent an extensive account of labour 
movement development. As part of those discussions, for example, the danger of 
generalisation is exposed in the assumption that the membership of the local Labour 
parties involved in the campaigns of the 1980s, with the exception of Liverpool, were 
almost exclusively comprised of white collar professionals. Such practice is evident, 
however, in McLaverty's acceptance of the view that the 'New Urban Left' were 
'middle class' radicals and professionals. [ 1989: 37-8] Thus, while it may have been 
the case that some local parties would have fitted this description, it is sheer folly to 
generalise in this manner. 
Gyford acknowledges the difficulties involved in applying a general term to 
authorities which shared, ostensibly at least, similar values, but which adopted 
differences in practice, strategy and style. [ 1985,16-18] Wainwright makes a similar 
point with regard to the Race and Women's committees set up in the GLC, Sheffield 
and Newcastle. [ 1987: 94-144] Despite these considerable differences, however, 
Gyford concludes that: 'As for the councillors and their policies one can perhaps talk 
of a "new urban left" and of "local socialism". [op. cit: 17] The problem with Gyford's 
stance is that the meta-theoretical category of 'New Urban Left' amounts to 'a chaotic 
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conception of the whole' from which point he and other theorists 'move analytically 
towards ever more simple concepts, from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner 
abstractions' until they arrive at 'the simplest determinations'. [Marx, 1973: 100] What 
they are unable to do, is to retrace that process back to reconstitute the category as a 
'rich totality of determinations and relations'. [loc. cit. ] In other words, the 
preconceived meta-theoretical category of the 'New Urban Left' is applied as a general 
description of a particular form of practice, but the category cannot be validated in 
reference to that practice; it remains a meta-theoretical and therefore abstract 
construct. 
This problem is evident in the tendency to depict the 'New Urban Left', as a 
movement of white collar, public sector professionals, accompanying a decline in 
'working class' activism. The collapse of Labour Party's traditional working class 
base in London[Wainwright, op. cit: 105], for example, is considered to have resulted 
in a lack manual trade union input that was evident in many provincial CLPs. [Seyd, 
1987: 173] As was pointed out earlier, however, local Labour parties in London also 
included younger manual workers, who were mostly men, mostly employed in the 
public sector, and who adopted a confrontational approach. [Goss, 1988: 151-2] 
Similarly, in Sheffield two sets of activists are identified: articulate, highly educated 
and professionally qualified, and a new generation of manual worker trade unionists 
concerned with defending living standards. Both of these groups are described as 
being less deferential to the Labour Party and trade union leadership. [Seyd, op. cit: 
74] Furthermore, the tendency to focus selectively on certain London boroughs, as do 
Lansley, Goss, and Wolmar[ 1989], produces an inevitably distorted picture. 
The 'New Urban Left' abstraction also embodies the nebulous character of all 
references to the concepts of left and right. As Lipsey points out in reference to trade 
unions, such dichotomies are bogus and serve only to conceal variations within 
categories that cannot be classified on a day to day basis. [Seyd, op. cit: 2] Accounts 
that employ such generalities as a form of short hand, therefore offer a stylised version 
of reality that does not bear practical validation. This practice is all too evident in 
attempts to explain the events studied here as a part, or consequence, of a 'New Urban 
Left' movement. 8 The contention here, and supported by the evidence presented in the 
first three chapters, is that the campaigns should be understood in the context of 
broader labour movement developments within society as a whole, and not stylised 
version of reality. 
Attempts to evaluate the policy and practice of the campaigns, in reference to a 
preconceived framework or model of 'New Urban Left' are guilty of separating theory 
from practice. In other words, analyses of the campaigns which conduct a selective 
8 McLaverty[ 1989] and Lansley, Goss, and Wolmar[ 1989] fit this description. 
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study of authorities on the basis of the unvalidated meta-theoretical category of 'New 
Urban Left', are unable to explain the motivations and activities in reference to 
developments in society as a whole. These approaches therefore face the dilemma of 
opting for a circularity of presupposing the categories they seek to investigate, or of 
resorting to a process of infinite regress, validating their meta-theoretical categories in 
reference to another level of meta-theory. 9 
This thesis studies the campaigns of the 1980s in the context of societal 
developments affecting local Labour parties, Labour groups, the wider Labour Party, 
local government trade unions, and trade unions in general. In other words, the 
campaigns are examined in a. labour movement and societal context. The 
identification and understanding of the role of societal processes facilitates the 
evaluation of principles and practices of the later campaigns, not in terms of 
unvalidated categories, but as part of reciprocal processes of interrogation and 
validation between meta-theoretical and empirical levels. 
The events discussed in this chapter, for example, serve to demonstrate two 
interrelated developments. First of all, the period witnessed a growth in trade union 
membership and organisation which was accompanied by an ebullient outlook and 
practice. These factors are also an indication and product of the emerging confidence 
the movement had in its own capabilities; as evidenced the examples cited at the start 
of this chapter. Similarly, during the same period the Labour Party experienced a 
decline, partial recovery, and recomposition of its membership. In both areas, 
however, a movement toward local control by activists was evident through the 
growth of the shop steward movement in the trade unions, and the campaign for 
democracy and accountability within the Labour Party. 
The 1970s, however, also witnessed a decline in the fortunes of the British 
economy, and a concomitant change in approach to public finance by central 
government. Chapter Three therefore considers how the labour movement, as 
validated here, approached and responded to these changing circumstances. 
Examination of labour movement opposition to attacks on local government and the 
welfare state, and of the rationale and circumstances that precipitated both attack and 
defence, therefore completes the historical context within which the policy and 
practice of the 1980s campaigns can be interrogated. 
9 Further consideration is afforded to the problems associated with the use of models and frameworks 
in Appendix Two. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LABOUR MOVEMENT DEFENCE OF LOCAL SERVICE VARIATION, 
AND OPPOSITION TO RETRENCHMENT 
IN THE 1970S 
Chapters One and Two began the process of establishing the historical context 
within which the campaigns of the 1980s can be interrogated and understood. As part 
of the analyses conducted in those chapters references were made to the 
interrelationships between the areas considered, and explanations constructed in 
reference to broader societal and economic factors. Examples of this approach 
include the consideration afforded to: labour movement demands for expanded 
welfare provision and the expansion of local government services executed by a 
Labour Government; the premising of such demands on economic growth; and, the 
growth of local government trade unions at a time of increasing local government 
employment, increased militancy, and private sector job losses. 
That approach is developed here by considering high profile examples of labour 
movement opposition to central government attempts to restrict public spending and 
service provision in the 1970s. In keeping with practice of previous chapters, these 
events are considered in reference to the fortunes of the British economy, which 
experienced a downward spiral through the late 1960s and 1970s. By proceeding in 
this manner, the development of labour movement principles and practices relevant to 
the campaigns of the 1980s are identified, interrogated, and the interpretations and 
understandings developed in earlier chapters transcended. 
Two specific examples of localised opposition are analysed here: the campaign 
against the Housing Finance Act 1972; and, South Yorkshire's dispute with central 
government over the funding of its transport policy. Both examples establish a clear 
link, in terms of the justification of their stance and the manner in which the goals 
were pursued, between the topics discussed in the previous chapters and the 
campaigns of the 1980s. These discussions are also accompanied by a more general 
consideration of issues and practices surrounding labour movement opposition to 
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central government attempts to reduce public expenditure toward the end of the 
1970s. By considering the interrelated aspects of the areas explored here and in 
earlier chapters, and by subjecting the empirical and meta-theoretical aspects of 
categories to reciprocal processes of interrogation and validation, the chapter 
completes the historical context within which to interrogate the campaigns conducted 
in the 1980s. 
These areas are addressed in three sections entitled: Housing Finance Act 1972; 
South Yorkshire and Transport Policy; and, Anti-cuts Campaigns. The discussions 
undertaken within each section explore, within a labour movement context, 
approaches to the issues of service provision, local democracy and autonomy, and 
highlight those principles of local democratic practice that are evident in the 
organisation and tactics of the campaigns studied. Furthermore, preliminary analogies 
are drawn between the principles and practices reviewed here and those exhibited by 
the campaigns of the 1980s. A particular aspect of this approach concerns the 
identification of developments in labour movement structures and organisation that 
take place through the process of struggle. Thus, the significance of such 
developments and events for the campaigns of the 1980s are identified as part of the 
on-going reciprocal processes of interrogation and validation. ' 
HOUSING FINANCE ACT 1972 
The most infamous case of opposition and resistance to the Housing Finance Act 
1972 is that of Clay Cross Urban District Council. Although other authorities, most 
notably in Scotland and Wales, mounted similarly determined campaigns, only Clay 
Cross has been the subject of an in depth account. [Skinner and Langdon, 1974] 
Consideration of Clay Cross therefore forms the focus of this section, which is 
divided into two sub-sections entitled: The Broader Campaign; and, Clay Cross. As 
part of the first sub-section, the scope and practice of the wider campaign is 
considered, but the general issues of service provision, internal party and 
constitutional local democracy, and the structures and organisations through which the 
campaign was conducted are explored in more detail when considering the case of 
Clay Cross. 
The Broader Campaign 
The White Paper, 'A Fair deal for Housing', published July 1971, formed the basis 
of the Housing Finance Act and outlined the Conservative Government's plan to 
reduce the levels of subsidy for public rented housing by prescribing rent levels 
' Unfortunately, the areas investigated here have received only limited coverage and this is reflected in 
the limited number of sources cited. 
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centrally. [Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 150] In similar fashion to punitive fiscal 
measures introduced by the Conservative governments of the 1980s, the proposals 
affected mainly Labour councils; in this case those who adopted a policy of 
subsidising local authority rents from the local rates charge. Under the provisions of 
the Act designated local authorities were required to increase their rents in line with 
central prescriptions. 
The Act therefore raised two important questions concerning the theory and 
practice of local autonomy and democracy, introduced in Chapter One, and both 
issues underpinned the justification of local resistance. The first point concerned the 
rights of local authorities to set their own rent levels through the use of revenue raised 
locally, and the second involved their right to follow local variations in policy on the 
basis of local electoral mandates. [loc. cit. ] Once again, there are evident parallels 
with the 1980s when much of the opposition and resistance was premised on these 
same principles. 
These issues need to be understood in the context of two other factors. First of all, 
the outlook and expectations of local authorities at this time differed from those of the 
later 1970s and 1980s. The atmosphere of the period was still one of expansion and 
relative independence as opposed to retrenchment and coercion. Secondly, the events 
discussed here took place before the re-organisation outlined in the Local Government 
Act 1972. Thus, the responsive nature of small local authorities to the demographic 
needs and structure of their local communities played a deciding role in the 
formulation of policy and service provision. In Clay Cross, for example, local 
policies and service provision were targeted at local authority tenants and the elderly, 
as the largest sections of the community. [Mitchell, 1974] 
Initially, defiance of the Housing Finance Act was fairly widespread, with 42 
authorities declaring their opposition on 1.10.72. [Skinner and Langdon, 1974: 49]. 
Thus, in similar fashion to the campaign against the Rates Act 1984, there was hope 
of making the Housing Finance Act unworkable if enough local authorities refused to 
implement it. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 43] Livingstone, for example, describes 
how Ted Knight, later to lead Lambeth Council's resistance of the Rates Act, argued 
that the Government could be forced to back down by the mobilisation of public 
support, and 12 or more local authorities refusing to implement the Housing Finance 
Act. [1987: 27] 
While the campaign in 1972 coincided with the period and examples of confident 
labour movement resistance and advance, identified in Chapter Two, a number of 
factors also described in the previous chapter, mitigated the likelihood of Knight's 
proposal achieving any level of success. At this time, for example, there was minimal 
development of activist structures such as local government trade union shop steward 
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systems or internal Labour Party organisations. Furthermore, the small and 
fragmented nature of local trade union branches and local Labour parties prior to re- 
organisation, and the dominance of the latter by Labour groups, suggest that the 
organisational means required to conduct a broad-scale campaign were difficult to 
build. 
Nevertheless, at its high point during 1972, the campaign involved a number of 
authorities promising non-implementation, and employed tactics similar to those used 
in the 1980s. These include the staging of rallies and conferences, and calls for 
industrial action by trade unions in support of opposition. [Skinner and Langdon, op. 
cit: 91 ] Several lobbies of parliament were also staged, and the TUC raised objections 
to the legislation. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid; TUC 1960-1987,1972] Similarly, 
successful motions to the LPAC, and the TUC called on their respective organisations 
to support campaigns of non co-operation and non-implementation, mounted by 
tenants, trades councils, and local Labour parties. As both motions were moved by 
the private sector AUEW[Labour Party 1966-1984,1972; TUC 1960-1987, op. cit. ], 
however, there is no scope for the invention of sectoral dichotomies. NALGO's 1972 
conference also rejected the Housing Finance Act, and as it did in the 1980s, agreed to 
support its members who refused to co-operate with commissioners introduced to run 
local authority affairs. [Newman, 1982: 288] 
The Labour Party NEC issued statements on the Housing Finance Act, on 20 
January and 10 March 1972[Labour Party 1966-1984,1972: 355-6], advising Labour 
groups not to increase rents until the were forced to and then to blame the 
government. The Labour Party's central offices also produced leaflets and a Labour 
Weekly broad-sheet for local use, urged local deputations to be sent to the Secretary 
of State, and called on Labour groups to organise meetings on a ward basis. [loc. cit. ] 
The similarity between the approach adopted here and that of the 1980s is evident in 
the NEC's refusal to offer a clear national lead; although it pledged its opposition to 
the Bill and promised its repeal by a future Labour Government. [Skinner and 
Langdon, op. cit: 91] Thus, the NEC's March statement argued that a national lead 
was impracticable because the position of each local authority was different, and each 
therefore had to make their own decisions. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1972: 355-6] 
By November 1972, only 12 of the original 42 authorities were sill refusing to co- 
operate with the Act. [Mitchell, op. cit: 174] Of those 12, six were English councils 
and included Clay Cross, Halstead and Eccles who had received default 
orders. [Skinner and Langdon, op. cit: 50] By the end of the year only three English 
authorities were maintaining their stance, and were accompanied by an unspecified 
number of authorities in Scotland, including Glasgow[Newman, op. cit: 289], and two 
in Wales: Bedwas and Machen; and, Merthyr Tydfil. [loc. cit; Skinner and Langdon, 
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op cit. ] The English authorities were: Camden in London; Consiborough in 
Yorkshire; and Clay Cross in Derbyshire. [loc. cit. ] Eventually, Camden and 
Consiborough followed the other Labour groups where the decision to oppose the Act 
had not been unanimous. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 55-6] Glasgow and Camden, 
for example, complied in early 1973, and Consiborough in March 1973. [Newman, op. 
cit: 289] 
Apart from Clay Cross, therefore, the only authorities maintaining resistance were 
in Scotland and in Wales, where Housing Commissioners had been appointed to 
Bedwas and Machen, and to Merthyr Tydfil. [Skinner and Langdon, op. cit: 70] 
Within the labour movement, explanations for the absence of a sustained campaign of 
widespread non co-operation focused on actions of the Labour Party NEC. Thus, the 
NEC was accused of failing to mobilise the Party in opposition to the Act, and for 
creating confusion and splits in many Labour councils. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 49 
& 91] A motion to the 1973 LPAC, for example, condemned the lack of NEC support 
offered to Clay Cross, and called for an intensification of the struggle against the 
Act. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1973: 207-8] While the NEC's role may offer a partial 
explanation of events, other factors, such as those outlined earlier in this discussion, 
need to be taken into consideration; as do the special circumstances prevailing in Clay 
Cross at this time. 
Clay Cross 
Two aspects of the Clay Cross campaign warrant attention here. First of all, the 
practices of the local labour movement, and accompanying social and economic 
circumstances, help explain why Clay Cross Labour Party was able to mount a 
concerted campaign against the Housing Finance Act. Secondly, the stances adopted 
by the Parliamentary leadership of the Labour Party and the NEC, in relation to Clay 
Cross and to the Housing Finance Act, indicate broader practices and principles, 
relating to internal Labour Party democracy. Exploration of these areas contributes to 
the interrogation and validation of the categories of service provision, employment, 
and democratic practice within the Labour Party and local state, commenced in 
previous chapters. Furthermore, the identification of analogies, between these areas 
and the practices and principles of the 1980s, forms an integral component of the 
development of reciprocal processes, and of the historical context. 
The Clay Cross Labour Party practised a disciplined form of delegatory 
representation that treated councillors as delegates of the local Party. From the 1960s 
until the dissolution of Clay Cross in the 1970's re-organisation, for example, the 
Labour Group met every Friday to decide policy, and decisions were then presented as 
a united front. Councillors were also answerable to a monthly meeting of the local 
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Party, and those who disagreed with Party policy were either de-selected or asked to 
resign. [Mitchell, 1974; Skinner and Langdon, 1974] In other words, the Labour 
Group was accountable to the local Party, and all councillors were expected to abide 
by Party policy and manifesto commitments. By operating in this fashion, the local 
Party practised principles similar to those promoted by the CLPD and local parties 
struggling to make MPs and local councillors accountable to the Party at large, as 
described in Chapter Two, but they also adapted the structures and practices of the 
local state to suit their own requirements. 
This approach should not be attributed to the size of the local Party, or to a lack of 
participation. On the contrary, the Clay Cross Labour Party increased from 15 
members in 1969, to 120 in 1972. [Mitchell, op. cit; Skinner and Langdon, op. cit. ] 
Participation of the wider populace was also encouraged through an open forum, held 
after every council meeting, where members of public could question councillors and 
discuss current policy. Following disruption by the Resident's Association, however, 
the `Forum' was replaced with a new scheme entitled: 'communiplan', which aimed to 
involve local groups in council policy making and to allow for co-optation onto 
council committees and council meetings. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 35] The new 
scheme resembled some of the committee structure initiatives developed by Labour 
local authorities during the 1980s, and constituted an attempt by the Clay Cross 
Labour Group to prevent themselves being distanced from the local electorate; 
especially as they held all 11 seats on the council. 
The approach to local authority housing provision in Clay Cross was founded on 
principles of slum clearance, and affordable rents that were based on a 16% subsidy 
from the rates. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid. ] These policies formed a central plank of 
Clay Cross Labour Party's programme, and were therefore at the forefront of local 
electoral contests. Electoral opposition to the Labour Party, for example, took the 
form of a Residents Association which contested local elections on a commitment to 
remove the housing subsidy. Thus, the high profile of the issue at each election, 
together with the Party's continuing electoral success, meant that the Clay Cross 
Labour Party had a convincing case for arguing that it had a clear local mandate on 
which to practise a degree of local autonomy; through the practice of local policy and 
service provision. 
The Clay Cross experience, and broader opposition to the Housing Finance Act, 
illustrates the importance of housing provision to the labour movement, and therefore 
validates related claims made in Chapter One. Similarly, the changing demographic 
and economic circumstances of Clay Cross reflected those described in Chapter One; 
especially in terms of rising levels of unemployment resulting from mine closures, 
and an increasingly elderly population. The local Labour Party justified its housing 
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policy, therefore, as a means of redistributing wealth in the locality[ Skinner and 
Langdon, ibid: 28] and, given the composition of housing in Clay Cross, where 1,600 
local authority homes provided for a considerable percentage of an electorate of 
7,000, the policies of the Labour Party almost guarantied it a majority in local 
elections. [Mitchell, op. cit. ] Similar approaches were still evident in the 1980s, 
however, where Norwich and Sheffield maintained high levels of local authority 
housing stocke; in spite of the attempt, noted in Chapter One, to break up of tight knit 
communities through local government re-organisation in the 1970s. 
Analogies can also be drawn between the campaign practices adopted in and 
around Clay Cross, and those of the 1980s. These include holding public meetings to 
discuss related issues, the staging of demonstrations in October 1972 and April 
1973 [Skinner and Langdon, op. cit. ], and the holding of a conference on the issue of 
Clay Cross at Central Hall Westminster in June 1973. The conference was attended 
by 200 CLP delegates, 200 trade union branches and 150 Labour Party Young 
Socialist(LPYS) branches[Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 95-6], and bears analogy with 
the delegate conferences discussed in later chapters. Of particular significance to this 
thesis, however, is the view that the development of political awareness in Clay Cross 
gained its momentum from militancy in trade unions. This reflects the assertions of 
Chapter Two, that the period was one of mobile and confident trade unionism, and 
indicates an interrelation between local government and the outlook and practice of 
the broader labour movement. 
Clay Cross councillors, for example, are described as working for a fusion of 
political struggle in the council chamber, and trade union struggle outside. [Skinner 
and Langdon, ibid: 58] Evidence of this approach includes: the award of a pay 
increase to manual council workers in 1970, when elsewhere their pay claim resulted 
in the 'dirty jobs strike' of October[loc. cit. ]; refusing to hold council meetings during 
the Post Office workers strike of 1971; circumventing the 1972 national pay freeze by 
re-negotiating contracts with manual workers[Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 65]; and, 
unanimous support given to the Miners strikes of 1972 and 1974. In particular, the 
NUM and NUPE are identified as influential in the Clay Cross Labour Party, with five 
out of the 11 councillors who defied the Housing Act being NUPE members. [Skinner 
and Langdon, ibid: 60-1 ] 
This view has to be kept in perspective, however, as several disputes arose with 
NALGO members over dealings with the Housing Commissioner. Thus, although it 
was national NALGO policy to support councils refusing to implement the Act, the 
members in Clay Cross rejected the council's order that staff should not co-operate 
with the Housing Commissioner, because NALGO members would then be breaking 
These are discussed in Chapter Four in the Deregulation section. 
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the law. [Newman, 1982; Skinner and Langdon, op. cit. ] Furthermore, the authority 
employed a small work-force in contrast to the Metropolitan authorities created after 
1974, and this may have made it easier to have a close working relationship. 
The size of the authority's labour force can be gauged from the numbers involved 
in the 'dirty jobs' pay settlement, and by the numbers of NALGO staff who took 
industrial action against the authority's instruction for them to break the law; 44 and 
27 respectively. When considered in these terms, the doubling of the Clay Cross 
Direct Labour Organisation(DLO) in 1971, in an attempt to counter the effects of 
unemployment in the area[Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 61 ], is barely comparable to 
those authorities who, as Chapter Four identifies, employed tens of thousands in the 
1980s. Nevertheless, the practice demonstrates a concern with local employment 
levels and also illustrates the small-scale of local initiatives. 
In addition to the issues of local democratic practice discussed earlier, Clay Cross 
also raises issues concerning the internal democracy of the Labour Party; particularly 
PLP and NEC accountability, and the role of the LPAC as the sovereign body of the 
Party. Motions passed at successive conferences, for example, called for support to be 
given to local authorities defying the Housing Finance Act, and for retrospective 
legislation to relieve councillors of any penalties incurred as a result of their 
defiance. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1972 and 1973; Skinner and Langdon, op. cit. ] In 
spite of conference decisions, however, the NEC voted to adopt a policy which 
included a commitment to repeal the Housing Finance Act 1972, the removal of 
disqualification, but excluded financial indemnity of penalised councillors. [Skinner 
and Langdon, ibid: 52-3, & 91] 
Furthermore, Edward Short, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, argued at the 
1973 LPAC that, in spite of Conference policy, the NEC could not encourage 
councillors to break the law, because: to do so would be an offence in itself; they 
could not tell councillors to suffer the consequences of their actions; and, the next 
Labour Government would introduce legislation that might be unpopular, but which it 
would expect to be carried out. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1973; Skinner and Langdon, 
op. cit. ] Similarly, Harold Wilson argued that the decision to do something about the 
surcharge of councillors was taken by the LPAC, and was therefore not the 
responsibility of the PLP or a Labour Government. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 94-5] 
Thus, a conference held in Westminster Hall to discuss the plight of Clay Cross 
passed a motion which, in a similar fashion to the stance of the CLPD, questioned the 
nature of the Labour Party's parliamentary representation, and indicated the need for 
a change in the balance of power within the Labour Party. [Langdon and Skinner, 
ibid: 96] 
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The expectation that local authorities obey Government policy, but that the PLP 
and NEC could ignore LPAC decisions is indicative of an inconsistency in the attitude 
of the PLP and NEC toward the autonomy of local parties. Thus, while local parties 
were not required to comply with decisions relating to campaigning activity, 
compliance was required in other areas. After reorganisation in 1974, for example, 
North East Derbyshire CLP adopted a policy of not raising rents under the Housing 
Finance Act, but 11 councillors refused to accept DLP policy and were barred from 
the list of prospective candidates. Following an inquiry by national officers of the 
Labour Party, the 11 names were reinstated, in spite of their refusal to accept local 
policy. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 81] 
Similarly, the decision by the annual meeting of the CLP to expel 17 Labour 
councillors who voted against a manifesto commitment to extend Clay Cross policy 
on the Housing Finance Act to the whole area, heralded an inquiry into the conduct of 
the CLP. [Skinner and Langdon, ibid: 82] The contradiction between the PLP and 
NEC's refusal to require Labour groups to support Party policy and their active 
intervention on behalf of councillors who actually disobey Party Policy was also an 
issue in the early 1980s, and is discussed in the next Chapter. The practice related 
here, however, reinforces the view that the PLP and NEC adopted an approach to 
democracy which was premised on the representation of all electors as opposed to 
those who voted, campaigned, or worked for their election. The stance also reflects a 
parliamentarist approach whereby decisions taken by the PLP and Government were 
held to be beyond the remit of the LPAC. 
The areas discussed in this section contribute to, and are explored within, the 
historical context initiated by chapters One and Two. The attempt to mount a 
campaign against the Housing Finance Act should, for example, be understood in the 
context of confident labour movement outlook and practice, but also in relation to the 
difficulties such an attempt faced in view of the nature of local authorities and labour 
movement organisation prior to re-organisation. In particular, the categories of 
service provision, local democracy, autonomy, and to a lesser extent employment, all 
introduced in Chapter One, are interrogated and validated in reference to the practice 
of the Clay Cross Labour Party, Labour Group, and the broader campaign against the 
Housing Finance Act. Similarly, issues first raised in Chapter Two relating to the 
practice and perception of accountability and representation within the Labour Party 
are developed in reference to the Clay Cross campaign, the PLP, NEC, and North East 
Derbyshire CLP. These categories receive further interrogation and validation in the 
following sections, where they are explored in the context of financial limits promoted 
a Labour Government. 
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SOUTH YORKSHIRE AND TRANSPORT POLICY 
The resistance undertaken by South Yorkshire contrasts to that mounted by Clay 
Cross and the other authorities that opposed the Housing Finance Act. South 
Yorkshire was not part of a broad based campaign against an Act of Parliament, 
though it was opposed to a particular aspect of central government fiscal policy. The 
stance adopted by South Yorkshire is similar to that adopted Clay Cross, however, to 
the extent that both stemmed from a commitment to provide, develop and defend a 
particular service area. [Gyford and James, 1983: 138-47] Thus, in both cases a 
particular policy lay at the centre of the local Labour Party's manifesto commitment, 
and each saw their election success as a mandate to vary local policy and provision. 
Unfortunately, a thorough comparison of the tactics and organisation employed in the 
two areas is not possible as the attention afforded to South Yorkshire Labour Party is 
somewhat remiss. In view of the limited information available, only a brief 
discussion of the issues and tactics employed is possible. 
The process of adopting their policy on service provision started in December 1972 
when, as a first step toward free public transport for all, the South Yorkshire Labour 
Party Manifesto Working Group for the new Metropolitan County Council elections 
recommended consultation with district councils to explore the possibility of 
providing free public transport for the elderly, the handicapped, and the 
disabled. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Gyford and James, op. cit. ] These 
demographic groups are recorded in Chapter One as receiving expanded and improved 
service provision, and such practice is therefore confirmed here as a labour movement 
objective. 
The policy review took place as a consequence of the re-organisation of local 
government in the mid 1970s when, amongst other things, transport provision was 
made the responsibility of the newly created metropolitan county councils. Thus, as a 
consequence of re-organisation, existing local fares, previously set at different levels, 
had to be unified under the new authority. South Yorkshire therefore chose to set its 
fares at the level of one of the cheaper districts, and later froze them at that 
level. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 71] Re-organisation also involved a new system 
of allocating central funds for public transport. The old system entailed a combination 
of RSG and specific grants for particular projects, but was replaced by the Transport 
Supplementary Grant(TSG). The new TSG, Chapter One explains, took the form of a 
block grant designed to reduce central government supervision. [Gyford and James, 
op. cit; Skelcher, 1985] TSG, however, was paid at a fixed rate, and based on 
accepted expenditure plans. Any excess would therefore have to met through a local 
subsidy from the rates, and this, in line with its manifesto commitment, is exactly 
what South Yorkshire did. 
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A conflict of interest arose with a change of government thinking in this area. First 
of all, the RSG No. 2 Order 1974 recommended that local authorities increase fares in 
line with costs, and that: 'authorities who have not increased fares of late should 
consider what additional increases are necessary to cover some of the lost 
ground. '[Gyford and James, op. cit: 139] This represented a difference of opinion 
between South Yorkshire and the Government, but the real problem began when the 
Government sought to reduce the overall TSG available to authorities as a means of 
reducing public expenditure levels. As part of the TSG settlement for 1977-78, for 
example, South Yorkshire submitted plans for a transport programme costing 
£28,300,000 at 1975 prices. The Government, however, considered this programme 
to exceed, by £10,000,000, South Yorkshire's entitlement to funds from a finite 
resource of £720,000,000. [Gyford and James, ibid: 141] 
The Government's case rested on the argument that higher subsidies, and therefore 
higher spending, would attract greater RSG. [loc. cit. ] In other words, because the 
previous years spending was used as a base to calculate the following years RSG, 
allowing South Yorkshire to spend more on Transport would attract a higher RSG 
settlement the following year. From South Yorkshire's point of view, however, the 
Labour Group had a mandate to pursue its policy, not only from the local electorate 
but also from: LPACs of 1973,1975 and 1977; the precepted metropolitan district 
authorities of South Yorkshire; and at CLP, City, County and Regional levels of the 
Labour Party. [Gyford and James, ibid. ] 
The campaign launched by the South Yorkshire Labour Group, or at least that part 
covered by the sources available, concentrated on official channels. Thus, the main 
means of communication are identified as: bilateral meetings between council 
officials and civil servants, and council leaders and ministers; through the Association 
of Metropolitan Authorities(AMA); and through the internal channels of the Labour 
Party. [Gyford and James, ibid: 141] Although there is no obvious analogy here with 
Clay Cross, there are analogies with the tactics employed in Liverpool's campaign for 
more resources in 1984, where channels of communication with government were 
maintained throughout the period. [Byrne, 1994] There is also evidence of the lines of 
communication established within the Labour Party during the campaign in 
Liverpool[Jinkinson, 3.4.84; Sonnet, 31.5.84], and during the campaign against the 
Rates Act the following year. [LGCU Management Committee 1984-85; LGCU 
Management Group 1984-85] 
Both South Yorkshire and Clay Cross sought to defend policies that formed central 
planks of their respective local election manifestos, but because of changes in central 
government policy brought them both into positions of confrontation. Both South 
Yorkshire and Clay Cross considered their respective transport and housing policies to 
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be public services. [Gyford and James, op. cit; Skinner and Langdon, 1974] They 
therefore sought to defend a particular local service, but were also asserting their 
rights to pursue variations in local policy based on local mandates at successive 
elections, on the basis of democratic decision making within the Labour Party, and 
financed through local taxes. These positions, together with the tactics discussed 
above, are also evident in the campaigns of the 1980s. 
Finally, the solution adopted by South Yorkshire indicates the level of autonomy 
available to authorities, at that time, in the area of finance and service provision. For 
the 1978-9 settlement South Yorkshire declared only a part of its total revenue support 
for transport in its submission for TSG. The remainder of its planned expenditure was 
included in the budget as a whole and therefore not submitted to the Department of 
Transport for TSG purposes. [Gyford and James, op. cit: 145] This technical solution 
obviated the need for a protracted and high profile campaign, and is reminiscent of 
'creative accountancy' measures adopted by many authorities in the 1980s, and 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
Consideration of the policy and practice adopted by South Yorkshire Labour Party 
affords another dimension to the exploration and interrogation of the issues of service 
provision and local democracy. The section therefore provides additional validation 
of the areas identified and discussed in relation to Clay Cross and in earlier chapters, 
and also introduces the concept of financial restraint; explored further in the following 
section. In particular, using the service category of transport as a means of serving the 
needs of particular demographic groups is identified as a labour movement objective. 
Similarly, the notions of local democracy and autonomy are developed in reference to 
relations between government and local authorities, between PLP and local Party, in 
terms of manifesto commitments and local mandates, and the ability of local 
authorities to finance service provision through local taxes. The objective now, in 
completing the pre 1980 historical context, is to consider the wider implications of 
financial restraint and labour movement responses. 
ANTI CUTS CAMPAIGNS 
This section introduces and explores the policy and practice of labour movement 
opposition to reductions in public expenditure implemented, toward the end of the 
1970s, by the Callaghan Labour Government. The importance attached to the areas of 
service provision, employment, and local democracy by labour movement 
organisations, is therefore explored in the context of financial restraint, and earlier 
validation of these categories and associated values developed. Similarly, the 
validation of categories pertaining to labour movement organisation, outlook and 
79 
practice is developed in reference to the structures that arose during the campaigns of 
opposition mounted by trade unions in the 1970s. In particular, the categories and 
areas identified are considered in reference to the changing outlook and practice of a 
Labour Government, and the contrasting values identified and explored. 
By exploring the reasons for, effects of, and responses to financial restraint, the 
section completes the preliminary stage of the historical context, and facilitates 
interrogation of the policy and practice of subsequent Conservative governments 
toward local government, and of labour movement responses. To achieve these 
objectives a working definition of the term 'cuts' is provided. Consideration is then 
afforded to the opposition and resistance mounted by trade unions, and to the vestiges 
of dissent evident within the Labour Party. Exploration of these areas involves 
drawing analogies with associated principles and practices interrogated and validated 
in earlier sections and chapters, and is undertaken over three sub-sections entitled: 
Defining and Quantifying the Cuts; Trade Union Opposition; and Opposition in the 
Labour Party. 
Defining and Quantifying the Cuts 
Since the mid 1970s, when central government policy and practice turned to 
restricting the growth of public expenditure, the term 'cuts' has been used in labour 
movement circles as a euphemism for reductions in public expenditure. The term is 
vague, however, referring to anything from reductions in planned expenditure growth 
at the national level, to the practical effects of expenditure restriction in individual 
local authority service areas. Similarly, the policy and practice of public expenditure 
restriction in the 1970s differs significantly to that of the 1980s. The following 
account concentrates on the 1970s, and addresses three areas as a means of defining 
the term: reductions in proposed public expenditure as a whole; reductions in specific 
areas of expenditure; and the effects of such reductions in terms of the levels and 
standards of local authority services. As part of this process consideration is also 
afforded to the reasoning behind attempts to curb public expenditure, and alternatives 
approaches identified. 
The expenditure white papers, published in the second half of the 1970s, afford the 
best indication of the Labour Government's approach to public expenditure 
during this 
period. Duncan and Goodwin, for example, note that 
The Attack on Inflation White 
Paper was presented to Parliament in July 
1975, and signalled the Labour 
Government's conversion to monetary economic theory. 
[Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 
101]1 Control of inflation was earmarked by the 
White Paper, as a social and 
Too much emphasis has been placed on the 
influence of the International Monetary Fund(IMF) in 
securing the Labour Government's conversion 
to monetary policies. Prior to the intervention of the 
IMF in 1976, Cabinet Ministers were already exhibiting a monetarist 
bent: in July 1975 D Healey, 
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economic priority requiring reductions in public sector borrowing and spending, and 
the containment of real wage levels. [loc. cit. ] Similarly, Fryer records that the 
approach was confirmed in 1976, when the Public Expenditure White Paper envisaged 
a levelling off of public expenditure growth, and the Cash Limits and Public 
Expenditure White Paper imposed limits on three quarters of central government 
expenditure, other than social security benefits. [1979: 96] Table 3.1 shows the level 
of original reductions and those for 1977-8 and 1978-9, announced in July and 
December 1976, and made at the behest of the IMF. Fryer also notes that the 1977 
Expenditure White Paper outlined further reductions for 1977-8, and provided 'a year 
of overall stabilisation or minor improvement in 1978-9'. [loc. cit. ] 
Table 3.1 
Announced Cuts in Public Expenditure 
April 1975 E1,100 million 
February 1976 £4,595 million 
July 1976 £1,012 million from 77-78 
December 1976 £1,513 million from 78-79 
Source: Fryer, Manson and Fairclough, 1978: 76 
Note: The later figures are at 1976 prices and do not allow for the effects of inflation. 
In practice, estimated effect of reductions in levels of expenditure proved to be 
conservative. Expenditure White Papers for 1977-8, for example, are described by 
Fryer as identifying an actual under-spend of £2.4 billion, but if this figure is 
compared to the original level of planned spending for that year, produced in 1975, 
the effect is that public expenditure for 1977-8 was actually reduced by nearly £5 
billion. [op. cit: 97] This issue was raised by the TUC Liaison Committee in 1978, 
and the concerns reflected in an ASTMS motion that called for £1 billion of 
underspend to be carried over as an additional figure for the following years 
expenditure round. [TUC 1960-1987,1978] Table 3.2 indicates the level of local 
government underspending. 
As part of the Government's attempt to reduce levels of public borrowing and 
expenditure, particular attention was paid to the funding of local government. In 
December 1974, for example, the Department of the Environment Circular 171/74 
'Rate Fund Expenditure and Rate Calls 1975-6', offered guidance to local authorities 
on limiting service provision. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 147] Furthermore, the 
Consultative Council for Local Government Finance(CCLGF) was established in 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, identified a sharp reduction in the rate of inflation as an over riding 
priority[Newman, 1982: 400], and in April 1975 identified unemployment as a price paid 
for lower 
inflation[McDonnell, 1978: 43]; in May 1975 J Barnett, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, expounded a 
version of the 'overload thesis' that the public sector claimed more resources than was compatible 
with 
provision for production investment[Taylor, 1979: 9]; and, S Williams, 
Secretary of State for Prices 
and Consumer Protection, warned against 'the cancer of inflation' at the 
NALGO conference in 
1975. [Newman, op. cit: 400] 
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1975[loc. cit. ], and used as a means of persuading local government that central 
guidelines where reasonable. [Jones and Stewart, 1985: 33] Local government finance 
was therefore an issue before the intervention of the IMF, but following their 
intervention the tenor of central government prescriptions changed. Until Crosland's 
speech at Manchester Free Trade Hall in October 1976, for example, attempts at 
reducing local expenditure had been persuasive rather than coercive. [Blunkett and 
Jackson, op. cit. ] The upward trend in central contributions to local spending stopped, 
therefore, with the RSG settlement for 1976-7, and actually fell by 4.5% for 
1977-8. [Blunkett and Jackson, ibid: 150] 
Table 3.2 
Over and Underspending by Local 
Government 1974-1979 






Source: Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 105. 
Note: Figures relate to local government 
expenditure minus RSG target, for England and Wales. 
The cash limits introduced in April 1976, amount to a coercive weapon for central 
government to reduce contributions to local spending. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit; 
Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit. ] Under this mechanism, central grant allocations were 
fixed to price levels assumed to operate for the whole financial year, and could not, 
therefore, be adjusted for inflation. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid; Newton and Karran: 
1985] As the late 1970s was a period of spiralling inflation, however, cash limits had 
the effect of reducing RSG in real terms. Table 3.3 shows local government spending 
falling as a proportion of both GDP and public sector expenditure, and therefore 
provides an indication of the impact of cash limits, following their introduction in 
1976. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 102] 
The attempt to restrict local spending was not targeted exclusively on current 
expenditure. To appreciate the full effect of the Government's approach, cash limits 
need to be understood as working in conjunction with the loan sanctions introduced 
for capital spending in 1976. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid: 109] Just as 
inflation 
compounded the effect of cash limits, the impact of loan sanctions was exaggerated 
by 
the high level of interest rates already restricting capital spending. [Stoker, 1988: 13- 
14] Consequently, gross figures of capital spending by English local authorities, 
including spending funded by loans and sales of assets, dropped from £7,898,000,000 
in 1976-7 to £6,588,000,000 in 1979-80. [loc. cit. ] 
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Table 3.3 
Local Government Spending 
in the United Kingdom, 1960-1978 
Local government Local government 
expenditure as % Expenditure as % of 
of GDP total 
Government 
expenditure 
1960 9.9 23.3 
1965 13.4 30.6 
1970 14.9 31.5 
1975 17.6 29.5 
1976 17.0 28.2 
1977 15.1 27.0 
1978 13.0 24.0 
Source: Duncan & Goodwin, ibid: 99. 
Reductions in projected expenditure programmes are difficult to quantify in terms 
of their effect on the levels of service provision and employment in individual local 
authorities. Notwithstanding the argument that reductions in planned expenditure and 
programmes are not actually quantifiable cuts[Cresswell, 1994], the general nature of 
targets that are expressed as national totals serves to confound their impact at the local 
level. For the year 1975-6, for example, the government budgeted for a reduction of 
£86,000,000 in the education budget, but this still translated into 4% growth in 
spending, as the cuts highlighted were in proposed spending. [TUC 1960-1987,1975: 
167] Similarly, cuts that take involve reductions in the quality of provision, lowered 
standards of service, repair, and maintenance, and the use of inferior materials, are 
more difficult to quantify than large scale redundancies or the sudden slashing of 
projects. [Fryer, op. cit: 97] 
The Treasury, for example, estimated that the measures of July and December 
1976 would each increase unemployment by 100,000 across the private and public 
sectors. [Fryer et al, op. cit: 76] In contrast, the National Steering Committee Against 
the Cuts(NSC) estimated that 150,000 jobs were lost as a consequence of the 
December measures, and a further 250,000 in the following year. [CSE, 1979a: 2] 
Furthermore, the TUC estimated that the RSG settlement for 1977-8 would result in a 
reduction of 20-30,000 local government jobs. [1960-1987 1977: 278] Localised 
examples of these effects are difficult to identify, however, as employment levels 
were reduced through the non-filling of vacancies. [Fryer, op. cit: 97]' Labour costs 
were also reduced through the switch from full-time to part-time labour, 
discussed in 
Chapter One, and became common practice during the two years from March 
1976. [loc. cit. ] 
4 Redundancies did take place, however, in Surrey County, Strathclyde, Tayside and 
Glasgow, and 
NALGO estimated that there were 50,000 vacant local government posts 
in 1976. [Newman, 1982: 
459] 
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The measures adopted by the Labour Government to control money supply and the 
primacy afforded to inflation resembled those advocated by the Conservative Party in 
'The Right Approach', published October 1976. [McDonnell, 1978: 50] Accordingly, 
G Howe's reply to the Chancellor's budget speech in 1976 welcomed the 
Government's conversion, albeit that they were castigated for not going far 
enough[McDonnell, ibid: 51]; a view to which the practice of the Conservative Party 
in government in the 1980s bears witness. Significantly, however, the deflationary 
and quasi-monetarist approach' adopted by the Government was one of three 
alternative strategies proffered at the time. The others included the general Keynsian 
prescriptions for demand management' and the Alternative Economic Strategy(AES). 
The AES is of particular relevance here as it was advocated within the labour 
movement as a programme for economic growth that excluded reductions in 
expenditure and welfare provision. The most common components of the AES were: 
planning agreements; expanded industrial investment through the National Enterprise 
Board to reduce unemployment; increased public ownership, including control over 
the banks and financial institutions; cuts in military expenditure; price controls; 
selective import controls; and industrial democracy as a means of controlling the 
planning process. [CSE, 1979b; McDonnell, op. cit. ] These elements of the AES are 
evident in composite motions moved at the TUC in 1976 by the AUEW and 
NALGO[TUC 1960-1987,1976: 526 and 534], and the composite motion moved by 
NUPE at the LPAC in 1976. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1976: 161] The NALGO 
motion to the TUC was supported by COHSE, the CPSA, the FBU, NATFHE and 
NUPE. [Newman, 1982: 407] 
Significantly, NALGO identified the contradictions in the Government's thinking 
by pointing out the cyclical and self defeating effect of cuts: increasing unemployment 
and therefore public expenditure and borrowing to finance welfare payments, while at 
the same time reducing tax and national insurance contributions. [Newman, ibid: 463] 
Furthermore, by arguing that redundant public sector workers did not have the skills 
required by the private sector[McDonnell, op. cit: 62], NALGO undermined a central 
contention of the 'overload thesis', and the Government's case, that the public sector 
deprived the private sector of prospective employees. This does not, however, 
deny 
an intention of creating mass unemployment in order to reduce wage costs 
in the 
5 Attempts to control inflation and reduce public expenditure were 
intended to facilitate capital 
accumulation and thereby rejuvenate the private sector. 
Equally important, however, is the consequent 
move from validating the quality of service provision 
in terms of levels of employment levels, to the 
acceptance of meta-theoretical validation in terms of abstract exchange value. 
Thus, the Labour 
Government's variant of monetary fiscal analysis signalled the move toward measuring service 
quality, 
efficiency and effectiveness in terms of monetary as opposed 
to human worth, in theory as opposed to 
practice, a development now accepted as the norm 
in local government policy and practice. 
6A variant of which was represented by Peter 
Walker's call, in October 1977, for tax cuts and 
increased public expenditure channelled to industry under a panel of 
'experts'. [McDonnell, 1978: 52] 
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private sector, as implied by D Healey's 1975 statement referred to earlier, or the 
argument that attempts to reduce public expenditure were symptomatic of the 
restructuring of capital. [McDonnell, ibid. ] 
The term cuts is validated here through consideration of reductions in public 
expenditure, including the effects of inflation and underspending, and by considering 
reductions in proposed public expenditure for future years. This process is enhanced 
by exploration of specific measures for reducing local government expenditure, such 
as cash limits and loan sanctions, and identifying education spending and employment 
levels as affected areas. The effects of these measures on the levels and standards of 
individual local authority services are difficult to quantify, however, especially 
because of the range of bodies involved at local and regional levels, and through 
which national policies were implemented. [Fryer, op. cit: 104]. Finally, the absence 
of restrictions on the spending limits of individual local authorities, and their 
continued ability to finance local spending through local rates, left the levels of local 
democracy and autonomy relatively in tact. 
Trade Union Opposition 
Together with the conceptual principles espoused, the organisational and tactical 
aspects of the trade union campaign against public expenditure cuts in the late 1970s 
form the focus of this sub-section. Identification and exploration of these areas allows 
later labour movement campaigning activity to be evaluated immanently, in terms of 
their principles and practice, and therefore adds to the context within which the 
campaigns of the 1980s are interrogated. Thus, as part of this process, this sub- 
section explores the development of structures, tactics, and conceptual principles, 
identifies their relevance to the findings of other chapters and sections, and thereby 
develops the historical context and validation of categories. Particular attention is 
focused on those aspects of the campaign that were concerned with either: co- 
ordination and organisation; publicity and education; parliamentary 
intervention; or 
mass protest and industrial action, and thereby 
facilitates the development of 
analogies in subsequent chapters. 
Attempts to organise and co-ordinate opposition to public spending cuts 
involved a 
number of ad hoc bodies that resembled the structures and 
tactics employed in earlier 
and later labour movement campaigns. In 
October 1975, for example, the National 
Co-ordinating Committee against Cuts in the National Health Service was elected at a 
delegate conference organised by the 
Medical Committee Against Private 
Practice. [Fryer, 1979: 99] Similarly, in December 1975, a 
broad based committee 
was formed to oppose cuts in Manchester and 
involved ASTMS, ATTI, COHSE, 
FBU, MPU, NALGO, NUPE, NUT, the National Union of 
Students and the National 
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Abortion Campaign. [loc. cit. ] Also in December 1975, NALGO established a 
Campaign sub-committee of its National Executive Council(NNEC). [Newman, 1982: 
456] Local campaigns and protests were also organised by trades councils, such as in 
Lancashire, and by joint trade union committees in South Wales, Birmingham, 
Sheffield, Tyneside, Humberside, Oldham, Bristol, Portsmouth, Southampton and 
elsewhere. [Fryer, op. cit: 99] A campaign committee was also set up by NALGO's 
Metropolitan District, serving London. [Newman, op. cit: 465] 
Additionally, and in response to local developments and initiatives, NALGO and 
NUPE began to hold meetings at the national level during 1976, to explore the 
possibility of mounting a common approach to the Government's policy of 
cuts. [Fryer, op. cit: 100] This co-operation extended to a joint meeting of the research 
staff of both unions to discuss the opportunities for practical co-operation in the 
campaign, and to a NALGO-NUPE committee which considered a joint approach to 
other unions to muster support for a joint lobby of parliament on the issue of public 
expenditure cuts. [loc. cit. ] 
Another example of joint union co-operation is provided by the NSC, which 
involved representatives from ASTMS, COHSE, CPSA, NALGO, NATFHE, NUPE, 
the National Union of Students, NUT, and the TUC South East Regional 
Council. [Fryer, op. cit; Fryer, Manson and Fairclough, 1978; Newman, op. cit. ] Set 
up to plan a lobby of parliament in November 1976, the NSC was re-established on a 
continuing basis following a meeting of General Secretaries and National Officers of 
the unions involved in the original steering committee. Other NSC activity involved: 
meetings between senior full-time officials; staging regional 'days of action' involving 
stoppages, demonstrations, and lobbies; establishing regional and local joint union 
committees(JTUC); holding a delegate conference on the social wage; and, preparing 
and publishing joint literature setting out the arguments against cuts. [Fryer, op. cit: 
101] 
The decision of the NSC to establish regional and local JTUCs corresponds, in 
timing and nature, to the TUCLGC recommendation that joint committees be formed 
at the local level to combat redundancies. [TUC 1960-1987,1976; Leopold and 
Beaumont, 1982] Also at this time, the TUC General Council was encouraging trades 
councils to lobby local authorities and to resist government cuts. [TUC 1960-1987, 
1976: 188] A distinction needs to be drawn, however, between JTUCs that developed 
in response to local struggles[Burgess, 1994; Cresswell, 1994; Lowes, 1994]', and 
those that were the product of national edicts. TUC and NSC engendered committees, 
' In addition to the joint committees identified earlier in this sub-section, other examples include: a 
local Authority Workers Shop Stewards Combine formed in Coventry in 1975; and, a Joint Trade 
Union Committee in Swansea in 1976. [Walsh, 1982b: 7] Similarly, Chapter Five discusses the 
emergence of Liverpool's JSSC. 
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for example, were geared toward full-time officials as opposed to shop 
stewards[Lowes, ibid. ]; whereas the involvement of stewards made JTUCs more 
likely to be responsive to local events. 
In keeping with normal trade union practice, local publicity was produced on ad 
hoc bases for distribution at demonstrations and lobbies. [Fryer, op. cit: 99] Publicity 
was also produced though official union structures, including NUPE's internal 
circulars distributed to local branches, and a document entitled 'Inflation: Attack or 
Retreat', was produced in response to the Government's White Paper: The Attack on 
Inflation. 'Inflation: Attack or Retreat' argued that NUPE could not fight to defend 
member interests through wage negotiating machinery alone, but required trade union 
action on a broad political front. [Fryer, ibid: 98] Along similar lines to NUPE 
NALGO co-operation described earlier, the SCPS and the CPSA co-produced a 
pamphlet in 1975 entitled 'Cuts that Puzzle'. [loc. cit. ] The SCPS/CPSA document 
argued that Britain consumed less of its national product on public spending than 
comparable nations, and rejected the idea that a programme of cuts could solve the 
problems of inflation and unemployment. [loc. cit. ] 
Furthermore, as part of the pre-budget debate in 1976, NUPE produced an 
economic review entitled 'Time to Change Course', and called for a general trade 
union withdrawal from involvement in wages policy if the government continued with 
public expenditure cuts. [Fryer, ibid: 99] As part of its campaign, NALGO Publicity 
Department produced bulletins, speakers notes, leaflets, stickers and posters[Newman, 
op. cit: 458], and, in similar fashion to NUPE, produced an economic review in 1976 
and a document entitled: 'The Economic Situation and Cuts in Public Expenditure' in 
1977. [McDonnell, 1978] Finally, the NSC's 1977 document entitled 'Breakdown: the 
crisis in your public services' analysed successive government announcements of cuts 
in the various areas. [Fryer, op. cit: 96] 
A common labour movement approach to the dissemination and development of 
ideas and structures involves the concept and practice of the 'delegate conference'. 
Such activities appear as initiatives of both official or unofficial structures and their 
attendance rates vary accordingly. Individual or groups of delegates were accepted 
from recognised bodies such as trade union branches or local parties, but the bodies 
recognised depended on the organisers or sponsors of the conference. A national 
delegate conference on the social wage and cuts, for example, was organised through 
the NSC in March 1977. [Fryer, ibid; Newman, op. cit. ] The official sponsorship of 
this conference is reflected in its organisation and arrangements, with delegates being 
addressed by academics and national union officials, and by the attendance of 200 
delegates, from 23 different trade unions. 
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Other conferences held on related issues during the same period include: a National 
Save Our Hospitals Delegate Conference, staged in 1977 by Hospital Worker and the 
Right to Work Campaign[Fryer, op. cit: 102]; and, a National Right to Work 
Campaign delegate conference, held in Manchester in 1976 to protest against cuts and 
unemployment. [Fryer, ibid: 100] Similar initiatives, undertaken in the 1980s, are 
described in subsequent chapters and, as has already been recorded, a delegate 
conference was organised as part of the Clay Cross campaign. 
Opposition to public expenditure cuts also took the form of demonstrations and 
lobbies of Parliament, trade union, and Party conferences. The National Co- 
ordinating Committee against Cuts in the NHS, NALGO, and the Socialist Medical 
Association, for example, organised a demonstration held in London in April 
1976. [Fryer, ibid: 99] Local demonstrations and days of action also took place toward 
the end of 1976, during the early months of 1977[Fryer, ibid: 102], and were 
supported by sections of the labour movement not involved in the NSC. British 
Leyland shop stewards in Birmingham supported local initiatives[loc. cit. ], for 
example, and local sections of the AUEW, TGWU, GMBATU, and EETPU 
supported the NSC's lobby of Parliament in November 1976. [Fryer, ibid: 101] 
Furthermore, workers from Greenwich Reinforcements, a British Steel subsidiary, 
were disciplined for supporting a NALGO/NUPE day of action against public 
expenditure cuts. [Newman, op. cit: 446] 
Other examples of mass protest against public expenditure cuts and unemployment 
involved: the Hospital Worker group and Hammersmith JSSC joining the TUC North 
West Region's lobby of Parliament in 1976[Fryer, op. cit: 99]; NUPE organising 
lobbies of the TUC and LPAC to encourage support for an NSC lobby of Parliament 
in November 1976[Fryer, ibid: 100]; and a national week of action from 21 November 
1977, including a rally and lobby of Parliament[Fryer, ibid: 102] and the presentation 
of a 175,000 signature petition to 10 Downing Street. [Newman, op. cit: 466] 
Parliamentary intervention was also evident, at the level of the TUC General 
Council and its Industrial Committees. The Trade Union-Labour Party Liaison 
Committee, and other links within the Labour Party were therefore used by the 
General Council to try and influence government policy and practice; as were contacts 
between other TUC committees and corresponding government departments and 
Ministers. In 1975, for example, the restoration of cuts in education, announced by 
the previous Conservative Government, was made a condition of the Social 
Contract. [TUC 1960-1987,1975: 166-7] 
Other TUC activity illustrates the importance attached to education as an area of 
service provision worth defending. As part of the 1976-7 Social Contract discussions, 
for example, the TUC General Council pressed the Government to avert cuts in 
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education[TUC 1960-1987,1976: 412-3], and at a meeting with the Education 
Secretary, in November 1976, the TUC outlined its continuing opposition to the 
Government's plans. [TUC 1960-1987,1977: 136-7] In relation to more general 
matters, the TUC Economic Committee also met with the Chancellor and Prime 
Minister, in July 1976, and expressed concerns over the proposed reductions in the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement(PSBR) for 1977-8. [TUC 1960-1987,1976: 
309] During the meeting the TUC argued that cuts were not necessary up to the 
planned date of 1980, and expressed the concern that cuts increased unemployment 
unnecessarily. [loc. cit. ] 
The stances adopted by the TUC, representing both private and public sector 
unions, demonstrate the futility of postulating simplistic sectoral cleavages based on a 
dichotomous interpretation of trade unions recruiting in the public and private 
sectors! So to, do the organisational practices of GMBATU, TGWU, EETPU, and 
UCATT, who all recruit in both public and private sectors. Furthermore, to 
distinguish between the interests of trade unionists on the basis of their employer 
discounts the possibility that low paid workers employed by private enterprises 
benefit from the social wage. The estimated job losses, identified earlier as a result of 
cuts in public expenditure, also affected both sectors; not least because of consequent 
reduction in public sector orders for goods and vehicles, and a decline in construction 
work in housing, hospitals, schools and roads. [Newman, op. cit: 462] 
Finally, the apparent contradiction between the motion moved by the AUEW at the 
TUC in 1976[TUC 1960-1987,1976: 526], with it's implicit criticism of public 
expenditure restrictions, and H Scanlon's , argument that there was a need for 
cuts[Fryer, op. cit: 100], is not as surprising as it might first appear. On the contrary, 
these conflicting stances merely reinforce the validity of observation made in Chapter 
Two, in reference to the invented dichotomy of left and right. In other words, 
absolute distinctions based on dichotomy, in this case between private and public 
sector interests, are meaningless in relation to categories and issues that arise on a day 
to day basis. 
As well as identifying employment and service provision, such as education, as 
areas of labour movement concern, this sub-section allows clear analogies to be 
drawn between the campaign structures and tactics practised in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Particular similarities involve: the existence of, and roles played by national joint 
committees and organising bodies; the use of publicity to encourage mobilisation and 
participation; the development of local JTUCs; the staging of delegate conferences; 
and, calling weeks of action, lobbies of Parliament, and demonstrations at the local 
8 McDonnell[ 1978: 60] argues, for example, that little support for the campaign against the cuts was 
forthcoming from manufacturing trade unions. 
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and national levels. Furthermore, the development of local government trade unions, 
considered in Chapter Two, had implications for the trade union campaign against 
cuts in the 1970s. Campaigning activity, for example, was hampered by the 
underdeveloped organisational forms and the absence of well established shop 
stewards systems[Fryer, ibid: 98], but benefited from, and contributed to, struggles to 
establish internal democracy and shop steward structures. 
Finally, involvement in trade union campaigning activity against cuts, by those 
who were traditional targets for cuts and redundancies, contributed to the organisation 
and radicalisation of such groups. [Fryer, ibid: 104 & 109] Such activity also 
contributed to the development of activism, organisation, and structures that 
facilitated more concerted opposition and resistance on the 1980s. These 
developments are evidenced through the historical context constructed over the first 
three chapters. Their identification and exploration therefore allows the policies and 
practice of the campaigns of the 1980s to be understood, not in isolation, but as the 
product of particular historical developments and experiences. 
Opposition in the Labour Party 
The sources available offer scant evidence of internal Labour Party opposition to 
the Labour Government's public expenditure cuts and their effects. The scarcity of 
evidence means that it is unwise to draw concrete conclusions. One of the few 
examples of such activity relates to the Camden Labour Group in London which, 
under the leadership of F Dobson, convened a London wide meeting to oppose 
housing expenditure controls imposed by the Labour Government. From that meeting 
an organisation called Labour Against Housing Cuts was established and involved 
T Banks, D White, and K Livingstone. This group evolved into Labour Against the 
Cuts, but their operations were limited and practised mainly in London. [Gyford, 1985; 
Kogan and Kogan, 1983; Livingstone, 1987; Seyd, 1987] Furthermore, at the GLLP 
Annual Meeting in 1976, affiliated trade unions expressed opposition to the cuts 
programme implemented by the GLC Labour Group; primarily because of the number 
of jobs lost. The meeting rejected the GLC programme of housing cuts and fares 
increases, and repudiated the Labour Government's cuts programme. [Livingstone, op. 
cit: 71-2] 
Outside the LPAC, there are few examples of dissension over the issue of cuts. 
One of the few examples of parliamentary dissent involves the abstention of 37 
Labour MPs from a vote on the Government's Expenditure White Paper in March 
1976. [Seyd, op. cit: 80] Opposition was evident within the Cabinet, however, and 
reflected the perspectives, identified earlier as alternatives to the Government's 
fiscal 
approach. A Crosland and R Hattersely, for example, preferred a Keynsian solution, 
90 
while A Benn promoted a version of the AES. [McDonnell, 1978: 58-9] The Tribune 
newspaper was also a vehicle for the expression of parliamentary dissent with G 
Sinclair and B Sedgemore espousing an AES line in December 1976, and April 1977 
respectively. [loc. cit. ] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, therefore, Fryer's 
assertion that opposition to cuts was principally a union campaign[op. cit: 103] seems 
to be well founded. 
The opinions of those involved in the Party at CLP, NEC and PLP levels, as well 
as those of trade union delegates, are indicated by the motions submitted and debated 
at the LPAC. Motions submitted to the Party conferences that were critical of the 
Government's cuts programme were moved, seconded, or received support from 
CLPs. In 1976, for example, composite 25 was moved by Richmond, and seconded 
by Bromsgrove and Redditch CLPs. The motion called on the Government not to 
implement further cuts in public spending, and to prevent further decline in the 
standards of social, education and community services. [Labour Party 1966-1984, 
1976: 158] 
An example of trade union opposition is provided by composite 26, which was 
moved successfully by NUPE in 1976, in spite of the NEC's request for 
remission. [Labour Party 1966-1984, ibid: 161] The NUPE motion was seconded by 
Cardiff North West CLP, supported by two CLP speakers, referred to the Party's 
manifesto commitment to improve and expand social services, and rejected the view 
that public spending on houses, schools, hospitals and health centres should be cut to 
provide profits in the private sector. It also argued that unity existed in the trade 
union movement to resist cuts and, expressed opposition to proposed cuts in education 
and social services. Furthermore, the LPAC was asked to support Labour councils 
refusing to implement cuts, and other Labour groups were encouraged to follow suit. 
Finally, the motion demanded a Labour Party campaign opposing cuts, and called on 
the NEC to support unions opposing cuts. 
Based on the evidence available, it seems that opposition to the Government's 
approach to public expenditure was most evident at the constituency level; the area 
most accessible to activists. Similarly, NUPE had a high profile of opposition, 
associated with a burgeoning activist movement and the growth in its shop steward 
structures; identified in Chapter Two. The motions considered here also identify 
specific areas of service provision to be defended, and therefore contribute to the 
validation of the category introduced in Chapter One. 
Not until 1979 and the return of Conservative Government, do motions opposing 
public expenditure reappear on the agenda of the LPAC. Composite 22 on public 
expenditure, for example, highlighted cuts in public services and called for the PLP, 
Labour groups, the trade union movement, and CLPs to unite in full scale opposition. 
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As part of this opposition councils were asked to refuse to implement cuts in services, 
and not to increase rates or rents. The NEC was also instructed to organise a 
campaign against cuts with the trade union movement, and to provide support for 
trade unionists involved in industrial action against cuts. As NEC spokesperson, 
Michael Foot opposed the motion, and the size of the card vote, 5.29m to 1.62m 
against, suggests trade union opposition to a motion which was moved and seconded, 
respectively, by Woking and Blackpool CLPs. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1979: 195-6] 
In contrast to the specific nature of composite 22, D Basnett, General Secretary of 
GMBATU, moved composite 23 which called for a campaign between the Labour 
Party, trade unions, and Labour local authorities to maintain services within the 
law. [Labour Party 1966-1984, ibid: 197] This motion was seconded by Pontefract 
and Castleford CLP, supported by Orpington CLP, and carried unanimously. There 
are two significant aspects in the nature of the motions submitted to the 1979 LPAC. 
First of all, both composites called for campaigns involving the Labour Party, trade 
unions, and Labour local authorities, and are therefore consistent with the principles 
and practice of the campaigns in the 1980s. Secondly, the general nature of composite 
23, and its call to defend services within the law, is indicative of the stance taken by 
the national leadership of the labour movement in the 1980s. These issues are 
explored in greater detail in forthcoming chapters. 
This chapter completes the historical context within which to explore and 
interrogate the principles and practice of the labour movement campaigns of the 
1980s. This is achieved by adding extra dimensions to the validation of the categories 
introduced in chapters One and Two, and by demonstrating their interrelations. Thus, 
the issues of service provision, employment, and local democracy are considered in 
terms of constitutional and labour movement practice. These three areas are, for 
example, explored in reference to: the campaign against the Housing Finance Act 
1972; South Yorkshire's transport policy; and, the Labour Government's conversion to 
a version of monetarist economic theory. 
Furthermore, the categories of labour movement, its constituent elements, and the 
development of structures and tactics through campaign committees, delegate and 
annual conferences are explored in reference to the areas identified. As part of this 
exercise, the practice democracy within the labour movement is identified and 
explored in reference to Clay Cross and South Yorkshire, as are the varying attitudes 
exhibited by its constituent elements to: service policy and provision; the autonomy of 
local authorities and local parties; and, the importance of employment. The impact of 
financial restraint on the areas of service provision, employment, and local democracy 
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are also explored in terms of. the changes in approach exhibited by the PLP and 
Labour Government; and, the broader labour movement responses engendered. 
In each of the above cases, the findings are cross referenced to those of earlier 
chapters, and identified as precursors of the principles and practice exhibited by the 
labour movement campaigns of opposition in the 1980s. In other words, 
developments in the organisation, outlook, and practice of the labour movement are 
understood as products and sources of the struggles referred to in this and earlier 
chapters. Finally, an interrelation is also identified between the Labour Government's 
acceptance and practice of a version of the monetary theory, and the policies pursued 
with greater vigour by the Conservative Governments of the 1980s. Chapters One to 
Three therefore provide an historical background to the 1980s; one which facilitates 
the reciprocal validation and interrogation of the practices and principles of the labour 
movement campaigns conducted during the first half of that decade. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 
AND LABOUR MOVEMENT RESPONSES 
Chapters One to Three established an historical context within which to examine 
the approach of Conservative governments to local government in the early 1980s, 
and more specifically, labour movement responses to it. As part of this process, the 
categories of local government service provision, employment, local democracy, and 
labour movement were validated in reference to practical developments and 
conceptual principles. ' This approach is practically reflexive, as described in the 
Introduction, because it asks reciprocally after the validity of empirical categories 
through recourse to meta-theory and vice versa; treating both levels of theory as a 
totality. The processes undertaken in the opening chapters therefore facilitate the 
reciprocal confrontation, in their historical context, of labour movement campaign 
practice and conceptual principles in the 1980s. 
The practically reflexive process is developed here through the reciprocal 
exploration and interrogation, in historical and contemporary terms, of the categories, 
principles and practices of campaigns mounted in the early 1980s. This reciprocal 
process is described in the Introduction as immanent critique, whereby the areas 
interrogated are selected by the conceptual principles of the subject; in this case 
selection rests with the incidence of labour movement resistance and therefore 
correspondence to conceptual principles relating to local government service 
provision, employment and local democracy. There are therefore no presupposed 
meta-theoretical or empirical categories against which to measure the principles or 
performance of the campaigns, and there is no external methodology to be employed 
as a means of conducting such an examination. Both levels of theory interact 
reciprocally and simultaneously without either being reduced to the other. 
In relation to service provision, for example, 
Chapter One charts the growth of services and the 
labour movement approach to the area. 
Similarly, Chapter Three considers examples of labour 
movement defence of service provision 
in the areas of housing and transport. 
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In accordance with this approach, the chapter consists of five sections entitled: 
Financial Restraint, Deregulation, Economic Regeneration; A Nascent Campaign; and 
Campaign Leadership. The first three sections focus on aspects of legislation that 
demonstrate the implications of Conservative Government policy and practice, 
between 1979 and 1983, for local government jobs and services, and for local 
democracy. The chapter therefore explores: the application of financial and other 
policies to local government by the Conservative Party; the justification of such 
measures; their practical implications; and, labour movement responses to them. The 
last two sections consider the extent to which the examples of localised resistance 
discussed in the chapter can be understood as elements of a broader campaign. 
FINANCIAL RESTRAINT 
The concept and practice of financial restraint is considered over three sub- 
sections entitled: Calculation and Distribution of Grant; Government Rationale; and, 
Labour Movement Resistance. The first sub-section identifies the main changes to the 
calculation and distribution of local authority funding, introduced by the Conservative 
Government between 1979 and 1983. As part of the on-going analysis, the following 
sub-section assesses, in reference to the Government's practice, the reasoning 
espoused as justification for the approach to local government expenditure. The third, 
and final sub-section discusses labour movement responses to the practice of financial 
restraint. As a whole, the section identifies and explores the implications of the 
Government's approach for local government services, jobs, and local democracy in 
reference to earlier conclusions and contemporary circumstances. Similarly, and as 
part of the same process, attention is afforded to related labour movement thinking 
and practice. Finally, by demonstrating the Government's inability to control local 
authority current expenditure, policy, and practice the chapter develops the historical 
context through which the provisions of the Rates Act 1984, and labour movement 
responses to it, can be interrogated. 
Calculation and Distribution of Grant 
The Conservative Government's approach to the autonomy and funding of local 
government are indicated by particular provisions of the Housing Act2 and the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act; both of 1980. These acts introduced procedures 
whereby funding for individual local authorities was calculated and distributed 
according to centrally devised formulae and criteria, and ostensibly removed 
local 
discretion to vary policy and levels of service provision. Under the Housing Act, for 
2 The Deregulation section of this chapter explores the extent to which the Act constituted an attack on 
local authority housing provision, by affording tenants of three or more years standing 
the right to buy 
their council house. 
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example, central government funding was calculated as the amount a local authority 
needed to break even on its Housing Revenue Account(HRA), after the deduction of 
notional income; assumed by the government to have been raised through rents, house 
sales and rates-[Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 153] Thus, if by virtue of the above 
calculation an authority's HRA was deemed to be in surplus, no general housing 
subsidy was allocated. [loc. cit. ] 
The use of centrally devised formulae imply that greater central control was 
exerted over local housing policy. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid; Rayner and Conway, 
1981] Through the use of negative incentives, for example, the Government 
attempted to set minimum levels for each authority in relation to: rents charged; 
houses sold; and, rates used to fund housing provision. Ultimately, however, 
authorities were not obliged to obey Government guidelines, as they could subsidise 
housing provision through local rates charges. Ironically, therefore, the withdrawal of 
central funding left local policy effectively beyond central control, and by 1984-5 
only 46 of the 367 local authorities with responsibility for housing received central 
funding. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 153] Local control had a price for the local 
electorate, however, in terms of increased rates, discussed later, and through an 
increase in the average weekly rent for local authority housing in England, from £8.18 
in 1980-1, to £13.59 in 1982-3. [Stoker, 1988: 178] 
This aspect of the Housing Act indicated a change from the persuasive attempts to 
restrict local expenditure in the 1970s, to one whereby local authorities were coerced 
through the restriction of central funding if they failed to obey Government 
prescriptions. Thus, the use of centrally determined formulae to calculate funding, 
and the sale of 550,000 council houses by the end of 1984[Duncan and Goodwin, op. 
cit: 161 ], contributed to a reduction in central government spending on public housing 
to 3% of public expenditure in 1984-5, compared with 10% in 1974-5. [Duncan and 
Goodwin, ibid: 149]3 The extent to which these measures represented an attack on the 
policy and service provision of Labour controlled authorities, such as Norwich and 
Sheffield, is considered in the Deregulation section. 
Central control of grant allocation also formed part of the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act 1980, which replaced the RSG with a block grant. In similar 
fashion to the change to housing subsidy allocation, entitlement to block grant was 
calculated and distributed to authorities according to centrally determined formulae 
known as Grant Related Expenditure Assessments(GREA). The amount of block 
grant allocated depended on the circumstances of each individual authority, and 
corresponded to the balance remaining after a figure for 'locally raised rate 
fund 
3 The following sub-section considers increased spending in other areas, such as transfer payments, that 
served to reduce spending on public housing as a percentage of overall government expenditure. 
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contribution', or 'grant related poundage'(GRP), was deducted from the 
GREA. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid; Howells, 1982; Stewart, 1985; Travers, 1986] As 
with the HRA calculations, both the GREA and the GRP were calculated according to 
central criteria, and therefore intended to increase control of central contributions to 
local current spending. As RSG had been calculated according to previous years 
spending, and was therefore open to local authority influence, the change in funding 
arrangements implied a loss of local autonomy. As the following sub-sections 
demonstrate, however, authorities still retained some control by raising rates to 
compensate for lost grant, and by minimising the impact of targets and penalties by 
over estimating budgets. 
The changes in central funding favoured rural authorities[Boddy, 1984b; Duncan 
and Goodwin, op. cit; Gibson and Travers, 1985; Loughlin, 1986; Stewart, op. cit; 
Travers, op. cit. ], as opposed to urban areas which included impoverished inner-cities, 
required greater welfare facilities, and were generally represented by Labour local 
authorities. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 276] Similarly, the demographic and 
economic circumstances evident in authorities like Liverpool, and Clay Cross 
described in Chapter Three, where population migration and mass unemployment 
created a population dependent on council services, were integral factors in the 
election of Labour authorities, and the adoption of policies tailored to local needs. [loc. 
cit; Liverpool City Council, 1983; Liverpool City Council, undated(a)] The 
misnomer of overspending was therefore applied by central government as an external 
critique, based on calculatory models that did not reflect the practical circumstances 
facing those authorities. In effect, the Government's approach formed an attack on 
local authorities right to vary local levels of service provision which, as later 
observations confirm, formed the basis of labour movement claims to be defending 
local democracy. 
The Local Government Planning and Land Act also introduced annual cash limits 
on capital spending by individual authorities, and block allocations for education, 
personal social services, transport, housing, and other services. [Duncan and Goodwin, 
op. cit; Stoker, op. cit; Travers, op. cit. ]4 These block allocations were monitored by 
the relevant Government Minister, amounted to another form of central control, and 
therefore a reduction in local autonomy. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 110] The 
block allocation presents an appearance of greater flexibility within financial limits 
through the variance of allocation between blocks[Travers op. cit: 141]; a perception 
reinforced by allowing authorities to spend up to a limit of 10% over allocation, and 
' Given that education, personal social services, transport, and housing are identified as the major 
areas of capital spending, standards of service provision would be affected by the restrictions 
imposed. 
The introduction of new buildings, facilities, equipment and repair and renovation of existing ones 
was, for example, limited under the new controls. [Rayner and Conway, 1981: 
86] 
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to include proceeds from the sale of assets in any calculation of overspend. [Duncan 
and Goodwin, op. cit; Travers op. cit. ] In reality, however, further spending could be 
refused if previous allocations had been exceeded, and future allocations were reduced 
by any amount of overspend; including the 10% allowance. [Duncan and Goodwin, 
op. cit: 110] Finally, the use of capital receipts were also restricted from up to 100% 
of housing and non-housing capital receipts in 1981-2, to 50% in 1983-4, and to 20% 
of housing capital receipts by 1985-6. [Travers, op. cit: 142] 
Chapter Three records how cash limits for local government current expenditure, 
introduced by the Labour Government in the 1970s, were exacerbated by high 
inflation and unexpected levels of underspend. In the 1980s, the Conservative 
Government made a similar mistake by allowing cash limits on capital spending to be 
compounded by the effects of economic recession and high interest rates. This 
resulted in an under-spend of 21% in 1981-2[Boddy, 1984b: 218], and an estimated 
under-spend of one-third for 1982-3. [Caulcott, 1983: 80] The Government was 
therefore forced to urge local authorities to increase capital spending in October 1982, 
and to raise ceilings on such spending for 1983-4. [Boddy, 1984b] As a percentage of 
total local government expenditure, therefore, capital spending fell from 32% in 1975- 
6, to 10% in 1982-3[Boddy, ibid: 219], and as a percentage of GDP from 4.5% in 
1973-4, to 1.1% in 1981-2. [Travers, op. cit: 144] The relative severity of measures to 
reduce capital spending is illustrated by Table 4.1 which compares local authority 
current and capital expenditure during the period. 
Table 4.1 
Local Government Capital and Current Expenditure 





1979-80 5,952 22,291 
1980-81 4,912 22,894 
1981-82 3,312 23,352 
1982-83 2,772 23,958 
(est. outturn) 
Source: uauicott op. cit: i antes '+ ana : ). 
As Table 4.1 indicates, the Government exerted more control over capital than 
current spending. The reasons why current expenditure continued to rise are 
considered in following sub-sections, in terms of the flaws evident in Conservative 
attempts to control current spending, and as a consequence of labour movement 
responses. For the moment, attention is focused the imposition of targets and 
penalties aimed at reducing grant allocation for those local authorities deemed to be 
high spenders. This approach first appeared with the Local Government Planning and 
Land Act, which introduced a grant taper to discourage authorities from spending 
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more than 10% over government guidelines. [Boddy, 1984b; Stoker, op. cit, Travers, 
op. cit. ] Together with the later imposition of centrally defined targets and penalties, 
this move represents a clear threat to local autonomy by attempting to limit spending 
on projects financed through local taxes, and subject to electoral approval. 
The changes in the calculation and imposition of penalties were frequent and 
complicated, and are therefore summarised in tables 4.2,4.3 and 4.4. The said tables 
detail the various targets set by the Government, the penalties imposed for breaching 
targets, and provide an indication of the increasing severity of penalties imposed 
according to the percentage level of overspend. Thus, January 1981 saw the first 
individual targets allocated to local authorities in England. [Stoker, op. cit, Travers, op. 
cit. ]' The system of targets and penalties were not included in the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act 1980, however, and therefore required retrospective 
legalisation by the Local Government Finance Act 1982. This Act also abolished the 
right of local authorities to levy a supplementary rate, thereby removing the ability to 
raise extra revenue during the year to offset the effect of government 
penalties. [Stoker, op. cit. ] 
Table 4.2 
Local Authority Targets 
1981-2 5.6% below each authority's 1978-9 current spending in volume terms; 
1982-3 1981-2 minimum volume budget, i. e. lesser of an authority's original or 
revised 1981-2 budget. 
1983-4- tied to 1982-3 targets: authorities budgeting to spend less than one 
percent over 1982-3 target allowed 1982-3 budget plus 4%; those over 
1% allowed 5% on top of their 1982-3 target, as long as the new target 
was not more than a1% reduction in the authority's 1982-3 budget. 
Sources: Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit; Gibson and Travers, op. cit; Loughlin, op. cit; 
Stewart, op. cit. 
Table 4.1 demonstrates the increase in current spending during the first four years 
of the Conservative Government.. In 1981-2, for example, local authority spending 
exceeded government targets by an estimated 5.3%[Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit; 
DOE, 1981], and by 1983-4 the overspend was still 3.8% in England. [NALGO, 
1984a: 3] This was in spite of a reduction in the proportion of local authority current 
expenditure supported by central government grant, from 48.5% in 1979-80, to 35.9% 
in 1982-3. [Travers, op. cit 211]1 Changes in the percentage of grant allocation are, 
however, the product of both central government reductions and compensatory rate 
rises, whereby the latter serves to exaggerate the impact of the former. Thus, Table 
4.5 shows overall reductions in central contributions to local expenditure in England 
Targets were not applied in Wales until 1983-4. [Stewart, 1985: 21] 
References to levels of overall expenditure should not be confused with those of current or capital 
expenditure, but represent a total of the two. Similarly, separate references to capital and current 
expenditure are made for the purposes of illustration. 
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and Wales, for England from 1979-80 to 1983-4, and the reduction in the proportion 
of RSG contributions. 
Table 4.3 
Targets and Penalties, 1981-2 to 1983-4 (England Only) 
1981-2 1981-2 1983-4 









Higher of volume 
target or GRE 




Resetting of poundage 
schedule so as to 
increase the rate 
poundage cost of 
spending at GRE by 
9.03p with steeper 
slope and taper. Full 
protection for 
authorities spending 
below the higher of 
GRE or target. 
Authorities not more 
than 2% above target 
protected from 75% 
of grant loss and 
authorities between 
2% and 4% above 
target protected from 
40% of grant loss- by 
means of multipliers 
Higher of target or 
GRE constitute 
effective target 
Continuous, 3p for 
each percentage 
point 
15% or more above 
effective target 
Increased poundage 




target' and partial 
protection for those 
spending up to 5% 
above `effective 
target' by means of 
multipliers less than 
one. 
Target i. e. no GRE 
exemption 
Continuous, lp for 
each of the first two 
percentage points 
above target. 5p for 
each point thereafter 
No maximum 
Multipliers greater 
than one set for 
authorities 
exceeding target. 
less than one. 
Source: Travers op. cit: 128 
Table 4.4 
Penalties Imposed. Rate Poundage Effect 
Expenditure above Target 
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 
1981-2 2p 2p 6p 6p 9p 9p 9p 9p 9p 
1982-3 3p 6p 9p 12p 15p 15p 15p 15p 15p 
1983-4 lo 2p 7p 12p 17p 42p 67p 92p 142p 
Sources: Travers, op. cit; Loughlin, op. cit; Stewart, op. cit. 
100 
In general terms, government grant fell from 61 % of a local authority's budgeted 
expenditure in 1979-80 to 53.8% in 1983-4. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 153] There, 
were variations in the reductions cited, however, and these reflect the period covered 
and the element(s) of spending referred to. Cochrane, for example, cites a reduction 
in RSG as a percentage of budgeted expenditure from 66.5% in 1975-6, to 50% in 
1983-4. [1985: 44] Alternatively, Duncan and Goodwin state that central government 
grants covered only 55% of local government expenditure in 1981-2, compared to 
63% in 1975-6[op. cit: 110], and that RSG dropped from 61% of expenditure in 1980- 
1, to 45% of a reduced total in 1985-6. [ibid: 123] NALGO, on the other hand, reflect 
the figures shown for England in Table 4.5, when RSG as a percentage of relevant 
expenditure is identified as falling from 61% in 1979, to 52.8% in 1983-4, and to 
51.9% in 1984-5 [op. cit: 4] There is, however, general agreement that as a percentage 
of GDP local government spending fell from 15.9% in 1974-5, to 12.8% in 1983- 
4. [Cochrane, op. cit; NALGO, op. cit. ] 
Table 4.5 
Grant uercentaLye at main Rate Suunort Grant Order 





1980-81 61.0 60.1 
1981-82 60.0 59.1 
1982-83 57.1 56.1 
















1978-9 to 1979-80 0.5 
1978-9 to 1980-81 1.1 
1978-9 to 1981-82 2.2 
1978-9 to 1982-83 4.1 
1978-9 to 1934-84 6.4 
1978-9 to 1984-85 8.9 
Sources: Caulcott, op. cit; Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit. 
Note: Both Caulcott and Duncan and Goodwin[op. cit. ] cite 61% for England and 
Wales 1980-81 as opposed to Blunkett and Jackson's figure of 60%. 
This discussion focused on the implication of financial restraint for local 
democracy and autonomy. The argument is not, however, clear cut. On the one 
hand, 
central government increased its control over the allocation of 
funding, but authorities 
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retained a degree of autonomy as to how the reduced funds could be spent. 
Furthermore, they also retained the right to use local taxes to supplement central 
funding in order to pursue, within legal constraints, the wishes of their local 
electorate. The extent to which such autonomy was restricted by imposition of targets 
and penalties and the effects they had on local policy, service provision and 
employment levels are explored in the following sections and sub-sections. 
Government Rationale 
A chasm exists between the pronouncements and practice of the Conservative 
Government in its approach to local government funding. This stems from the 
Government's eclectic use of economic devices, and is confused further by the 
indolent 'monetarist' categorisation of the Government's approach to local government 
finances. While the use of interest rates to control money supply may, for example, fit 
a monetarist categorisation, there is little macro-economic justification for the 
imposition of spending targets and penalties on individual local authorities. [Boddy, 
1984b; Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Lansley, Goss, and Wolmar, 1989]' In 1982-3, 
for example, local government accounted for only 4.1 % of the PSBR as opposed 79% 
for central Government, and 17% for public corporations. [Boddy, 1984b: 230] In 
view of the percentages involved it is difficult to justify, in monetarist terms, the 
concern to control or reduce current spending at the local level, even if, as Caulcott 
argues, the PSBR would have been higher if central contributions had not been 
controlled. [ 1983: 77] 
Another flaw in the monetarist categorisation is indicated by Table 4.6 which 
shows central government expenditure rising between 1979-80 and 1982-83. This rise 
in central expenditure does not fit with the monetarist prescription of controlling or 
reducing money supply, but is attributable to increased defence spending, to increased 
transfer payments to finance mass unemployment, and increased pension provision, 
associated with improved longevity. [Caulcott, ibid; Goldsmith, 1985; Howells, 
1982](see Table 4.7) Reductions in local authority grant provision can therefore be 
explained in terms of priorities, as the Government chose to finance unemployment, 
pensions, and defence. [Travers, 1986: 80] Furthermore, the Conservative Party's 
antipathy toward the collectivist ethos and practice of local service provision provided 
a motive for the attack on local government in general and on Labour local authorities 
in particular. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Boddy, 1984b; Duncan and 
Goodwin, op. 
cit; Goldsmith op. cit. ] The fact that the reduction of state intervention at the 
local 
' Chapter 6 revisits the question of the Government's monetarist credentials 
by considering rate 
limitation as a macro-economic device. 
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level required strong intervention by the centre is but another paradox of Conservative 
policy and practice. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 108] 
The Government's pronouncements are a further source of confusion if principles 
and practice are interrogated reciprocally. A DOE press notice of 19.6.80[Liverpool 
NALGO Branch Records], for example, states that public expenditure reductions are 
central to the Government's economic strategy, but this is contradicted by the data 
presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Furthermore, the notice states that 'Extra local 
authority staff and employees mean fewer houses, old persons homes, schools, roads 
and less work in the construction industry' because local authority staffing accounted 
for 70% of gross expenditure. [loc. cit. ] In practice, however, the introduction of cash 
limits for local authority capital spending does not equate with the apparent desire to 
protect the capital projects mentioned. The unspoken intention here, but one apparent 
from the measures discussed in the Deregulation section, is that the Government 
expected such functions to be transferred to the private sector. 
Table 4.6 
Total Central and Local Government Expenditure 
1979-80 to 1982-83 at Constant Prices (mid 1981) (Britain 
Central Local Government 
Government £m. 
£m. 
1979/80 73,493 28,242 
1980/81 75,179 27,805 
1981/82 76,933 26,664 
1982/83(est. outturn) 79,856 26,730 
Source: Caulcott, op. cit: 71 
Table 4.7 
Central Government Current Expenditure 1979-80 to 





Total Current Social Current Security and 
Expenditure security Expenditure Defence 
£m(Nov. 81) Expenditure £m(Nov. 81) £m(Nov. 81) 
£m(Nov. 81) 
1979-80 66,146 24,987 12,060 29,099 
1980-81 67,860 25,537 12,376 29,947 
1981-82 70,459 27,932 12,606 29,921 
1982-83 73,041 29,256 13,402 30,383 
Source: Caulcott, ibid: 74 
The absence of Green or White Papers to accompany the introduction of the block 
grant system makes identification of the Government's objectives and rationale 
difficult. Nevertheless, four objectives are discernible from a variety of sources: 
equalisation of authorities rateable value per head; simplification of the calculation 
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process; improved local accountability through the publication of needs assessments; 
and, a reduction in local spending levels. [Gibson and Travers, 1985: 17] In practice, 
however, the introduction of targets and penalties served to undermine the first 
objective by treating each authority as a special case. Similarly, the complicated and 
ever changing system of targets and penalties undermined the aim of simplification, 
and removed any semblance of accountability by making needs assessments more 
complex, and therefore more difficult for voters to comprehend. [Gibson and Travers, 
ibid: 21 ] 
The gap between pronouncement and practice is also evident in the mechanisms 
employed by the Government to control local authority current expenditure. As has 
been stated earlier, some of the reasons why local authority current expenditure rose 
are attributable to flaws in the mechanisms and calculations employed by the 
Government. Traditionally low spending authorities, for example, were encouraged 
to spend up to their GREA when the use of the new formulae calculated their needs in 
excess of present spending. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit; Howells, op. cit; Travers 
op. cit. ] In 1982-3, for example, Inner London Boroughs budgeted for an increase of 
4.5% while the mainly Conservative non-metropolitan counties who accounted for 
nearly 45% of total expenditure, budgeted for an increase of 8.8%. [Boddy, 1984b: 
224] Hence the point made in the previous sub-section, that the Government 
penalised authorities controlled by Labour, and benefited those under Conservative 
control. 
Similarly, the practice of setting targets that were based on previous years budgets 
failed to reduce spending, as authorities with large budgets received larger targets, and 
were therefore encouraged to spend more to increase their targets. [Gibson and 
Travers, op. cit; Loughlin, 1986] In addition, local authorities were able to maintain 
spending levels by increasing rates to offset penalties, and create special funds with 
which to counter the effects of future reductions and limitations on grant. [Loughlin, 
ibid; Stewart, 1985; Travers, op. cit. ] These last two points indicate the degree of 
autonomy local authorities retained to resist central spending restrictions, and 
provides a partial explanation for the introduction of the Rates Act in 1984. 
Only in the area of local capital expenditure did the Government's claims match 
performance, and then the measures proved to be too effective and had to be relaxed. 
In terms of immanent critique, measuring practice against principles and vice versa, 
two related conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the Government's failure to put 
espoused principles in to practice or to realise stated aims, stems 
from epistemic 
weaknesses in the analysis and reasoning employed. In particular, this relates to the 
separation of theory and practice whereby needs assessments, targets, and penalties 
were calculated according to a priori criteria and not practical circumstances. 
The use 
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of centrally determined formulae, for example, represents a mode of external critique 
whereby anything that does not meet pre-ordained standards is rejected. 
Secondly, the practice of introducing a-priori standards and assessment criteria 
which allowed Conservative authorities to increase spending while penalising Labour 
authorities suggests that the macro-economic rhetoric was designed to conceal other 
objectives. Conservative Party antipathy toward Labour local authorities is, for 
example, evident in the 'Politics Today' series, published by Conservative Central 
Office, where Labour controlled councils are variously categorised in unvalidated 
abstract terms, as 'high spending', 'left-wing', 'lunatic', and, 'Red'. [21 February 1983 - 
1 March 1986]8 
Labour Movement Resistance 
The extent to which the resistance of the Conservative Government's financial 
restraint formed part of a broader labour movement campaign is considered in the 
final two sections of the chapter. For the moment, attention is afforded to localised 
incidences of resistance. Table 4.8, for example, supports the view that increases in 
annual and supplementary rates formed the main resistance of reductions in central 
funding by Labour local authorities in the early 1980s. [Stoker, 1988: 159] The Table 
also shows a decline in the use of the tactic, which reflects several factors including: 
the growing unpopularity of the tactic within the labour movement; increased pressure 
from central government; and, the use of special funds financed through earlier, 
higher, rate increases. 
In Sheffield, for example, rates were increased by 41% in 1980, and by 37% in 
1981 [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 154], in Liverpool by 50% for 1980-81 [Parkinson, 
1985: 29-31 ], and Lambeth levied a supplementary rate equivalent to a 70% increase 
in weekly rates for the period to which it applied, in order to compensate for a £5.6m 
reduction in grant imposed by the Government in July 1980. [Livingstone, 1987: 130]9 
Similarly, in 1982 the GLC's Labour administration combined a 35% rate increase 
with creative accountancy measures to finance its spending programme. [Livingstone, 
ibid: 217-8] The GLC rate increase was justified as a one off measure needed to 
finance future plans, and avoiding the experiences of Lambeth. [loc. cit. ] 
The rate increase tactic proved to be unpopular electorally, and within the labour 
movement. In Liverpool and Lambeth, for example, the Labour Party lost control in 
8 The analytical weaknesses include the categorisation of Labour councils as 
high spending on the 
basis of pounds spent per head of population[Politics Today # 
3,21 February 1983: 46]. No 
consideration is afforded to the practical circumstances that pertained to such authorities, and 
the 
evaluation of service provision in terms of abstracted exchange value 
is again demonstrated as a 
Conservative practice. 
' The Lambeth increase followed a failed attempt to mount a broad based campaign of resistance to 
the Government's approach, explored in the A Nascent Campaign section. 
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elections following the rate rises noted above. [Parkinson, op. cit; Lansley, Goss and 
Wolmar, 1989] Control was regained in Lambeth in November 1982, after the 
defection of a Social Democrat Party councillor to Labour[Kogan and Kogan, 1983: 
176], but Liverpool was not regained until May 1983. The case against rate increases 
also rested on the objection that increases in domestic rates were subsidising central 
government[Lambeth, 1980; Liverpool City Council, 1983], and increasing the 
burden on poorer domestic rate payers. [Lambeth, 1980; Liverpool City Council, 
undated(a)] Ironically, the change in attitude toward rate increases preceded the Rates 
Act 1984, and calls into question the need to cap rates. 
Table 4.8 
Domestic rate 
Increases in England 1980-84 (per cent) 
1980-1 1981-2 1982-3 1983-4 
27 19.4 15.4 7.3 
Source: Stoker, op. cit: 159 
Financial restraint resulted in reduced service provision and employment levels in 
Conservative authorities like Wandsworth where, in the absence of strong trade union 
action: 230 social service posts were made redundant; 11 social service aides posts 
deleted; a day centre closed; the number of meals on wheels reduced; and the home 
help budget cut by £380,000. [Rayner and Conway, 1981: 82-3] In Labour authorities 
such as Camden, Lewisham and Newcastle, however, cuts were also adopted and 
combined with rates increases. [Lansley et al. op. cit: 32] 
Thus, the local authority associations warned that the combined effect of 
expenditure reductions, unrealistic targets, and the change to cash planning could 
result in actual cuts of 9% in 1982-3 and a loss of 250,000 local government 
jobs. [NALGO, 1981: 3]1° More specifically, the Labour controlled authority of 
Sheffield reduced its new house building programme to a virtual standstill, and by 
March 1980 the local authority housing list had increased over the previous year by 
5,000 names. [Alcock and Lee, 1981: 74] Similarly, the Labour Group in Birmingham 
introduced: a moratorium on spending prior to the 1982 local elections; reduced the 
1981 education budget by £3,000,000; privatised Sutton Coalfield 
Leisure Centre; and 
introduced a vacancy freeze and a redundancy programme. 
[Kline, 1983: 94] 
Apart form increasing rates, a series of financial devices were employed to 
maintain spending commitments, jobs, and minimise cuts 
in service provision. [Stoker, 
op. cit: 160] This 'creative accountancy' was used primarily as a means of avoiding 
penalties and maximising grant allocation. 
The main devices employed were: the 
'o Between January 1979 and September 1982 local government 
in England and Wales lost 97,500 full 
time equivalent posts. [Travers, 1983: 
64] 
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creation of special funds in one year for revenue purposes in other years; 
capitalisation, whereby spending on repairs and maintenance was transferred from the 
revenue to the capital account; the re-scheduling of debt re-payments to reduce 
revenue spending on interest payable for capital borrowing; and, deferred purchase 
schemes to avoid restrictions on a local authority's capital allocation by transferring 
spending on projects to another year. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 155] Thus, local 
authorities sought to maintain local service variation, and therefore local autonomy 
and constitutional democracy, by using local rates charges or technical financial 
devices. In either case, defence was carried out through the abstracted form of the 
state and did not involve the mobilisation or participation of labour movement 
members. 
Resistance also included legal challenges mounted by Brent and Camden London 
boroughs, again through abstracted state structures, against central government 
financial orders under 1980 Act. [Blunkett and Jackson, ibid; Duncan and Goodwin, 
1988; Stoker, op. cit. ] Birmingham and Greenwich also undertook separate legal suits 
against the Government, and found that the Local government Planning and Land Act 
was drafted incorrectly, and all RSG paid since 1980 was therefore illegal. [Duncan 
and Goodwin, op. cit: 124] By depending on increased rates, cuts, financial 
manoeuvring, or legal action, however, the labour movement failed to address or 
resist the impact Government policy and practice was having on the welfare state and 
local democracy. [Clarke and Cochrane, 1989: 53] In other words, the Government 
was engaged on its own technical ground, and its policies not confronted. [Blunkett 
and Jackson, op. cit: 156] 
The imposition and resistance of financial restraint was conducted by councillors 
and professionals through abstracted structures of the state, and in terms that were not 
easily accessible to the lay person; as elector, trade unionist, or Labour Party member. 
The areas of resistance discussed above, for example, indicate that service provision 
and jobs were defended by minimising the impact of financial restraint, as opposed to 
confronting it. Campaigns of resistance involving broad-based mobilisation and 
participation were attempted, but tended to be local and against Labour authorities not 
with them. In Birmingham, for example, a Public Sector Liaison Committee was 
formed to combat cuts and redundancies, but not all local unions participated 
in its 
organisation of demonstrations. [Kline, op. cit: 94] 
Local examples of opposition and resistance also tended to 
be isolated, and the 
result of, and reason for, the practice of resistance being restricted to councillors and 
officers. Attempts to develop a broad based campaign against 
financial restraint, and 
the reasons for its failure are discussed in the Nascent 
Campaign section, and explored 
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in later chapters. In the early 1980s, however, labour movement responses were also 
engendered by other areas of Government policy and practice toward local 
government. These areas, and their relevance to financial restraint, are explored in the 
following sections to provide a broader picture of the policies and practices of both 
Government and labour movement, and to develop the historical context within which 
to analyse later labour movement activity. 
DEREGULATION 
The discussion of financial restraint concentrated on implications for local 
democracy and autonomy, while indicating a impact on service provision and jobs. 
This section concentrates on the implications for local government service provision 
and jobs of transferring local government functions to the private sector, and therefore 
develops the analysis of the Government policy and practice toward local government. 
Three areas of legislation demonstrate the relevant aspects of central government 
policy and practice: the provisions of the Transport Acts 1980 and 1983, aimed at 
deregulating local bus services; changes to the operation of local authority Direct 
Labour Organisations(DLO) introduced by the Local Government Planning and Land 
Act 1980; and, the sale of council houses under the Housing Act 1980. In keeping 
with the interrelation identified, in this and previous chapters, between variation of 
local service provision and local autonomy and democracy, the transfer of functions 
and responsibilities to the private sector had the effect of restricting options for local 
policy and service variation, and also accountability. These changes and labour 
movement responses to them are explored here in three sub-sections entitled: Public 
Transport; Privatisation; and Council House Sales. 
Public Transport 
The provisions of the Transport Act 1980 are perhaps the least contentious of those 
discussed in this chapter. Ultimately, the Act was intended to make it easier for 
private sector operators to obtain licences to run bus services[Evans, 1985: 100], and 
in three trial areas removed the need for such licences altogether. [Stoker, 1988] 
Nevertheless, the Act constituted a step toward the transfer of functions to the private 
sector in an area of service provision identified in Chapter Three as 
important to the 
labour movement, and also posed a threat to job totals and working conditions. 
The 
following discussion considers examples of the effects such moves had on service 
provision and jobs, and labour movement responses engendered. 
In 1981 the Secretary of State for Transport exercised powers under section 43(2) 
of the 1980 Act, and repealed the Cardiff Corporation 
Act 1930 to allow private firms 
licences to run bus services on two routes. [Evans, op. cit: 
101] The Labour controlled 
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authority responded by reducing fares and increasing the frequency of services on the 
routes subject to private tender. [Evans, ibid: 102] Thus, it could be argued that 
service provision actually improved. When Labour gained control of South 
Glamorgan County Council in May 1981, however, the Passenger Transport 
Authority(PTA) refused an application from the private company to extend its 
services because they conflicted with the PTA's plans and policies. Furthermore, in 
July 1981, as part of a re-tender process, the County Council's schools transport 
contract, worth £8,000 per month, was awarded to Cardiff City Transport(CCT) who 
submitted a lower bid than the previous contractor; the firm involved in 
Cardiff. [Evans, ibid: 103] 
Significantly, the CCT contract was successful because the TGWU agreed to 
reductions in working conditions and changes in working practices to obviate the 
threat of privatising services. [loc. cit. ] As was argued in Chapter One, therefore, the 
labour movement engaged in the defence of job totals at the expense of quality. In 
particular, the extra duties required under the new contract were incorporated in 
existing shift duties, and the standard of maintenance checks on vehicles used under 
the contract were less than those undertaken on the rest of the CCT fleet. [loc. cit. ] In 
this latter respect, therefore, standards of service provision were reduced. 
The Transport Act 1983, though not overtly concerned with deregulation, invited 
challenges to local policy by introducing legal limits on public transport subsidies up 
to levels prescribed annually by the Transport Secretary. [Boddy, 1984b: 222] This 
legislation was at least a partial response to the transport policies implemented by the 
GLC, the Metropolitan counties of Merseyside and South Yorkshire, and the labour 
movement campaigns mounted to defend them. In December 1981, for example, 
following proceedings brought by Bromley borough council, the Law Lords declared 
the GLC's transport policy illegal because, in line with earlier examples of variation in 
service provision and local autonomous practice, London Transport fares were 
subsidised from rate income. In response the Labour Group adopted a position of 
non-compliance and launched a publicity campaign in January 1982 to build support 
for their stance. [Livingstone, 1987] 
As part of its campaign of non-compliance the Labour Group held meetings with: 
the public; local trade unions; Labour MPs; and, with the Secretary of 
State for 
Transport. [Livingstone, ibid: 198-9] The GLC also liaised with commuter and other 
community groups, and representatives of commuter groups and 
London Transport 
workers were co-opted onto its campaign committee. 
[Livingstone, ibid: 201] The 
trade unions also mounted their own campaign which 
began with a one day strike and 
threatened an indefinite stoppage if the 
Government failed to resolve the 
situation. [loc. cit. ] The practice of democracy 
in the GLLP, however, was uncertain. 
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Thus, although the Regional Executive voted 25 votes to seven in favour of non- 
compliance, the Labour Group only voted 23 to 22 in favour. Labour councillors 
therefore voted against: local party policy; their manifesto pledges; the wishes of their 
electors; and, with opposition councillors to implement the court decision and reverse 
the GLC's transport policy [Livingstone, ibid: 206-8] 
South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council's transport policy was threatened by 
the ruling against the GLC, and by court proceedings brought against Merseyside 
County Council by Great Universal Stores[Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Livingstone, 
op. cit. ] A campaign was therefore mounted by the South Yorkshire labour 
movement involving: a one day stoppage on 25.1.82, supported by engineering and 
steel workers; the distribution of leaflets; and, a 250,000 signature petition supporting 
local transport policy. South Yorkshire affirmed its transport and fares policy, 
following the vindication of Merseyside County Council on 17.2.82[Blunkett and 
Jackson, op. cit: 72-3], and thereby maintained an area of policy and service provision 
identified as important to the local labour movement in Chapter Three. 
The examples discussed here illustrate the complexity of the arguments and 
responses to what was perceived to be an attack on service provision, jobs and local 
democracy. In Cardiff for example, the local authority could argue that local 
autonomy had been compromised by the intervention of the Secretary of State and the 
imposition of private transport facilities. Alternatively, however, the removal of local 
discretion at one level, and its retention on another, resulted in the reduction of fares 
and increases in the frequency of services. This improved service, however, was paid 
for by reductions in the employment conditions of the work-force. 
Similarly, the local autonomy and electoral legitimacy of the GLC and Merseyside 
County Council were challenged in the courts; by another elected authority in the case 
of the GLC. In practice, the GLC had to amend its transport policy and service 
provision, but engaged the labour movement in a campaign which involved the 
membership at large in industrial action and demonstrations. Thus, in both examples 
activity involved abstracted structures and broader involvement at Councillor, activist 
and membership levels. In Cardiff, for example, the membership accepted the 
reduced terms and conditions as a means of saving jobs and avoiding greater 
reductions in conditions and levels of employment. 
Privatisation 
Changes in the operation of local authority DLOs, introduced under the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act 1980, represented a direct threat to jobs, services, 
and local democracy. By compelling local authority 
DLOs to make a 5% rate of 
return on each area of activity, such as maintenance and new 
buildings, as opposed to 
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on the whole operation as a private firm would[Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Stoker, 
1988], the Act reduced discretion and therefore local autonomy. Furthermore, DLOs 
were not allowed to tender for work outside the local authority remit, but had to 
compete with outside contractors for a percentage of existing work. [Blunkett and 
Jackson, op. cit; Stoker, op. cit. ] As with the Transport Act 1980, these measures 
indicate the Government's desire to transfer local authority functions to the private 
sector. They are also part of the process of reducing local expenditure, as discussed in 
the previous section, whereby private contracts reduce costs due to the fewer numbers 
employed, lower wages, and poorer working conditions. 
The extent to which such measures constituted an attack on jobs can be gauged by 
the 22.5% reduction in the numbers of DLO employees from 156,606 in 1980, to 
121,381 in 1985. This was accompanied by a fall of 17% in the value of DLO output 
from £1,800,000 to £1,500,000 over the same period[Stoker, ibid: 186]; though this is 
attributable to both the transfer of work to the private sector, and to restrictions on 
capital spending. Furthermore, of the 90,000 local authority jobs lost in England and 
Wales between 1979 and 1982[Travers, 1983: 64], the main losses were experienced 
by manual workers; especially those in construction and refuse collection. [Caulcott, 
1983; Travers, op. cit. ] In other words, jobs were lost in the areas where local 
authorities were required to compete for existing work with private companies. 
Both the threat of privatisation and the process itself were used to reduce jobs and 
working conditions, and therefore standards of service provision. In Birmingham, for 
example, 236 Refuse Collectors jobs were lost in 1982-3 as part of a successful in- 
house tender. [Kline, 1983: 96] Croydon's school cleaning contract, on the other hand, 
required longer hours to be worked for a smaller hourly rate of pay. Thus, although 
contractors claimed that their workers were- paid more per week than local authority 
employees, the former were working longer. [Halford, 1982: 4] Other examples of 
reduced conditions include: the removal of bonus schemes(Southend - Refuse 
Collection); the imposition of compulsory overtime at lower rates(Southend - Refuse 
Collection); reduced rates of sick pay(Wandsworth - Street Cleaning); reduced 
holiday entitlement(Southend - Refuse Collection, Wandsworth - Street Cleaning); 
and inferior or no pension provision(Wandsworth - Street Cleaning). [Halford, ibid: 4- 
8] Finally, employees lost rights to grievance and disciplinary procedures and, due to 
the practice of summary dismissal, rights to redundancy payments. [Halford, 
ibid: 8] 
National trade union opposition took the form of publicity drives among the 
general public and union members, which utilised the experiences of 
former 
employees of privatising firms. [Ascher, 1987] Individual unions also ran courses 
for 
stewards, brought high profile court cases against 
firms, and publicised industrial 
disputes as a means of deterring councils from 
looking to privatise work. [loc. cit. ] In 
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general terms, the TUC acted as a focal point for opposition[Ascher, ibid: 118], but in 
April 1981 the TUCLGC wrote to local government unions urging them to oppose 
contracting out because of its impact on the terms and conditions of 
employment. [TUC 1960-1987,1981: 331] Furthermore, the TUC's General Council 
issued the Keep Public Services Public pamphlet in April 1982, which outlined the 
TUC's case against contracting out as a threat to the social wage and local 
democracy. [TUC 1960-1987,1982: 285] Finally, the TUCLGC also wrote to 
Blackpool local authority, in 1983, threatening a boycott of their venues by the TUC 
and its member unions if services were privatised. In response, the local authority 
passed a motion promising no privatisation for 5 years. [TUC 1960-1987,1983: 301] 
Overt campaigns of opposition to the privatisation of council work tended to be 
localised, reflecting the development of the local labour movement, the Party 
controlling the local authority, and employer-employee relations. Opposition was 
mounted more often by trade unions in non-Labour local authorities, and a conference 
on tendering organised by Sheffield City Council in September 1984 attracted 200 
delegates. [Stewart and Underwood, 1983: 167] By 1983, for example, no Labour 
controlled authority had privatised a contract worth over £50,000. [Ascher, op. cit: 
Table 7.4, p. 222] This does not mean that Labour authorities refused to co-operate 
with requirements to submit a percentage of DLO work to private competition. More 
often than not, private tenders were deterred by strict contract specifications relating 
to: health and safety; trade union and employment rights; service standards; and strict 
penalty clauses. [Ascher, ibid: 115] Nevertheless, the financial restrictions identified 
in the previous section led authorities to seek savings by subjecting work to private 
competition, and thereby reducing staff numbers and working conditions. 
Given the variation in local circumstances trade unions allowed local branches to 
decide their own responses. Thus, in the absence of a national campaign, unions 
offered support to local branches where they felt the need to take action. [Ascher, ibid: 
114] One such local initiative was the 'Campaign Against Privatisation: Resistance 
83' organised by Basingstoke Trades Council. This involved public sector trade 
unions, local Labour Party delegates, tenants groups and the Labour groups on 
Basingstoke Council and Hampshire County Council. [Ascher, ibid: 122] Also in 
1983, the Gloucester branches of NALGO, NUPE and the TGWU met local MPs to 
discuss a joint strategy of combating privatisation. From this meeting the Gloucester 
City Public Services Defence Committee was established to rally local union 
members, mobilise public opinion, and organise a one day strike, 
demonstration, and 
lobby of the council. [Ascher, ibid: 229] Resistance collapsed, 
however, following the 
Conservative's local election victory. 
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Similarly, local authority workers in Wandsworth mounted a campaign involving 
local authority unions, rate-payers, local Labour Party branches and the local trades 
council. [Minogue and O'Grady, 1985: 38] The Wandsworth campaign had 
membership support in the form of a seven week strike over privatisation plans, and 
received support from workers in other authorities who refused to process refuse from 
Wandsworth. In almost a mirror image of Gloucester, however, the action folded with 
the Conservative's local election victory in May 1982. [Ascher, op. cit: 234]" These 
developments also bear similarities with the experience in Liverpool, discussed in the 
next chapter, where the local labour movement waged a campaign against 
privatisation of the Cleansing Service prior to the local elections of 1983. There, 
however, the Labour Party was successful electorally and the privatisation plans 
abandoned. 
Council House Sales 
Together with the new formulae for calculating housing subsidy and restrictions on 
capital expenditure, discussed in the Financial Restraint section, the mandatory sale of 
council houses under the Housing Act 1980[Rayner and Conway, 1981: 86] 
constituted a direct attack on an area of service provision central to the policy and 
practice of many Labour authorities. " The mandatory element of the Act was 
supported by section 23(3) and allowed the Secretary of State to 'do all such things as 
appears to him necessary or expedient to enable secure tenants... to exercise the right 
to buy'. [Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 157]. Almost 100 Labour councils stated their 
opposition to the Act, and in view of the perceived attack on local autonomy and the 
legitimacy of local electoral mandates, launched a national campaign against council 
house sales; involving a conference sponsored by Lambeth. [Alcock and Lee, 1981; 
Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit. ] 
By May 1981 39 local authorities had been contacted by the Housing Minister for 
not implementing the Act fast enough. [Evans, 1985: 105] In a similar fashion to the 
resistance of the Housing Finance Act 1972, however, the broader campaign had by 
November 1981 all but collapsed leaving only Norwich refusing to co-operate. The 
analogy can also be developed by comparing the argument espoused by Norwich and 
" Another example of attempted resistance involves the joint union committee formed 
in Birmingham 
in 1982 to oppose privatisation plans. The committee was dominated 
by full-time officials, however, 
and failed to resolve inter union rivalry and white and blue collar 
differences. [Kline, 1983: 94] Initial 
opposition among union members to the privatisation of the refuse collection, school cleaning, school 
meals, and caretaking services, also opted for negotiation and reduced working conditions as a means 
of saving jobs. [Kline, ibid: 96] 
12 In Sheffield, for example, 44% of its housing stock was council owned[Alcock and Lee, 1981: 
84] 
and in Norwich 50.4% of all households resided in 
local authority dwellings in 1981. [Evans, 1985: 
106] Similarly, the importance of housing provision to Labour authorities is demonstrated 
by the 
discussion, in Chapter Three, of the Housing Finance Act 1972. 
113 
Clay Cross, both of whom advocated the right of local authorities to make their own 
decisions about local housing stock. [Stoker, 1988; Skinner and Langdon, 1974] 
Furthermore, Sheffield's position had, in similar fashion to South Yorkshires transport 
policies in the 1970s and 80s, been bolstered by local electoral success on a manifesto 
commitment to oppose sales, agreed by the DLP and Labour Group. [Alcock and Lee, 
op. cit; Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit. ] 
As with the examples of opposition and resistance discussed in the previous 
section, however, the failure to develop a co-ordinated campaign meant that 
opposition occurred in isolated pockets; in this case, where co-operation occurred 
between sympathetic trade union branches and Labour groups. In particular, support 
for resistance was forthcoming from NALGO members who were required to process 
sales applications. Thus, NALGO conferences in 1979 and 1980, resolved: not to co- 
operate with new service demands without adequate funding; to oppose Council 
House sales in stress areas; and, to support councils resisting central sales 
directives. [Ascher, 1983: 14]13 In Glasgow, Hackney, Lambeth, Newcastle, Sheffield, 
and Southwark, for example, local union branches took the first initiative and refused 
to process applications without extra resources. [Ascher, ibid: 15] 
Disparity in the local action undertaken by trade unionists, local politicians, and 
tenants organisations was also a feature of opposition and resistance. In Barking, for 
example, opposition was the initiative of councillors and there was no trade union 
action. Camden councillors, on the other hand, encouraged the slow processing of 
applications, but NALGO pre-empted their position by refusing to process any at all. 
In contrast, Lambeth councillors agreed to co-operate with the Act, but NALGO took 
official action over the lack of resources. [Ascher, ibid: 16-18] NALGO action was 
confined to twelve Labour areas, however, where implicit support was forthcoming 
from the Labour Group. [Ascher, ibid: 19] 
Ultimately, resistance and the resultant failure to sell houses in line with 
government projections meant that local authorities lost revenue as a consequence of 
the GREA calculations described earlier. Thus, as with the other examples discussed 
in this section, the failure to comply with central government prescriptions served to 
compound financial restrictions. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 160] The case of 
housing, for example, involved the calculation of subsidy on the basis of a notional 
figure assumed to be raised from council house sales. 
There are obvious analogies between the abstracted and bureaucratic manipulation 
of financial controls, through creative accountancy techniques, and the tactics 
13 The justification of NALGO action relates to service conditions issues of processing more work with 
the same or less resources. This reflects the motivation of those 
involved in the action and also 
avoidance of the label of a `political', and therefore illegal, strike. 
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employed to delay council house sales by: requesting extra information; 'counselling' 
prospective buyers; limiting the number of cases reviewed each month; refusing to use 
the District Valuer for house valuation; and, refusing to delegate powers to officers, 
thereby requiring council committees to make all decisions. [Evans, 1985] Similarly, 
use of the courts to challenge the Government's financial mechanisms resembles 
Norwich's use of abstracted legal structures to resist the Government's imposition of 
commissioners in December 1981. In general, however, the extent to which 
opposition and resistance involved abstracted structures, broader involvement or a 
combination of the two, depended on local labour movement development. 
ECONOMIC REGENERATION 
The Conservative Government's approach to economic regeneration in the early 
1980s has been characterised as: state intervention to show that state intervention does 
not work[Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 132], and as continuing the property led 
emphasis of earlier initiatives. [Boddy, 1984a: 162] This approach exhibited four 
main characteristics: co-operation between central and local government; the creation 
of Enterprise Zones(EZ); the creation of Urban Development Corporations(UDC); 
and, the provision of urban development grants to support local initiatives developed 
between local authorities and the private sector. [Chandler and Lawless, 1985; Stewart 
and Underwood, 1983] The implications of these and other initiatives for 
employment levels and the practice of local democracy are considered over two sub- 
sections entitled: Central Government Approach; and Labour Movement Responses. 
The section therefore complements the findings of its predecessor by exploring 
another facet of the Government's attempt to promote the private sector and its drive 
to privatise state functions. Similarly, the exploration of categories relating to labour 
movement concern over employment levels and attempted solutions, develops the 
conclusions of earlier chapters. 
Central Government Approach 
In addition to the areas considered in the preceding sections, the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act 1980 instigated the Conservative Government's approach to 
economic regeneration: providing public assistance to private enterprise through the 
introduction of EZs and UDCs. [Duncan and Goodwin, 1988] EZs, for example, 
offered firms relief from taxation, as well as relaxed planning procedures. 
[Duncan and 
Goodwin, ibid; Stewart and Underwood, 1983]" Similarly, UDCs were funded by 
14 The financial assistance to firms located in EZs included: exemption 
from development land tax; 
100% allowance for corporation and incomes taxes 
for capital expenditure on industrial and 
commercial building; exemption from 
industrial training levies; and, exemption from paying rates on 
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central government, established in designated Urban Development Areas(UDA), and 
allocated local government functions relating to planning, housing, public health, and 
building controls. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit; Stewart and Underwood, op. cit. ] 
The two schemes indicate a reduction in the autonomy of elected local authorities 
through the transfer of functions to the centre or to un-elected agencies. Thus, 
although EZs were requested by local authorities and run locally, central government 
retained control over their designation and overall execution. [Duncan and Goodwin, 
op. cit: 132] 
UDCs represented a reduction of local autonomy and democracy through the 
transfer of functions from elected local authorities to un-elected bodies appointed by, 
and answerable to, central government. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid: 133] In addition, 
however, the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 allowed the Secretary of 
State to designate UDAs where it was considered to be 'expedient in the national 
interest', and to vest UDCs publicly owned land in, or adjoining, the designated 
UDA. [loc. cit. ] Thus, the transfer of functions and land was conducted under the 
pretence of an unvalidated meta-theoretical category of 'national interest', and 
therefore made it virtually impossible to challenge the decisions of the Secretary of 
State. 
The extent of this form of intervention should not by overplayed, however, as only 
28 EZs were created between 1981 and 1983 [Shutt, 1984: 29], and about 20 still in 
existence by 1984. [Chandler and Lawless, op. cit. ] Furthermore, the total number of 
jobs created in EZs during this time totalled no more than 3,000, and a number of 
those were jobs transferred from existing sites. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 134] 
The development of dockland on Merseyside and in London was transferred from 
local authority to UDC control in 1981, and by 1987 four more UDCs had been 
created in Tyne and Wear, Teeside, Manchester, and the West Midlands. [Duncan and 
Goodwin ibid: 136] Significantly, all six UDCs were in Labour controlled inner city 
authorities, as opposed to 15 EZs. [Duncan and Goodwin ibid: 141 & 136] The 
transfer of functions from local to UDC control corresponds to the practice, described 
in Chapter One, whereby functions are transferred from the electoral sphere to avoid 
challenges to central priorities. 
The Government's promotion of the private sector as an agent of local economic 
regeneration also involved a number of other initiatives. Some of these required 
private and public sector co-operation, but the involvement of the private sector 
led, 
inevitably, to a dilution of local electoral accountability and, ultimately, the exclusion 
of local authority participation. The Financial Institution 
Group(FIG), for example, 
industrial and commercial buildings, for which local authorities were reimbursed 
by the Treasury. 
[Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Shutt, 1984] 
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was formed in October 1981, seconded personnel from financial institutions as a 
means of promoting private sector interest in urban questions, and spawned a property 
service company, named Inner City Enterprises, which sought investment 
opportunities in inner city areas. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid: 142-3] Urban 
Development Grants were also an offspring of the FIG initiative, involving the use of 
public money to support private investment in 41 schemes by February 1983. [Duncan 
and Goodwin, ibid: 143] 
Co-operation between public and private sectors was a more obvious component of 
the Business in the Community(BIC) scheme. In this instance, regional DOE officers 
participated in the creation of local enterprise agencies which brought together local 
companies, chambers of commerce, voluntary groups, trade unions, and local 
authorities in schemes to assist local communities. Thus, by 1983 for example, 34 of 
the 100 active enterprise agencies had been developed through the BIC initiative. [loc. 
cit. ] In contrast to the BIC approach, however, the Task Force initiative introduced on 
Merseyside and in the West Midlands in 1983, excluded the participation of local 
authorities and trade unions. Under such schemes, civil servants from the Department 
of Industry, Manpower Services Commission, and managers from local firms were 
brought together to co-ordinate schemes and policies, pilot new initiatives, and 
allocate public subsidy. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid: 146-7] 
The examples discussed here illustrate a trend whereby responsibility for local 
economic regeneration was removed from the local electoral sphere. In this respect, 
the programmes contrast with the mainly local initiatives, identified in Chapter One. 
The examples demonstrate a reduction in local democratic accountability and control 
through the removal of functions and responsibility from local authorities to un- 
elected agencies, and to the unaccountable private sector. This is apparent in the 
direct involvement of ministers, the creation of agencies answerable only to the 
centre, the involvement of civil servants in bodies designed to develop local schemes, 
and the secondment of private sector personnel. " Finally, the reduction in funding to 
local authorities, discussed in the first section of this chapter, made local initiatives 
difficult to maintain. Thus, while resources committed to the urban programme 
reached £361,000,000 in 1985-6, £500,000,000 in RSG was lost by London 
authorities in 1982 alone. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid: 142] 
Labour Movement Responses 
Labour movement responses to the Conservative Government's approach to local 
economic regeneration were inconsistent, confused, and essentially took place at the 
15 The origins of these processes are evident in the Inner Urban 
Areas Act 1978, discussed in Chapter 
One, and introduced by the previous Labour Government. 
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Labour Group level. 16 In its Home Policy Statement of August 1980, for example, the 
Labour Party NEC announced its opposition to EZs, but by the end of 1983 15 zones 
were situated in Labour authorities, and Bradford MDC had requested that the whole 
of Bradford be designated as an EZ. [Shutt, 1984: 39 & 32] Furthermore, Salford's 
ruling Labour Group ignored a campaign by local residents against the proposed 
designation of an EZ in an area set aside for housing, a school, and parkland. [Shutt, 
ibid: 33] In effect, Labour authorities were presented with the option of co-operating 
with the EZ initiative, developing their own proposals[Shutt, ibid: 40], or risk 
accusations of not doing anything about local unemployment. 
This dilemma is evident in the stance adopted by those authorities that refused to 
apply for EZ status. North East Derbyshire, for example, refused to accept 
designation in the second round of EZ applications, and Manchester and Sheffield 
refused to apply. The latter authorities, however, drew up alternative proposals for 
local regeneration based on EZ applications. [Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Shutt, op. 
cit. ] More sustained examples of resistance involved the creation of an employment 
committee and department by Sheffield MDC, and enterprise boards by the GLC and 
by West Midlands County Council. These bodies pursued local economic strategies 
that differed from the Conservative Government's emphasis on private capital, and 
from attempted economic regeneration practised in the 1970s. [Boddy, 1984a: 165] 
Among other things, for example, the Sheffield employment department attempted to 
co-ordinate local authority, trade union, and community group activity to: prevent 
further job losses; stimulate new investment; create new kinds of employment; and, 
diversify job opportunities. [Boddy, ibid; Mclaverty, 1989; Seyd, 1987] Thus, these 
initiatives indicate the degree of autonomy retained by authorities. 
The scale of labour movement initiatives was only on a par with that of EZs. Thus, 
by December 1983, the Greater London Enterprise Board had approved investment 
worth £ 18.6m, in support of 142 projects, and saved or created about 2,000 
jobs. [Stewart and Underwood, 1983: 229] When compared to the employment levels 
of the larger metropolitan authorities and the scope for job creation and protection 
exhibited there, however, EZs and the initiatives of the Labour authorities pale into 
insignificance. At the end of 1982, for example, full-time employee levels in the 
largest authorities included: ILEA - 40,339; Birmingham - 30,508; 
Manchester - 
23,360; Liverpool - 21,705; GLC - 20,666; Sheffield 
20,495; Leeds - 20,162. [Travers, 
1983: Table 2]" Furthermore, through London Transport the GLC was until 1984, 
responsible for a further 60,000 employees. [Mackintosh and 
Wainwright, 1987: 15] 
1' Trade Union opposition and activity was focused on the anti-union nature of 
firms re-locating in EZs 
and health and safety matters. [Shutt, 1984: 41] 
" Similarly large employment levels are also evident among some other non-metropolitan county 
councils. [Travers, 1983, Table 2) 
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Together with the stimulation provided to local economies through the purchase of 
supplies and services, therefore, local authority employment levels represented a 
significant focus of attempts to create and protect jobs. Thus, the smaller Labour 
controlled London boroughs of Haringey, Hackney and Lambeth all increased their 
establishments between 1979 and 1982. [Travers, op. cit: 66] 
The introduction of financial restraint, the sale of council houses, the restrictive 
practices imposed on DLOs, the attempted privatisation of local government 
functions, and the introduction of EZs, UDCs, and other initiatives for economic 
regeneration, contrast with the policy and practice of Labour authorities discussed in 
this and previous chapters. The pressures exerted through financial restraint cannot be 
separated from the other areas, however, because reductions in bloc grant required 
authorities to raise rates, adopt creative accountancy measures, and look for savings 
through the privatisation and reduction of services. Similarly, central housing subsidy 
was premised on the sale of council houses. The measures identified and discussed in 
the first three sections of this chapter therefore required local authorities to review 
their spending commitments; an almost inevitable consequence of which, given the 
labour intensive nature of local government identified in Chapter One, was a 
reduction of labour costs. This interrelation is recognised in calls, discussed in the 
following section, for a comprehensive campaign of opposition. 
So far, the discussion of labour movement resistance has focused on localised 
examples, and on resistance mounted through Labour groups. Analysis of the internal 
democratic practice of the labour movement has therefore been limited, and relates 
mainly to the practices discussed in the Deregulation section. In contrast, the broader 
question of local democracy has been identified in all three sub-sections, in reference 
to the implications of Conservative measures for local autonomy and the legitimacy of 
electoral mandates. With the following sections, however, the focus of the chapter 
moves to consider the extent to which localised examples of resistance fit with the 
idea of a broader labour movement campaign. Thus, as part of this process, the 
internal democratic practice of the labour movement receives greater attention, and 
therefore facilitates the reciprocal validation of local democracy as conceptual 
principles and practice, in a broader context. 
A NASCENT CAMPAIGN 
The discussion of financial restraint, deregulation and economic regeneration 
subjected particular aspects of Government policy and practice to reciprocal 
interrogation, and explored their implications for the interrelated areas of 
local 
government services, jobs, and local democracy. Similarly, 
labour movement 
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responses to Government initiatives were identified and explored in terms of their 
conceptual principles and practice. Because the discussions followed Government 
policy and practice, however, the extent to which the examples of localised resistance 
can be understood as constituent parts of a broader campaign still needs to be 
addressed. 
Over the next two sections, therefore, consideration is afforded to the extent and 
nature of calls for a broad based campaign of resistance, and to attempts to build 
structures and alliances through which such a campaign could be conducted. The 
present section is divided into three sub-sections entitled: Conference Resolutions; 
Delegate Conferences; and Structures. These sub-sections explore: the nature of 
motions adopted and rejected at the LPAC and the TUC; the differences between, and 
the consequences of, the approaches advocated in the motions; and, the implications 
of such approaches for the existence of, and the roles played by, forums attempting to 
co-ordinate campaign activities. By addressing these areas, the section provides a 
context within which the labour movement responses, discussed earlier in this chapter, 
can be understood as elements of a broader campaign of opposition and resistance. 
These discussions also provide an insight into the practice of democracy within the 
labour movement, and develop the historical context within which the subsequent 
campaigns against rate capping can be explored. 
Conference Resolutions 
The extent to which the examples of opposition and resistance, recounted in earlier 
sections, can be understood as elements of a broader campaign is established by 
examining the calls for a co-ordinated response to the central government measures 
made in different forums and formats. Such calls were evident at the LPAC, where 
motions displayed a degree of consensus over the need for a labour movement 
campaign to defend local government, but differed over how it could and should be 
achieved. A specific difference between motions, identified at the end of Chapter 
Three, involves the inclusion or exclusion of specific tactics. Both types of motion, 
however, employed abstract terminology when referring to `cuts', `privatisation', or 
the defence of `services'. This practice serves to highlight the importance of 
reciprocal validation. In other words, the categories and their relation to labour 
movement conceptual principles and practice are identified and explored 
in earlier 
sections and chapters, and therefore facilitate the demonstration of the 
link between 
earlier examples of opposition and resistance and the motions 
discussed here. 
The most common tactics prescribed in conference motions 
involved local 
authorities refusing to: implement cuts; raise rates and rents; and, 
trade unions taking 
industrial action to defend jobs and services, and support 
local authorities resisting 
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cuts. Motions making reference to specific tactics, however, were defeated at 
successive conferences, composited, and moved by Liverpool CLPs. '8 At the 1981 
conference, for example, Composite 40 advocated specific tactics, was moved by 
Liverpool Toxteth CLP, seconded by Sunderland CLP, and lost. [Labour Party 1966- 
1984,1981: 28] In contrast, resolution 431 was moved successfully by Cardiff North 
West CLP, and called on the NEC to: campaign against cuts; give guidance to local 
authorities; and, co-ordinate their actions with the support of the whole labour 
movement. [Labour Party 1966-1984, ibid: 29-30] The pattern continued in 1982 
when Composite 65, moved by Liverpool Edge Hill CLP and seconded by Poole 
CLP, was defeated. In addition to the tactics identified earlier, the motion also 
provides a link with the examples of opposition and resistance discussed in this 
Chapter, by advocating: `no council house sales'; `no privatisation'; and, the removal 
of'anti-democratic' UDCs. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1982: 147] 
At the 1983 Conference there is an indication that the mood within the Party was 
changing. Composite 30, for example, was moved successfully on behalf of Sheffield 
CLP by D Blunkett and seconded by Glasgow Shettleton CLP. Though not as 
prescriptive as the Liverpool motions, it called for a campaign involving the use of 
`political and industrial muscle' to `oppose through all available channels' further 
legislation against local government. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1983: 80] This more 
combative stance now accompanied the less prescriptive approach. Thus, conference 
still approved Composite 29, moved by Tooting CLP and seconded by Lewisham 
CLP, which opposed the abolition of the Metropolitan counties, and supported a 
campaign of local authorities and trade unions to defend jobs and services. [Labour 
Party 1966-1984, ibid: 78] In spite of the apparent mood change, however, a 
prescriptive motion moved by Liverpool West Derby CLP, and seconded by 
Edinburgh West CLP, was still unsuccessful. [Labour Party 1966-1984, ibid: 82] 
Calls for a campaign involving the NEC of the Labour Party, local Labour parties, 
trade unions, and local authorities were also evident in other quarters. In 1981, for 
example, the Sheffield Branch of NALGO circulated a resolution adopted at an 
Special General Meeting(SGM) 19.11.81, to all branches considered by Sheffield to 
be affected by government proposals. The motion called for a campaign against cuts 
in jobs and services involving council members and local authority trade 
unions. [Liverpool NALGO F&GP 1979-1986,12.11.81] In the same year, the TUC 
18 There were exceptions to this trend. In 1980, for example, emergency motion 
No. 5 was 
successfully moved by T. Knight on behalf of Norwood CLP and seconded 
by Sheffield CLP. The 
motion instructed the NEC to: co-ordinate a united fight of Labour councils and 
Trade Unions on a no 
cuts position; include industrial action as a tactic; and campaign to unite 
local communities behind 
local councils and their unions. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1980: 
111-112] An emergency 
resolution(No. 3) was also moved by T Knight at the 1981 conference on 
behalf of Norwood CLP and 
as Leader of Lambeth Council. This was less specific than its earlier counterpart, 
but was carried even 
though the NEC asked for the motion to be remitted. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1981: 
30-31 ] 
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approved a composite motion, moved by the Civil Service Union(CSU), which 
identified a link between public expenditure cuts, the centralisation of RSG decisions, 
privatisation, and the use of the voluntary sector and unemployment to depress wages. 
The motion called for a campaign involving the Labour Party NEC, trade unions, and 
local authorities to fight cuts, and for support to be given to local authorities and local 
unions working together against cuts. The fact that the motion was seconded by the 
AUEW would appear to deny scope for the invention of sectoral cleavage 
dichotomies. [TUC 1960-1987,1981: 504-6] 
The adoption of Composite 30 at the 1983 LPAC coincided with a growing resolve 
among Labour local authorities19 and the wider labour movement. The discussion of 
labour movement opposition to financial restraint, for example, recorded a growing 
dissatisfaction with the tactic of rate increases, and described how subsequent 
Government measures reduced the options open to local authorities who wished to 
resist central policy and practice. Due to the lack of guidance offered by successful 
motions, on how local labour movements should oppose and resist the implementation 
and consequences of financial restraint, however, all attempts at opposition and 
resistance can be interpreted as part of a general labour movement campaign of 
opposition. 
Furthermore, the prescriptive motions moved and seconded at the LPAC by CLPs 
indicate the variety of responses available to local labour movements wishing oppose 
or resist central government, and also support for particular approaches at CLP level. 
That such motions were composited and supported by areas other than Liverpool, 
suggests a fairly broad support for this type of stance; albeit a minority in LPAC 
terms. The extent of support for prescriptive motions needs to be kept in perspective, 
however, as such motions were all defeated on a show of hands, and CLPs also moved 
and supported less prescriptive motions. 2° This suggests a more complicated division 
than one restricted to a dichotomy between leadership and local parties. 
Finally, the composite motion passed at the 1981 TUC provides an opportunity to 
understand the process by which prescriptive and other motions reached national 
forums, and therefore another example of democratic practice within the labour 
movement. The TUC motion corresponds to one adopted by NALGO's 1981 Annual 
Conference which instructed its NEC to: `call on the TUC General Council to seek 
joint action with the NEC of the Labour Party in co-ordinating the activities of trade 
19 The capture of twelve London Boroughs by Labour in the local elections of 
May 1982[Kogan and 
Kogan, 1983: 176] had been consolidated, and added to by the capture of Liverpool in 
May 1983. 
Furthermore, the internal developments in local Labour groups and parties, described 
in Chapter Two, 
made resistance a more realistic option. 
20 The defeat of these motions on a show of hands indicates an aspect of 
democratic practice within the 
labour movement, and suggests that the motions had no realistic chance of success. 
The use of trade 
union block votes, for example, was not required to ensure 
defeat. 
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unions and local authority Labour Groups in the fight against the cuts'. [NALGO, 
1981: 4] The NALGO motion was moved by the Scottish District Council and a 
corresponding motion was duly submitted to that year's TUC by NALGO. [loc. cit. ] 
Motions intended for submission to NALGO Annual Conference and to the TUC, 
were first moved at Branch and steward committee level, and later discussed and 
amended before final submission through District Council. [Liverpool NALGO BEC 
1979-1987] Such bodies were composed of activists, but as is indicated by the SGM 
decision circulated by Sheffield and the Annual General Meeting(AGM) and SGM 
decisions of Liverpool NALGO, discussed in the following chapter, the decisions 
taken by these bodies were supported by the broader membership who attended 
AGMs and SGMs. For motions to arrive at national forums, therefore, some level of 
support had to exist in the wider labour movement, and at the local level in particular; 
albeit that activists alone could make such meetings quorate. There was therefore 
scope for a variety of tactical approaches to be advocated and practised within a broad 
based campaign, such as those advocated at the LPAC, TUC, and the NALGO 
Conference, and conducted under the guise of the Labour Party NEC. 
Delegate Conferences 
While the submission or approval of conference motions do not constitute a 
campaign, the identification of characteristics exhibited by the motions assists the 
development of a context within which the examples of labour movement opposition 
and resistance, discussed in the first three sections, can be understood as part of a 
broad campaign. The previous sub-section, for example, identified two main labour 
movement approaches to the defence of local government: prescriptive and non- 
prescriptive. An integral part of their differentiation involves the degree of emphasis 
placed on the co-ordination of campaigning activity, and the development of 
structures through which to oppose and resist central government policy and practice. 
The interrelation between prescriptive and non-prescriptive motions and the issues of 
co-ordination and structure, are therefore explored in this and the following sub- 
section. 
Delegate conferences were identified in Chapter Three as a feature of labour 
movement opposition to the policy and practice of public expenditure reductions 
in 
the 1970s, and in support of Clay Cross. The convening of conferences continued as a 
means of formulating responses to the approach to local government of the 
Conservative Government elected in 1979, but there is evidence of differing 
approaches in this area. On 8.12.79, for example, a conference 
for representatives 
from Labour groups was held in Coventry to discuss the 
formulation of strategic 
responses to the RSG settlement for 1980-81. [Gyford and 
James, 1983: 179] Twelve 
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months later, on 6.12.80, another delegate conference was held in Leeds and attended 
by representatives from Labour groups, local Labour parties and trade unions. The 
Leeds conference was called to discuss the Labour Party NEC's statement on local 
authority spending cuts. [loc. cit. ] 
The practice of the non-prescriptive approach, as advocated by the NEC's 1981 
statement[Labour Party, 23.11.83], is illustrated by a meeting of controlling Labour 
groups and their local parties in July 1981. [Gyford and James, ibid: 190] The aim of 
this meeting was to: 'co-ordinate a sustained campaign against present policies and 
threatened further legislation', but merely called another meeting involving the Labour 
Party NEC, Shadow Cabinet, the Regional and Local Government Sub- 
committee(RLGSC) of the NEC, the local authority association of Labour groups, and 
trade union representatives[loc. cit. ]. Furthermore, the follow-on meeting did not take 
place until October 1981, after the LPAC had passed Lambeth's emergency resolution 
calling on councils to refuse to make cuts and for trade unions to defend jobs. [loc. cit. ] 
The confused approach, described above, contrasts with the more definite stance 
adopted by the `Local Government in Crisis: National Labour and Trade Union 
Conference'. Held 1.11.80, the delegate conference was organised by Lambeth local 
authority trade unions, Lambeth Labour Party and Lambeth Labour Group, and its 
sponsors included the NEC of NUPE, several NALGO Branches and two NALGO 
district councils. [Lambeth, 1980] The Lambeth conference happened after the LPAC 
supported Lambeth's emergency motion instructing the NEC to: co-ordinate a united 
fight of Labour councils and trade unions on a no cuts position; include industrial 
action as a tactic; and, campaign to unite local communities behind local councils and 
their unions. [Labour Party 1966-1984,1980: 111-112] The agenda and decisions 
adopted at the Lambeth conference therefore indicate an attempt by those in favour of 
the prescriptive approach to take the initiative. 
The conference draft statement corroborates the conclusions of the Financial 
Restraint section by describing early labour movement responses as relying on rate 
increases as their main form of defence. [Lambeth, op. cit. ] Similarly, the depiction of 
rate increases as having limited effectiveness due to the imposition of government 
penalties, and the effect of rate increases on impoverished communities, corroborates 
another conclusion of the Financial Restraint section. [loc. cit. ] The aim of the 
conference was therefore identified as organising concerted action to secure more 
government funds for local government services and 
jobs. In pursuing this goal, 
however, the statement recognised the importance of differing 
local circumstances, 
and the need for individual local authorities and trade unions 
to take their own 
decisions. [loc. cit. ] This recognition contrasts with the 
NEC and PLP's refusal, on the 
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grounds of local autonomy and diversity, to offer a definite lead to those demanding 
it. 2' 
Four options for Labour local authority opposition and resistance were identified in 
the draft statement as: rate increases; no rate increases or cuts, effectively deficit 
budgeting; resignation; and, industrial action. These tactical alternatives formed the 
basis of debate, and the adoption of a prescriptive approach that Labour councils 
should: not cut jobs or services; not raise rents or rates to compensate for government 
cuts; refuse to sell council houses or housing land; introduce a 35 hour week for all 
employees; and, work with local anti-cuts committees and community groups to build 
local support. The conference also resolved that trade unionists should: refuse to 
cover for unfilled vacancies; refuse to deal with increased charges; and, consider 
strike action and occupation to defend threatened facilities. [loc. cit. ] 
A steering committee consisting of 50 delegates was also elected by the conference 
for the purposes of exchanging and disseminating information relating to action being 
taken in different labour movement organisations, and to recall the conference in 
support of councils or councillors penalised by the Government. [loc. cit. ] In adopting 
the position outlined above, the delegates had refused to support a call by T Knight, 
Labour Leader of Lambeth Council, for Labour controlled authorities to refuse to 
implement cuts provided that trade unions agreed to organise extended industrial 
action from January 1981. An amendment was also moved, unsuccessfully, on behalf 
of NUPE's NEC by R Keating, the union's Assistant General Secretary, proposing that 
local authorities should increase rates and blame the government. 
The Lambeth conference provides further evidence of the differentiation between 
prescriptive and non-prescriptive approaches. In this instance, the stance adopted by 
the NEC of NUPE, indicates the kind of action envisaged by those who, at the LPAC, 
moved and supported motions calling for an unspecified campaign of opposition. The 
conference decision and the position proposed by NUPE's Assistant General 
Secretary also corroborates the view that support for the prescriptive and non- 
prescriptive approaches approximates to a difference between the stances adopted 
by 
some local activists and those in positions of leadership. The extent of such 
local 
support is indicated by the conference attendance: 450 delegates 
from local authority 
unions; 200 from CLPs; 50 from Labour Groups; and, 
300 observers. [Liverpool 
NALGO, 1980] 
The adoption of a prescriptive approach was not simply an 
idealistic or symbolic 
opposition. If that had been so, Knight's proposal 
for Labour controlled authorities to 
refuse to implement cuts provided that trade unions agreed 
to organise extended 
industrial action from January 1981 would 
have been adopted. The immediacy of 
Z' This point is explored further in the 
following section. 
125 
Knight's proposal fits with developments in Lambeth before it introduced its 
supplementary rate, but the conference's refusal to back them suggests a recognition 
that effective structures for the organisation of support within the labour movement 
and among the public, were absent. 
Finally, analysis of the Lambeth conference produces several important 
conclusions. By advocating that local authorities refuse to cut jobs or services, not 
raise rents or rates to compensate for government cuts, and refuse to sell council 
houses or housing land, for example, the conference provides further evidence that the 
examples of opposition and resistance, discussed in earlier sections, were part of 
broad based campaign. The decision by Lambeth to act against the delegate 
conference decision and increase rates, however, calls into question the authority of 
the conference; organised, amongst others, by the Lambeth labour movement. This 
point also raises the issue of democratic practice and questions the role of people 
attending conferences, voting for positions of high-principle, and then finding that 
there is no local support for the position they adopted. In other words, the people 
attending from Lambeth were not delegated by the membership of their organisations 
to vote the way they did. 22 
In addition to the differences identified between leaders and activists, therefore, 
differences existed between labour movement activists and those they claimed or 
sought to represent. In London, for example, K Livingstone claims that the positions 
adopted by local NALGO BECs were 'out of sympathy with the bulk of its 
membership' and therefore weak. [Livingstone, 1984: 270] This an important issue 
which is considered in the following sub-section and revisited and developed in later 
chapters as part of the explanation for the outcome of the campaign against rate 
capping. The final position adopted by the Lambeth conference can, however, be 
viewed as an agenda through which the support of trade unionists, party members, and 
electors could be won. The staging of delegate conferences therefore formed part of 
the process of developing effective structures through which a co-ordinated campaign 
of opposition and resistance could be conducted. 
Structures 
The structures and alliances that developed in the early 1980s are analogous to 
those of the anti-cuts campaigns of the late 1970s; discussed 
in Chapter Three. In 
22 The Liverpool NALGO delegate, for example, was nominated 
by the Branch Executive 
Council(BEC)[Liverpool NALGO BEC 1979-1987,24.9.80] which was made up of representatives 
from departmental steward committees. A process of practical abstraction 
is evident here, however, 
whereby stewards elected, theoretically at 
least, by the membership represented their departmental 
committee on the BEC and voted accordingly. 
As part of this process a gap could therefore 
develop 
between activists and members, but as is 
demonstrated in Chapter Five the Liverpool NALGO 
positions were approved at AGMs and SGMs. 
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addition to the delegate conferences already considered, the existence and 
development of ad hoc committees provide a striking resemblance. On Merseyside 
alone, such committees included: the Merseyside Liaison Committee which organised 
public meetings on cuts in 1980[Liverpool NALGO Service Conditions 1979-1987, 
22.5.80]; the Merseyside Anti Cuts Committee[Liverpool NALGO F&GP 1979-1986, 
16.10.80]; a group called Merseyside Education Alliance which, in 1983, included 
trade unions, community and other groups[Liverpool NALGO Service Conditions 
1979-1987,3.2.83]; and, the North West Public Sector Campaign 
Committee. [Liverpool NALGO F&GP 1979-1986,26.5.83] As the representative 
nature of such groupings is hard to establish, this discussion focuses on structures that 
have a clearer genesis. 23 
At the national level, the TUCLGC encouraged and participated in the creation and 
development of structures. Local government unions, for example, were reminded of 
the TUCLGC's 1976 recommendation that local JTUCs be established to co-ordinate 
action against cuts[TUC 1960-1987,1980: 308]. The TUCLGC also encouraged the 
creation of co-ordination committees at the regional level, to improve TUC-Labour 
Party liaison, and wrote to member unions stressing the importance of liaison with 
local Labour groups. [loc. cit] As Chapter Three records, however, the trade union 
activists interviewed considered JTUCs to have developed in response to local 
struggle; a view reflected in the identification, in the Deregulation section, of local 
JTUCs created to fight privatisation. 
A similar, but more tangible development of structures also took place in NALGO 
around this time. In July 1981, for example, the annual National Local Government 
Group Meeting(NLGGM), held during NALGO's annual conference in June, was 
reconvened to agree a response to the Government's approach to local government. 
NALGO NLGGMs were attended by delegates from local branches, and therefore 
offered a means by which activists could develop policy and practice on a national 
level. They also indicate the extent to which activist involvement and structures had 
developed within NALGO since the introduction a stewards system; identified in 
Chapter Two. The reconvened NLGGM agreed to adopt a `... detailed strategy of 
national action to defend the jobs and living standards of NALGO members in local 
government'[NALGO, 1981: 2]. The NLGGM was then adjourned pending 
preparation, by the National Local Government Committee(NLGC), of a 
discussion 
paper outlining proposals for a national strategy; including options 
for maximum 
unity among all NALGO members, and a drive 
for solidarity with other local 
authority unions and with the Labour Party at national and 
local levels. [loc. cit. ] 
23 The structures and activities which developed around 
the NEC of the Labour Party are identified 
and addressed as part of the next section. 
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The NLGC report was circulated in September 1981, and included publicity drives 
and parliamentary intervention to encourage opposition to specific measures, as part 
of the proposed national strategy[loc. cit. ]; tactics that are analogous with the 
campaign against cuts in the 1970s. The strategy also included other tactics which 
reflect the local government focus of the 1980s campaigns, such as meeting with the 
local authority associations to help achieve goals. Significantly, however, the report 
indicates a readiness to contemplate and implement a co-ordinated campaign of 
industrial action to achieve desired aims. The type of action considered feasible at 
that stage included action similar to that taken in the 1970s, such as not covering for 
vacancies, and one day strikes. Thus, as a consequence of this cautious perspective, 
the options for industrial action that was not `already being taken as part of the cuts 
campaign' were considered to be limited. [NALGO, ibid: 6] 
In part, this stance was based on the view that only two forms of action would 
have a direct effect on central government. Thus, apart from a combination of `less 
extreme' measures aimed at irritating the Government, the only examples of industrial 
action with any chance of success were identified as: widespread national strike action 
by all local government trade unions; or branches urging `hit-list' authorities to resist 
Government cuts even if it involves bankruptcy and refusing to co-operate with 
Government commissioners. [loc. cit. ] The first option was considered to be 
vulnerable to the variable impact of the Government's policies, and both options were 
recognised as not guaranteeing maximum unity amongst NALGO members. A 
paradox is also identified in the practice of taking action in authorities that are 
supposed to be allies[loc. cit. ], and this corresponds to the dilemma of withdrawing 
from users, services that the action is supposed to be defending. [Blunkett, 1994] 
Once again two approaches are evident, a combative offensive approach to achieve 
predetermined objectives, and a more passive resistance based on nuisance value. 24 
The identification and consideration of more emphatic measures indicate the 
responsive nature of NALGO structures which allowed an input from activists, and 
also of the way the campaign was to develop in response to the Government's 
imposition of more punitive measures. Thus, when the NLGGM was re-convened, 
on 5.3.82, it adopted a `National Strategy of Action' consisting of eight features 
indicative of resolve and the prescription of tactics. The features included: branches 
taking indefinite strike action if they were severely affected by cuts, or if one or more 
of their members was declared compulsorily redundant; initiating the creation of 
JTUCs within their authority to prepare joint action and co-ordinate publicity; and, 
adhering strictly to existing NALGO policies opposing cuts, 
including total 
opposition to privatisation and refusing to cover 
for vacant posts. 
24 This and related issues are afforded further consideration 
in Chapter Seven. 
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As part of the strategy, the NNEC was instructed to: collect a levy from branches 
to maintain a national Fighting Fund for striking members, and to begin collection of 
the levy when an appropriate level of strike action in defence of jobs and services was 
taking place; instruct District Councils to co-ordinate support for striking branches; 
continue parliamentary opposition; and, continue the provision of publicity material 
and advice to Branches for the mobilisation of public and trade union support. 
Finally, the NLGC was instructed to seek the support of other local government 
unions in the implementation of this strategy, and to request that the TUC and STUC 
co-ordinate support and organise national demonstrations as appropriate. [NALGO, 
1984a] 
When viewed in conjunction with the discussion of delegate conferences, 
NALGO's adoption of a national strategy in 1982 illustrates the low level of structural 
development within the labour movement at this time. The absence of effective 
structures and preparation helps to explain the lack of co-ordination evident among 
the examples of resistance described in the first three sections of the chapter. These 
developments also indicate a growing resolve and preparation for co-ordinated 
opposition and resistance, however, and therefore contribute to the context within 
which the examples discussed in the first three sections of the Chapter can be 
understood as parts of a broader campaign. Similarly, the national strategy's 
reference to NALGO policies opposing cuts, privatisation, and refusing to cover for 
vacant posts also indicates that existing opposition was part of a broader movement. 
Significantly, however, such decisions were adopted at abstracted levels involving 
officers and activists, as opposed to the membership at large. 
The willingness of NALGO's leaders to accept wide-scale industrial action as a 
tactic to secure a change in government policy constitutes an important factor in the 
development of the policy and practice of the labour movement. Approval of the 
national strategy not only demonstrates the responsive nature of NALGO's internal 
democratic structures, but also the extent to which policy was decided by activists, 
and a certain section of activists. 25 The tactics identified in the national strategy, 
for 
example, reflect the prescriptive elements of the motions discussed earlier 
in relation 
to the LPAC, and therefore help identify the demands of activists with such motions. 
These aspects of NALGO's approach were also accompanied 
by more usual tactics, 
aimed at securing broader support: publicity; parliamentary 
lobbying; demonstrations; 
and, days of action. Thus, chapters Six and 
Seven explore the extent to which the 
25 A later NLGC report, for example, records that: 
'activity at district and branch level is sporadic 
and that adherence to existing policies and tactics 
is not complete... with some notable exceptions in the 
metropolitan county, GLC and some 
"hit list" branches, there is little or no action to mobilise the 
membership and public around the 
issues'[NALGO, 1984a: 91 
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approval of radical and conventional tactics, through abstracted labour movement 
structures, and the interrelation and interaction between the tactics helped to shape the 
practice and outcome of the campaigns against rate capping. 
Similarly, the approval of extra-parliamentary tactics, though contrary to the 
parliamentarist critique of the labour movement and, as is demonstrated later, to the 
stated aims of the national Labour Party, is a consequence of the working through of 
internal relations. The recognition and adoption of the extra-parliamentary tactic 
within NALGO, for example, is evidence of policy development through the 
interaction and interrelation of officers, leaders, and activists. Furthermore, as the 
prescriptive and non-prescriptive approaches correspond to activist and leadership 
positions, a similar process of interrelation and interaction can be identified, whereby 
each group and their respective positions affected the development of the other. The 
working through of these reciprocal processes is considered in chapters Six and 
Seven, but before this process can be understood, the position adopted by the national 
leadership of the labour movement needs to be identified and explored. 
CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP 
As previous sections demonstrate, the elements that constituted a labour movement 
campaign against the Conservative approach to local government in the early 1980s 
lacked co-ordination and a unified goal. In part, this reflects the disparate approach of 
the Government, but the absence of developed structures was also a symptom of, and 
a reason for, the lack of co-ordination. The lack of co-ordination, and therefore the 
absence of broad-based structures, is also attributable to the approach of the national 
leadership of the labour movement, in general, especially that of the Labour Party. 26 
Notwithstanding arguments about uneven development and variations in labour 
movement activity and organisation at the local level[Duncan and Goodwin, 1988], 
the approach adopted by the national leadership was consistent with its response to the 
campaign against the Housing Finance Act 1972, and an important factor in the 
development of the campaigns studied here. The practice and implications of this 
approach are therefore addressed in two sub-sections entitled: National 
Campaigning 
Activity; and Leadership Goals. 
26 References to local and national in this thesis indicate 
functional and spatial variations. National 
leadership, for example, is responsible for decision making and practice 
that impacts on sections of the 
movement within the geographical and political 
framework of the nation state. Such distinctions 
should not be taken to imply dichotomy, 
however, because, as has been explained previously, national 
phenomena are influenced and constituted 
by local variants and vice versa. 
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National Campaigning Activity 
In keeping with the non-prescriptive approach supported by the Party leadership 
and approved by the LPAC, a number of broad based activities were undertaken by 
the national leadership of the labour movement in 1979 and in the early 1980s. In 
1979, for example, a campaign sub-committee of the Labour Party NEC was 
established and organised a series of rallies, marches, and meetings to oppose the 
Conservative Government's approach to local government. The focal point of this 
activity was a demonstration, rally, and lobby of parliament in the November 1979; an 
event supported by the TUCLGC. [Gyford and James, 1983; TUC 1960-1987,1980] 
The NEC campaign committee also produced a monthly circular entitled: Cuts 
Briefing, to provide facts and arguments for spokespeople at the local level, and 
facilitate the sharing of local experiences. [Gyford and James, op. cit: 179] Similarly, 
the TUC circulated a `Cuts Checklist' to Trades Councils and County Associations of 
Trades Councils, to provide examples of the kind of cuts taking place. [TUC 1960- 
1987,1980: 308; TUC 1960-1987,1981: 331] The generality of these initiatives 
provides another context within which the examples of opposition and resistance, 
discussed previously, can be viewed as part of a broader campaign. 
Another similarity between the approaches of the Labour Party and TUC, and 
indicative of their respective outlooks, is their focus on the parliamentary process as a 
means of prosecuting their respective campaigns. To argue, as do Duncan and 
Goodwin, that such a concentration of resources is the inevitable consequence of 
opposing legislation[ 1988: 217], is to succumb to monological reasoning. Specific 
actions may be explained in this way, such as: the TUC General Council's approach to 
the Secretary of State for the Environment to express their opposition to the 
provisions of the Local Government Planning and Land Bill[TUC 1960-1987,1980: 
264]; the TUCLGC's request that local government unions encourage sponsored MPs 
to oppose the Bill; and, the TUCLGC's liaison with opposition spokespeople on the 
same issue. [TUC 1960-1987,1980: 309] 27 The same is not automatically true, 
however, of the TUC's other contacts with government ministers. 
The TUCLGC, for example, held meetings with the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, and other ministers, to discuss public expenditure and annual 
RSG 
settlements. Such meeting took place in October 1979, May 1980[TUC 
1960-1987, 
ibid: 307], December 1980[TUC 1960-1987,1981: 329], and November 1981. [TUC 
1960-1987,1982: 312] This focus of attention on ministers is more a reflection of 
corporatist practices, and an indication of the 
TUC's acceptance of the primacy of 
parliament. The historical practice of liaison 
between the TUC and PLP, such as 
Z' The TUC opposed the Local Government Planning and 
Land(No. 2) Bill because a unitary grant 
system would remove a local authority's 
freedom to provide a higher level of services than that laid 
down by central government. [TUC 1960-1987,1980: 
264] 
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during the Social Contract period of the 1970s for example, served to emphasise and 
reinforce the dominance of the parliamentarist approach in the outlook and practice of 
the labour movement in Britain. " 
The concentration of resources on parliamentary opposition was not an inevitable 
consequence of opposing legislation, but a preferred practice of labour movement 
leaders. Thus, the most interesting feature of TUC activity during this period, was not 
that it focused on parliament as the seat of government, and therefore a means of 
amending or influencing government policy and practice, but that it focused almost 
exclusively on that arena. This approach contrasts with that being developed in 
NALGO at the time, and is particularly beguiling in view of the large parliamentary 
majority held by the Conservative Party. 
Given the Labour Party's electoral raison d'etre, and the presence of its leadership 
in parliament, their approach focused on the legislative process; though not with any 
consistency. During the passage of the Local Government Planning and Land Bill, for 
example, the PLP leadership advocated neither alternatives to the Bill nor a distinct 
line. [Gyford and James, op. cit: 168-9] Most of the PLP amendments were provided 
by the AMA, and it was the AMA who co-ordinated parliamentary lobbying for other 
local authority associations, not the PLP. [Gyford and James, ibid: 167-8] One 
explanation for the absence of any sustained PLP opposition to the Local Government 
Planning and Land Bill, is that it indicates an acceptance of the measures of central 
financial control and restraint. [Gyford and James, ibid: 169] This conclusion 
certainly fits with the practice of the PLP in government in the 1970s, but two other 
explanations for the PLP's behaviour are also plausible: the absence of Green or White 
consultative papers; and, the sheer complexity of the local Government Planning and 
Land Bill[Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 106], both made concerted opposition 
difficult. 
In contrast, every clause of the comparatively straight forward Housing Bill was 
opposed before its enactment in 1980. [Gyford and James, op. cit: 168] The similarity 
between the financial measures contained in the Housing and Local Government 
Planning and Land bills, and the PLP's concerted opposition to the 
former, suggests 
that the PLP did not accept the necessity of central financial control and restraint. 
The 
Housing Bill was easier to oppose, however, and the Party 
had a clear historical 
position which supported and promoted the provision of 
local authority housing. 
Opposition to the subsequent Act's provision for the sale of council 
houses was 
therefore confirmed at the 1980 LPAC[Labour 
Party 1966-1984,1980: 109]; whereas 




block grants and a call for the repeal of the Local Government Planning and Land Act 
were not raised at the LPAC until 1981. [Gyford and James, op. cit: 169] 
The generalised nature of national campaigning activity, and the preoccupation 
with the parliamentary process offers a partial explanation for the lack of a co- 
ordinated labour movement campaign. Due to their concentration on the 
parliamentary process, for example, the PLP and TUC merely reacted to Government 
policy and practice. Their room for manoeuvre was therefore restricted, and the task 
of mounting a concerted and co-ordinated campaign of opposition to the 
Government's approach to local government made almost impossible. 
In its defence, the PLP could argue that it was complying with LPAC decisions 
calling for a campaign without specific tactics, and reflecting the position of the 
majority of Labour groups who were not practising overt opposition to Government 
policy. Furthermore, by adopting their own version of the non-prescriptive approach, 
the TUC, Labour Party NEC, and the PLP sought to include a range of activities and 
traditions in the campaign to defend local government services, jobs, and local 
democracy. A more complete explanation for the campaigning activity undertaken by 
the Labour Party NEC, PLP, and TUC, therefore requires that the campaign objectives 
advocated by these bodies be identified and explored. 
Leadership Goals 
The goals of the Labour Party's national leadership are evident from the statements 
issued by the NEC. The Rate Controls statement issued 23.11.84, for example, refers 
to an earlier statement which was endorsed by the 1981 LPAC, entitled: Local 
Government Cuts, and offered guidance to local authorities dealing with cuts in 
RSG. [Liverpool NALGO Branch Records] Significantly, the 1984 document states 
that the principles outlined in 1981 were still applicable, and thereby illustrates a lack 
of development in the position adopted by the national leadership. Of particular 
importance, however, is the statements' identification of service areas considered to 
be worth defending, and an absence of recommendations for the conduct of defence. 
The guiding principle of the 1981 statement was one of avoiding measures rather 
than promoting solutions, and therefore in keeping with the non-prescriptive 
approaches discussed earlier. Labour groups were therefore urged to avoid: 
`as far as 
possible' cuts in essential social and public services; `in any event' compulsory 
redundancies among the work-force; and, actions which 
jeopardise maximum 
unity. [loc. cit. ] Guidance was therefore offered on what should not 
be done rather 
than what should be achieved, let alone how 
it could be achieved. 
The statement identified service areas requiring protection as: 
teacher-pupil ratios; 
school meal charges, to be increased 
by no more than the rate of inflation; nursery 
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education, day nurseries, provision for under-fives, and services for children in care or 
at risk; housing management and maintenance affecting responsiveness to tenants' 
day to day problems, and avoidance of excessive rent increases; and, residential home 
provision, home helps, meals on wheels, and back up services for elderly, sick, or 
disabled people. Local authorities were also advised to maintain: local passenger 
transport services; standards of street lighting, road-sweeping, refuse collection, and 
environmental protection. 
The document provides an invaluable insight into the position and reasoning of the 
national leadership, and helps complete the context in which local labour movement 
opposition and resistance to central government policy and practice, and attempts to 
defend services, jobs, and local democracy formed part of an uncoordinated 
campaign. First of all, the statement identifies services areas considered important by 
the national Labour Party; covering the same areas as the examples of expansion 
identified in Chapter One, and the areas of labour movement defence discussed in 
Chapter Three and in the earlier Deregulation section. The call to avoid compulsory 
redundancies 'in any event', also implies a concern with employment levels, but does 
not rule out reductions in the work-force by other less provocative means such early 
retirement. Furthermore, the concern with employment does not include opposition to 
the reduction of working conditions of those employed in local government, and 
therefore fails to recognise that lowering working conditions lowered levels of service 
provision. Finally, the offer of guidance on what to avoid as opposed to what to do, is 
an important factor for explaining why local resistance lacked co-ordination, fits with 
the non-prescriptive approach adopted by the LPAC, and demonstrates the absence of 
clear leadership. [Gyford and James, 1983; Gyford, 1985] 
A series of national figures, including R Hattersley, N Kinnock, and F Allaun, 
sought to justify the absence of a prescriptive or clear lead on the basis that local 
authorities had to take decisions according to local circumstances. [Gyford and James, 
op. cit; Gyford, op. cit. ] Hattersley, for example, argued that the PLP could not 
oppose the Local Government Planning and Land Act on the basis that it reduced 
local government autonomy and then instruct Labour groups how to act. [Gyford, ibid: 
28] This is a consistent position adopted by various PLP spokespeople, and the 
predecessors of Hattersley are recorded in Chapter Three as offering the same reason 
for not providing a clear lead to the campaign to oppose and resist the Housing 
Finance Act in the 1970s. There are inconsistencies in this approach, however, and in 
the claim that the Labour Party lacked the machinery to secure concerted action 
by 
Labour groups, or hold them accountable to the national Party. [Gyford and 
James, op. 
cit; Gyford, op. cit. ] 
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Meetings at the Labour Party Local Government Conference 1981 between the 
Shadow Transport Spokesperson and representatives from Metropolitan County 
councils, for example, were able to agree a policy for reducing bus fares. [Blunkett and 
Jackson, 1987: 72] Similarly, delegates to the Labour Party's 1982 Local Government 
Conference were warned that local enterprise Boards should not be allowed to go 
against national Labour Party economic planning policy. [Gyford, op. cit: 114] The 
Labour Party also retained and practised the power to suspend local parties and hold 
enquiries into their affairs. As Chapter Three records, the latter option was adopted in 
North East Derbyshire CLP following the dissolution of Clay Cross in the 1974 re- 
organisation of local government. Similarly, councillors could be suspended from 
Labour groups and this happened in Manchester, Bristol, and Coventry where 
councillors voted against cuts. [Gyford and James, op. cit; Wainwright, 1987] 
The exercise of such powers is conspicuous in its application to parties or elements 
within parties that sought to adopt a more combative approach 2' but appears to be at 
odds with the NEC statement issued in 1980, which called for councils to 'refuse to 
implement' government policies and to 'maintain' services. [Gyford, op. cit: 30] A 
more feasible explanation for the action taken by the PLP and NEC is offered by 
referring to Clay Cross when, as Chapter Three notes, the PLP opposed local 
authorities refusing to obey central legislation, for fear that Conservative councils may 
refuse to obey Labour Government legislation. In the 1980s, however, there was also 
the added fear that Labour councils may also refuse to obey a future Labour 
Government. [Lowes, 1994] 
The lack of guidance from the national leadership of the Labour Party on how to 
achieve the aims identified in the NEC statements is one reason for the lack of co- 
ordination between the campaigning activity described in earlier sections. As was 
noted in the previous sub-section, however, the absence of a clear lead was also a 
product of, and reason for, the absence of developed broad-based structures. 
Furthermore, local campaigns had their own specific targets, such as persuading a 
local authority not to privatise certain services. Local action of a focused nature was 
therefore difficult to co-ordinate as part of a campaign concerned with broader issues. 
The existence of different attitudes, strategies, and goals within the same campaign 
also made co-ordination difficult. Thus, although the general approach adopted by the 
Labour Party NEC contrasts with the prescriptive tactics advocated and defeated at the 
LPAC, both shared the same ultimate goal of avoiding cuts and changing Government 
policy. Ultimately, however, attempts to ensure maximum unity, as required 
by 
NALGO's national strategy, and by the NEC statement of 1980[Gyford and 
James, 
29 Other devices were used to persuade Labour groups to abandon combative stances, such as 
the 
meeting between national officials of the Labour Party and 
local government trade unions from 
Liverpool in 1984. This event is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
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op. cit: 188], had the effect of reducing goals and tactics to the lowest common 
denominator; that of the majority of Labour groups who were not prepared to adopt an 
overt stance of opposition and resistance. 
This chapter covers a broad range of subjects to demonstrate the Conservative 
Government's approach to local government in the early 1980s, and the extent and 
nature of labour movement responses. Through this approach the focus of the thesis 
moves from the identification and exploration of historical experiences that helped 
shape labour movement policy and practice in the 1980s, to an identification and 
interrogation of the latter. Furthermore, the evaluation of principles and practice is 
undertaken in reference to both historical and contemporary matters. The 
categorisation and validation local government service provision, employment, and 
local democracy, for example, are developed as part of this chapter. 
Thus, the Deregulation and the Campaign Leadership sections identified the 
service areas that were the subject of central government attention, and labour 
movement defence in the early 1980s. Housing, social services, education, and 
transport were all defended to a greater or lesser extent during the early 1980s, and 
correspond to the areas of expansion in the 1960s, and areas defended in the 1970s. 
The interrelation between these areas of policy and practice and the Government's 
imposition of financial restraint is also identified and explored in terms of their 
implications for local democracy and local autonomy, and of their implications for 
levels and conditions of employment. Furthermore, the concept of democratic 
practice is developed in reference to the development and practice of the labour 
movement campaign, with specific reference to the LPAC, TUC, NALGO, and 
delegate conferences. 
By introducing and interrogating the campaign goals and practice of labour 
movement organisations in the early 1980s, the chapter also contributes to the 
development of an historical context within which to study the anti-rate capping 
campaigns. The differing commitment and strategies of leaders, activists, and 
members, for example, are introduced as factors influencing the aims and practice of 
the campaigns. Overall, therefore, the chapter contributes to the validation of 
elements that assist the direction and intensity of interrogation of the anti-rate capping 
campaigns; specifically in terms of their aims and practice. Before considering the 
campaigns mounted against rate capping, however, one more aspect of the 
historical 
background, and its correspondence to the conclusions drawn here, needs to 
be 
identified and analysed. To this end, the campaign mounted for more resources 
by the 
Liverpool labour movement in 1983-4 forms the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LIVERPOOL AS ENIGMA 
In contrast to the examples of labour movement opposition and resistance 
discussed in Chapter Four, the Liverpool labour movement campaign for more 
resources mounted between November 1983 and July 1984, represents a more 
focused, concerted and apparently successful resistance of the Conservative 
Government's approach to local government. Thus, by considering the difference and 
similarities between the labour movement experiences, practices, and structures 
discussed in previous chapters and those evident in Liverpool before and during the 
said campaign, this Chapter contributes to the developing historical context within 
which the campaigns against rate capping can be understood and interrogated. In 
particular, consideration of the Liverpool labour movement contributes to the on- 
going reciprocal validation and interrogation of the categories, principles, and 
practices explored in previous chapters and evident in the labour movement 
campaigns of the 1980s; especially those relating to the mobilisation of party and 
trade union activists and members. 
The approach adopted here therefore contrasts with accounts that focus on the 
practices of the Liverpool Labour Group, or conduct their analysis within the artificial 
framework of New Urban Left, and thereby treat Liverpool as a separate and distinct 
phenomenon; such as those of McLaverty[1989], Lansley, Goss and Wolmar[1989] 
and Stoker[1988]. Failure to consider the labour movement campaign in Liverpool 
within the framework of society as a whole, and therefore as related to events 
elsewhere, means that the significance of the Liverpool experience for the anti-rate 
capping campaigns, can not be understood or demonstrated in its entirety. The victory 
claimed by Liverpool in 1984, for example, served to galvanise resolve for the non- 
compliance of others in 1985, was instrumental in the choice of the no rate tactic, and 
provided the Government with experience of combating such an approach. [Blunkett, 
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1985a; Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Livingstone, 1987]' This is not to suggest that 
the Liverpool labour movement did not exhibit differences in approach, outlook, and 
practice. On the contrary, the argument here is that the experiences of the anti-rate 
capping campaigns are best understood by examining the differences and similarities 
evident between the Liverpool labour movement, and those of other authorities 
involved campaigning activity; not by treating Liverpool as an enigma. 
The chapter is therefore divided into two sections entitled: Liverpool Labour 
Movement; and, Campaigning Activity. The first section considers aspects of the 
historical development and experiences of the Liverpool labour movement and draws 
analogies with those discussed in previous chapters. Campaigning Activity, on the 
other hand, concentrates on the organisation, practice, and tactics employed in 
Liverpool during the campaigns of the early 1980s, and again draws appropriate 
analogies. Given the extensive coverage afforded elsewhere to the financial 
arguments that supported Liverpool's campaign for more resources in 1984, the 
chapter focuses on organisation, practice, and tactics before and during the campaign. 
LIVERPOOL LABOUR MOVEMENT 
Chapters One to Four identify a variety of developments and experiences that have 
implications for the organisation, practice, and tactics exhibited by labour movement 
campaigns of opposition and resistance mounted in the early 1980s. Some of the 
examples provided relate to Liverpool and serve to indicate the shared nature of the 
developments and experiences. Given the importance attached to the Liverpool 
campaign', however, further attention is required to identify the extent of such 
similarities and the significance of any differences. 
This is achieved by addressing two areas that, although treated separately for 
reasons of analysis, are to all intents and purposes integral parts of the same process. 
The first area, discussed under the title: General Developments, outlines the evolution 
of the local labour movement in a socio-economic context. A second sub-section 
carries the self explanatory title: Local Authority Trade Union and Labour Party 
Relations, and focuses on the development and significance of the relationship 
between these two groups. As part of the analysis, consideration is afforded to 
' The previous chapter identified organisational preparations for opposition to rate capping, as 
defined 
in the Local Government Finance Bill No. 1, as early as September 1981. Publication of the Rates 
White Paper in 1983, however, heralded more concerted preparations on this front and coincided with 
events unfolding in Liverpool. These preparations are afforded specific attention 
in Chapter Six, but 
the reciprocal interaction between such preparations and developments 
in Liverpool should not be 
underestimated. 
2 As has already been mentioned, Livingstone[ 1987] draws a connection 
between the Liverpool 
experience and the choice of tactic for the anti-rate capping campaign. 
Blunkett and Jackson also 
make a similar point[1987: 169-70], and in spite of excluding Liverpool 
from the New Urban Left 
framework, McLaverty describes Liverpool as a focal point of the local government left between 
1983 
and 1987. [1989: 42] 
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NALGO's involvement in the local labour movement and its relations with the 
Labour Party. Given NALGO's status as a non-affiliated union, therefore, the section 
provides a broader analysis of Labour Party-trade union relations than accounts that 
focus on manual trade unions and portray their involvement in the campaign as 
determined by their affiliation to the Labour Party, and by favourable service 
conditions improvements. [Crick, 1986; Davies, 1987; Thompson and Allen, 1986] 
General Developments 
The evolution and formation of local labour movements reflect local socio- 
economic circumstances and developments. In the case of the Liverpool, for example, 
labour movement development was influenced by the reliance on the port as a source 
of unskilled, casualised employment, and the post-war introduction of manufacturing 
industry to the city. [Davies, 1987; Parkinson, 1985] In contrast, the Sheffield labour 
movement was dominated by engineering and steel unions[Duncan and Goodwin, 
1988; Wainwright, 1987]; again a reflection of the local industrial landscape. The 
comparison of Liverpool and Sheffield is not arbitrary, however, as both maintained 
until the 1970s, a joint labour movement organisation in the form of the Trades 
Council and Labour Party. [Wainwright, ibid: 106-7] 
As Chapter Two records, the close relationship maintained in Sheffield meant that 
the Labour Party did not suffer the membership loss experienced 
elsewhere. [Wainwright, ibid: 107-8] In Liverpool, however, ties were maintained 
through an alliance of trade union and Labour Party officials, premised on moribund 
party organisations, such as Liverpool Exchange constituency which had no 
members. [Davies, op. cit: 155] Thus, the religious divisions and casualised 
employment practices that had militated the development of a strong and unified 
labour movement in Liverpool[Davies, ibid; Parkinson, op. cit. ] contributed to the 
'boss politics' of the Braddock era. 
Significantly, however, the maintenance and development of the Liverpool labour 
movement through the Trades Council meant that its structures were vulnerable to the 
effects of local social and economic change. Issues of internal democracy and policy 
making were, for example, points of contention within the Liverpool labour 
movement as early as 1957. During that year the Trades Council and Labour Party 
organised a Municipal Policy Conference to consider items for the following year's 
manifesto, but the Labour Group ignored those policies it disliked. [Davies, ibid: 180] 
This practice was challenged from the 1960s onwards, however, following changes 
in 
the internal organisation of the TGWU which allowed local branches to send rank and 
file delegates from the docks and car plants to the Trades Council and Labour 
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Party. [Davies, ibid: 179 & 182] Furthermore, the 1960s and early 1970s also 
witnessed a growth of white collar affiliates to the Trades Council and Labour Party. 
The influx of activists threatened the established structures and arrangements 
within the Liverpool labour movement, and therefore contributed to the separation of 
Trades Council and Labour Party in 1970, with the support of the Labour Group 
leader. [loc. cit; Taaffe and Mulhearn, 1988] Explanations for the growth of militancy 
and radicalism in the Liverpool labour movement should not, however, be premised 
on a monological association with casualism. While the experiences of casualism 
may have influenced the development of rank and file labour movement structures, 
the developments were also part of broader societal processes, including the growth of 
shop stewards movements and white collar unionism described in Chapter Two. 
Although the issues of internal party democracy, accountability, and policy making 
were issues within the Liverpool labour movement as early as 1957, the Labour Group 
split in 1972, over its response to the Housing Finance Act, is cited as marking the 
emergence of Labour Group accountability and democracy as issues within the 
Liverpool Labour Party. [Crick, 1986; Lansley, Goss and Wolmar, 1989; Parkinson, 
op. cit; Taaffe and Mulhearn, op. cit. ] This development was undoubtedly important, 
but should be understood in the context of the growth of activism described above. 
Thus, in 1972,21 Labour councillors voted in line with Party policy, and opposed 
the rent increase, while 28 reneged. [Parkinson, op. cit; Taaffe and Mulhearn, op. cit. ] 
Those who opposed the increase were supported by activists in the DLP, and a 
campaign mounted to make the Labour Group accountable. [Crick, op. cit; Davies, op. 
cit; Parkinson, op. cit. ] The isolation of those who supported the increase is 
demonstrated by the Trades Council condemnation of the increase[Davies, op. cit: 
160], and a rent strike among local authority tenants, supported by activists and 
workers from Fords and Birds Eye. [loc. cit. ] The power struggle between Labour 
Group and DLP continued until 1978 when members of the Labour Group voted by 
21 votes to 16 to select a new leader. Following DLP objections, however, the 
decision was reversed by 24 votes to 14. [Davies, op. cit; Parkinson, op. cit. ] 
An essential feature of these struggles, and a deciding factor in the transfer of 
power from Labour group to DLP, was the move to give the DLP control over the 
selection of prospective councillors. Under the new arrangement, for example, 
candidates were only accepted if they agreed to vote in line with DLP policy. [Byrne, 
1994; Parkinson, op. cit. ] The processes outlined here are analogous to events 
elsewhere in the 1970s and early 1980s, described in Chapter Two, when 
local Labour 
parties in Greater London, Manchester, and Sheffield sought to make their 
Labour 
groups accountable. The resultant control exercised over the 
Labour Group in 
Liverpool, with the consent of prospective councillors, resembles the practices 
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discussed in Chapter Three in reference to Clay Cross, and pertains to the issues of 
democratic practice identified and discussed in Chapter Two. Finally, the ascendancy 
of the DLP also saw the creation of policy sub-committees that mirrored the structure 
of the local authority. [Byrne, op. cit. ] This development not only bears analogy with 
developments in Manchester, described in Chapter Two, but also resembles the 
Trades Council's 1974 initiative to establish policy committees on such matters as: 
industrial injuries, nursery schools, social security, pensions, illiteracy, women, youth 
and race. [Davies, op. cit: 184] 
Liverpool also experienced developments in membership growth and composition 
comparable to other local Labour parties. The recovery of Labour Party membership 
in Liverpool in the 1970s, for example, was similar to Sheffield and Southwark where 
Labour parties witnessed an influx of new members; including manual working class 
people as well as public sector professionals. [Goss, 1988; Seyd, 1987] In Liverpool, 
many of the activists who joined the Labour Party came from struggles against factory 
closure, 3 supported Labour Group accountability, and included people who became 
councillors in the 1980s. [Byrne, op. cit; Parkinson, op. cit. ] This concurs with the 
assertion that the Party machine was broken up in the 1970s by rank and file struggles 
in the industrial sphere, and that the moribund wards of the 1960s were rejuvenated by 
an influx of activists from this arena. [Davies, op. cit: 196] 
One other factor that deserves mention in the context of the development of the 
local Labour Party is the impact and role of Militant Tendency. Although moribund 
parties, of which there were many in Liverpool, are considered to be easy targets for 
entryism[Seyd, op. cit: 50], a monological equation between the influence of Militant 
and the existence of moribund parties should be avoided. Labour Party membership 
and outlook in Liverpool was developed and influenced by activists radicalised 
through industrial struggles[Parkinson, op. cit. ], not just by Militant. Entryism may 
represent a partial explanation for the influence of Militant in Liverpool, but it should 
not be overstated. There is, for example, agreement among activists and 
commentators that Militant's influence as a minority group in Liverpool was 
dependent on the support of a broader spectrum. [Burgess, 1994; Cresswell, 1994; 
Crick, op. cit; Seyd. op. cit; Wainwright, op. cit. ] 
Militant's notoriety was a product of their own grandiose claims, and the 
propaganda of Conservative and Labour Party leaderships who sough to 
discredit the 
Liverpool campaign. [Wainwright, ibid: 126] This process is also assisted 
by the non- 
critical acceptance of claims made by Militant to be the decisive 
factor. [McLaverty, 
1989: 42] Similarly, unsubstantiated claims are made about Militant's presence 
in the 
3 Struggles against factory closure and redundancy are also recognised and 
discussed in Chapter Two 
as a factor in broader labour movement development. 
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DLP, Labour Group, and local authority trade unions. Crick, for example, estimates 
that 16 out of 51 Labour Councillors were Militant supporters in 1983, and that by 
1982 they almost had a majority on the DLP Executive. [op. cit: 229 & 232] The 
statement is qualified, however, by acknowledging that the adoption of policies 
depended on the support of others, and that confrontation with the Government would 
have happened without Militant's existence. [Crick, ibid: 232 & 236] Similarly, 
Davies asserts, without evidence that Militant supporters held 'key' positions on the 
DLP Executive. [op. cit: 173] In contrast, however, the maximum number of Militant 
supporters in the local authority trade unions is estimated as: GMBATU, 100; 
NALGO 20; TGWU single figures; and, minimal in the remaining unions. [Lowes, 
1994] 
Local variations notwithstanding, the developments experienced by the Liverpool 
labour movement during the 1960s and 1970s are analogous to those identified in 
Chapter Two as affecting the labour movement in general. Thus, the period 
witnessed: a fall and rise in Labour Party membership; struggles to make Labour 
groups and the PLP accountable to the Party at large; the radicalisation of trade 
unionists through industrial struggles, latterly against factory closure; the growth of 
public sector trade unions; and, the introduction and growth of stewards systems 
within those unions. Developments in Liverpool should therefore be understood in 
this general context, while recognising the significance of specific local factors such 
as the casualism of port related employment, and the maintenance of close relation 
between Labour Party and trade unions through the Trades Council. In particular, the 
close links between Labour Party and trade unions, albeit at officer level during the 
immediate post war period, was evident and developed as part of local labour 
movement organisation and practice in the 1980s. 
Local Authority Trade Union-Labour Party Relations 
The relationship between Liverpool Labour Group and the local authority work- 
force is recognised as an important factor in Liverpool's ability to mount concerted 
campaigns between November 1983 and July 1984, and again in 1985-6. [Blunkett and 
Jackson, 1987; NALGO, NDAM 16.10.84; Parkinson, 1985; Byrne, 1994] Several 
writers, however, posit a simplistic causal connection between improvements 
in 
employee conditions of service, or increased status for union representatives, 
especially GMBATU, as a means of explaining trade union support 
for the 
campaign. [Crick, 1986; Davies, 1987; Thompson and Allen, 1986] 
While there is an 
element of truth in this view, the developing relationship between 
Labour Party, 
Labour Group, and local authority trade unions was more complex, and took place 
in 
a broader context. The nature and genesis of the relationship 
is therefore examined by 
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exploring three factors that shaped the links between party and unions: the decline of 
the private sector in the 1970s; the importance of service conditions improvements; 
and, union disputes with the Liberal administration 1981-3. 
In a similar fashion to the industrial decline experienced in London, Manchester, 
Rotherham, and Sheffield, described in Chapter One, Liverpool suffered a collapse of 
its manufacturing sector during the 1970s. Between 1971 and 1984, for example, 
Liverpool lost 57% of its manufacturing sector, 47% of its construction sector, and 
one-third of its service sector. [Davies, op. cit: 80] The severity of Liverpool's 
experience can be emphasised by comparing the above figures to Merseyside as a 
whole, where the respective sectors declined by 42,17, and 5%. [loc. cit. ] 
Furthermore, this process resulted in Liverpool unemployment levels rising from 
6.2% in 1971, to 25% in 1986[Davies, ibid: 81] or, put another way, employment in 
the city declined by 33% between 1971 and 1985, as opposed to a national decline of 
3%. [Parkinson, op. cit: 13] 
The decline in Liverpool was exacerbated by a local peculiarity whereby a small 
number of large firms provided most of the city's employment, and by the absence of 
a service sector. [Parkinson, ibid: 11 & 13] By 1979, for example, 40% of employees 
were employed by less than 1% of the city's firms. [Parkinson, ibid: 12] In part, this 
imbalance is attributable to regional economic policy which encouraged large scale 
enterprises to invest in the area, as a means of stemming long term economic 
decline. [loc. cit. ] The down side of this policy, however, meant that the public 
expenditure cuts of the late 1970s and early 1980s accelerated the pace of economic 
decline. Due to reductions in regional aid, for example, firms receiving public 
subsidy were forced to shed jobs or close completely. Similarly, jobs were lost in the 
public sector, including local authorities, as expenditure was curtailed. [Parkinson, 
ibid: 13] 
As the previous sub-section noted, socio-economic changes had important 
consequences for the development of the labour movement in Liverpool. In common 
with the campaigns described in Chapter Two, the Liverpool labour movement 
resisted closure of the factories that provided many of the area's jobs. Thus, an eight 
year campaign was mounted to save Tate and Lyle[Davies, op. cit: 185], a campaign 
launched against the closure of Fisher Bendix in 1971, and CAV Lucas was occupied 
for four months in 1972. [Taaffe and Mulhearn, 1988: 42] 
The failure of such 
resistance witnessed an influx of radicalised trade union activists 
into the Labour 
Party in search of a broader political strategy[Parkinson, op. cit: 
25], and into local 
government which offered the main chance of employment. 
[Lowes, 1994] Another 
consequence of this decline was that Liverpool City Council 
became the largest single 
employer on Merseyside, employed almost one-third of public sector employees 
in 
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Liverpool, and therefore increased the importance of defending local authority 
jobs. [Liverpool City Council, 1983: 3] 
Furthermore, the decline of the private sector meant that the bulk of the trade union 
movement in Liverpool was now based in the local authority, and this was reflected in 
trade union affiliations to the Labour Party where GMBATU and the TGWU 
dominated. [Davies, op. cit; Lowes, op. cit; Parkinson, op. cit. ]' GMBATU and the 
TGWU, for example had 85 delegates between them; more than other delegates put 
together. [Crick, op. cit: 254] Representation was, however, based on the number of 
members and branches. As the biggest union, therefore, and because it was organised 
in several branches, GMBATU had most delegates. In contrast, NALGO had a large 
membership but organised in one -branch. If it had been affiliated to the Labour Party, 
therefore, it would have had limited influence on policy and practice[Lowes, op. cit. ]; 
though it may have been able to ally itself with other groupings. 
Similar processes were also evident elsewhere. In Sheffield, for example, job 
losses in the steel and engineering industries were reflected in the composition of the 
Trades Council. Thus, by the early 1980s, NALGO and not the AUEW was the 
largest union on the Trades Council, and other public sector unions increased their 
affiliations. [Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Wainwright, 1987] In London too, the 
demise of industrial unions reflected the loss of manufacturing jobs, and the two 
largest block votes at the GLLP conference were held by the TGWU and NUPE; 
amounting to around 25% of the votes. [Livingstone, 1984: 264] 
The more sceptical accounts of the policy and practice of the Liverpool Labour 
Group between 1983 and 1987, including those of the LCC, seek to portray 
relations between the Labour Party and trade unions as dependent on improved 
service conditions[Davies, op. cit: 173], or as the product of a 'sweetheart 
relationship'. [Thompson and Allen, op. cit: 9] While there is little doubt that the size 
of GMBATU's delegation to the local Labour Party and its political composition 
afforded it a pivotal position in policy making[Crick, op. cit; Lowes, op cit. ], such 
arguments fail to explain NALGO's relations with the Labour Party. The Chairperson 
and Secretary of the Liverpool Branch, during the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s, both refute the idea that service conditions improvements played a part in 
securing NALGO's support of the campaign for more resources. Both say that 
improvements were easier to negotiate with the Liberal administrations, but that 
Labour afforded more job security. [Burgess, 1994; Cresswell, 1994] Furthermore, 
GMBATU was forced into disputes with the Labour authority to ensure that promises 
of improved conditions, such as a 35 hour week, were honoured. [Lowes, op. cit. 
] 
°A further consequence of this process was the displacement of the 
Trades Council by the local JSSC 
as the focus of trade union organisation. This development is 
discussed in more detail as part of the 
following section. 
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In the context of the later campaign, the most important arrangements introduced 
by the Labour administration were advantageous, not to the conditions of service of 
trade union members, but to trade union activism. Such initiatives include: paid time- 
off for trade union duties; JSSC observers on the Council's Personnel Committee; 
trade union nomination rights in the filling of vacancies; non-voting trade union 
observers at recruitment interviews; departmental stewards committee representation 
when Personnel and Performance Review Committees considered Chief Officers' 
recommendations on the filling of departmental vacancies; and, paid time off for 
work-place meetings and courses promoting the campaign. The last of these facilities 
is identified as the most important to the conduct of the campaign. [Burgess, op. cit; 
Cresswell, op. cit; Lowes, op. cit. ] 
Perhaps the most contentious of these arrangements was that of nomination rights, 
whereby trade unions were allowed to suggest candidates for vacant jobs. NALGO, 
for example, declined to exercise such rights, and for NUPE, who did not have the 
one-third membership requirement to qualify for such rights[Crick, op. cit; Liverpool, 
1984-5], the arrangement was a source of grievance. This may explain, at least in 
part, Thompson and Allen's assumption that the provision of nomination rights 
constituted part of a sweetheart arrangement with GMBATU. [op. cit: 9] The other 
arrangements were evenly available, however, and contrast to experiences in 
Southwark where stewards had more difficulty acquiring time off for normal union 
duties than campaign activities. [Weinstein, 1986] 
The policy and practice of Liverpool NALGO in relation to the Labour Group and 
DLP, does not fit the view propounded by Crick, Davies, or Thompson and Allen. Of 
particular interest, is the extent to which NALGO's policy development was 
ostensibly independent of the Labour Party, given their unaffiliated status, but similar 
in content. The NALGO BEC 23.1.80, for example, called an SGM 11.2.80 to 
discuss Liverpool Labour Party's policy of opposing 'huge rent and rate increases' that 
compensate for cuts in RSG. The SGM received a report entitled: `The Rate, the Cuts 
and the Grant', which discussed the Party's policy in the context of local government 
oriented public expenditure developments since 1975, and outlined the case 
for and 
against cuts. [Liverpool NALGO, 11.2.80] The approval of branch policy through the 
holding of general meetings, open to all members is evidence of the 
democratic 
practice of Liverpool NALGO, but no attendance figures are available to gauge 
the 
level of support. ' 
5 At this time the process, discussed in the previous sub-section, through which 
the DLP came to 
control Labour Group policy and practice was incomplete. 
Thus, the minority Labour Group ignored 
DLP policy by proposing and securing a rates 
increase of 50% for the 1980-81 financial 
year. [Parkinson, 1985: 29-31] The losses in the following election, 
however, mirrored those suffered 
by Lambeth Labour Party in similar circumstances, described in 
Chapter Four, and assisted the 
selection and election of candidates who would abide 
by DLP policy. 
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A special Service Conditions Committee, held 3.11.83, provides another example 
of the decision making process, and therefore democratic practice within Liverpool 
NALGO. The meeting considered a City Council/Labour Party document entitled: 
'Jobs, Services and Rates', agreed to circulate the document to all NALGO stewards, 
and to submit motions to the NALGO's North West and North Wales District Council, 
and to the North West District Local Government Committee calling for national 
support for the campaign in Liverpool. [Liverpool NALGO Service Conditions 1979- 
1987,3.11.83] The decisions of the SGM and Service Conditions committee are 
important because they demonstrate they existence of support, among activists at 
least, for policies similar to those adopted by the Liverpool Labour Party. NALGO's 
support cannot be explained, however, in reference to affiliation to the local Party, or 
to nomination rights; although a number of activists were Labour Party members. 
The position adopted by NALGO was also a response to the severity of the problems 
faced by Liverpool, and indicates the basis of co-operation on which the later 
campaigns were conducted. 
A final area that helps to explain and illustrate the evolution of the relationship 
between Labour Group, DLP, and local authority trade unions is the latter's dealings 
with the Liberal and Conservative administrations between 1980 and 1983. The re- 
negotiation of the local authority's 'no redundancy agreement', for example, developed 
links among the local authority unions, and between unions and the Labour Party. As 
part of this process, NALGO District and Branch Officers achieved their own 
agreement with the City Council in August 1980, but agreed that they would not to 
undermine action taken by other unions pursuing a similar agreement. [Liverpool 
NALGO BEC 1979-1987,20.8.80] The Labour Party, however, voted against the 
NALGO agreement at the Finance and Strategy Committee and at the full Council 
meeting, because vacancies were not being filled, and because the Group had not been 
consulted as part of the negotiating process. [Liverpool NALGO Branch Organiser, 
undated] 
The NALGO Branch organiser's report on the issue argues that the lack of co- 
ordination between NALGO and the local Labour Party resulted from councillors not 
understanding the agreement reached. This was in spite of the Chairperson of 
Liverpool NALGO writing to the Leader of the Liverpool Labour Party on 3.4.80 to 
request a meeting with the DLP to discuss joint opposition to cuts. 
[loc. cit. ] Taken at 
face value, therefore, the Labour Group's position is one of 
detached principle, 
ignoring the practical improvements available to a particular set of employees, and 
the 
fillip provided to others in negotiating a similar settlement. 
By September 1980, 
however, the agreement applied to all unions, but the process 
demonstrates the level 
of interaction and understanding evolving between the two groups at 
that time. 
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A final factor important in developing a level of co-operation and understanding 
between local trade unions, DLP, and Labour Group, was the successful campaign 
mounted against Liberal plans to privatise the Housing Management and Cleansing 
services. The campaign against privatisation is, for example, credited with 
contributing to Labour's local election victory of 1983 [Burgess, op. cit; Liverpool 
NALGO, undated], and contrasts with those examples of opposition cited in Chapter 
Four, primarily because it was successful. Like the examples of action in other areas, 
the Liverpool campaign involved joint trade union action and committees, but its 
significance here lies with its contribution to the development of labour movement 
unity. The burgeoning unity was also a consequence of previous struggles and 
collaboration discussed above, but the campaign against privatisation raised the 
consciousness of union members through the successful prosecution of joint 
initiatives, such as delivering leaflets and boycotting work associated with 
privatisation, and was perceived to have aided the Labour Party's electoral victory in 
1983. [Burgess, op. cit; Cresswell, op. cit; Lowes; op. cit. ] 
Relations between Labour Party and trade unions form a particular feature of the 
development of the labour movement in Liverpool. An alliance of Party and trade 
union officials, for example, dominated the Labour Party and Trades Council, until 
the delegation of activists from affiliated unions in the 1960s precipitated the break up 
of old structures. Similarly, the radicalisation of the Liverpool Labour Party and 
moves toward greater accountability within it, coincided with the influx of trade union 
activists radicalised by struggles against factory closure in the 1970s. The demise of 
the private sector in Liverpool was also a factor in the changing structure within the 
Party, where local authority unions became the main affiliates. Finally, the defence of 
jobs and services against the Liberal administration in the early 1980s, assisted the 
development of co-operation between Labour Party and trade unions, with NALGO 
adopting positions similar to those developing in the DLP, and co-operating with 
manual unions to combat Liberal policies. 
Nevertheless, these developments should be understood in the context of the socio- 
economic evident elsewhere. As has been demonstrated in Chapter Two, for example, 
struggles against factory closure, for greater accountability within the Labour Party, 
and the development and impact of shop steward systems, were part of broader 
societal developments. In Liverpool, however, the combination of all these factors 
with local circumstances, such as the conflict between casualism and factory 
discipline in the 1960s[Davies, op. cit. ], and the experiences, opinions and 
personalities of those who joined the Labour Party in the 1970s[Parkinson, op. cit. 
], 
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served to shape the close working relationship between Party and local authority 
unions, and thereby the conduct of the campaigns for more resources in the 1980s. 
CAMPAIGNING ACTIVITY 
The experiences that shaped the relationship between local Labour Party and trade 
unions in Liverpool, were important for the conduct of the campaign for more 
resources between November 1983 and July 1984. In particular, the influence of these 
factors is evident in the practice and structures through which the campaign was 
prosecuted. Thus, the tactics employed to mobilise and express support for campaign 
aims, the role played by activists, and the democratic practice through which decisions 
were taken and constituent bodies represented, can all be understood in reference to 
the development of Labour Party-trade union relations. These factors are therefore an 
important means of understanding the differences between Liverpool and elsewhere, 
and how the Liverpool labour movement was able to mount a concerted campaign to 
resist the Conservative Government policy and practice. ' 
By considering the interaction and interrelationship of these factors, the 
conclusions of the last section are expanded, together with the validation and 
interrogation of labour movement categories, aims, experiences, practices, and 
structures. These processes are developed over three sub-sections entitled: Structures; 
Campaign Tactics; and, National Involvement. The first two identify and compare 
activities evident in Liverpool and elsewhere, while the third complements the former 
by examining the attitude and approach to Liverpool of the national leadership of the 
labour movement. As has already been explained, the identification and exploration 
of differences and similarities, between Liverpool and elsewhere, form the basis of 
explanations, developed in succeeding chapters, for the fate of the campaigns against 
rate capping. 
Structures 
The experiences described in reference to developing Labour Party-trade union 
relations in Liverpool are also evident in the emergence and practice of broad based 
committees to organise, promote, and prosecute campaigns of opposition and 
resistance. Broad based committees form the focus of this discussion, provide a 
comparison with campaign structures and practices evident elsewhere, and therefore 
afford identification and analysis of the difference and similarities between Liverpool 
and others. Exploration of these issues and their relevance to campaigning activity 
in 
6 As part of this process, consideration is focused on those trade unions that were active 
in the 
campaign, and on NALGO in particular. NUPE and the NUT were the main 
dissenters from the 
campaign, though as was evidenced by events, their absence had little practical effect on 
its conduct or 
on its chances of success. 
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Liverpool are undertaken here in reference to: the JSSC of trade unions organising in 
Liverpool City Council; the Merseyside Trade Union and Labour Movement 
Campaign Committee(MTULMCC); Meetings between councillors, full-time and lay 
trade union representatives; and, the Campaign Working Party established by the local 
authority. ' 
The JSSC provides a prime example of the similarities and differences between 
Liverpool's campaigning activity, and opposition and resistance mounted elsewhere. 
Formed and developed in the late 1970s as a response to attacks on jobs and working 
conditions by Liberal and Conservative administrations[Burgess, 1994; Parkinson, 
1985; Liverpool NALGO, undated], JSSC activities included opposition to 
redundancies, cuts, and privatisation. As Chapter Four notes, joint union co-operation 
to oppose privatisation also occurred in other areas, but co-ordination in Basingstoke 
was undertaken by the Trades Council[Ascher, 1987], and in Birmingham there were 
two committees: the Public Sector Liaison Committee founded by lay members; and, 
a committee dominated by full-time officials. [Kline, 1983: 94] The Liverpool JSSC 
faced no such bifurcation, despite eschewing of full-time officer participation[Lowes, 
1994], and campaigned successfully to defer privatisation plans until a Labour victory 
had been secured in local elections. Conversely, analogous campaigns in Gloucester 
and in Wandsworth folded following Conservative victories in local elections. 
As well as being activist led, the Liverpool JSSC included both manual and non- 
manual trade unions. Chapter Three, for example, records the development of JTUCs 
in the 1970s in response to the effects of public expenditure cuts. The total number of 
such committees was limited, however, and rarely involved both employment 
categories. [Fryer, 1979: 99] In Sheffield, for example, a joint union campaign 
committee was not formed until January 1985, and involved full-time 
officers. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 176] Furthermore, the previous JTUC 
representing local authority workers in Sheffield involved only blue collar 
unions. [Blunkett, 1994] 
Local campaigns and protests were also organised through Trades Councils, such 
as: Lancashire County Association of Trades Councils opposition to the effects of 
public expenditure cuts in the 1970s[Fryer, op. cit: 99]; Basingstoke's opposition to 
privatisation; [Ascher, op. cit. ]; and, Croydon Trades Council's campaigning activity 
in the 1980s. [London NALGO, 10.8.83] Similarly, Liverpool Trades Council 
supported NALGO action over vacancies in June 1979, established a Trades Council 
Co-ordinating Committee Against Cuts in September 1979, and supported a one day 
Committees were also important at other levels in the Labour Party and 
in individual trade unions. 
Liverpool NALGO Branch, for example, carried out much of its co-ordinating activity through 
its 
Finance and General Purposes Committee(F&GP), Service Conditions 
Committee, and BEC. A series 
of ad-hoc sub-committees were also created to deal with specific campaign responsibilities. 
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strike on 18.2.80, called by South Yorkshire Trades Council to oppose cuts. [Liverpool 
NALGO BEC 1979-1987,23.1.80] The Liverpool Trades Council also helped to 
found the MTULMCC in 1983. [Liverpool City Council, undated(a): 11 ] 
As a consequence of developments described in the previous section, however, the 
Liverpool JSSC replaced the Trades Council as the main co-ordinating body for local 
government unions. References to the Trades Council in Liverpool NALGO BEC 
Minutes, for example, tail off from April 1981, while references to the JSSC increase. 
In practice though, the Trades Council co-existed with the JSSC, albeit as a junior 
partner, and was used to obtain support from the wider labour movement. Ultimately, 
however, the demise of the private sector, the shift of attention to the local authority 
arena, and a pre-occupation with sectional in-fighting, all contributed to the eclipse of 
the Trades Council by the JSSC. [Burgess, op. cit; Cresswell, 1994; Lowes, op. cit; 
Davies, 1987] 
The main campaigning functions undertaken by the JSSC relate to the co- 
ordination of activities and policies, among member unions. As has already been 
noted, much of the JSSC's activity, prior to the campaign for more resources, focused 
on opposition to cuts, privatisation, and redundancies. Specific examples of the 
tactics used as part of these activities are explored in the following sub-section, but 
can be summarised as: limited industrial action, such as one day strikes and non-co- 
operation with work or councillors'; demonstrations and lobbies of Council meetings; 
and, holding mass meetings. This last activity allowed JSSC polices to be explained 
to, and approved by, activists and members. Separate meetings, for example, were 
held between stewards from all affiliated trade unions, and between all local authority 
trade unionists. A programme to stop cuts and redundancies and to establish an 
Industrial Action Committee was discussed in this manner in 1980. [Liverpool 
NALGO, 17.6.80] The practice of holding mass meetings formed an integral part of 
campaign activity to inform and mobilise activists and members, and therefore 
receives further consideration in the following sub-section. 
Democratic and representative practices of the JSSC are also evident in the 
practices of Liverpool NALGO; though these should not be taken to represent 
practices common to all affiliated unions. NALGO representatives to the JSSC, 
for 
example, were elected from the BEC, and nominations for executive positions were 
discussed and agreed at that level. [Liverpool NALGO BEC, 1979-1987] 
Individual 
stewards committees were also encouraged to affiliate to the 
JSSC. [Liverpool 
8A NALGO programme to stop cuts and redundancies was carried out 
in conjunction with the JSSC in 
1980, and involved various forms of industrial action including non co-operation: 
with councillors who 
voted for cuts; working parties on cuts; the transfer of 
housing repairs to private contractors; and, the 
processing of redundancies. The programme also involved not covering 
for absences; ceasing to serve 
Council committees and sub-committees after 4.45pm; and, non co-operation 
with rationalisation plans 
for special schools if trade unions were not consulted. 
[Liverpool NALGO, 17.6.80] 
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NALGO F&GP 1979-1986,10.2.81] In addition to the mass meetings held by the 
JSSC, Liverpool NALGO also discussed and obtained support for JSSC policies 
through a number of general meetings. 
On 25.6.80, for example, the re-convened half-yearly AGM approved a day of 
action called, in conjunction with the JSSC, for the 23.7.80 to oppose 600 threatened 
redundancies in the Minor Works Department. Similarly, an SGM, held 10.3.81, 
agreed a motion opposing cuts in jobs and services, and instructed negotiators to seek, 
in conjunction with the JSSC, an unconditional no redundancy agreement for all 
council employees. The meeting also agreed to hold a demonstration and lobby of the 
Council's Budget meeting on 18.3.81. Finally, an SGM held 6.3.84 supported the 
Labour Group's case for more resources and approved strike action for 29.3.84; the 
day of the Council Budget meeting, and designated 'Democracy Day' by the 
TUC. [Liverpool NALGO, 8.3.84] 
The broadest based committee, in terms of labour movement involvement, in the 
campaign for more resources was the MTULMCC. Established to oppose public 
expenditure cuts and anti-trade union laws[Liverpool City Council, op. cit: 11 ], the 
MTULMCC adopted a role in Liverpool's campaign for extra resources that is 
comparable to that played by the NSC in the 1970s, and by the LGCU in the later the 
anti-rate capping campaigns. The MTULMCC was the initiative of, and therefore 
involved, a number of local labour movement bodies including: Liverpool Trades 
Council; Liverpool DLP; Liverpool Labour MPs; Merseyside County Council Labour 
Group; Liverpool City Council Labour Group; MTUURC; and Liverpool City 
Council JSSC. [loc. cit. ] Thus, together with other structures discussed in this sub- 
section, the MTULMCC provided a means through which joint policies, activities, 
and mutual support could be discussed and agreed. 
Like the JSSC, the MTULMCC was involved in the co-ordination of activities and 
policies among its affiliates. These included assisting in the organisation of a rally 
and demonstration in Liverpool on 19.11.83; the 'Liverpool in Crisis' delegate 
conference 27.2.84; a meeting of activists 9.2.84; lobbies of City Council budget 
meetings; public and factory gate meetings, and a lobby of parliament 
22.3.84. [MTULMCC 1983-85] Other MTULMCC initiatives involved the 
compilation, production, and distribution of leaflets and newsletters, and the 
organisation of meetings at which representatives from stewards committees, trade 
union branches, district committees, other trade union organisations, community 
groups, tenants associations and unemployed centres could be consulted. [loc. cit. 
] 
Regular meetings also took place between councillors, full-time trade union 
officials and lay officials, to discuss the tactics, direction, and progress of 
the 
campaign for more resources. Such meetings were, however, outside the above 
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structures and included full-time officers from GMBATU, MATSA, NALGO, NUPE 
and the TGWU. Links therefore existed between the Labour Group and full-time 
trade union officials, and allowed differences in approach between lay officers and 
full-time officials to be aired. At one meeting, for example, the full-time GMBATU 
official announced that the policies presented to councillors were not necessarily 
official, because full-timers had not been involved in the decision making 
process. [Liverpool 1984-5,28.2.84] A divide is also evident in NUPE, but there 
national pressure was exerted to encourage greater local involvement. [loc. cit. ] 
Similar meetings were also held between full-time trade union officers, the JSSC 
executive, the DLP and Officers of the Labour Group, and provide further evidence of 
the collaboration between Labour Party and trade unions. Such a meeting was held 
1.4.84, for example, to discuss campaign strategy and direction after the City Council 
meeting of 29.3.84 failed to agree a budget. [Liverpool Labour Group, 28.3.84; 
Liverpool 1984-5,1.4.84] 
Finally, a 'Campaign Working Party' was established by the local authority as an 
additional means of co-ordinating the campaign for more resources. The terms of 
reference of this body indicate that it was designed to assist the local authority's 
Communication sub-committee in establishing and developing links with other local 
authorities and bodies who shared the City Council's aims of retaining and expanding 
jobs and services. The Working Party's terms of reference are similar to the activities 
undertaken by the MTULMCC and include: assisting the promotion of public, trade 
union, and political support for the policies of the council; co-ordination and 
development of an effective campaign to further the Council's aims; prevention of 
redundancies in the council work-force, and privatisation of council services; 
improving services and creating jobs; and, securing greater resources for the city from 
the Government. [Liverpool City Council, undated(b)] 
Representatives eligible to attend the working party included: councillors from the 
Communication, Performance Review, and Financial Control sub-committees, and 
from the Housing and Building, Education, and Social Services Committees; 
councillors from Merseyside County Council, Knowsley and Saint Helens councils; 
the executive of Liverpool JSSC; representatives of the trade union movement 
organising workers outside the City Council; representatives from local community 
based organisations; and, representatives from `umbrella' organisations such as 
Merseyside Community Relations Council, the Liverpool Council of Voluntary 
Services and Merseyside Pensioners organisations. [loc. cit. ] The body therefore 
provides another example of collaboration between trade unions and 
Labour Party, but 
this time in a broader context. 
152 
The first meeting of the working Party took place 9.1.84, and an undated draft 
resolution indicates the committees anticipated functions and the similarities to those 
undertaken by the JSSC and MTULMCC. The motion outlines a programme of 
action to be undertaken which included: public meetings9; council speakers to 
organisations represented on the working party; factory-gate meetings to encourage 
private sector involvement in the campaign; assisting in the organisation of 
demonstrations and lobbies; and, the development of links with service users through 
council departments, by the Council's Central Support Unit(CCSU), to promote 
services in ways which help to further the campaign. As part of an attempt to create a 
climate of public, trade union and political support for the Council's policies, the 
CCSU also liaised between the Council, voluntary organisations, community groups 
and the MTUURC, and arranged for speakers to attend meetings on the 
campaign. [Liverpool NALGO Bulletin 1983-84,15.12.83] 
As chapters Three and Four demonstrate broad based committees were essential 
features of labour movement campaigns to oppose and resist aspects of government 
policy and practice. Thus, similar structures are also evident in Liverpool's campaign 
for more resources; especially in the co-ordination of activities and policies. 
Consideration of these bodies demonstrates the similar practices adopted by the 
Liverpool labour movement and those elsewhere, and how, through the trade union- 
Labour Party relationship that emerged from local struggles, described earlier in the 
chapter, Liverpool practices differed. The JSSC, for example, developed in response 
to, and campaigned against redundancies, cuts, and privatisation; the same issues that 
engendered greater co-operation between Liverpool's local authority unions and 
Labour Party. 
This relationship developed in response to local and national socio-economic 
developments and struggles, but the local aspects served to shape the outlook and 
practices of the bodies involved in the campaign for more resources. A resolution 
passed by the Merseyside in Crisis Organising Committee, for example, linked the 
predicaments of local authorities with factory closures, job losses, proposed abolition 
of the Metropolitan County councils, privatisation, cuts in the NHS, and the attack 
on public transport. [MTULMCC 1983-85] Similarly, the involvement of activists 
in 
the bodies considered, and the democratic practices identified, especially in relation to 
the activist controlled JSSC, are a product and reflection of the struggles 
for 
accountability within the local labour movement, and of the growth of activist 
structures in the trade union movement in general. In particular, the involvement of 
Parkinson records 40 public meetings taking place between April and 
June 1984 with an estimated 
attendance of 50,000. [1985: 42] 
153 
activists played an important part in the selection and practice of the tactics used to 
pursue the campaign and to encourage participation and support. 
Campaign Tactics 
Through the use of broad based committees in the organisation of its campaign for 
more resources, the Liverpool labour movement exhibited similarities and differences 
with campaigning activities undertaken elsewhere. Another area that exemplifies the 
convergence and divergence of campaigning activity involves the extent to which 
activists were involved in the organisation and prosecution of the Liverpool campaign. 
The previous sub-section, for example, identified the representation of activists on 
broad based committees through the JSSC; an activist led committee. The importance 
of activists for the conduct of the campaign and the similarities and differences 
between Liverpool and elsewhere can, however, be explored further in reference to the 
kind of tactics employed. There are three main activities where analogies can be 
drawn, and these form the focus of the following discussion: the convening of 
delegate conferences; the production and distribution of education and publicity; and 
the holding of lobbies and demonstrations. Other activities where similarities can be 
discerned, such as parliamentary intervention and the use of industrial action, are 
discussed as part of these three areas. 
The practice of staging delegate conferences is associated with labour movement 
campaigning activity in Chapter Three, where opposition to, and resistance of, the 
Housing Finance Act 1972 and public expenditure cuts in the 1970s are considered. 
Similarly, Chapter Four identifies delegate conferences as part of labour movement 
campaigning activity to oppose and resist the Conservative government's approach to 
local government in the early 1980s. Thus, the holding of delegate conferences, as 
part of the Liverpool campaign for more resources, demonstrates similarities between 
the structures and tactics adopted, but also differences on approach. 
The 'Liverpool in Crisis' delegate conference, for example, took place on 27.2.84, 
was open to local authority workers from other areas, and five delegates invited from 
interested stewards committees. [MTULMCC 1983-85] In addition to its focus on 
trade unionists, the conference was called consider and develop the situation in 
Liverpool. This focus is clear from the aims of the conference which were to: discuss 
concrete proposals for support; explain the council's position; and, conclude the 
first 
phase of the campaign, defined as consultation with shop stewards committees and 
trade union leaders. [loc. cit. ] By virtue of the approach to stewards committees, the 
conference and the first stage of the campaign was aimed, essentially, at 
informing 
and mobilising activists. 
154 
More details are available regarding organisation, preparation and practice of the 
'National Fight Back' conference, held 23.6.84. [Liverpool City Council, undated(a): 
13] The conference was open to a broader spectrum than the `Liverpool in Crisis' 
conference and included: trade union branches; stewards committees; Trades councils; 
Branch, Constituency and District Labour parties; Labour groups; LPYS; trade union 
youth sections; community groups; tenants associations; and, unemployed 
centres. [MTULMCC 1983-85] Invited speakers included: Labour MPs T Benn, E 
Heffer, J Maynard, and D Skinner; Labour Group leaders D Blunkett of Sheffield 
Council, and K Livingstone of the GLC; and, trade union leaders A Kitson from the 
TGWU, R Bickerstaffe from NUPE, and A Scargill from the NUM. [loc. cit. ] 
The conference agenda identified the format as opening speeches, followed by 
discussion groups: 'In Defence of Local Authorities and Metropolitan Counties' 
chaired by K Livingstone; 'Trade Unions, Community Groups, Tenants Associations 
and the Defence of Public Services' chaired by E Loyden Labour MP; 'Building the 
Campaign' chaired by E Heffer; and 'Closures, Redundancies and Organising the 
Unemployed' chaired by B Owens TGWU, Region 6. [loc. cit. ] A statement submitted 
to the conference also linked: the Miners' struggle; the city council's campaign; the 
defence of local democracy; the defence of the NHS; and, the defence of trade union 
rights. Conference arrangements were organised by the Liverpool CCSU, but 
conference practice differed from the stated intention. In contrast to the decision 
making process evident at the `Local Government in Crisis' Conference, described in 
Chapter Four, the workshops planned for Liverpool's 'National Fight Back' 
conference were cancelled, and the conference adopted the approach of a rally which 
left little room for meaningful discussion of tactics or issues. [Islington NALGO, 
23.6.84] 
Much of the publicity and education practices undertaken as part of the Liverpool 
campaign reflected the labour movement approach evident in the campaign against 
public expenditure cuts, described in Chapter Three. The production and distribution 
of leaflets, stickers, posters, and badges, and the compilation of a petition containing 
20,000 signatures[Parkinson, 1985: 42], represents a significant part of this activity. 
Many of the leaflets produced served a combined purpose of explaining 
issues, and 
publicising demonstrations and other events. They were therefore intended to raise 
awareness among activists, trade union and Labour Party members, and the general 
public. 
A MTULMCC leaflet, for example, promoted the `Liverpool in Crisis' delegate 
conference 27.2.84, a half day stoppage on 28.2.84, linked the 
Liverpool campaign to 
a wider defence of local democracy, and called on the 
PLP, the Labour Party NEC, 
and the TUC to support to the Liverpool campaign. 
[MTULMCC 1983-85] The 
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demonstration and lobby of the Liverpool City Council budget meeting 29.3.84 were 
also promoted in a similar way. [loc. cit. ] The local authority also produced a 
Campaign Bulletin and a civic newspaper entitled: 'Liverpool News'. [Liverpool City 
Council Bulletins] Both of these circulars publicised events and issues, and promoted 
the council's stance. Similarly, a document entitled: 'Rates, Services and Jobs: The 
Campaign in Liverpool' was produced by the council in 1983 and included: analyses 
of Liverpool's problems; a review of the Liverpool Labour Party's manifesto; and, a 
general description of the approach to the campaign in Liverpool. [Liverpool City 
Council, 1983] 
Similar practices were undertaken within Liverpool NALGO, where activists 
produced and distributed various ad hoc circulars, and the regular 'NALGO Herald' 
news sheet, to publicise events and explain issues. As part of this process the Branch 
Campaign Committee, consisting of delegates from departmental stewards 
committees, produced a regular bulletin entitled: 'Our City Our Fight' to explain 
issues, provide a running report on developments, and catalogue support from 
elsewhere. [Liverpool NALGO Campaign Committee 1983-85] The production of 
reports for consideration by general meetings, identified in earlier sub-sections, was 
also continued and developed as part of the campaign. Thus, reports were produced to 
inform activists and the general membership, and for broader circulation, such as: 'The 
Liverpool Crisis - an explanation for other NALGO Branches'. [Liverpool NALGO, 
undated] Whereas the local authority's initiatives were produced through the CCSU, 
much of the NALGO publicity was produced by activists, and distributed to members 
through the stewards system. These channels of communication and the holding of 
general meetings were an important aspect of informing the broader membership and 
securing their support for the campaign. 
Activists also played a significant role in obtaining support from, and explaining 
ideas to other local authority workers, by visiting other local authorities and 
addressing meetings. [MTULMCC 1983-85] Liverpool NALGO, for example, sent 
speakers to: Norfolk Branch[Norfolk NALGO, April 1984]; North East District 
Council, who also ordered publicity from Liverpool[North East NALGO, undated]; 
and, to the South West District Delegate meeting 11.5.84. [South West NALGO, 
14.3.84] This initiative formed part of a reciprocal process, with speakers addressing 
Liverpool NALGO from: Merseyside County Branch of NALGO[Liverpool NALGO 
BEC 1979-1987,26.10.83]; and, Hackney NALGO. [Liverpool NALGO BEC 1979- 
1987,23.2.84] Similarly, Glasgow District Branch of NALGO requested speakers 
from Liverpool, Lothian, and Sheffield, to address a meeting in February 
1984. [Glasgow NALGO, February 1984] 
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Councillors also undertook similar activities, visiting local authorities to address 
meetings and promote Liverpool's case[Liverpool City Council, op. cit: 12], and by 
addressing Liverpool NALGO's BEC. Speakers addressing the Liverpool NALGO 
BEC on the campaign for more resources, included D Hatton Deputy Leader of the 
Liverpool Labour Group, and T Byrne Chair of Finance. [Liverpool NALGO BEC 
1979-1987,26.10.83] Their attendance at the BEC provides a further example of the 
practices employed to disseminate information to activists, and indicates the working 
relationship between NALGO and the Liverpool Labour Group. 
Perhaps the most innovative role played by activists as part of the publicity and 
education drive involved the Campaign Committee organising and conducting the 
'Jobs, Services and Rates: NALGO Road Show' which leafleted various parts of the 
city in the week prior to the local elections in 1984. [Liverpool NALGO Bulletin 
1983-84,18.4.84] The 1984 local elections formed a focus for publicity, with 
advertisements placed in the local media asking people to vote for 'Jobs and Services'. 
Similarly, a circular to NALGO members stressed that NALGO was independent 
from the Labour Party, but both supported the same issues in the May elections. [loc. 
cit. ] Finally, Liverpool NALGO also wrote, on 29.3.84, to dissenting Labour 
councillors enquiring after their positions on cuts and redundancies. [Liverpool 
NALGO, 29.3.84] 
An important element of Liverpool NALGO's campaign was the education and 
mobilisation of members. NALGO activists, for example, conducted a programme of 
work-place meetings, attended by an estimated 4000 members, and campaign courses 
attended by 180 shop stewards. [Liverpool NALGO Bulletin 1983-84,5.2.84] In 
addition to the holding of general meetings, the Branch also held several all steward 
meetings to discuss issues and events. 10 On 12.4.84, for example, an all stewards 
meeting was held to discuss the situation after the Council failed to set a 
rate[Liverpool NALGO BEC 1979-1987,9.4.84; Liverpool NALGO Bulletin 1983- 
84,18.4.84], and on 10.7.84 a similar meeting was convened to receive a report back 
from the discussions that had been held with the Government. [Liverpool NALGO 
Bulletin 1983-84,6.7.84] On a larger scale the Labour Group also held meetings with 
stewards from all the unions at various stages, the first being held in September 
1983. [Liverpool City Council, 1983: 10] These meetings also formed part of the 
decision making process, and their decisions taken into account when the 
DLP 
decided on its tactics. [Byrne, 1994] 
'° An important factor indicating relations between trade unions and Labour group, and affecting 
the 
attendance of such meetings, especially those held with the membership, was 
that they were allowed 
with pay. As has been noted previously, however, it would 
be too simplistic to assume that such 
provisions influenced the decisions taken at those meetings. 
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Finally, campaigning activity of the labour movement in Liverpool, in similar 
fashion to elsewhere, involved the use of demonstrations and lobbies. In particular, 
such activities involved demonstrations that culminated in lobbies of council 
meetings. Examples of earlier activities are provided in preceding sections of the 
chapter, but as part of the campaign for more resources one day strikes and lobbies of 
Council budget meetings were staged on 29.3.84,25.4.84, and 11.7.84. A lobby of 
Parliament also took place 22.2.84, as part of a national initiative described in the 
following chapter, and Liverpool NALGO representatives met J Straw and C Clarke; 
N Kinnock's personal assistant. [Liverpool NALGO BEC 1979-1987,23.2.84] 
The tactics identified above are analogous to those described in previous and 
subsequent chapters. In particular, the use of publicity and education, lobbies, 
demonstrations, and one day stoppages are areas of common ground. The issues 
raised and linked by the campaigning activity in Liverpool, the central role played by 
activists, and the close working relationship between Labour Group and local 
authority trade unions were, however, a reflection of the historical development of the 
local labour movement. In Liverpool, for example, the issues of casualism, 
unemployment, and the struggle for activist control over, or at least involvement in 
decision making processes were dominant features of recent labour movement history 
and development. They therefore had a significant impact on the formulation of the 
policies and practice of the campaign, and contributed to its ability to inform and 
mobilise trade union and party members, as well as broader sections of the public. 
National Involvement 
The previous sub-sections identify the role of activists, and developing trade 
union-Labour Party relations, as factors influencing the approach to campaigning in 
Liverpool. This interpretation is supported here, by exploring the involvement of 
national labour movement figures in the Liverpool campaign for more resources. 
Consideration of national involvement is worthwhile because it: affords a different 
perspective through which to view the Liverpool campaign; facilitates the 
identification and exploration of the organisational and practical strengths of the 
Liverpool campaign; demonstrates differing local and national goals; exhibits 
inconsistency in the national approach to local autonomy and democratic practice; 
and, contributes to the on-going validation of the categories. 
The involvement of national figures in the Liverpool campaign is identified and 
explored here in reference to meetings between representatives of the 
PLP, trade 
unions organising in Liverpool City Council, and the Liverpool 
Labour Group. The 
first of these meetings were held in March 1984, and 
involved J Straw and J 
Cunningham for the PLP, and Assistant General Secretaries and National officers 
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from GMBATU, NALGO, NUPE, the NUT, and the TGWU. [Jinkinson, 3.4.84; 
Parkinson, 1985] Following the Liverpool Labour Party's success in the local 
elections of May 1984, meetings were also held between representatives from the 
Liverpool Labour Group, the PLP, and officials of GMBATU, NALGO, NUPE and 
the NUT. One such meeting, was undertaken in preparation for a meeting with P 
Jenkin, Secretary of state for the Environment and his departmental officials, and this 
is considered here. [Sonnet, 31.5.84] 
National labour movement figures are characterised in the previous chapter as not 
offering a lead to instances of overt opposition and resistance between 1979 and 1984. 
Similarly, the Chapter also notes that this stance was in keeping with LPAC decisions, 
and that national Party and PLP figures, including Kinnock and Hattersley, argued 
that local parties could not be instructed to participate in a national campaign because 
it was against the Labour Party's advocacy of local autonomy. This respect for local 
autonomy took a curious form, however, in response to events unfolding in 
Liverpool. 
In March 1984, for example, the Labour Party, through N Kinnock's office, 
approached the General Secretaries of five unions involved in Liverpool 
MDC. [Jinkinson, op. cit. ] As a consequence of this approach, a meeting took place 
between J Straw and J Cunningham for PLP, and the Assistant General Secretaries of 
the unions approached. The meeting was attended for NALGO by D Prentis, 
Assistant General Secretary (Service Conditions), who reported that Cunningham and 
Straw were seeking trade union support for an attempt to restrain the leadership of 
Liverpool Labour Group. [loc. cit. ] To this end: `representatives of the NUT, NUPE, 
and TGWU agreed with John Cunningham that they should seek a meeting with 
leading members of the Labour Group .... to 
indicate that the Labour Movement would 
not support illegality nor would it be willing to bale anybody out if things went 
wrong'. [loc. cit. ] There is no evidence of a mandate for the position adopted by the 
PLP, the NUT, NUPE and TGWU, but both Prentis for NALGO and J Edmonds for 
GMBATU stated that they would not support such a proposal because their members 
in Liverpool supported the policies adopted by the Council. They also argued that 
neither Cunningham nor Straw appreciated the issues involved or strength of feeling 
of those aroused by the problems in Liverpool. [loc. cit. ]" 
This meeting is important because it indicates that, in contrast to NUPE, the 
NUT, 
and the TGWU, the level of support for the campaign within NALGO and 
GMBATU 
was such that the national leadership of each union felt obliged to support the 
local 
This intervention by the PLP also serves to corroborate the assertion, made 
in the previous chapter, 
that the Labour party had the means to discipline and coerce 
local parties if it so desired, but that such 
action was taken against those local parties, or sections of parties that adopted 
a combative form of 
opposition and resistance. 
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position. The GMBATU and NALGO positions are also an endorsement of the local 
democratic practice, described previously in relation to NALGO, which secured 
support among the general membership for positions adopted by activists. Finally, 
the meeting exposes the contradiction in the Labour Party's defence of local 
autonomy when it meant not instructing local Labour groups to oppose and resist 
central government policy, and the preparedness of the PLP to overturn agreed 
policies of opposition and resistance in Liverpool. 
In view of the position adopted by NALGO and GMBATU, a fact finding meeting 
was sought with leaders of the Labour Group to explore possible alternatives in 
relation to the impending budget. Prentis and A Jinkinson, NALGO Assistant 
General Secretary, attended the subsequent meeting with councillors, and described 
the trade union presence as 'conciliatory'. [loc. cit. ] At the meeting the NALGO 
representatives again stressed that NALGO's Liverpool Branch were strongly in 
support of the Council's policy not to cut either jobs or services. In contrast, however, 
the PLP representatives proposed compliance with national Labour Party policy, and 
then minimisation of central government measures through a 60% rates increase, and 
reductions in service provision. [Parkinson, op. cit: 53-4] These opposing positions 
again raise the question of local autonomy, and the right of local parties to vary policy 
based on local democratic practice. 
In addition to the meetings held with the trade unions, there had been regular 
contact between the Liverpool labour movement and the PLP. Labour MPs 
representing Liverpool constituencies had, for example, been involved in arranging 
meetings between local and national officials. [Byrne, 1994; Liverpool 1984-5,1.4.84] 
As was noted earlier, representatives from Liverpool NALGO Branch arranged to 
meet C Clarke, Personal Assistant to N Kinnock, and J Straw MP as part of the lobby 
of parliament on 22.2.84. [Liverpool NALGO Campaign Committee 1983-85,25.1.84] 
In the wake of the 1984 local election, however, the PLP approach changed from 
dissuader, to facilitator and intermediary. 
Thus, J Cunningham arranged for a meeting between representatives of Liverpool 
Labour Group, himself and Straw for the PLP, representatives from GMBATU, 
NALGO, NUPE, and the NUT, and the Secretary of State for the Environment and his 
officials. [Sonnet, op. cit; Liverpool City Council, undated(a): 2] The meeting took 
place 17.5.84, and identified room for manoeuvre on both sides; the possibility of 
which was established through informal talks between Cunningham and 
Jenkin, and a 
preparatory meeting between labour movement representatives, prior to the meeting of 
17.5.84. [loc. cit. ] 
The local mandate provided by the local election in 
May 1984, where the 
Liverpool Labour Party increased its majority by seven, and secured 46% of the vote 
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in a turn-out of 51 %[Parkinson, op. cit: 59-60], appears to have been an important 
factor in the PLP's change of tack; partly because the result increased the resolve of 
the local labour movement. Up to that point the leadership of the PLP had, following 
the general Election defeat in 1983, exhibited a wariness of 'anything that smacked of 
radical or revolutionary politics'. [Blunkett, 1994] The PLP attitude to Liverpool's 
refusal to set a rate is also consistent with it's opposition to illegality, described in 
Chapter Three in reference to Clay Cross; although as Chapter Seven establishes, 
Liverpool's campaign tactic did not involve a clear point of illegality. 
Furthermore, the PLP stance was restated at the Local Government Conference in 
Nottingham February 1984, by J Cunningham, when he urged local authorities to stay 
within the law, and to minimise the impact of government policies. [Parkinson, op. cit: 
45] Finally, the overlap between Liverpool's campaign in 1984 and preparations for 
the campaign against rate-capping was also used as an argument by PLP leaders for 
Liverpool to hold back. [Parkinson, ibid: 44] The PLP therefore attempted to dissuade 
the Liverpool Labour Group from following its chosen course of action, and that 
option having failed, then attempted to ensure that a negotiated settlement was 
reached. 
That the PLP was unable to achieve its primary goal, and the Liverpool campaign 
achieve a modicum of success, was due in part to the specific campaign characteristics 
exhibited in Liverpool. As has been recorded, the democratic practice within NALGO 
played a part in securing membership support for the campaign, and this translated 
into national support which obstructed PLP attempts to undermine the campaign. 
Furthermore, the strength of local campaign structures and involvement of activists 
were factors in: the mobilisation of labour movement members, through rallies, 
demonstrations and mass meetings; the election victory in 1984, through leafleting 
activities like the `NALGO Road Show', and the placing of adverts in the local media 
as part of the run up to the election; and, ultimately, the change in PLP tactics. 
This Chapter explored, in national and local contexts, and in reference to socio- 
economic and labour movement developments, the similarities and differences evident 
in labour movement campaigning activity practised in Liverpool and elsewhere in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The analysis undertaken therefore identifies the shared 
experiences of economic decline, changes in the composition and structures of labour 
movement organisations, and aspects of these processes that were peculiar to 
Liverpool and important for the conduct of it's campaign for more resources 
between 
November 1983 and July 1984. As part of this process, relations between 
local 
authority trade unions and the Liverpool Labour Party, and the role of activists 
in 
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mobilising labour movement members and the wider electorate, are identified as 
central factors in the Liverpool campaign for more resources . 
12 
By considering labour movement experiences, practices, and structures, in 
previous chapters and in reference to Liverpool, before and during the said campaign, 
the analysis contributes to the interrogation and validation of categories. Categories 
are interrogated and validated in reference to Liverpool through consideration of the 
development of activism, structures, and Labour Party-trade union relations, and by 
acknowledging the influence of national developments, such as economic decline, the 
fluctuations in Labour Party membership, and the growth of shop stewards systems. 
Examination of the campaign to oppose and resist the proposed privatisation of 
cleansing services, for example, provides an analogy between the practice of 
defending services in Liverpool and those discussed in Chapter Four. 
Of particular significance here is the democratic practice evident in the Liverpool 
labour movement. Through struggles to make the Labour Group accountable to the 
DLP, to the validation and approval of activist decisions at general and mass 
meetings, and the involvement of activists in securing the election victory of 1984, the 
campaign for more resources was able to overcome pressure from within the labour 
movement, as well as from central government. By considering these developments 
as part of historical and societal processes, therefore, the chapter forms an important 
part of the historical context, within which the categories, principles, and practices 
employed during the labour movement campaigns against rate capping can be 
understood, validated, and interrogated. 
12 The extent to which local chauvinism played a part in mobilising activists, 
labour movement 
members, or electors is not explored as part of this thesis. 
Admittedly, the campaign for more 
resources played on the unfair treatment of the meta-theoretical category of 
Liverpool, but the same 
approach was open to the rate capped authorities. Reasons why they were unable 
to mobilise support 
in a similar fashion to Liverpool are therefore considered 




RATE CAPPING AND THE CAMPAIGN 
OF OPPOSITION 
The labour movement campaigns against rate capping represent a culmination and 
transition of opposition and resistance to the Conservative's approach to local 
government in the early 1980s. During the campaigns, labour movement activity was 
transformed from fragmented local initiatives, described in chapters Four and Five, 
into a co-ordinated and focused response at national and local levels. This 
development was due, in part, to the implications of rate capping, the primary purpose 
of which was to allow central government to limit taxation levels raised by an 
individual authority, but was also influenced by the experiences gained as part of the 
struggles outlined in previous chapters. Similarly, the severity of the Government's 
measures indicates the failure of previous attempts to control the spending and activity 
of particular Labour groups, while the drastic nature of the labour movement response 
was fuelled by exhaustion of previous schemes to counter Government policy and 
practice. This and the following chapter demonstrate that the issue of rate capping 
constituted a decisive stage in the struggle between Labour local authorities and 
central government. 
The threat of rate capping had accompanied earlier attempts to control the spending 
and activity of local authorities[NALGO, 1981: 3], however, and was evidenced in the 
Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 1982. [NALGO, 1984a; Stoker, 1988] 
The labour movement response to capping was therefore developed, at theoretical and 
practical levels, alongside the struggles described in chapters Four and Five. In 
particular, the campaign against capping in England and Wales consisted of two 
elements: opposing the Rates Bill and Act prior to and during implementation; and, 
resisting the provisions of the Act. Opposition to the conceptual principles and 
practicalities of rate capping are therefore considered in this chapter, and resistance to 
the Rates Act in Chapter Seven. 
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In keeping with the examples of labour movement opposition and resistance, 
discussed in earlier chapters, the campaign against rate capping espoused the same 
aims of defending local government services, jobs, and local democracy. The 
validation of these categories is therefore developed here by examining labour 
movement opposition to the Rates Bill and Act in the historical context established by 
preceding chapters, and by analysing, in reference to earlier campaigns, the 
organisation, tactics and ideas used to oppose it. As part of this practically reflexive 
approach, the successes and failures of the campaign are explored through the 
immanent process of interrogating, in reference to each other, campaign practice and 
the claims of the conceptual principles espoused. 
To achieve these analytical objectives, the chapter is divided into two sections 
entitled: Legislation and Background; and Labour Movement Opposition. The first 
section introduces and discusses the conceptual principles informing the 
Government's position, and those of the labour movement. An evaluation of the aims 
espoused by those who were, to varying degrees, involved in the labour movement 
campaign of opposition, completes the section. The second section develops the 
conclusions of its predecessor by examining, in reference to espoused principles, 
aims, and previous practice, the structures and tactics employed to oppose the 
provisions of the Rates Bill and Act. An evaluation of the campaign's performance in 
reference to these criteria concludes the section. 
LEGISLATION AND BACKGROUND 
For the conceptual principles informing rate capping, and opposition to it, to be 
subjected to rigorous interrogation, they should be explored in the context of the 
Conservative governments' approach to local government since 1979, and in reference 
to the developments considered in preceding chapters. In other words, the Rates Bill, 
subsequent Act, and labour movement campaign to oppose them should be evaluated 
within an historical context that: identifies the post-war expansion and contraction of 
local government service provision, employment, and local democracy; explores 
concomitant developments within the labour movement; and, evaluates and explains 
both within a societal framework. As the context and framework are established 
by 
preceding chapters, the task here is to begin analysis of the labour movement 
campaign of opposition by identifying and exploring the conceptual principles that 
informed arguments about rate capping. 
The three sub-sections into which this section is divided analyse: the 
Conservative 
Justification of rate capping; the Labour Movement Interpretation of 
it; and, the 
Campaign Aims of those mounting opposition. Conservative Justification, 
for 
example, considers the Conservative's explanation of the provisions of 
the Rates Bill 
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and Act, while the following sub-section, juxtaposes the labour movement's 
understanding. Taken as a whole, therefore, the sub-sections assess and explain the 
arguments for and against the Bill, in reference to previous and contemporaneous 
practice in the area of local government legislation and finance. A final sub-section 
analyses, in reference to the preceding sub-sections, the aims espoused by those 
involved in the labour movement campaigns. ' 
Conservative Justification 
Ostensibly, Boddy[1984b] notes, the Government's reasons for imposing rates 
limitation are outlined in the Rates White Paper published in August 1983, but their 
practice in this area should also be understood in terms of Conservative antipathy 
toward the rating system as taxation without business representation. In general 
terms, the White Paper argued that local government was spending more than 'the 
country' could afford; a problem apparently aggravated by a small number of 
authorities. [Boddy, ibid: 226] This argument is also restated in the White Paper as: 
'the economic regeneration of the country cannot be secured if the cost of local 
government is too great for the private sector to carry. '[ Sheffield Information Pack, 
undated] The term 'country' is employed as a euphemism for business, as is indicated 
by the White Paper's assertion that local rates constituted a heavy burden on business 
and commerce, and that business, with no voting power, exerted only a limited 
influence on local rating decisions. Thus, the effect of high business rates on 
industrial and commercial costs was considered to have major consequences for 
competitiveness and jobs extending beyond the locality. [loc. cit. ] 
These assertions are similar to the `overload thesis' and the justification of cuts in 
public expenditure, referred to in Chapter Three, but take no account of the increase in 
central government expenditure. As Chapter Four notes, central expenditure rose 
between 1979-80 and 1982-83, due to: increased transfer payments to finance mass 
unemployment; increased pension provision demanded by improved rates of 
longevity; and, increased defence spending. [Caulcott, 1983; Goldsmith, 1985; 
Howells, 1982] The Conservative's use of the term 'country' as a meta-theoretical 
validation of its approach to local government, therefore served to obscure the reality 
that, as Chapter Four records, local government accounted for a fraction of the 
PSBR, 
in comparison to central government, and public corporations. 
The 'Politics Today' bulletin 13.2.84, repeats the lamentation that those who pay 
non-domestic rates 'have no direct influence on councils'[Conservative 
Central office 
1983-86,13.2.84: 20], and justifies rate limitation in reference to the British 
Chamber 
Because opposition to the principles of rate capping continued after 
the Rates Act became statute, 
and accompanied the resistance of that legislation, references 
are made to the Bill and Act 
interchangeably, but each usage reflects the date of documentation referred 
to. 
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of Commerce's unsubstantiated claim that rates stifle growth, cost jobs, and damage 
industry. [ibid: 21] Paradoxically, however, rate limitation was also propounded as a 
means of bringing the overall level of public spending in line with public expenditure 
plans [Conservative Central Office 1983-86, ibid: 24]; even though central grants and 
not local rates form part of the PSBR calculation. Arguments, explored in Chapter 
Four, which question the macro-economic case for the control of local expenditure are 
relevant again, and demonstrate the Conservative's separation of theory and practice 
in an attempt to justify rate capping. As Chapter Four demonstrated, local 
government spending as a proportion of PSBR was not out of control by 1984[Boddy, 
1984b; Duncan and Goodwin, 1988], and selective rate capping was estimated to 
reduce taxation by only 0.5%. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid: 180] 
Insight into Conservative thinking on issues of democracy is also available from 
Blunkett and Jackson's report of a parliamentary speech, made 30.7.84 by C Franks, 
Conservative MP for Barrow in Furness, and K Baker's contribution to The Times 
14.11.84[Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 166]. The latter, for example, justified rate 
limitation on the basis that the non-domestic rate sector was without a vote, and 
contributing half of the rates raised by local authorities. Both men also sought to 
question the legitimacy of local mandates on the basis that some rate-payers received 
rebates. [Blunkett and Jackson, ibid: 167] This amounts to a curious version of the no 
taxation without representation tenet, and questions the theoretical equivalence of one 
person one vote implied by universal suffrage. ' 
Although the Government was not confident enough to re-introduce the `business 
vote', the consequences of the thinking outlined above are evident in the Rates Bill. 
Thus, the Bill allowed the Government to limit the level of domestic and non- 
domestic rates levied by an individual local authority, and by local government in 
general'. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit; NALGO, 1984a; Stoker, op. cit. ] Similarly, 
local authorities were required to consult representatives of industrial and commercial 
rate-payers, over an authority's expenditure and finance plans. [Duncan and Goodwin, 
op. cit; Gyford, 1985] Authorities were allowed to appeal against their rate limit, 
however, but at the risk of having their spending curbed after a central inspection of 
local finances. 
Ultimately, the imposition of rate limits formed part of a general attempt to 
centralise power and control, by removing the right of local communities to 
decide 
their own levels of service provision and taxation. [Boddy and 
Fudge, 1984: 16]' 
z See Appendix One for an explanation of `theoretical equivalence'. 
' In addition to the imposition of rate limitation, the Act was accompanied 
by a new system of targets 
and penalties designed to restrict local expenditure; these are 
discussed as part of the following sub- 
section. 
' These measures included: the London Regional Transport 
Bill; the Paving Bill for the abolition of 
Metropolitan County Council elections prior to the abolition of those authorities; and, 
the Education 
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Following the failure of earlier attempts to control the spending and activity of 
individual local authorities, the Rates Bill constituted a more direct threat to the 
elements of autonomy and local democracy identified and explored in earlier chapters, 
and therefore exceeded the impact of the devices described in Chapter Four. Thus, 
although the provisions of the Rates Bill were presented as the culmination of a 
process that began with the attempts to reduce public expenditure in the 1970s, and 
justified in terms of macro-economic rhetoric, the immediate objective was central 
control of local decision making. 
In addition to evaluation undertaken in labour movement circles, the proposals and 
their justification were received with caution in other quarters. Thus, in spite of their 
Conservative domination, both the Association of County Councils and the 
Association of District Councils expressed opposition. [Boddy, 1984b; Duncan and 
Goodwin, op. cit. ] Back-bench Conservative MPs also expressed doubts about the 
proposed legislation. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 159] Significantly, however, the 
doubts expressed by Conservatives related to constitutional implications for local 
democracy and accountability, as opposed to jobs, service provision, and the effect of 
the legislation on local communities. Understood in this light, therefore, PLP calls for 
a broad campaign, and consensus of opposition[TUCLGC, 1983], risked accepting the 
aims of the lowest common denominator as the ultimate aims of opposition. 
Labour Movement Interpretation 
Labour movement interpretations of the Rates Bill display two important 
contextual characteristics. First of all, the implications of the Bill are considered 
against a background of previous attempts to control local authority spending and, 
secondly, a link is identified between the provisions of the Act and other 
contemporary legislative measures. These interpretations also indicate how and why, 
from a labour movement perspective, the Conservative approach to local government 
from 1979 was detrimental to local government services, jobs, and local democracy. 
Significantly, however, the inclusion of jobs and services, as categories affected by 
the provisions of the Bill, differentiates labour movement opposition from that within 
the Conservative Party. Consideration of these areas is therefore undertaken here to: 
provide an alternative understanding of the Government's general approach to local 
government in the early 1980s; identify and explore the conceptual principles 
informing the labour movement campaigns to oppose the Rates Bill; and, develop the 
validation of categories. 
(Grant and Awards) Bill, the provisions of which are 
identified and explored in the following sub- 
section. 
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In keeping with Conservative criticism, labour movement analyses depict the 
provisions of the Rates Bill as altering the constitutional position of local government, 
and threatening the practice of local democracy. The control of local expenditure via 
the selective and general rate capping schemes is, for example, considered to threaten 
local democracy. In other words, by imposing a limit on the amount of rates a local 
authority could raise, the Government was considered to have removed the right of 
authorities to set their own tax levels, and thereby to vary levels and standards of 
service provision, in accordance with mandates provided by local elections. [NALGO, 
1984a: 6] The requirement for local authorities to consult with representatives of 
local business and commerce was also hailed as: undemocratic; constituting a 
business veto; presaging the end of the principle of one person one vote; and, 
signalling the re-introduction of property qualifications. [NALGO, ibid: 715 
The perceived increase in central control over local decision making is also 
presented as one stage in a continuing process of removing responsibility for financial 
and policy decision decisions from local authorities. The Rates Bill was therefore 
viewed as a means of neutralising the response of local authorities to the changes to 
the local government finance system since 1979. As was described in Chapter Four, 
for example, local authorities raised rates in response to: reductions in the level of 
RSG; changes in the allocation and distribution of grant; and, the imposition of targets 
and penalties affecting local expenditure. [ALA/AMA, undated; NALGO, 1984a; 
TUC, 1984]6 `Creative accountancy' measures were also adopted as a means of 
rendering ineffective the imposition of targets and penalties. Thus, given the level 
and success of resisting earlier measures, the limitation of an individual authority's 
rate levels under the selective scheme, was considered to be aimed at those who had 
consistently defied the government. [NALGO, 1984a: 6] 
The provisions of the Rates Act were accompanied by a new system of targets and 
penalties for non-capped authorities, and by other items of legislation that were 
perceived as threatening local democracy, jobs, and services. Consideration of these 
additional measures explains their relation to rate capping, and illustrates the severity 
of its impact in the relation to the categories identified. Ultimately, however, the 
initiatives were viewed as contributing to central government's attempt to control the 
spending and practice of individual local authorities. 
The value attached to the principle of one person one vote fails to acknowledge the abstract nature 
of 
the equality afforded. Hence, NALGO argued that in similar fashion to the theoretical 
independence of 
judicial, legislative, and executive functions of the state apparatus, the independence of 
local 
government formed an integral part of the balance between centre and 
locality. [1984a: 7] The stance 
adopted therefore seeks to defend the status quo and accepts the prevailing constitutional 
balance, and 
as such, signals a reactive as opposed to pro-active form of campaigning. 
The Association of London Authorities(ALA) and the AMA are 
included here given their 
domination by Labour groups, and their participation in the LGCU. 
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The increasing severity of the Government's approach to local authority spending 
and activity is indicated by the new targets and penalties which involved deductions 
of. 7p for every pound of the first one percent spent over target; 8p for the second; 
and, 9p for each successive percentage point of overspend. [TUC, 1984: 4] The 
seventy of these penalties can be gauged by comparing them to the levels described in 
Chapter Four, and by referring to Merseyside County Council where the maximum 
capped precept increase of 18p would incur 16p in penalties. [Coombes, 1985: 5]. 
Thus, the Rates Act and new penalties presented local authorities with a choice 
between rate increases and future capping, or cuts in jobs and services. [LGCU, 
undated: 4] In addition, 15 of the 18 authorities identified for capping, had their 
1985-6 targets frozen at 1984-5 levels, and 13 were given a rate limit lower than the 
level raised in 1984-5. This move allowed no consideration of inflation or increased 
labour costs[TUC, 1984: 4], amounts to a cut in real terms, and illustrates the control 
over local spending available to the centre under the Rates Act. 
Although the impact of such measures on services and job losses are difficult to 
quantify, indications are available. ' The Government, for example, expected `fringe 
expenditure' to be reduced, such as: advertising; spending on police monitoring 
committees in non-police authorities; and, in the case of Sheffield, using private sector 
funding for housing. [LGCU, undated: 3] Similarly, a Liberal amendment to a 
parliamentary motion submitted by Labour MPs in March 1985, argued that it was 
possible for capped local authorities to adopt budgets that preserved all statutory and 
essential services and jobs. [Parliamentary Notices, 6813 and 6879] In other words, 
only the bare minimum could be retained. 
In contrast, a joint statement issued by NALGO, NUPE, TGWU, GMBATU, FBU, 
NUT, and NATFHE, estimated that the measures would cost 75,000 jobs, and cuts in 
services for the old, young, sick, and disabled. [LGCU, undated: 4] Similarly, the 
TUC identified roads, Fire Brigades, schools, and social services in its list of services 
threatened by the provisions of the Rates Act. [ 1984b: 1] Essentially, labour 
movement opposition, and the case for maintaining service and staffing levels, was 
based on the effect of such actions had on communities already blighted by economic 
decline. [NALGO, 1984a; TUC, 1984] On Merseyside, for example, compliance with 
the County Council's cap was estimated to require: £23m worth of cuts; an increase in 
public transport fares; a redundancy programme; and, an overall reduction 
in services 
of 10%. [Coombes, op. cit: 6] 
' The difficulties are identified and discussed in chapters Three and Four, 
but can be summarised as: 
the variety of organisations affected by the measures; the 
different approaches adopted therein; and, the 
surreptitious nature of cuts such as not filling vacancies or using 
inferior products, as opposed to 
wholesale redundancies or complete withdrawal of services. 
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Contemporary items of legislation were also considered to undermine local 
accountability and democracy, and to reduce service provision. The London Regional 
Transport Bill, for example, transferred control of London Transport to central 
government, and thereby removed local control over service provision under the guise 
of creating a regional transport system. [NALGO, 1984a: 7]8 Similarly, the 
Education(Grants and Awards) Bill increased central influence and therefore control 
of local education policy, by withholding 0.5% of the annual RSG education 
settlement, and requiring local authorities to compete for allocation according to 
central priorities. [NALGO, ibid: 8] Perhaps inevitably, the proposed abolition of the 
Metropolitan County councils was considered to constitute an overt attack on local 
democracy, jobs, and services. Thus, the creation of 21 boards, three new quangos, 
and up to 100 joint local authority bodies to replace the directly elected Metropolitan 
County councils was cited as an attack on accountability and democracy. [loc. cit. ] 
Labour movement opposition to abolition was also based on other factors, 
including: the removal from local democratic control of strategic services, such as 
fire, police, and public transport; the increased likelihood of waste disposal and 
transport services being privatised; the undermining of co-ordinated strategic 
planning; an estimated loss of 9,000 jobs with minimal redundancy compensation; 
and, the practice of ministers appointing to joint boards and quangos, people who 
were sympathetic to the Government's general objectives, and the consequent 
implications for the levels and standards of service provision, and increased central 
control. [loc. cit. ] 
The importance attached by the labour movement to local accountability and 
democracy, stems from a desire to exercise de facto rights to vary levels of taxation 
and service provision. In practice, for example, areas affected by economic decline, 
social deprivation, and urban decay, such as those identified in Chapter One, increased 
rates to mitigate the effects of Conservative policy. As Chapter Four records, 
however, the labour movement moved away from increasing the local domestic tax 
burden for those who could afford it least, to `creative accountancy'. The labour 
movement case for local democracy was couched in the language of 
community[Cochrane, 1985: 55], however, and while it contrasts with the 
Conservative Party's advocacy for local business, both displayed an antipathy toward 
increasing local taxes. The provisions accompanying rate limitation were therefore 
indicative of the Conservative's desire to control local spending, policy, and practice. 
Finally, the financial logic of the Act was called into question, and the introduction 
of capping held to be counter-productive. The imposition of a cap, 
for example, 
8 The provisions of the Bill are also an example of how services are removed 
from the local electoral 
sphere. This matches the views of Dearlove[1979] and Saunders[1984], 
discussed in Chapter One, and 
should be understood in the context of the GLC's transport policy of the early 
1980s. 
170 
removed a particular authority from the system of targets and penalties. Thus, by 
freezing 13 of the capped authorities' targets at 1984-5 levels, and preventing them 
from increasing rates to fund spending, the amount of grant paid to those authorities 
could increase due to the removal of previous penalties. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 
158] Furthermore, studies by the Audit Commission and Cambridge University 
contradicted the Government's case for targets, penalties, and rate limits; particularly 
in terms of the impact of rates on local business. [ALA/AMA, op. cit; TUC 1960 - 
1987,1985] Given these anomalies, and the arguments recounted earlier, the labour 
movement agreed to oppose the Act. There was, however, little unanimity as to how 
such opposition should be expressed, and what it could and should achieve. 
Campaign Aims 
Preceding chapters validated the categories of local democracy, jobs, and services, 
by exploring the post-war expansion of local government, and labour movement 
identification of, and response to, measures that were considered to threaten one or all 
of these categories. Thus, the exploration of earlier, examples of labour movement 
opposition and resistance identified and explored aims, conceptual principles, and 
practices associated with the expansion and defence of local democracy, jobs, and 
services. These areas are also evident in the campaign against rate capping, but the 
focus and co-ordination of this campaign required a new approach. This sub-section 
therefore concentrates on the campaign against rate capping, but also draws analogies 
with earlier examples. 
The aims proclaimed by those sections of the labour movement opposing the 
principles and implementation of the Rates Act, its theory and practice, operated at 
interdependent levels. First of all, the defence of local democracy, jobs, and services 
by countering and reversing the Rates Bill, as part of an on-going attack on local 
government, can be identified as ultimate aims. On interconnected and reciprocal 
levels, the campaign also involved aims of organisation, participation, and 
mobilisation through which the campaign could be waged and tactics practised. 
These intermediate aims were no less important than their ultimate counterparts, as 
they constituted the foundation upon which the success or failure of the ultimate aims 
depended. ' The identification and exploration of the interrelation between the two is 
therefore an essential element of the discussion undertaken in this chapter. 
9 The terms 'intermediate' and 'ultimate' are used in preference to 'means' and 
'ends' because the former 
facilitate an understanding that recognises the internal relation 
between campaign structures and 
ultimate aims. In other words, while the structure through which 
the campaigns were conducted were 
an end in themselves, they were also essential to the operation of 
the campaign and therefore the 
realisation of the ultimate goals; neither automatically excluded 
the realisation of the other. 
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Within the span of labour movement involvement, almost as many agendas can be 
identified as individuals and organisations participating. These ranged from: Ted 
Knight's proclamation that: 'They can't fight us and the Miners. We can bring down 
Thatcher and then anything can happen'[Livingstone, 1987: 315]; through, uncapped 
Liverpool's participation in the campaign, as a means of securing more resources; to, 
the set of consistent aims that were elaborated at various meetings and conferences as 
part of the development and practice of the campaign. As a consequence of these 
variations, the conclusion has been drawn that the campaign lacked a clear 
understanding of what would constitute 'victory'[Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 171], 
but a clear set of ultimate aims are evident in the records available; the realisation of 
which would have constituted a distinct victory. 
The clearest exposition of ultimate campaign aims was made by representatives of 
local authorities and trade unions, under the auspices of the LGCU, at a meeting with 
Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment and his departmental officials, 
on 4.2.85. A document presented to the Minister at this meeting listed the following 
demands: the abandonment of targets and penalties for 1985-6; the publication of 
financial assumptions upon which maximum rate level calculations were based; 
disclosure of the anticipated impact of financial limits on services, clients, and jobs; 
abandonment of the Rates Act; that a commission of enquiry be established to resolve 
the financing of local government; the restoration of grant levels to those inherited by 
the Conservative Government in 1979; and, abandonment of the timetable for 
implementing the Rates Act. [LGCU, 1985a] 
These demands are consistent with the decision of the LGCU's strategy conference 
13.11.84 that the campaign should seek: withdrawal of powers, provided under the 
Rates Act, to enforce cuts in local government spending; abolish the system of targets 
and penalties; and, restore RSG to 1979 levels. [NALGO, 1984b: 3]10 Similarly, much 
the same demands were made in a joint approach to the Secretary of State for the 
Environment by the ALA and AMA. [AMA/ ALA, undated]" 
Common themes are also evident between the ultimate aims identified here, and 
opposition mounted against the effects of earlier measures. In particular, 
neutralisation or defeat of the Rates Act, protecting public services, counteracting 
10 Similar aims are evident in the debate and amendment, at the 
local level, of motions for NALGO's 
annual conference. Liverpool NALGO, for example, considered motions and amendments 
which 
identified the aims of the anti-rate capping campaign as: making the 
Rates Act inoperative; removing 
targets and penalties; returning RSG to, at least, 1979 
levels; and, allowing adequate levels of capital 
spending for housing and infrastructure. [Liverpool NALGO 
BEC 1979-1987,27.3.85] The ultimate 
aims identified were therefore supported at the local, and therefore activist 
level. 
" The ALA/AMA also made requests for what they considered to 
be improvements under the existing 
arrangements, including: the use of capital receipts 
by authorities to fund projects; the classification of 
expenditure which could be disregarded when calculating authorities 
targets and GREAs; and, matters 
relating to funds available under schemes 
for economic regeneration such as the urban 
programme. [AMA/ ALA, undated] 
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market-place mentality, and resisting and defeating the Government's general attack 
on local government[Labour Party 1966-1984,1984; Blunkett, 1985(b); NALGO, 
1984a; TUC, 1984], cover a broad range of objectives acceptable to most sections of 
the labour movement. The restoration of grant levels to those of 1979 and the 
removal of penalties and targets, for example, addressed Liverpool's grievance, but 
would also benefit other authorities, including those that chose to make cuts. 
Similarly, protecting public services, and counteracting the market-place mentality, 
applies to privatisation as well as the justification and practice of financial restraint. 
The general nature of the aims identified facilitated a broad level of support, but 
also allowed differences to exist between campaign participants over the desirability 
of certain aims, the commitment to campaigning, and the minimum level of 
concessions expected. Such generality therefore made the identification and 
agreement of intermediate objectives more difficult, but more important for the 
success of the campaign. Intermediate aims, for example, involved developing 
structures for the co-ordination and organisation of opposition and resistance, and 
these were, in turn, prerequisites for the mobilisation and participation of trade union 
and Labour Party members, activists, service users, and members of the general 
public. They also included the identification and practice of tactics for the pursuit of 
intermediate and ultimate aims, and therefore the means by which the Government 
could be persuaded to change or abandon its proposals. [TUC, 1984: 6] 
The development and utilisation of structures that monitored and co-ordinated the 
implementation of tactics are indicated by the references used in this and the 
preceding sub-section. Furthermore, attention is afforded to these matters in the next 
section, where an examination of the activity and support of full-time officials, 
councillors, and activists, for the various aims, is undertaken through the exploration 
of the campaign organisation, structures, and tactics. Consideration here would 
therefore lead to repetition, and so attention is restricted to one final area of 
intermediate aims. 
The aim of maintaining maximum levels of unity within a broad based campaign, 
also fits the intermediate aims category. Problems are evident in the general nature of 
this aim, however, as the probity of minimum demands and employment of effective 
campaign tactics had to be balanced with the desire to maintain an informal alliance 
formed from a myriad of organisations and individuals. Calls within 
NALGO for 
maximum unity among members, for solidarity with other trade unions, and with 
the 
Labour Party at national and local levels, for example, provide an 
indication of the 
breadth of attitudes and organisations among which some 
form of common ground 
was supposed to be identified and maintained. [ 1981: 
4] Similar sentiments are also 
evident in the Labour Party, where J Cunningham, the 
Shadow Secretary of State for 
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the Environment, espoused the aim of maintaining a consensus position facilitating all 
party opposition to the Rates Bill as the best means of defeating the 
Government. [TUCLGC, 1983: 17] 
Ultimate and intermediate aims identified here, are consistent with earlier labour 
movement opposition to the Conservative Governments' approach to local 
government. As part of it's National Strategy of Action, initiated in July 1981, for 
example, NALGO developed and applied ultimate and intermediate aims in response 
to Government policy and practice. Similarly, the campaigns of opposition and 
resistance to financial restraint, deregulation, and economic regeneration, considered 
in Chapter Four, exhibited a development of tactics and structures as part of 
campaigning activity; some of which were developed further as part of the campaigns 
against rate capping. Finally, an analogy can be drawn between the general nature of 
the ultimate and intermediate aims considered here, and the non-prescriptive approach 
described in Chapter Four. 
Through the exploration of Conservative justification for rate capping, labour 
movement responses, and campaign aims this section identifies the conceptual 
principles employed in each area, but also relates them to particular examples of 
practice. Similarly, the identification of analogies with earlier labour movement 
opposition, and with Conservative practice described in Chapter Four, facilitates 
interrogation of the campaign against rate capping in terms of its practice and 
conceptual principles, and within the specified historical context. Thus, as previous 
chapters establish, the defence of local government services, jobs, and local 
democracy were consistent general aims, evident in previous labour movement 
practice. 
During the campaign against rate capping, these principles were translated into the 
specific objectives of abolishing targets and penalties; restoring grant levels to those 
inherited by the Conservative Government in 1979; and, withdrawing powers 
provided under the Rates Act, to enforce cuts in local government spending. Thus, 
having identified the existence of generally accepted aims, and the conceptual 
principles informing them, the task remains to explore the extent to which each 
informed, and were informed by, the practice of opposing the Rates 
Bill and 
subsequent Act; an essential aspect of which, is the role played by activists and 
full- 
time officers in developing and operating structures and tactics. 
LABOUR MOVEMENT OPPOSITION 
Evaluation of the campaign to oppose, defeat, or amend 
the Rates Bill is 
undertaken over the following sub-sections, with reference 
to the conceptual 
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principles, aims, and practices identified and validated in the previous section and 
chapters. Because the Act was not actually enforced until the financial year 1985-6, 
however, the campaign activities examined include opposition to the preparations for 
its implementation. Similarly, aspects of the later campaign of resistance are referred 
to where they have relevance for the discussion in hand, or serve purposes of 
illustration. Attention is therefore focused on three areas which facilitate a reciprocal 
examination of campaign aims and practice: the existence and development of 
structures necessary for the co-ordination, organisation, prosecution, and promotion of 
the campaign; the selection and utilisation of tactics; and, the effectiveness of attempts 
to realise stated aims. This approach also facilitates an examination of the role and 
functions of activists, full-time officers, and councillors in and through the 
campaign's structures and tactics. 
By undertaking the reciprocal interrogation of aims and practice within the 
established historical context, the analysis meets the requirements of immanent 
critique outlined in the introductory chapter, and therefore of practically reflexive 
theorising. This is achieved over three sub-sections entitled: Committees and 
Structures; Campaign Tactics; and Realisation of Aims. The first sub-section 
identifies the use and development of structures, and their relevance to the aims of the 
campaign. Similarly, the second sub-section examines the most prominent campaign 
tactics in reference to the same criteria. Finally, the aims and practices identified are 
evaluated through a process of reciprocal interrogation, and the performance and 
achievements of the campaign of opposition thereby assessed. 
Committees and Structures 
Identification and exploration of the main structures through which the campaign 
of opposition was co-ordinated and organised, and therefore how the aims of the 
campaign were addressed, forms the focus of this sub-section. The discussion serves 
to introduce the use and development of structures, however, as the processes are 
explored further during subsequent discussions. For the moment, attention is afforded 
to four areas of activity that illustrate the structural characteristics of the campaign: 
the TUC; the LGCU; the public sector trade union NALGO; and, the existence and 
activity of localised structures. These organisations exemplify the type and 
breadth of 
structures employed during the campaign, and an extensive investigation of campaign 
activities undertaken by their constituent elements 
is therefore conducted. 
Consideration of these areas also contributes to the identification and exploration of 
activist and full-time officer involvement. 
175 
As a body representing over 100 trade unions in the early 1980s, the policy and 
practice of the TUC was decided by its affiliates. " References to the subject of rate 
capping in the TUC Annual Reports, for example, provide an indication of how 
decisions taken at annual congress were put into practice during the following year, by 
the General Council and other committees. Similarly, the specific interests of 
affiliates were represented and pursued through ad hoc committees. Trade unions 
organising and recruiting in local government, for example, were represented on and 
by the TUCLGC; a body consisting of full-time officers from the TUC and affiliated 
trade unions. Thus, as is noted in Chapter Four, much of the TUC's campaigning 
activity was conducted, organised, and co-ordinated under the auspices of the 
TUCLGC; a practice continued in the campaign against rate capping. 
To pursue the identified ultimate and intermediate aims, however, the TUCLGC 
created the Local Government Campaign Co-ordinating Committee(LGCCC), 
consisting of one national representative from each local government trade union, and 
the secretaries of the TUC's regional councils. [NALGO, 1984a; TUCLGC, 1983] The 
LGCCC was established in line with a 1983 Congress motion, to oppose the Rates 
Bill and abolition of the Metropolitan County councils[TUC 1960 - 1987,1984: 322], 
and had intermediate aims of assisting liaison between individual trade unions, and 
promoting a unified trade union response. [NALGO, 1984a: 10] The main TUCLGC 
and LGCCC contributions to the campaign reflected their domination by full-time 
national officers, and involved the intermediate aims of co-ordinating and developing 
national initiatives through liaison with: affiliated trade unions; the PLP; the LGCU; 
rate capped local authorities; and, the local authority associations. [NALGO, ibid; 
TUC 1960-1987,1984 and 1985; TUC, 1984; TUCLGC, 1983] TUC initiatives were 
also developed and co-ordinated at the regional and local levels through the TUC's 
regional councils[NALGO, 1984a; TUC, 1984]; the substance of which is identified 
and explored in the remainder of the thesis. 
The LGCU13 was also established in 1983, as the initiative of public sector trade 
unions14 and 70 local authorities[Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; NALGO, 1984a], and 
followed the decision of Labour local authorities meeting in Sheffield, in the 
aftermath of the 1983 General Election, to establish a national campaign unit. 
Furthermore, the purpose and functions expected of the LGCU are evidenced 
in the 
intermediate aims pursued during the campaigns of opposition and resistance, namely: 
'Z TUC Annual Reports, for example, record 108,105 and 102 affiliates 
for the years 1981,1982 and 
1983. [TUC 1960 - 1987,1981: 666,1982: 
704,1983: 642] 
13 The Unit changed its name to the Local Government Information 
Unit in March 1985, but for clarity 
and consistency all references in this thesis are to the LGCU. 
'a By December 1984, trade union affiliates included: COHSE, CPSA, FBU, 
GMBATU, NALGO, 
NATFHE, NUPE, NUT, and the TGWU. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,4.5.84; 
LGCU Briefings and 
Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing, 4.1.85] 
176 
the co-ordination of campaign activities; the creation and operation of a central 
resource; and, the accumulation of information for use by affiliates. [loc. cit. ] 
Co-ordination of campaigns mounted by groups and organisations including local 
authorities, professional associations, the voluntary sector, trade unions, and the TUC 
was, for example, aimed at avoiding organisational conflicts and unifying separate 
initiatives to common time-scales. [NALGO, 1984a: 10] The LGCU therefore played 
a role similar to that of the NSC in the 1970s, described in Chapter Three, and that of 
the MTULMCC in Liverpool, described in Chapter Five. The breadth of 
organisations involved in the LGCU, and the national approach, represents a 
difference to these other bodies, however; one that engendered a degree of national 
co-ordination and co-operation hitherto unseen in local government campaigns. 
By acting as a central resource and accumulating information for use by affiliates, 
the LGCU was able assist co-ordination by sharing information through the 
production of bulletins and broad sheets. [LGCU, 16.1.85: 1] Similarly, links were 
developed between the LGCU and other bodies, and campaign co-ordination 
enhanced through the attendance of LGCU officers at meetings held by local authority 
campaign teams, trade unions, the voluntary sector, the local authority associations, 
and other interested bodies. [loc. cit. ] The inaugural meeting of NLACC, for example, 
received an account of the latest developments in the campaign from an LGCU 
speaker. [NLACC 1985,23.2.85] 
There is also evidence of liaison between the LGCU, local government trade 
unions, and the TUC. Trade Union representatives from local authorities and regional 
structures are, for example, recorded as meeting regularly from November 1983, and 
as liaising with the LGCU. [TUC 1960 - 1987,1984: 322] Another joint initiative 
involving the LGCU, local government trade unions and the TUC, was the lobbies of 
parliament organised in February 1984. [NALGO, 1984a: 10 & 11 ] Finally, a joint 
union campaign officers group was established by the LGCU to co-ordinate national 
level activities of unions campaigning against rate capping and abolition. [LGCU 
Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing February 1985; NALGO FTDLD 1983-85, 
4.3.85] 
The LGCU also provided an opportunity for the leaders of the Labour groups 
involved in the campaign to share their views and experiences, and for their views to 
be shared with Labour groups not directly involved in the campaign. 
The LGCU 
Management Committee, for example, was open to representatives from all 
local 
authorities and trade unions affiliated to the LGCU, and 
dealt with general matters 
regarding the running of the LGCU and the conduct of the campaign. 
[LGCU 
Management Committee, 1984-85] A strategy sub-group was also established and 
attended by those with a direct involvement in the campaign, 
dealt with specific 
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campaign matters, and reported back to the Management Committee. [LGCU Strategy 
Sub-Group 1985; NALGO RCLGM 1984-85,13.3.85] 
Finally, representation at the LGCU consisted of leading councillors, full-time 
trade union officers, officers from the AMA and ALA, and employees of the Unit. 
Essentially, this structure reflected the bureaucratic nature of the functions undertaken 
and the concern with intermediate aims of co-ordination and disseminating 
information. In this sense, therefore, the LGCU's composition and activities reflected 
those of the TUCLGC and LGCCC. Decisions in both organisations were taken in a 
relatively detached environment, without procedures to ensure that decisions were put 
in to practice, or supported by those the delegates claimed to represent. Thus, this 
practice compounds the point, made in Chapter Four, regarding the accountability of 
delegates attending delegate conferences where people adopted positions without a 
credible mandate. In the case of the LGCU, however, contact was made with activist 
bodies such as the NLACC, but took the form of external, detached briefings, as 
opposed to interactive dialogue. The implications of such practices for the 




Branch Stewards committees, Branch Executive Council and its 
sub-committees, attended by activists; and General 
meetings open to all members. 
Regional 12 District councils attended by Branch representatives; 
including activists and full-time officers. 
National National Executive Council and its sub-committees. The 
NNEC comprised of full-time officers, representatives 
appointed by District committees and elected by the 
whole membership; sub committees comprised of full- 
time officers and appointees from District. Annual 
Conference and Service Groups, attended by national 
officers and activists. 
Source: NALGO, 1989. 
In contrast, the development of structures within NALGO facilitated a greater 
degree of accountability and interaction between officers and activists. As Table 
6.1 
indicates, NALGO was comprised of affiliates and operated at three levels: national, 
district, and local. " The structures through which the interests of members and 
activists were represented are also identified in Table 6.1. Thus, 
NALGO's annual 
conference formed the sovereign decision making body of the union, was attended 
by 
15 References to NALGO are made in the past tense not only as a reflection of the 
historical nature of 
this study, but also as an indication that the union no 
longer exists following its merger with COHSE 
and NUPE to form Unison. 
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delegates from local branches, and its decisions put into practice by the NNEC and 
other committees. Conference also acted as a forum for the 'Service Groups' that 
reflected the specific areas in which members were organised and represented: local 
government, electricity supply industry, gas industry, the NHS, the transport industry, 
and the water supply industry. [NALGO, ibid: 9] 
Each level of the union had parallel bodies representing service groups, and the 
union as a whole. At the national level, for example, local government was 
represented on the NLGC, at the regional level by District Local Government 
Committees and at the local level by Branches organised according to the employing 
authority. Thus, the NLGC served an analogous function to the NNEC, and the 
NLGGM paralleled the annual conference. These structures were reflected in the 
conduct of the campaign against rate capping, and their role in the formulation of 
earlier campaigning policy and practice is identified in Chapter Four. 
At the national level, for example, the direction of the campaign and pursuit 
of intermediate and ultimate aims was undertaken by the NLGC, in conjunction 
with the NNEC's Economic, Education, Publicity, and Law and Parliamentary 
committees. [NALGO, 1984a: 10] Similarly, the campaign was progressed at the 
regional level through District councils, the creation of District Campaign Co- 
ordinating committees[NALGO, ibid: 9], and district delegate meetings involving 
Metropolitan County, District, and London Borough branches, called to discuss 
abolition. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,4.5.84] Special NLGGMs were also called and 
recalled for activists to discuss developments and strategy proposals, such as that held 
in Liverpool 20.3.84. [NALGO, 1984a] 
The NALGO campaign also developed structures to facilitate interaction between 
branches, and between officers and activists. The NLGC, for example, set up regular 
National Delegate Advisory Meetings(NDAM), starting 30.11.83, to provide a forum 
for discussion between the NLGC and local authority branches considered to be 
candidates for rate capping. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,7.12.83] The attendance of 
local authority observers at NDAMs also indicates the level of links and co-ordination 
in the broader campaign. [NALGO NDAM, 16.10.84] 
Interaction between officer and activists was also developed by the convening of 
Rate Capping Liaison Group Meetings(RCLGM), on a monthly basis. Representation 
at RCLGMs was based on two delegates from branches identified 
for rate capping, 
and one from those severely affected by targets and penalties. 
[NALGO RCLGM 
1984-85,20.11.84] Furthermore, the RCLGM was allowed to send two observers to 
the NLGC if the latter was discussing rate capping or the campaign 
for the defence of 
local government. [loc. cit] Motions adopted by the meetings are 
discussed in the 
following chapter, but indicate a primary concern with 
intermediate aims, pertaining 
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to the conduct of the campaign. [NALGO, 1984b; NALGO NDAM, 16.10.84; 
NALGO RCLGM, 1984-85. ] 
Finally, local activity and organisation was uneven, within NALGO and elsewhere. 
In London, for example, NALGO Hit List Branches held regular monthly meetings 
from 1983 onwards. [London NALGO, 10.8.83] Similarly, Liverpool NALGO 
established a Branch Campaign Committee in 1983 and, as Chapter Five records, 
other structures in Liverpool included: the JSSC; the MTULMCC; a local authority 
campaign working party; a CCSU; and, regular meetings between councillors, full 
time trade union officials, and activists. A significant refrain of national NALGO 
bodies, however, relates concerns over uneven activity at the local level; particularly 
among branches not affected by rate capping, but also among other local government 
trade unions. [NALGO, 1984a] 
Similar, concerns are also evident in calls by NALGO and the TUC for the creation 
of local JTUCs. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,22.11.83; NALGO, 1984a; TUC, 1984] 
In an attempt to create co-ordinated local structures reflecting LGCU activity, and 
echoing earlier calls, the TUCLGC wrote to public sector trade unions to encourage 
the creation of JTUCs. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,22.11.83] As chapters Three, 
Four, and Five note, however, and as indicated by NALGO's recognition of uneven 
activity in branches not affected by rate capping, such committees tended to develop 
around local struggle. This uneven development is indicated by South Tyneside 
NALGO requesting correspondence and other material on the subject of joint union 
committees, and by Durham where the JSSC, consisted of manual workers. [NLACC, 
undated] Furthermore, the inaugural meeting of NLACC, held in Liverpool 30.3.85, 
was attended by representatives from only 40 local authorities, and only nineteen 
JTUCs had affiliated by the time the first meeting was held in Sheffield 
13.4.85. [NLACC 1985,13.4.85] 
The preceding discussion identifies similarities between structures employed as 
part of the campaign of opposition, and those discussed in relation to earlier examples 
of resistance, such as the NSC in the 1970s, the MTULMCC 
in Liverpool, and local 
JTUCs. Furthermore, the creation of the LGCU, NDAMs, and RCLGMs represent a 
development of earlier initiatives, with the latter bodies affording new 
levels of 
interaction between officers and activists. The relation of structures to the pursuit and 
prosecution of campaign aims, their development, and the 
involvement of activists 
and full-time officers is also demonstrable through consideration of 
the selection and 
practice of tactics during the campaign of opposition. 
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Campaign Tactics 
Eight tactical elements feature prominently in the campaign of opposition to the 
Rates Bill: education, publicity, delegate conferences, parliamentary intervention, 
legal action, public protest, and industrial action. 16 The categories are identified as 
separate elements for the purposes of exploration, but should not be viewed as 
singularities. As is apparent from previous and later discussions, tactics such as 
delegate conferences served all three functions of education, publicity, and 
organisation. Similarly, each aspect of campaigning activity addressed ultimate and 
intermediate aims simultaneously. The tactics identified here, were also features of 
previous campaigning activity discussed in chapters Three, Four, and Five, and 
exploration here identifies developments in each area. Finally, analysis of the 
effectiveness of the tactics identified, takes place by identifying and exploring the 
interrelationship between conceptual principles, the practice of tactics, the structures 
discussed in the previous sub-section, and the role and function of full-time officers, 
activists, and councillors. 
The practice of education and publicity demonstrates the difficulty and futility of 
attempting to differentiate between the two. NALGO's approach, for example, 
attempted no such dichotomy, recognising that each activity fulfilled both 
functions. [NALGO, 1984a: 10-11] For purposes of analysis, consideration of the 
tactics employed in this area addresses two types of practice: specific or detailed 
information targeted at those participating in, or belonging to organisations with an 
interest in the campaign; and, general information directed at a broad audience to raise 
awareness of the issues. In this context, education and publicity fulfil an intermediate 
aim of encouraging mobilisation and participation, but through an increase of activity 
the campaign would also exert pressure on the Government to realise its ultimate 
aims. 
Examples of educational initiatives provided by full-time officers for activists, 
include the education workshops run by the TUC General Council, in conjunction 
with LGCU, on the subject of local government finance. [TUC 1960-1987,1985: 205] 
The workshops took place in London, Southampton, Cambridge, Sheffield, Liverpool, 
and Preston during 1985. [TUC 1960 - 1987,1986: 197-8] Similarly, a course on the 
implications of rate-capping was held at Northern College Barnsley, in 
October 1984, 
and included delegates from the GLC, Liverpool, and Sheffield. [Liverpool 
NALGO 
BEC 1979-1987,24.10.84; Liverpool NALGO Campaign Committee 1983-85, 
13.12.84] 
'b These categories are similar to the 'seven primary functions' 
identified by NALGO as essential 'for 
successful organisation of the campaign's objectives to resisting and 
defeating the government's 
attack. ': Co-ordination and Organisation; Publicity and Education; 
Branch Activity; Support for local 
authorities resisting cuts; Parliamentary intervention; Mass 
Protest and Industrial Action. [1984a: 9] 
181 
Education and information programmes were also run by activists for the broader 
membership. In NALGO, for example, all branches in local authorities on the 
Government's hit list, or earmarked for abolition, were encouraged to hold work-place 
meetings to discuss the Government's attack on local government, and to invite 
national speakers to address BECs. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,4.5.84] This process 
was evident in active branches, such as in Islington. [London NALGO, 10.8.83] As 
Chapter Five records, Liverpool NALGO also undertook such activities as part of its 
campaigns in 1984 and 1985, running education workshops for stewards, and holding 
work-place and mass meeting to discuss issues. The campaign in Sheffield also 
included an education programme for employees through its trade unions, and 
Sheffield councillors held meetings with the work-force to discuss service provision, 
and employee concerns. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 177] Work-place meetings were 
also held in Camden[LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Bulletin: June 1984], 
and in Haringey. [LGCU, January 1985] 
Much of the information used in the local education and publicity initiatives was 
provided by circulars, bulletins, and through information and briefing packs produced 
and distributed by full-time officers. The LGCU, for example, produced and 
distributed packs on various issues including one, prepared with the ALA and AMA, 
on the RSG settlement for 1985/6. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 
14.12.84]. Similarly, NALGO full-time officers circulated an information sheet 
entitled: 'Fight to Defend Local Democracy'(FTDLD) to local government branches, 
during the campaign. The first issue was produced in September 1983, and by March 
1985 over 40 issues had been produced and circulated. [Liverpool NALGO Branch 
records] Targeted initially at local government branches, FTDLD was issued to all 
NALGO branches with effect from 1.2.84. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,1.2.84] 
NALGO full-time national officers also produced and distributed to branches, a series 
of briefing packs and fact sheets on: rate capping and the Rates Bill; abolition of the 
Metropolitan County councils; the Education(Grants and Awards) Bill; and, RSG 
settlements. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,22.11.83; LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 
1984-85, Briefing 14.12.84; NALGO, 1984a]" 
The circulars and briefing packs produced by NALGO and the LGCU provided a 
range of information including: arguments against capping and abolition; updates and 
" At the local level, Briefing and Information packs were also produced 
by: Basildon[LGCU 
Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 14.12.84]; Greenwich[LGCU 
Briefings and Bulletins 1984- 
85, Bulletin June 1984]; Hackney[LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefrag 
14.12.84], and the 
South East Regional TUC produced a pack on the Rates Act. [loc. cit. 
] Furthermore, 13 authorities 
developed campaigning activity in this area by utilising technological 
developments in the production 
and employment of videos as a means of publicising service provision 
to both users and work-force. 
Avon, for example, produced a video illustrating the services 
they provided[LGCU Briefings and 
Bulletins 1984-85, Local Link, February 1985], and Liverpool NALGO used a 
Southwark video on 
rate-capping for its stewards courses. [Liverpool NALGO 
Campaign Committee 1983-85,17.1.85] 
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advice on local organisation and developments; and, publicised the availability of 
campaign materials. Much of the information evident in the NALGO literature also 
appeared in local leaflets and circulars, such as Liverpool NALGO's `Campaign News 
'85'. [Liverpool NALGO Campaign News 85] A common feature of these initiatives 
was the aim of assisting local groups and organisations to campaign for local services 
and local democracy. A Sheffield pack, for example, included advice and information 
on: Providing Services People Need; The attack on Services; Winning the Argument; 
What to do in your area; Finding out the Facts; Building the picture and Speakers 
notes. [Sheffield Information Pack, undated] Finally, the interaction and 
interrelationship between activists and officers through the provision and use of 
education and publicity materials demonstrates the futility of attempting to impose a 
simplistic dichotomy. 
The inclusion of posters, leaflets, badges, and stickers in briefing and information 
packs, indicates the mainstay of publicity initiatives mounted by trade unions, local 
authorities, and other campaigning groups; identified in previous chapters. Other 
established practices, such as the production of booklets and pamphlets, and the 
compilation of petitions were similar to the activities of trade unions, discussed in 
Chapter Three, but also included the production of consultation documents. 
NALGO's national officers, for example, produced fact-sheets, leaflets, for use by 
local activists, and a 'hands off poster on abolition, and similar material on rate- 
capping[NALGO, 1984a: 10]. 
Similar publicity was produced for local elections and concentrated on the issues 
of jobs and services. NALGO election leaflets, for example, declared: 'If you care 
about services vote carefully', and 'Election Cancelled' was written across leaflets 
referring to Metropolitan County Council elections due for May 1985. [NALGO 
FTDLD 1983-85, February 1985] Thus, the orthodox initiatives undertaken by 
Liverpool in 1984, described in Chapter Five, were repeated in the campaign against 
rate-capping, and similar tactics employed in Basildon, Camden, Greenwich, Leeds 
and Leicester. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Bulletin June 1984] The 
production of civic newspapers and the placing of adverts in local media were, for 
example, used by activists to raise public awareness. [loc. cit. ] 
At the behest of their ruling Labour groups, local authorities also contributed to the 
education and publicity campaign through the production of booklets and pamphlets, 
including: Camden[LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 1.2.85]; 
Haringey[LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 14.12.84]; Sheffield. 
[loc. 
cit. ] Lambeth also produced a public consultation document entitled: 
Rate-Capping 
and Lambeth', outlining the effects of capping and government 
inspired cuts. [loc. cit. ] 
Finally, the LGCU produced a series of pamphlets examining the economic case 
for 
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rate capping, and identifying its effects on: education; services for the elderly; DLOs; 
and, Women. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Bulletin June 1984] 
Petitions were was also compiled during the campaign to raise awareness, and 
thereby encourage mobilisation and participation. Haringey and Islington local 
authorities, for example, compiled petitions of service users, by collecting signatures 
at the point of contact. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 1.2.85] 
Other compilers included Manchester, Leeds[LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, 
Bulletin June 1984], and Greenwich, where the latter collected 300,000 
signatures. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 1.2.85] Such initiatives 
were dependent on activist involvement, and encouraged within NALGO where, 
along with leafleting, public meetings, and rallies, the compilation of petitions by 
local branches was expected to form part of campaign promotion activities. [NALGO, 
1984a: 11] 
The publicity campaign also included innovations conducted through existing local 
authority structures, and addressed intermediate aims of maximising mobilisation and 
participation. Such initiatives included: Haringey's Service user months to publicise 
individual service areas[LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 1.2.85], and 
Sheffield's community inquiry which involved an open ended questionnaire for 
community groups to identify specific needs, and areas where resources were 
required. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 177] Greenwich, Lambeth, Lewisham, and 
Southwark also conducted local opinion polls on the issues of local finances and 
service provision, and held a joint press conference to compare new RSG levels with 
local opinion. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 14.12.84] 
These initiatives represent developments in the traditional campaigning structures 
employed by the labour movement, but also bear resemblance to the 'open forum' and 
'communiplan' initiatives practised by Clay Cross in the 1970s, and discussed in 
Chapter Three. Like the publicity initiatives described above, they addressed 
intermediate aims of raising awareness and encouraging mobilisation and 
participation, but tended to be transitory. In this respect, they attempted to reach out 
beyond the labour movement to other organisations and individuals, but structures to 
organise and sustain forthcoming mobilisation or participation were absent. 
As part of the campaign against rate-capping, however, attempts were also made 
to 
involve organisations outside the labour movement 
by developing `community 
conferences'. The LGCU in conjunction with London 
Community Work service, for 
example, organised a London Voluntary Sector 
Conference on 13.2.84 to discuss rate- 
capping. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, 
Bulletin February 1984] Lambeth 
also held a community campaign conference entitled 
'Fighting for the Future', on 
11.12.84, which attracted over 100 local groups-[loc. cit] 
Similarly, Sheffield's 
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community enquiry, referred to earlier, took evidence from three hundred local groups 
and culminated in a two day conference which produced a report on the needs of the 
community. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Local Link February 1985] 
Once again, however, such initiatives offered little scope for sustained mobilisation 
and participation, though Camden, Fulham, Hammersmith, and Lambeth attempted to 
address this breach by establishing umbrella assemblies of delegates and 
representatives from: the local community; trade unions; unemployed groups; and, 
others. [LGCU Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 14.12.84] 
A series of labour movement delegate conferences were also held as part of the 
campaign. In 1983, for example, Southwark organised a London wide conference 
attended by six Labour Groups, and all local government trade unions, except 
NALGO. The conference passed a motion supporting a policy of no cuts, no 
redundancies, no increases in rent or rates over the rate of inflation, and agreed to 
establish a steering committee. [London NALGO, 10.8.83] In contrast, a conference 
of hit list authorities met 23.5.84, rejected derogation, but failed to adopt a clear 
strategy. [LGCU Management Group 1984-85,4.6.84] Other conferences held during 
the period include that in Liverpool 23.6.84, discussed in Chapter Five, and, in 
Sheffield July 1984. 
The Sheffield 'Forging the Links' conference was organised with the help of the 
LGCU[Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 170], and by delegates from 40 Labour 
authorities, and agreed to defy the Government by not complying with rate-capping, 
penalties or targets. Of the Northwest authorities attending the conference, however, 
only Merseyside County Council faced an actual cap, but both Liverpool 
and Manchester faced penalties. [Liverpool NALGO Service Conditions committee 
1979-1987,26.7.84] The conference began with a group meeting on the evening of 
the 5th July to discuss the future of the LGCU. A conference of local authorities with 
budgets over £ 10m was planned for the 6th; splitting in the afternoon into Labour 
Groups only. The evening of the 6th and all day on the 7th was given over to a 
special Labour Party local government conference. [LGCU Management 
Group 1984- 
85,4.6.84] 
The conference decision to defy the Rates Act is portrayed as 
filling a leadership 
vacuum created by the PLP's reluctance to offer a 
lead[Gyford, 1985: 32], but as is 
demonstrated in Chapter Four the PLP was acting in line with LPAC decisions. 
Furthermore, the decision of the Sheffield conference reflects the sentiments 
expressed in the NEC statement presented to the 
LPAC in 1984[Labour Party 1966- 
1984,1984: 295-297], and with motions supported at the 
1984 LPAC. The decision 
taken in Sheffield was not so much filling a leadership void, 
therefore, as signalling a 
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change of direction in Labour Party thinking and resolve; although the PLP leadership 
continued to adopt its consensus approach. 
Furthermore, positions of defiance and non-compliance were already adopted by 
organisations other than the Labour Party, most notably NALGO. [NALGO FTDLD 
1983-85,8.11.83] As earlier chapters and sections demonstrate, the structures 
through which the campaign was waged were linked to earlier resistance, conducted 
regardless of a PLP lead. Campaigning activity was not dependent, therefore, on the 
national organs of the Labour Party. To suggest otherwise is to subscribe to, or foster, 
the myth that political actions take place only through political parties and their 
parliamentary or national bodies. 
The aims and tactics of the campaign were also developed at delegate conferences 
after Sheffield. An LGCU strategy Conference held 13.11.84, for example, adopted 
objectives discussed and outlined in the previous section of this chapter. [NALGO, 
1984b: 3] Similarly, the TUC's `National Consultative Conference on the Rates Act 
and the Defence of Local Government' took place on 4.12.84. Attendance was based 
on two delegates from each affiliated union, 12 delegates from TUCLGC unions, and 
two delegates from authorities affiliated to the LGCU. [NALGO NDAM, 16.10.84] 
NALGO's 12 delegates were selected by the NDAM 16.10.84, as two from the GLC 
liaison panel, eight from the NLGC, and two from the NDAM. [loc. cit. ] 
Attendance at the TUC conference involved 200 delegates from 30 local 
authorities and 27 local government trade unions/branches[LGCU Briefings and 
Bulletins, Briefing 14.12.84], and raises the question of whom the delegates were 
representing, and therefore accountable to. The conference's support for a strategy of 
non-compliance for rate capped councils, for example, required that the position 
adopted by delegates be supported by those they claimed to represent; particularly, as 
the practice and success of non-compliance depended on the support of the broader 
labour movement. As has been identified, NALGO's delegation consisted of eight 
NLGC representatives and four activists, though their mandate from the 
broader 
membership is unclear. 
The use of legal challenges to oppose central government, provides another 
similarity between the tactics of the campaign of opposition and those 
discussed in 
Chapter Four. Examples include the GLC's challenge to the Government's deadline 
for appeals against specific rate-caps as arbitrary, unjust, and unreasonable. 
[LGCU 
Briefings and Bulletins 1984-85, Briefing 18.1.85] 
Similarly, Sheffield challenged 
the GREA calculations as inconsistent and, 
in Sheffield's case, not taking all the 
factors into account. [loc. cit. ] Leicester and 
Greenwich also considered challenging 
the assumptions made by the Secretary of 
State about authorities' balances and 
reserves in announcing the hit list for rate capping and 
general rate limits, and the 
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DOE's practice of not making the same assumption for all authorities in determining 
RSG and rate limitation. [loc. cit. ] Such action was taken at a specialised level 
detached from activists and the broader public, but reflected the campaign aims of 
publishing central government assumptions; a move expected to provide local 
authorities with ammunition to counter the Government's decisions. 
The campaign also focused on the abstracted institutions of parliament, aiming to 
disrupt the passage of the Rates Bill. In effect, this meant writing to, visiting, and 
distributing information packs to MPs and peers. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85: 
12.10.83; 1.12.83; 1.2.84] Local government trade unions, for example, contributed 
to a rolling programme of parliamentary lobbies, commencing in February 1984 and 
scheduled for each Wednesday of the parliamentary session. [NALGO FTDLD 1983- 
85,1.2.84] Lobbying involved delegations of activists and councillors visiting 
parliament and were arranged, by the LGCCC and LGCU, to correspond to legislation 
being discussed in parliament. [loc. cit. ] Local JTUCs, assisted by district campaign 
co-ordinating committees, also organised individual lobbies, and the LGCU sought to 
ensure participation of the relevant local authorities. [loc. cit. ] 
To enhance the process NALGO produced lists of MPs on select committees to be 
approached, and the LGCU produced a guide on lobbying MPs. Other parliamentary 
tactics included: trade union General Secretaries writing to members of the relevant 
standing committees[NALGO, 1984a; NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,1.2.84]; trade 
unions placing adverts in the Houses of Parliament Journal[NALGO, 1984a: 12]; a 
selective distribution of NALGO briefing packs on rate-capping and abolition; and, 
branches lobbying local MPs. [loc. cit; NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,12.10.83] The 
tactics described here demonstrate another aspect of the interaction between full-time 
officer and local activists. In this instance, the full-time officers, particularly in the 
LGCU, played a pivotal role in organising and co-ordinating activity. 
Parliamentary intervention was, however, recognised to be limited in its 
effectiveness; at best defeating legislation, but not resisting cuts in RSG or the 
imposition of penalties and constraints. [NALGO, 1984a: 12] As early as 
October 
1983, NALGO recognised that political and parliamentary resistance of the 
government had to be backed by a strategy of non-compliance. 
[NALGO FTDLD 
1983-85,8.11.83] The limitations of parliamentary intervention is, for example, 
demonstrated by the Conservative's overall majority of 144, of 188 over the 
Labour 
Party[Crewe, 1985], and by the guillotining of the Rates Bill 
in March 1984. [NALGO 
FTDLD 1983-85: 12.3.84; 12.4.84] 
A tactic related to parliamentary intervention, and one which 
repeated the practice 
described in Chapter Five, involved NALGO full-time officers producing a specimen 
letter for local branch activists to send to election candidates. 
The letter enquired after 
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the candidates' position on issues relating to NALGO's service areas: rate-capping and 
abolition; bus deregulation; and, privatisation in the NHS and of the Gas, Electricity 
and Water utilities. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85, February 1985] Examples of letters to 
send to councillors who might be voting on a policy of non-compliance with rate 
capping were also provided. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,4.3.85] This particular letter 
expressed support for non-compliance even if it caused confrontation with the 
Government, and gave notice that the authors would not accept any settlement 
involving cuts. The letter also pledged support, including industrial action, for an 
authority opposing cuts and rate-capping, and described an alliance of trade unions 
and local authorities as capable of defeating the Government. [loc. cit. ] 
As with earlier examples of labour movement campaigning activity, the campaign 
of opposition employed public protest as: a means of pressurising central government; 
supporting or pressurising local authorities; mobilising support; and, raising the 
campaign profile. [NALGO, 1984a: 12] During the campaign of opposition, for 
example, protests were called in conjunction with days of action, like that organised 
by the GLC JTUC and Metropolitan County branches on 24.1.84 to oppose 
abolition. [loc. cit. ] Similarly, the TUC's 'Democracy Weeks', held in 1984 and 1985, 
provide prime examples of this type of activity, and the interaction between full-time 
officers and activists. Thus, activities were co-ordinated through the TUCLGC, TUC 
Regional Councils, and the LGCU, aimed to focus attention on the Government's 
attack on local services, jobs and democracy[NALGO, 1984a: 12], but were 
dependent on activist involvement to secure local participation. 
Events in 1984, for example, culminated in a national march and rally on 
`democracy day' Thursday 29.3.84, and were timed to coincide with the passing of the 
Rates Bill from the commons to the lords, and publication of the abolition paving bill. 
As is noted in Chapter Five, however, 29.3.84 was also the date Liverpool Labour 
Group chose not to set a rate, and when local employees staged a one day strike and 
lobby of the Council meeting. Similarly, activities in 1985 culminated on 7.3.85, 
when councils defying the Government synchronised their budget meetings so as to 
defer rating decisions on the same day. [NALGO FTDLD 1983-85: 1.2.84; 
2.2.84; 
13.3.85] Thus, in authorities not setting a rate the local labour movement arranged 
protests and staged one day strikes to support councillors. 
[NALGO FTDLD 1983-85, 
13.3.85] 
The link between earlier forms of protest and the campaign of opposition 
is 
extended through the use of industrial action, but 
its practice was diverse in nature and 
purpose. Among other things, for example, limited 
industrial action involved one day 
strikes and boycotting vacant posts as a way of protesting against 
local cuts. [NALGO 
FTDLD 1983-85,8.11.83] Furthermore, as the following chapter 
demonstrates, the 
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practice also involved a broader perspective indicated by NALGO's position, that: 'a 
coherent programme of militant industrial action against the government's attack on 
local democracy, services and jobs is imperative. '[NALGO, 1984a: 13] The forms of 
action discussed here, however, relate to the campaign of opposition and, within that 
context, focus on the use of industrial action: to `alert and mobilise the 
membership(trade union) to the threat posed by the government's policies' [loc. cit]; as 
`a highly effective weapon for resisting the local implementation of cutbacks' [loc. 
cit. ]; and, `for putting political pressure on the government'[loc. cit. ] 
Industrial action aimed at alerting and mobilising trade unionists and pressurising 
the Government consisted mainly of one day strike action. In July 1984, for example, 
the TUCLGC called, in conjunction with NALGO and NUPE, a one day strike to 
protest at the crisis in local government. [Liverpool NALGO Service Conditions 1979- 
1987,26.7.84] Similarly, NALGO members employed by Merseyside Metropolitan 
County Council also took strike action on 7.8.84 to protest against the imposition of a 
rate cap on the authority. [loc. cit. ] As was noted in the previous discussion of 
protests, however, such action was often called to coincide with, and therefore 
encourage support for, demonstrations and lobbies. The most prominent examples of 
such action pertain to the strikes called as part of the TUC's democracy weeks, 
discussed previously. 
As with the staging of protests, local examples of industrial action were designed 
to show support for or strengthen the resolve of local councillors; hence the co- 
ordination of action with important council meetings. In Liverpool, for example, 
strikes and mass lobbies of the council were common features of the campaign in 
1984 and evident again in 1985. Thus, on 30.1.85 the JSSC called a lobby of the 
Council meeting which was due to discuss its financial position. [Liverpool NALGO 
Bulletin 1983-84,21.1.85] Similarly, Liverpool, Sheffield, and other campaigning 
authorities held a one day strike and demonstration on 7.3.85. [Blunkett and Jackson, 
op. cit: 177; NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,13.3.85] Finally, the staging of such action as 
part of a national strategy, such as the last example co-ordinated through the LGCU, 
indicates a degree of interaction between full-time officers and local activists, 
whereby the former arranged and timetabled events, and the latter orchestrated 
local 
activities. 
The campaigning activities catalogued here, exhibit characteristics 
that are 
analogous to earlier examples of campaigning activity 
discussed in preceding 
chapters. Both encompassed successive and parallel activities, 
that included 
education, publicity, mass protest, parliamentary 
lobbies, and industrial action. 
Furthermore, the activities identified and explored required and produced 
interactions 
between activists and full-time officers, to agree aims and strategy, 
and to utilise and 
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develop the structures through which the campaign was co-ordinated, organised, and 
conducted. In the campaign of opposition, however, such activities required 
unprecedented co-ordination to address the ultimate aim of defeating or reforming the 
Rates Bill, as opposed to securing local concessions. 
At this stage of the campaign emphasis was placed on securing mobilisation and 
participation to defeat a particular piece of legislation, as opposed to focusing on the 
specific areas of services, jobs, and local democracy; though localised struggles and 
publicity continued to promote these categories. Mobilisation and participation at the 
local level, involving union members and the general public in one day strikes, 
demonstrations and lobbies, were therefore goals in themselves, and ways of 
pressurising the Government into conceding the ultimate aims of the campaign. The 
success or failure of the campaign of opposition should therefore be measured against 
these criteria, and as preparation for the next stage of the campaign in the event that 
the Rates Bill was enacted. 
Realisation of Aims 
In this section, the campaign of opposition to the Rates Bill is the subject of critical 
analysis. The conceptual principles, as indicated by the campaign aims and the 
defence of local government services, jobs, and local democracy, are therefore 
evaluated in reference to the practice of this campaign, and vice versa. Thus, the 
following campaign aims are subjected to a reciprocal interrogation with campaign 
practice: amendment or defeat of the Rates Bill and associated cuts and penalties; 
development of campaign structures; and, cognisation, mobilisation, participation, and 
motivation of trade unionists and the general public with regard to the effect of central 
government policies on local government. 
If taken literally, the campaign's ultimate aim of preventing the Rate Bill becoming 
statute, was unsuccessful; a virtual inevitability given the Conservative Government's 
overall parliamentary majority referred to earlier. In this context, the aim of 
preventing the Bill's effects on local democracy, jobs, and services, as described 
in 
the Legislation and Background section, was also unsuccessful. Closer 
inspection, 
however, reveals that this ultimate goal was not unitary, but exhibited sub-divisions 
that included amendment or defeat of the Rates Bill, and reversal of associated cuts 
and penalties. This conglomerate nature was not accidental, 
however, but the product 
of a coalition that, in Sheffield for example, accommodated 
different groupings that 
included: those prepared to accept nothing less than the 
defeat of the Rates Bill; those 
who sought negotiation; and, those who enjoyed 
the personal esteem of public 
life. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 178-91 
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Furthermore, the intermediate aims identified earlier included the maximisation of 
awareness to the effects of government policy and practice, and the mobilisation, and 
participation of as many people as possible in opposition to it. Thus, another way of 
evaluating the campaign of opposition's success, is to examine the development of 
campaign structures, and the practice of tactics as means of encouraging mobilisation 
and participation in the campaign. Such activity was not only important to the 
conduct of the campaign of opposition, but also a prerequisite of any attempt to resist 
the Rates Act in the eventuality that the campaign of opposition failed to realise its 
ultimate aims. 
In the preceding sub-sections, two versions of practice are presented. The first is a 
coherent and consistent development of structures involving full-time officers at the 
national level, and an interaction and interrelation through such structures between 
full-time officers, activists, and councillors. The second account, however, identifies 
fragmented and uneven levels of activity, organisation and structural development at 
the local level. Examples of the first version include the use of established structures, 
and the creation of ad-hoc committees by NALGO and the TUC. The creation and 
development of the LGCU also fits this criteria. Such a perception only has validity 
in relation to the organisations considered, however, as NALGO's NLGC was 
concerned by the lack of development in other trade unions as late in the campaign as 
March 1984. [NALGO, 1984a: 9] 
Uneven development was also evident at the local level, where NALGO activity at 
district and branch level was described as `sporadic', and adherence to existing policy 
and tactics as `not complete'. [loc. cit. ] Thus, by March 1984, with the exception of 
the Metropolitan counties, the GLC and some hit list branches there was `little or no 
local action to mobilise the membership and public around the issues, despite the 
efforts of some District Campaign Co-ordinating Committees. ' [loc. cit. ] Those 
branches not affected by rate capping, or targets and penalties, were not actively 
pursuing local campaign initiatives identified earlier. 
The uneven development of the campaign was symptomatic of the 
Government's 
selective approach to penalising and capping authorities, and of socio-economic 
circumstances affecting particular localities. In Liverpool and 
Sheffield, for example, 
the development and strength of local labour movement structures reflected socio- 
economic developments and contributed to the level of 
local activity. Similarly, these 
developments contributed to the election of Labour groups, and 
their practice of 
labour movement values which then brought them 
into conflict with central 
government priorities and policies. Within 
NALGO uneven development reflected 
the developmental process just described, but contributed to a position, whereby 
full- 
time national officers, responding to the 
demands of branch activists in authorities 
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where campaigning activity was underway, adopted a more radical approach than the 
non-active branches. Ultimately, therefore, the unevenness of campaigning activity 
detracted from the attempt to pressurise the Government into abandoning its 
legislation. 
Furthermore, NALGO's NLGC assumed that where formal structures exist for 
co-ordination and promotion of the campaign then such structure are sound and 
effective. [NALGO, 1984a: 10] The existence of structures, as was noted in reference 
to delegate conferences, does not necessarily imply sound and effective practice. 
Issues regarding accountability and representation are of primary importance here. 
Analogies can therefore be drawn between the practice of delegate conferences such 
as the one held by the TUC in December 1984, NALGO's NDAM and RCLGM, the 
LGCU, whereby those voting for policies were not representing the views of their 
constituents, or did not attempt to mobilise them in accordance with the policies 
adopted. [Byrne, 1994; Lowes, 1994] 
In other words, the existence of a gap between the aims and aspirations of full-time 
officers, activists, and members was a problem that the practice of campaign tactics 
was intended to address. This does not mean that campaigns should be undertaken 
only when there is pre-existing support, but education and publicity, and structures to 
maintain levels of mobilisation and participation are of paramount importance to 
ensure support for ultimate aims pursued. This is a fundamental point, developed 
through the following chapter's exploration of the campaign of resistance. 
Though difficult to quantify in absolute and relative terms", the questions of 
awareness, mobilisation, participation, representation, and delegation form an integral 
aspect of the evaluation of the principles and practice of the campaign of resistance. 
An analogy can be drawn, for example, between activists, at delegate conferences or 
other committees, taking principled positions, and the abstract practice of democracy 
in society, where representatives in parliament or the council chamber take decisions 
according to their interpretation of the will of the people supposedly divined from 
elections. The issues of representation and delegation are therefore explored further in 
the following chapter, and relate to the extent to which activists operated within their 
own milieu, and failed to engage a broader audience to secure support 
for the 
positions they adopted. In other words, the extent to which activists were able or 
18 Attendance on a march held in London on 24 January 
1984 to protest at the Government's proposals 
for abolition was, for example, estimated at 
30,000[NALGO, 1984a: 12], while Democracy Day in 
March 1985 was estimated at 70,000. [Blunkett and 
Jackson, 1987: 175] These differing figures were 
both considered successful, but do not give any 
indication of sustained participation. Furthermore, 
under the heading `Mobilisation', a survey undertaken 
for the LGCU to identify public awareness of 
local authority responsibilities, describes respondents as 
feeling powerless, and indicate the difficulties 
in attempting sustained participation and mobilisation. 
[LGCU, January 1985] 
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concerned to engage in dialogue with those they sought to mobilise, is an important 
area of exploration in explaining the performance of the campaign of resistance. 
The chapter identifies conceptual principles informing Conservative and labour 
movement approaches to the policy and practice of rate capping, and explores the 
interaction of labour movement principles and practice by examining the development 
and use of campaign structures and tactics to achieve desired ends. This is undertaken 
within the historical context established by preceding chapters, and therefore 
identifies and explores the continuity between the conceptual principles, structure, and 
tactics employed in opposing rate capping, and in earlier labour movement 
campaigns. Thus, the interrelation and interaction between activists, councillors, and 
full-time officers in developing and operating structures and tactics, is explored as a 
fluid process informed by, and helping to shape, the principles and practice of labour 
movement democracy. 
Of particular significance are the roles played by these groups, and their use of 
structures, to achieve the intermediate aims of mobilisation and participation as a 
means of defeating or amending the Rates Bill, and as preparation for the campaign of 
non-compliance. The practice of education, publicity, delegate conferences, 
parliamentary intervention, legal action, public protest, and industrial action are, for 
example, means of defeating or amending the Rates Bill, and encouraging 
mobilisation and participation in the campaign. As the discussion of campaign tactics 
demonstrates, however, mobilisation and participation relied on the direct 
involvement of activists, was therefore founded on the development of activist 
movements discussed in Chapter Two, but restricted to that grouping in particular 
areas. 
In addition, the use of parliamentary intervention and legal action, serve to 
emphasise the campaigns reliance on, and replication of, abstracted structures 
whereby political and legal decision making processes are removed 
from society as a 
whole. As a consequence, mobilising tactics such as limited 
industrial action and 
mass protest appeared ephemeral and ineffective, showing 
little effect on the intended 
target of central government. This separation of campaign practice 
from society was 
also emphasised when the Rates Bill became law, as the 
focus of the campaign shifted 
from the direct involvement of activists in mobilising opposition, to a reliance on 
the 




THE CAMPAIGN OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
The emphasis and practice of the campaign of non-compliance represents a 
development from general opposition, described in the previous chapter, to a co- 
ordinated and focused challenge to central government. Whereas the campaign of 
opposition had sought to encourage mobilisation and participation as a way of 
preventing the Rates Bill becoming statute, the campaign of non-compliance required 
support for, and from, councillors and Labour groups who were committed to resisting 
implementation of the Rates Act. In particular, the non-compliance of councillors was 
backed by the promise of sustained industrial action should concessions not be won, 
councillors be surcharged, or commissioners introduced. [NALGO, 1984a; NALGO 
NDAM, 16.10.84; NALGO, 1984b] The short term success of the campaign relied, 
therefore, on the commitment of elected representatives, but in the long term required 
an unprecedented level of mobilisation and participation, not just of activists, but of 
the membership of local government trade unions involved in the campaign. 
The threatened resistance to Parliament also represents a shift within the labour 
movement, away from accepted constitutional practice, to the sanctioning and 
anticipated use of extra-parliamentary opposition. Such an approach is particularly 
significant because through the intention to use industrial action to secure its aims, the 
campaign threatened the constitutional and ideological primacy of Parliament; both 
in 
society at large, and in the policy and practice of the Labour Party and 
labour 
movement. The question of whether all those involved intended such a challenge 
to 
take place is irrelevant in practical terms, because an outright 
defeat of the 
Government would have undermined Parliament's claim to primacy 
based on a 
universal suffrage at least once every five years. 
Furthermore, this challenge to the 
primacy of Parliament was all the more potent, 
because it carried the added dimension 
that the action was based not only on mandates secured within 
the labour movement, 
but also through the institutions of the state at 
local elections. 
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These issues are explored within the historical context established by preceding 
chapters, and attention afforded to the function, interaction and interrelationship 
of councillors, full-time officers, and activists. Similarly, the interaction and 
interrelationship between these elements and the conceptual principles, structures, and 
tactics employed during the campaign are also identified and interrogated. The 
chapter therefore develops the reciprocal validation of categories, and completes the 
reciprocal interrogation of the aims and practice of the campaign. 
This is achieved by dividing the chapter into two sections, entitled: Constitutional 
Confrontation; and Industrial Action. The first considers how those authorities 
resisting the Rates Act sought to gain concessions from the Government, and involves 
consideration of the tactics employed to defy the Act. The second section explores 
the issues surrounding the use of industrial action as a means of securing the desired 
aims of the campaign. In particular, this approach examines the structures through 
which the tactic was adopted, and how such activity was to be instigated and co- 
ordinated. A consistent theme is the identification of the roles undertaken by 
parliamentarians, full-time officials, and activists, in relation to the tactics of non- 
compliance and industrial action. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION 
The change in focus and practice accompanying the campaign of non-compliance, 
is explored within the historical context established by previous chapters, and in 
reference to the use of structures to prosecute the campaign, and the function of 
activists, councillors, full-time officers, and MPs. This is achieved by examining: the 
selection and practice of tactics; attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement; and, 
factors that contributed to the eventual failure of constitutional confrontation. These 
aspects of the campaign are therefore considered over three sub-sections entitled: 
Tactical Alternatives; Thwarted Negotiation; and, Local Practice of Non-compliance. 
By exploring the relative merits of tactics considered for resisting the Rates 
Act, 
the first sub-section provides a reciprocally validated understanding of the term 
`non- 
compliance'. An integral part of the adoption and practice of non-compliance, 
however, was the attempt to force the Government into a negotiated settlement 
that 
would have averted direct confrontation. [Blunkett, 1985b] 
Attempts at negotiation 
therefore forms the focus of the second sub-section. A synopsis of 
developments 
within local authorities and Labour groups prior to their setting a rate constitutes 
the 
final sub-section, and provides an insight into 
local decision making, and the levels of 
activity, commitment, and internal divisions affecting 
the campaign. Because the 
evaluation process involves the identification and exploration 
of structures and 
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elements over three sub-sections, however, the focus of individual sub-sections should 
not be interpreted as universal practice. 
Tactical Alternatives 
As Chapter Six records, the tactics of education, publicity, delegate conferences, 
parliamentary intervention, legal action, public protest, and industrial action were also 
elements of the campaign of non-compliance. As the mechanisms of non-compliance 
form the focus of this discussion, however, such tactics are afforded minimal 
consideration. Thus, following a brief account of the continuity of earlier tactics and 
structures, the main body of this sub-section explores the tactics considered or 
employed by the labour movement as mechanisms of non-compliance, namely: 
resignation; withholding information; not honouring financial obligations; not setting 
a rate; and, deficit budgeting. 
The continuation of interrelated tactics during the campaign of non-compliance, 
such as publicity, delegate conferences, public protest, and industrial action, served 
the combined purposes of encouraging mobilisation and participation in support of 
councillors in their attempts to avoid setting a rate, and of pressurising the 
Government into negotiation. In preparation for strikes and public protests to be held 
in conjunction with the TUC's `democracy day' 6.3.85[LGCU Management Group 
1984-85,18.12.84], for example, the LGCU aimed to produce and distribute: a leaflet 
in January; `facts packs' and a second leaflet in February; balloons, stickers, badges 
and a further leaflet in March. [LGCU, 16.1.85: 2] Furthermore, once non-compliance 
was underway, Greenwich suggested staging mass pickets outside DOE Offices in 
Marsham Street and P Jenkin's home, until negotiations were agreed. [LGCU, 12.4.85: 
2]' 
The convening of delegate conferences was also continued in 1985, as a means of 
developing structures, and a broadening of the campaign to defend local government. 
A particular example of this type of activity was the conference of 15 penalised 
but 
uncapped authorities, held 22.1.85 on North Tyneside, with the assistance of the 
LGCU. [LGCU, 16.1.85: 2] Events planned for the North Tyneside conference 
included an update on developments in the campaign of non-compliance, and 
discussions of. campaign experiences; anticipated developments up 
to and after the 
second round of capping; and, strategies for the second round. 
The conference was 
concluded with a Labour groups meeting. [loc. cit. 
] 
A one day national conference of local authorities and 
trade unions was also 
planned for Sheffield 21.4.85, to discuss the position of 
local authorities that had not 
' The compilation and presentation of petitions 
to the DOE as part of a media event during the week 
commencing 18.3.85[LGCU Management 
Committee 1984-85,12.3.85], also repeats a tactic 
identified in chapters Four, Five, and Six. 
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made a rate, and consider future strategy. [LGCU Management Group 1984-85, 
18.12.84]2 Conferences were also scheduled for London Labour groups that had not 
set a rate: South London boroughs on 14.4.85; and, North London boroughs on 
20.4.85. [LGCU Strategy Sub-Group 1985,3.4.85] The functions of education, 
publicity, tactics, and organisation addressed by these conferences through their 
involvement of activists, councillors, and full-time officers from trade unions and the 
LGCU, provide an analogy with the conferences discussed in Chapter Six. 
Tactics of parliamentary intervention and legal action were also practised as part of 
the campaign of non-compliance, and indicate a continued use of abstracted state 
structures. In addition to the examples of legal action described in Chapter Six, the 
GLC and ILEA also took legal action to quash their precepts on the basis of the 
assumptions made by the Secretary of State for the Environment. [LGCU Management 
Group 1984-85,11.2.85] As an additional means of pressurising the Government, the 
LGCU also sought to maximise media coverage of events, but recognised the 
presentational difficulties associated with technical legal points. [loc. cit. ]' As a 
reflection of the detachment of the people operating through the LGCU, however, the 
effects of abstracting campaign activity from the broader populace to professionalised 
forums of the courts and the caprice of media notoriety were not addressed. A further 
analogy can therefore be drawn between the practice, noted in Chapter Four, whereby 
the campaign against financial restraint retreated in to the professionalised and 
detached domain of creative accountancy. 
Finally, the tactic of parliamentary lobbying was also continued. In relation to the 
RSG settlement for 1985-6, for example, the LGCU: wrote to selected MPs; arranged 
a meeting between MPs and councillors; arranged press conferences; and, encouraged 
lobbying of sympathetic backbench Conservative MPs. [LGCU, 16.1.85: 1] Similarly, 
the LGCU Strategy Sub-Group agreed to write to `all Labour MPs and NEC members 
urging them to raise the subject of rate capping at every opportunity'. [LGCU Strategy 
Sub-Group 1985,18.4.85] The focus on Parliament indicates the level of abstraction 
involved in campaigning activity; though as part of the campaign of opposition 
it 
accompanied attempts to involve a broader base of labour movement members and 
general public. In contrast, the tactics of non-compliance signalled the transition 
from a campaign based on mobilisation and participation, to one 
focused on the 
2 Other examples included the national planning conference 
held in Liverpool 30.3.85 that agreed to 
establish the NLACC[Liverpool NALGO Campaign 
News 85,15.2.85; Liverpool NALGO F&GP 
1979-1986,14.3.85], and an LGCU organised conference 
held in Manchester, to discuss ways of 
continuing opposition to the Rates Act, cuts in 
jobs and services, and the attack on local democracy 
through privatisation, and abolition. [TUC 1960-1987,1985: 
358] 
' As is noted in the following sub-section, press conferences were 
also held following meetings with 
the Secretary of State for the Environment, as part of abortive 
attempts at negotiation. [ LGCU 
Management Committee 1984-85,16.1.85] 
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activity and commitment of Labour groups and councillors represented on and 
through the LGCU. 
A campaign of non-compliance was endorsed by the Labour Party NEC and by the 
LPAC in 1984, but neither offered guidance as to what form it should take; except that 
cuts in jobs or services be avoided. [Coombes, 1985: 3] The options considered or 
employed as part of non-compliance are identified in the introductory paragraphs of 
this sub-section, placed councillors and council officers at the forefront of non- 
compliance, and therefore focused responsibility on them as opposed to the broader 
labour movement. This responsibility was emphasised by the early rejection of the 
option of councillors resigning, a move opposed by national Labour Party leaders[loc. 
cit. ], and had been rejected by the Lambeth delegate conference held 1 November 
1980 because it did not prevent cuts. [Lambeth, 1980: 2] 
Extensive consideration was afforded to the tactics of not providing information to 
central government departments, and not honouring financial contributions or 
obligations. In particular, this meant not providing central authorities with 
information required to assist the abolition of the Metropolitan County councils', the 
implementation of the Rates Act 1984, and routine and other information, such as 
Capital Estimates and Commitment returns. [LGCU, 15.4.85: 1] Similarly, the 
financial contributions and obligations considered for non-compliance included: not 
paying precepts, such as contributions made to police authorities; not honouring 
interest payments to financial institutions; and, not paying PAYE and National 
Insurance contributions. [LGCU, 12.4.85; LGCU Strategy Sub-Group 1985,18.4.85] 
This latter tactic was considered at several meetings, and though the delay of financial 
contributions was countenanced and support sought from the TUC, non-payment was 
never formally adopted. [LGCU Strategy Sub-Group 1985,3.4.85, and 18.4.85; 
LGCU, 12.4.85] 
Refusal to return information was afforded more consideration, but was fraught 
with difficulties. NALGO, for example, had a policy of not co-operating with 
information requests relating to abolition and rate capping, but recognised that 
due to 
individual legal culpability, many chief officers could be prepared to 
defy councillors 
instructions. s[LGCU Management Group 1984-85,18.12.84] Legal action was, for 
example, taken against Merseyside County Council because 
it withheld information 
relating to Waste Disposal. [LGCU Management 
Committee 1984-85,1.2.85] 
Furthermore, much of the information required 
in relation to the abolition of the 
° The TUCLGC adopted a similar tactic when it refused 
to meet the Government's Staffing Committee 
to discuss staffing levels that might apply 
following abolition. [TUC 1960-1987,1984: 
323] The merits 
of such withdrawal are unclear, but it indicates 
the extent to which the tactic of non-co-operation 
permeated official structures. 
5 Chapter Three, for example, records NALGO members refusing 
to break the law in Clay Cross. 
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Metropolitan County councils was already in the public domain, and therefore made 
non-co-operation irrelevant. [loc. cit. ] 
This tactic was also hampered by other factors, including: the amount of 
information provided to central government made identifying crucial data difficult; 
certain local authority funding was dependent on returns; non-receipt of information 
could be used by employer bodies to stall negotiations with trade unions; and, some 
returns could be of benefit to one authority, but detrimental to another. [LGCU, 
15.4.85: 1] The AMA therefore sought to maintain the status quo, and its Social 
Services Committee to continue discussions on issues not directly related to rate 
capping. [LGCU, Management Committee 1984-85,1.2.85] Total non co-operation 
was therefore considered to be inappropriate, and a number of initiatives undertaken 
to identify crucial information, including: consideration of the matter by the AMA's 
Policy Committee 7.2.85; liaison between LGCU, AMA, and ALA officers[loc. cit. ]; 
and, the distribution of a questionnaire to local authorities. [LGCU, 15.4.85: 2] 
As a consequence of these problems, practice between individual authorities 
varied. A number of authorities, for example, returned routine forms under 
Councillor scrutiny, others under Councillor and officer scrutiny, and some, despite 
pressure from District Audit, delayed or refused to return particular forms. [loc. cit. ] 
Ultimately, the one area where agreement could be reached involved delaying the 
Capital Estimates and Commitments Return 1985-6. This information was required 
by central government to monitor capital spending, was used in the consideration of 
restrictions, and had been delayed successfully since 1983. [loc. cit. ] Thus, the tactic 
of refusing to provide information to central government exerted little pressure, and 
certainly did nothing to alleviate councillors' burden of responsibility. Furthermore, 
the focus of the tactic and its consideration through bodies such as the LGCU, AMA, 
and ALA, demonstrates the involvement of, and reliance upon, councillors and full- 
time officers for its adoption, practice, and success. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn by examining deliberations and practices 
pertaining to `no rate' and deficit budget tactics, and associated levels of confusion 
and preparation. The separate consideration afforded to each tactic, and the emphasis 
of retrospective accounts implies that the tactics were mutually exclusive[Blunkett, 
1985a; Blunkett, 1985b; Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Coombes, op. cit. ], and as the 
Labour Party NEC statement 1984 implied: `Non-compliance could 
lead some 
Councils being unable to fix a rate. For others, it could mean running out of money 
for essential services'. [Blunkett, 1985a: 1] In practice, 
however, this proved not to be 
the case, because as subsequent sub-sections show, not setting a rate 
meant running 
out of money too. Attention is therefore 
focused here on: perceived strengths and 
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weaknesses of each approach; the campaigning focus they engendered; and, the 
overall aims and criteria that governed the preference for one tactic. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the deficit budget and no rate strategies were 
articulated most often in reference to their perceived compatibility with achieving 
maximum unity among those authorities adopting a stance of non-compliance. Thus, 
the no rate tactic was preferred by the South London Boroughs[Blunkett, 1985a; 
Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit; Livingstone, 1987], reflected the position adopted by 
Liverpool during its 1984 campaign for more resources, and was presented as offering 
'the greatest likelihood of unity and strength'. [Blunkett: 1985a: 1] In particular, the 
tactic was expected to allow local authorities to work to a common timetable, and 
maximise public pressure for a negotiated settlement. [Blunkett, 1985b] 
Alternatively, deficit budgeting was considered to represent an obstacle to unity, 
because it was reminiscent of practices whereby authorities claimed to be maintaining 
services, while implementing surreptitious cuts. [Blunkett, 1985a] The tactic was 
therefore considered to be a recipe for suspicion between Labour groups and trade 
unions unless joint monitoring arrangements could be agreed[loc. cit. ]' Furthermore, 
deficit budgeting was considered to be an obstacle to unity because it would allow 
each authority to run out of money at different times. [Livingstone, op. cit: 309] Thus, 
for the tactic to be successful, authorities would have to stick rigidly to their budget 
strategies and fulfil promises on existing services and minimal expansion[Blunkett: 
1985a], even though this approach conflicted with the legal requirement, that 
authorities demonstrate the steps taken to match expenditure and income. [Coombes, 
op. cit: 5] 
Other advantages and disadvantages of deficit budgeting were ambiguous. The 
time-scale involved before authorities ran out of money, for example, was considered 
to involve the deferral of crises until the end of the financial year or the start of 1986- 
7, thereby pressurising councillors, but at the same time maintain pressure on the 
Government throughout the financial year. [Blunkett, 1985a] Similarly, the tactic was 
expected to result in a requirement for drastic cuts to be carried out either 
by the local 
authority or government appointed commissioners, but the scale of cuts necessary 
to 
compensate for a deficit budget and comply with further reductions 
demanded for 
1986-7, was expected to place the Government in an 
invidious position 18 months 
before a general election. [loc. cit. ] Finally, deficit 
budgeting was considered to be a 
recipe for confusion amongst those campaigning, 
but also a means for confusing the 
b Though Blunkett's comments do not indicate the 
level at which such monitoring should take place, 
the practice was evident in Liverpool , when 
following the collapse of the campaign of non- 
compliance, Liverpool returned to deficit 
budgeting to secure concessions from central government. 
The structures through which this took place are 
identified Chapter 
tatFive, ion 
in final sub-section 
i iof 
this section, and the final section of this 
Chapter. Levels of proved to be 
however, as the campaign foundered on disagreements over 
strategy. 
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Government with regard to the financial position and viability of local 
authorities. [Blunkett: 1985a; Coombes, op. cit. ] 
In practice, the no rate tactic proved to be no less difficult than that of deficit 
budgeting, when on 19/2/85, the LGCU decided that refusal to set a rate would be 
changed to deferral. 7 The phrase: 'it will be impossible for the authority to make a 
rate' was therefore adopted as the core wording for budget motions to be considered at 
meetings on 7/3/85[LGCU, 12.3.85; Livingstone, op. cit. ], and the Government's 
refusal to declare the information upon which it decided individual authorities grant 
allocation, blamed for deferral. [loc. cit; Blunkett: 1985b; LGCU: 12.3.85] The 
change was intended to maximise the number of Labour groups willing to adopt the 
same stance, and maintain unity within and among Labour groups, as the fear of 
illegality was expected to reduce the number of councils resisting. [Blunkett: 1985b] 
Adoption of the deferral tactic by the LGCU dealt a blow to unity amongst 
campaigning councils, however, because the precepting authorities, the GLC, ILEA 
and Metropolitan County councils, had a statutory obligation to set a rate by 10.3.85. 
Merseyside and South Yorkshire therefore declared that they would set a rate[Duncan 
and Goodwin, 1988; Lansley, Goss and Wolmar, 1989], while 15 Labour authorities 
deferred the decision on 7.3.85. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 175] Furthermore, the 
campaign divisions engendered by the no rate strategy were highlighted by the 
decisions of Merseyside and Basildon to adopt a deficit budget. [LGCU, 12.3.85: 2] 
The last minute change to deferral also indicates: a focus of campaign decision 
making on the LGCU; a lack of accountability within the GLLP; demonstrates 
uncertainty over the level of commitment of those involved; and, illustrates confusion 
over the viability of particular tactics. 
Furthermore, like refusal before it, the deferral tactic was premised on assumptions 
that the Government would negotiate, and, that it would continue to pay grant 
instalments. Those involved in the LGCU assumed, therefore: `that as with Liverpool 
in 1984 negotiations would commence at an early date and the pressure of council 
action would ensure a favourable settlement'. [Blunkett, 1985b: 2] Such pressure was, 
however, intended to be a threat rather than an operation carried to its ultimate 
conclusion, a process of 'bluff, counter bluff and tactical manoeuvring 
designed to 
achieve a negotiated settlement. [loc. cit. ] As the consideration of attempts at 
negotiation makes clear, however, Government ministers were all 
too aware of the 
level of resolve within and among Labour groups. 
Similarly, the final sub-section 
Livingstone's observation that the decision to change 
tactic was taken without recourse to the 




of accountability within 




identifies the absence of local structures through which support could be expressed 
and pressure exerted on the Government. 
Attempts were made to maintain a united front, however, and thereby give an 
impression of strength and resolve. Thus, council meetings discussing budget 
resolutions or matters relating to non-compliance were synchronised, and a collective 
approach to negotiations adopted on the basis of a rejection of rate limitation, targets, 
penalties, RSG announcements, and a refusal to use redetermination or appeals 
processes. [Blunkett, 1985b; LGCU, Management Group 1984-85,18.12.84; LGCU, 
16.1.85] This strategy was found to be flawed, however, because as a consequence of 
the initial budget meeting, opposition groups were entitled to call re-convened budget 
meetings[LGCU Management Group 1984-85,12.3.85], and therefore disrupt 
synchronised activity. To counteract such disruption, however, preparations were 
made to hold meetings on 28.3.85[loc. cit. ], and again on 24.4.85. [LGCU Strategy 
Sub-Group 1985,11.4.85] 
This stage of the campaign exhibited a divergence of tactical focus. Education, 
publicity, delegate conferences, parliamentary intervention, legal action, public 
protest, and industrial action were, for example, all elements of the campaign of non- 
compliance, but reflected the broader emphasis on participation and mobilisation 
discussed in Chapter Six. In contrast, the practice of non-compliance and the 
agreement of changes in that practice, took place through Labour groups, and at 
LGCU level through the Strategy Sub-Group of councillors, trade union and LGCU 
officers. 
The account provided here demonstrates the separation of particular practices, 
namely the tactics employed by councillors, and attempts at broad based mobilisation 
and participation in support of councillors. Thus, the absence of effective structures 
through which these respective practices could interact is explored further in the final 
sub-section, and remainder of this chapter, as an explanation for the campaign's 
limitations. For the moment, however, the process of evaluation continues to explore 
the structures, activity, and elements involved in LGCU orchestrated 
initiatives, by 
considering attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement. 
Thwarted Negotiation 
The tactics of non-compliance were adopted to pressurise the 
Government into 
early negotiations. [Blunkett, 1985b; Blunkett, undated] 
Ultimately, however, the 
practice of the campaign, and the constitutional primacy of 
Parliament over local 
authorities left the initiative with the Government. 
In other words, the confusion and 
lack of resolve described in the previous sub-section, 
together with the legal 
constraints on local authorities and their elected representatives, 
under the Rates Act 
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and `the Judge invented doctrine of fiduciary duty' [Labour Party 1966-1984,1982: 
1491, meant that those at the forefront of the campaign experienced more pressure 
than ministers. In the wake of the Miners strike, and wiser from its dealing with 
Liverpool the previous year, therefore, the Government could afford to await 
developments. 
The relative position of weakness and pressure experienced by the campaigning 
authorities is indicated by their attempt to initiate negotiations through their early 
approach to the Secretary of State for the Environment on 23.1.85. [LGCU, 1985a] At 
the subsequent meeting on 4.2.85, the LGCU delegation involved: councillors from 
26 local authorities; full-time officers from NUPE, NALGO, and GMBATU; and, 
full-time officers from the AMA, ALA, and LGCU. [LGCU, 1985b; LGCU, 1985c] 
The focus of the campaign of non-compliance on councillors and full-time officers, 
and its separation from broad based activity, is demonstrated by the composition of 
the delegation. At the meeting, the LGCU presented the Secretary of State with a 
document outlining its case as the: abandonment of targets and penalties for 1985-86; 
disclosure of assumptions; abandonment of the Rates Act; a commission of inquiry in 
to local government funding; and, the restoration of grant to 1979 levels. [LGCU, 
1985a; LGCU, 1985b]' 
The Secretary of State's behaviour at the meeting demonstrated the comparative 
positions of strength, by refusing to enter into negotiations on any of the matters 
raised, and by simply rebuffing the LGCU case. [LGCU, 1985b; LGCU, 1985c] In 
response, the LGCU demonstrated its inability exert real pressure on the Minister, by 
resorting to a predetermined plan for media activities following such meetings[LGCU 
Management Committee 1984-85,16.1.85], and issued a Press Release which 
attempted to portray the Minister as precipitating confrontation. [LGCU, 1985c] 
Furthermore, the LGCU's subordinate position was demonstrated by a letter issued to 
P Jenkin on 5.2.85, in the name of D Blunkett as Chairperson of the LGCU, which 
asked for the local authorities' case to be reconsidered, and emphasised the call 
for an 
enquiry as a means of avoiding confrontation. [LGCU Letters 
1985,5.2.85] 
At this point the LGCU's only means of exerting pressure on the 
Government 
involved the threat of confrontation, and attempts to secure media attention; although 
a lobby of the CCLGF was organised for 17.4.85. 
[NLACC 1985,13.4.85] The 
position of weakness was also evident in an exchange of 
letters between Blunkett and 
Jenkin, in which the LGCU offered further meetings, or requested 
details of the 
assumptions on which rate limitation was based. 
[LGCU Letters 1985; Jenkin, 1985] 
Not only does the LGCU's repeated request 
for meetings suggest uncertainty over 
These demands are consistent with the campaign aims outlined 
in the Campaign Aims sub-section of 
Chapter Six. 
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their resolve, but the rapidity of their responses compared to those of the Secretary of 
State is also an indication of respective self-assurance. This view is confirmed by 
Jenkin's response of 21.2.85, which agreed to further meetings, but only on the basis 
that there would be no changes to the Rates Act or RSG settlement, and that local 
authorities were not proposing or threatening illegal action[ibid. ]. Similarly, the 
power relation between the two sides is evident in Jenkin's suggestion, following 
parliamentary approval of rate limitations on 25.2.85, that consultation should be 
undertaken by individual authorities, or through the local authority associations and 
CCLGF. [Jenkin 1985,14.3.85]9 
Other labour movement organisations experienced similar treatment, and therefore 
demonstrates the power relation between Government and those involved in the 
campaign. N Willis, General Secretary of the TUC, for example, wrote to P Jenkin on 
1.4.85, on behalf of the TUCLGC, to request a meeting to discuss ways of 
overcoming the impasse between the local authorities who had not levied a rate and 
the Government. [Willis, 1.4.85] Jenkin refused to meet the TUCLGC, however, 
because a meeting could be misrepresented as negotiations, and provide local 
authorities with a reason to delay making a rate. [Jenkin 1985,3.4.85; LGCU Strategy 
Sub-Group 1985,3.4.85] 
In similar fashion to its involvement with Liverpool the previous year, the PLP 
engaged in a number of initiatives to precipitate a negotiated settlement. J 
Cunningham, Labour's Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, for example, 
tabled a series of questions regarding the publication of assumptions made in relation 
to the calculation of individual authority grant allocation and rate limits. In December 
1984, January 1985[Cunningham 1985,14.1.85], and again on 11.2.85[Jenkin 1985, 
21.2.85], Cunningham tabled parliamentary questions regarding the disclosure of 
assumptions. On each occasion, however, Jenkin's response was that such 
information would only be disclosed to authorities that sought 
derogation. [Cunningham 1985,14.1.85; Jenkin 1985,30.1.85] Cunningham also 
wrote to Jenkin on 12.4.85 requesting that a meeting be held with the Leaders of the 
ALA and AMA to discuss financial problems experienced by members of the two 
bodies. [Cunningham 1985,12.4.85] Jenkin's response merely reiterated earlier points 
about meetings being misrepresented as negotiation, 
justifying delays in rate setting, 
and consequently refused to meet. [Jenkin 1985,24.4.85] 
9 Similar Government tactics are also outlined in a letter issued 
by the Chairs of the AMA and ALA, 
J Layden(AMA) and M Hodge(ALA), in which they complain about 
Patrick Jenkin's refusal to meet 
outside the regular CCLGF cycle, and refers to an earlier 
joint letter dated 22.3.85 seeking 
discussions. [AMA/ALA, 10.4.85] The Government's resolve is also evident in 
its refusal to discuss 
the operation of the Rates Act or the RSG settlement 
for 1985-6 at the CCLGF of 17.4.85, because it 
could be misrepresented as negotiation and 
delay further rate decisions by those authorities still 
resisting. [Jenkin 1985,24.4.85] 
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This account identifies the strategies adopted by both sides, and the focus of labour 
movement activity on councillors, full-time officers, and MPs. In practice, it was the 
councillors of authorities seeking negotiation whom were isolated from broad-based 
support and under personal pressure. This pressure was exacerbated by the stream of 
authorities setting a rate, identified in Table 7.1 below, and the public feuding 
undertaken in high profile Labour groups such as the GLC. Given the precarious 
resolve exhibited amongst campaigning Labour groups, therefore, the Secretary of 
State was able to refuse negotiations on the basis that the Act made provision for 
individual derogation and, as the following sub-section explains, attempt to isolate or 
buy off individual councils. 
By conducting this stage of the campaign through established structures, and at the 
level of councillors, MPs, and Government ministers, the level of support or pressure 
channelled through local parties and labour movements was distanced, but still 
important. The extent to which councillors were mandated to adopt the positions they 
did, or valued local support, for example, is brought into question by the change of 
tactic from no rate to deferral without recourse to local structures. These and related 
issues are explored next by examining examples of local developments and structures 
that accompanied this stage of the campaign. 
Local Practice of Non-compliance 
The preceding sub-sections identify two aspects of the campaign of non- 
compliance that help explain the eventual failure of constitutional confrontation: 
concentrating campaign practice on Labour groups and councillors; and, 
consequently, the varying levels of commitment evident among, and within, 
campaigning Labour groups. These characteristics are indicated by: the choice of the 
original no rate tactic; the change to deferral to avoid illegality; the structures through 
which participants made tactical decisions; and, the attempts at negotiation. 
The 
significance of these aspects can be demonstrated, and explained 
further, by exploring 
local developments and structures in selected campaigning authorities. 
This process involves initial consideration of general 
developments that explain 
and catalogue the compliance of campaigning authorities. 
Then, as a means of 
exploring and explaining the commitment, practice, and structural probity 
of local 
campaigns, attention is afforded to developments within specific 
local authorities and 
Labour groups prior to their compliance. By examining and comparing 
different local 
developments, experiences, and practices, therefore, the varying 
levels of commitment 
between Labour groups is illustrated. Furthermore, 
the performance of local 
campaigns are explicable in reference to attempts 
by, and the ability of, local labour 
movements to support or encourage the non-compliance 
of councillors, and therefore 
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to overcome the separation of campaign practice engendered by the tactical focus on 
councillors and Labour groups. 
Reliance on the resolve of councillors, allowed the Government to exert pressure 
on the fragile unity of purpose evident among and within Labour groups. In addition 
to refusing to negotiate, for example, an early attempt to encourage splits in the 
campaign involved approaches to Thamesdown by the Parliamentary Private 
Secretary of the Minister for Local Government, and to Lewisham through the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, to encourage applications for 
derogation. [Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 233-4] Similarly, the resolve of selected 
councillors was tested in February 1985, when the rate limits of ILEA, Hackney, 
Haringey, Islington, Leicester, and Lewisham were raised. [Stoker, 1988: 165] 
Furthermore, district auditors wrote, on 1.3.85, to local authorities threatening non- 
compliance, to inform them that failure to set a rate could be construed as wilful 
misconduct[Lansley, Goss, and Wolmar, 1989: 38], and reiterated the threat to those 
authorities still resisting in May. [Blunkett and Jackson, 1987: 182] As has been 
noted, however, the first and main split in the campaign was produced by the LGCU's 
change to the deferral tactic. This resulted in the Metropolitan County councils of 
Merseyside and South Yorkshire deciding to set a rate, the GLC complying on the 10 
March deadline[ Stoker, op. cit: 164], and added to the pressure exerted by the 
Government. 
Including the GLC's prevarication until 10 March, 13 rate capped Labour 
authorities and three others, failed to set a rate on 7.3.8510[NALGO FTDLD 1983-85, 
13.3.85]; while Merseyside and Basildon adopted deficit budgets. [LGCU 
Management Committee 1984-85,12.3.85] The pattern of compliance presented in 
Table 7.1, however, does not indicate any individual points at which Government 
pressure on Labour groups resisting the Rates Act made an impact. Similarly, the 
decision to withhold block grant and Housing subsidy instalments from authorities 
that had not set a rate by 1.4.85[Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 179-80], contributed to 
a gradual build up of pressure, but does not appear to have had an immediate 
impact 
on the resolve of councillors. " 
Ultimately, given the focus of the deferred rate tactic, a lack of resolve among 
Labour councillors led to the demise of the campaign of non-compliance. 
This 
statement, however, exhibits the same degree of superficiality as explanations which 
10 In addition to the GLC, the rate capped authorities were: 
Camden; Greenwich; Hackney; Haringey; 
Islington; Lambeth; Leicester; Lewisham; Sheffield; Southwark; and, Thamesdown, and 
the uncapped 
authorities: Liverpool; Manchester; and, North Tyneside. 
[NALGO FTDLD 1983-85,12.3.85] 
" The decision to withhold funds demonstrates the development of 
Government tactics, especially 
when contrasted with the payment of instalments to 
Liverpool in 1984, and the employment of J. 
Halligan, the retired Treasurer of Lambeth, to ensure that 
bank loans were still made. [Livingstone, 
1987: 309] 
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premise the failure of the campaign on: the diversion of the campaign `into the issue 
of legality' [Lansley, et al, op. cit: 45]; the absence of a national Party lead[Stoker, op. 
cit: 165]; or ,a concentration on opposing the Rates Act, rather than defending jobs 
and services. [Byrne, 1994] Such explanations are superficial because they describe 
symptoms of the campaign's failure, but do not address determinate factors that 
produced the symptoms. 
Each of the Government measures discussed earlier, were targeted at the perceived 
weaknesses in the resolve of Labour groups and councillors, and the varying levels of 
commitment among, and within, Labour groups and local labour 
movements. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit; Lansley et al, op. cit.; Livingstone, op. cit. ] 
Similarly, the differing objectives- outlined in Chapter Six, and the tactical alternatives 
recounted in the earlier sub-section, indicate differing levels of commitment. 
Explanations for the failure of the campaign need to be grounded in the practice of 
local Labour groups and labour movements; not just in terms of the divisions within, 
but also by exploring the means by which councillors and Labour groups were 
supported or encouraged through local labour movement structures. Such an exercise 
is undertaken here in reference to three prominent campaigning authorities, who set 
their rates at different stages of the campaign: the GLC; Sheffield; and, Liverpool. 
Table 7.1 
Dates By Which Deferring Authorities Set a Rate 
10 March GLC 
28 March Thamesdown 
28 March Leicester 
31 March Manchester 
2 April North Tyneside 
4 April Lewisham 
11 April Haringey 
7 May Sheffield 
23 May Hackney 
30 May Southwark 
31 May Islington 
6 June Camden 
8 June Greenwich 
14 June Liverpool 
_3 
July Lambeth 
Sources: Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 181; North 
Tyneside, 2.4.85; Taaffe and Mulhearn, 1988: 208. 
In addition to abolition overshadowing rate capping[Livingstone, op. cit: 
311], the 
structures and practice of the GLLP and GLC militated the conduct of a 
broad based 
labour movement campaign of non-compliance. As 
Chapter One notes, for example, 
London lost around 500,000 jobs between 1961 and 
1964, mostly in the 
manufacturing sector. Socio-economic developments 
therefore translated into a 
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collapse of the GLLP's working class base which, together with the involvement of 
activists and councillors in community based struggles, tenants associations, and 
voluntary organisations[Wainwright, 1987: 98-9], contributed to attempts to create 
mass support beyond the Labour Party. [Wainwright, ibid: 7& 105] 
The attempt to create support beyond the Labour Party involved the creation of ad- 
hoc committees which, though ostensibly facilitating participation and the 
mobilisation of support, contributed to an absence of Labour Party activity 
independent of the GLC. [Wainwright, ibid: 7] As Webster suggests, however, such 
committees equated to an extension of corporate planning structures[Cochrane, 1985: 
51 ]; the undemocratic nature of which are discussed in Chapter One. Furthermore, the 
retention of places for dockers and printers on the GLLP executive reflected outdated 
representation practices[Wainwright, op. cit: 105], and the moribund nature of the 
Party. Both areas of practice indicate an absence of structures necessary for the type 
of labour movement campaigning activity, discussed in earlier chapters, involving the 
participation and mobilisation of activists and membership. Abstracted council 
committees, community groups, tenants associations, and voluntary organisations, for 
example, lacked the membership size, density, structures, accountability, and 
resources available to labour movement organs such as NALGO. 
Despite convening an assembly of London trade unions and Voluntary groups to 
discuss rate capping on 23.2.85[Livingstone, op. cit: 312], and the existence of the 
London Bridge JSSC to co-ordinate London wide JSSCs[Lowes, 1994], the GLC 
made little attempt to build up relations with its lower paid staffjWainwright, op. cit: 
7], or develop campaign structures for rate capping. This is explained in part, by 
Livingstone's assertion that the GLC trade unions were weak[op. cit: 262], and the 
priority afforded to abolition. The FBU, for example, was described as the only 
disciplined trade union, but together with the GLC Staff Association, accounted for 
60% of trade union members at the GLC[Livingstone, ibid: 260] Thus, the only 
attempt to build a trade union campaign related to abolition and involved councillors 
by-passing committees dominated by the Association. [Livingstone, ibid: 262] 
This 
initiative demonstrates the absence of independent labour movement activity at the 
GLC, and indicates the focus and reliance of the campaign on the Labour 
Group. 
The commitment of the GLC Labour Group to the campaign was uncertain, 
however, as budget discussions had to be suppressed prior to the 
March '85 deadline, 
to avoid a split. [Livingstone, ibid: 311] Similarly, 
T Knight and M Hodge refused to 
call a meeting of London councillors, due to divisions within 
the GLLP. [Livingstone, 
ibid: 320] At the GLLP Conference held in March 1985, however, such 
divisions 
were brought out into the open, and unity within 
the GLC Labour Group 
disintegrated. [Livingstone, ibid: 319-20] Thus, the Labour 
Group, including 
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councillors who had defied the Law Lords over 'Fares Fair', voted 24-18 to set a 
rate. [Livingstone, ibid: 320-21] The analogy between the `Fares Fair' and rate 
capping campaigns is significant, because in the former case Livingstone chose to 
expose councillors to the views of trade union activists in London Transport and the 
GLC, as a means of stiffening resolve following the Law Lords `Fares Fair' 
decision. [ibid: 215] For the campaign against rate capping, however, no such tactic 
was employed. 
The experiences of the GLC and Sheffield labour movements exhibit similarities 
and differences. One such similarity involved the collapse of local manufacturing 
industry in Sheffield and South Yorkshire, recorded in Chapter One. As Chapter Two 
notes, however, Sheffield did not experience a membership haemorrhage, or in the 
collapse of local labour movement organisation and structures. These different 
experiences are partly explicable in terms of the size differences, both demographic 
and geographic, between the GLC and Sheffield. They also reflect the smooth 
transition of Sheffield labour movement structures, such as the displacement of 
private, especially steel industry related, unions by their public sector counterparts on 
the Trades Council, and NALGO replacing the AEUW as the largest local 
union. [Wainwright, op. cit: 108] 
In spite of strong links between Labour Party and trade unions through the Trades 
Council[Wainwright, ibid: 105], however, Sheffield experienced a late development 
of campaign structures relating to rate capping. As Chapter Five records, a joint trade 
union campaign committee was not established until January 1985, as the initiative of 
councillors and activists [B lunkett, 1994], and private sector trade unions did not join 
the campaign against rate capping until after the Miners strike. [Blunkett and Jackson, 
op. cit: 181] Nevertheless, councillors attempted to develop links with the local 
authority workforce, by holding meetings before and after 7.3.85. [Blunkett and 
Jackson, ibid: 177 & 179] 
In their general approach to matters of policy, however, there appears to have been 
a cascade approach adopted by the Sheffield Labour Group. Both manual and white 
collar representatives, for example, felt that unions were not mobilised 
in the 
development of council policy, and that policy decided by councillors was presented 
as complete. [Mclaverty, op. cit: 197] Such an approach would 
have serious 
implications for campaign based on participation and mobilisation of 
labour 
movement members. 
Thus, despite assertions that: the Labour Group was 
in touch with the Sheffield 
DLP; the DLP was responsible for motions passed by the council[Wainwright, 
op. cit: 
109]; local labour parties, shop stewards, and some community groups persuaded 
and 
supported councillors to maintain the campaign[Blunkett and 
Jackson, op. cit: 178-9]; 
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and, the traditions of the Sheffield labour movement meaning that a majority of 
councillors would vote despite the personal consequences, a minority of Labour 
councillors moved a successful amendment to implement a maximum rate increase on 
7.5.85. This move followed the DLP's rejection of the Labour Group and local party 
leadership's deficit budget proposal on 30.4.85, and its decision that a rate not be set: 
'until the government provided sufficient resources for the fulfilment of the capital and 
revenues programmes for 1985/6 and subsequent financial years'. [Blunkett and 
Jackson, ibid: 180] 
A deficit budget, as outlined earlier, could have allowed the campaign to continue, 
provided direction, and exhibited resolve; especially if it was the initiative of the 
Labour Group. The continuation of the campaign appears to have been rejected, 
however, in favour of a position of principle regardless of its chances of success. 
Furthermore, opposition to the no rate strategy by the Teachers' unions, GMBATU, 
and the Attercliffe Constituency[loc. cit. ], meant that such a position was untenable. 
Although adopting similar tactics, experiencing economic decline, and fluctuations 
in Labour Party membership, Liverpool's position exhibited important differences to 
other authorities involved in the campaign against rate capping. In particular, the 
development of the local labour movement, involvement of activists, and the 
campaign for more resources in 1984, recounted in Chapter Five, produced structures 
for mobilisation and support among the authority's trade unions, and for the conduct 
of the campaign. [Blunkett, 1994] Liverpool's campaign of 1984 was therefore based 
on unity between the Labour Group and local authority unions[Blunkett and Jackson, 
op. cit; NALGO NDAM, 16.10.84; Wainwright, op. cit. ]; with the latter displaying 
degrees of radicalism and organisation developed through conflict with the previous 
Liberal administration. [Burgess, 1994; Lowes, 1994] Thus, the involvement of trade 
union activists in the campaign encouraged the involvement of the broader workforce, 
formed a bridge between the Labour Group and work-force[Lowes, ibid. ], and 
allowed Labour Party policies to be practised. [Cresswell, 1994] 
In addition to the leading role played by local authority trade unions in the DLP, 
recorded in Chapter Five, trade union participation was an integral 
factor in the 
campaign. Meetings between trade union activists, full-time officers, and councillors, 
for example, formed part of a consultation process that 
involved the Labour Group, 
DLP, JSSC, and mass meetings of stewards and members. 
[Byrne, op. cit. ] This 
process is identified as a contributing factor to the resolve of the 
Labour Group[loc. 
cit; Parkinson, 1985]; a resolve that was encouraged 
by the DLP selection process 
described in Chapter Five, and ensured that a rate was not set until 
June 1985. 
The Liverpool labour movement was also able to build on the experiences of 
the 
1984 campaign, and strengthen local resolve, 
by: staging workplace meetings; 
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stewards courses; lobbies; demonstrations; party meetings; public meetings; and, 
mass meetings of stewards, local authority workers, and labour movement 
activists. [Byme, op. cit; Cresswell, op. cit; Liverpool 1984-85,24.1.85; Liverpool 
Labour Group, 2.9.85; Lowes, op. cit; MTULMCC 1983-85; Liverpool NALGO 
Campaign News 85,21.1.85; Liverpool NALGO Campaign Committee 1983-85, 
22.7.85; Liverpool NALGO Campaign News 85: 15.2.85; Parkinson, op. cit. ] In sum, 
Liverpool was able to make the campaign more of a mass movement[Burgess, op. 
cit. ], but one that was organised through established structures. 
A crucial factor in the differing performances of the authorities considered here, 
relates to the existence of structures that facilitated the conduct of a co-ordinated 
campaign. Thus, although the GLC had participatory structures, they were not 
conducive to such campaigning activity. Similarly, Sheffield's structures were 
developed latterly, and therefore proved less effective than Liverpool's. Nevertheless, 
the existence of structures, or trade union pressure and support, were necessary for 
campaigning activity but not sufficient to ensure Labour Group non-compliance. 
In Southwark, for example, the Labour Group voted to set a rate despite local 
authority trade unions occupying the Council chamber to prevent the decision being 
implemented, and lobbying a re-arranged meeting. [NLACC 1985,2.5.85] Similarly, 
a mass lobby of Hackney Council Meeting was arranged in May 1985, following a 
Court instruction to set a rate[loc. cit. ], but ultimately failed to ensure that no rate was 
set. Perhaps the clearest explanation can therefore be made by way of an analogy 
between Clay Cross and Liverpool, where: the resolve of councillors was a an integral 
factor in their selection by the local party; the local labour movements employed 
cohesive structures; and, both practised a form of delegated democracy. 
Finally, trade union support for Labour groups adopting a stance of non- 
compliance had been a prerequisite for those promoting and participating in the 
campaign[Livingstone, op. cit: 309], and was proposed originally at the Local 
Government in Crisis Conference 1980. Similarly, the importance attached to such 
support is demonstrated by the Labour Party's NEC's resolution, 13.5.85, that: 
no council should be expected to continue with a particular tactic unless 
it a) 
sincerely believes it is the only option for maintaining jobs and services and 
b) has 
identifiable and specific commitments from party members, trade unionists and 
community groups, to ensure that financial and personal risks are shared with 
those 
calling for or supporting such decisions. [Blunkett and Jackson, op. cit: 
182] 
Assertions that premise the failure of the campaign on the absence of national 
leadership are therefore misplaced, as a national lead could not compensate 
for the 
absence of local structures and resolve. Similarly, arguments 
that portray the 
concealed reality of budget positions as undermining 
local unity[Clarke and 
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Cochrane, 1989: Stoker, op. cit. ], fail to recognise the pre-existence of divisions that 
were merely brought to the fore by such machinations. 
The contention here is that the campaign of non-compliance failed for a variety of 
reasons, including local divisions, but that the overriding factor was the tactical focus 
on councillors. While an emphasis on participation and mobilisation was retained, the 
practice of non-compliance and the agreement of changes in that practice, took place 
through Labour groups, and at LGCU level through the Strategy Sub-Group of 
councillors, trade union and LGCU officers. Thus, the absence of effective structures, 
particularly at the local level, through which councillors, activists, and members could 
interact was a weakness of the campaign. In effect, councillors of authorities seeking 
negotiation were isolated from broad based support and under a degree of personal 
pressure that meant half-hearted commitment was unsustainable. 
Furthermore, local support only had a significant bearing where councillors were 
selected on the basis of their commitment to policies, and mandated to adopt a 
position of non-compliance. Thus, the campaign of non-compliance did not fail, 
simply because it attempted to defend local government, and mobilise support for the 
defiance of councillors, as Mclaverty suggests[1989: 4]. The campaign failed due to 
the insufficient development of local labour movement structures, and their utilisation 
as a means of translating broad based support into Labour Group resolve and 
commitment. In other words, the structures and practice of the campaign mirrored the 
abstract nature of constitutional democracy; a consequence of accepting the validity of 
bourgeois political democracy, theoretical equivalence, and abstracted state structures. 
INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
The assertion that the campaign of non-compliance failed due to the 
underdevelopment and utilisation of labour movement structures, is also pertinent to 
the tactic of industrial action. Thus, in addition to supporting councillors and Labour 
groups who sought to resist the Rates Act, sustained industrial action was threatened 
as a means of continuing the campaign if Labour groups complied, and a way of 
penalising authorities that were making cuts. [NALGO, 1984b: 5] 
Consideration of 
the industrial action tactic therefore examines the way campaigning activity was 
designed to overcome the focus on councillors, and explores another aspect of 
labour 
movement democratic practice. 
This is achieved by identifying: structures through which 
decisions concerning the 
adoption, co-ordination, and instigation of the industrial action 
tactic were taken; the 
types of industrial action approved and circumstances 
in which such action would be 
effected; and, by exploring the practicality of 
industrial action as a tactic for the 
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defence of local services and defeat of central government. As part of this process, 
the attitudes, function, interaction, and interrelationship of councillors, full-time 
officers, parliamentarians, and activists receive consideration, and the reciprocal 
interrogation of conceptual principles and practice is completed. 
The specific or general character of decisions concerning the adoption, co- 
ordination, and instigation of industrial action correspond to the level or organisation 
at which the tactic was approved. The TUC, for example, approved a motion in 1984 
that included a general reference to `official industrial action to defend jobs services in 
local authorities'. [NALGO, 1984b; TUC, 1984] Support for such action was 
dependent on unions being affiliated to the TUC, however, and `having involved the 
General Council'. [loc. cit. ]. Decisions pertaining to industrial action were also 
required to involve the TUCLGC, and be taken through properly constituted trade 
union bodies, as opposed to ad-hoc campaigning committees. [TUC, 1984: 10] 
General references are also evident at Labour Party and NALGO conferences. As 
Chapter Four records, for example, the 1983 LPAC approved a motion calling for a 
campaign involving `industrial muscle', and `all available channels'. [Labour Party 
1966-84,1983: 80] Likewise, the NALGO conference of 1984, pledged `unqualified 
support to whatever industrial action proves necessary (subject to the industrial action 
regulations) in the course of an escalating campaign'. [NALGO, 1984b: 10] These 
resolutions are a reflection of an earlier recognition, by the Labour Party NEC in 
1980, that the labour movement had to be `prepared to use its full strength, including 
industrial action to defend the most needy in society'. [Gyford, and James, 1983: 188] 
The development of structures within NALGO to improve campaign organisation 
and practice is recorded in Chapter Six, which also notes that these bodies provided 
for interaction between national committees, officials, and local activists. Thus, as the 
following analysis demonstrates, it was through these structures that the industrial 
action tactic received clearest elucidation, and the consent of those involved. Other 
bodies involved in the consideration of the industrial action tactic, however, included 
some that the TUC would not recognise as `properly constituted trade union bodies'. 
In addition to officer led JTUCs at the local level, for example, activist led JSSCs 
were also evident, and the attempt to establish and develop the activist led NLACC 
is 
recorded in Chapter Six. [NLACC, 1985] The composition and 
functions of the 
bodies identified here, are explored by through an examination of their consideration 
and approval of the industrial action tactic. 
A qualitative difference exists between the industrial action 
described in Chapter 
Six, and the action planned as part of the campaign of non-compliance. 
The campaign 
of opposition, for example, used limited industrial action 
to publicise issues, and to 
mobilise and encourage participation amongst labour movement organisations 
and the 
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general public. As part of the campaign of non-compliance, however, industrial 
action of a `prolonged as opposed to demonstrative nature' [TUC, 1984: 10] was 
envisaged, and specific objectives and circumstances identified for the instigation of 
such action. Nevertheless, `a coherent a programme of militant industrial action 
against the government's attack on local democracy, services and jobs' was also 
expected to `alert and mobilise members to the threat posed by the Government's 
policies'. [NALGO, 1984a: 13] The distinction between earlier and later versions of 
the tactic therefore lies in the latter intention to take direct action in defence of local 
democracy, jobs and services[NALGO, ibid; NALGO, 1984b; TUC, 1984], to achieve 
the intermediate and ultimate aims identified in Chapter Six. [NALGO, 1984b: 3] 
The type of industrial action envisaged in pursuit of these objectives, falls into 
three broad categories, and correspond to specific circumstances. The first example, 
and the least combative, required trade union members refusing to co-operate with 
commissioners introduced by central government to run a local authority's 
affairs. [NALGO, 1981; NALGO 1984a, NALGO 1984b; NLACC 1985,23.2.85; 
TUC 1960-1987,1984] 12 This type of action was passive, almost paradoxical, taking 
action by not doing something, and depended on Government action to provoke a 
response. Because the Government was required to make the first move, however, the 
initiative was left with the Government who could decide the timing and area of 
engagement; though adoption and declaration of the tactic was also a way of deterring 
government action. The stance was also the most overt defence of local democracy, 
premising non-co-operation on: the removal of powers from elected representatives; 
the suspension of an elected council, or transferral of its powers to a non-elected 
body[TUC, 1984]; and, attempts to take local authorities out of democratic 
control. [NALGO, 1984] 13 
Of the types of industrial action approved, the least ambiguous was that of strike 
action to defend jobs and services. NALGO, for example, envisaged that: branches 
seriously affected by cuts would, in conjunction with other trade unions, take 
indefinite and total strike action in defence of jobs and services[NALGO, 1984a: 13]; 
branches where one or more of their members were affected by compulsory 
redundancy would take all out strike action[loc. cit. ]; and, strike action would 
be taken 
where wages and salaries could not be paid as a result of the 
Government withholding 
RSG contributions. [NALGO, 1984b; 5] The last example was also 
identified by D 
12 The imposition of Commissioners was used against Clay 
Cross in the 1970s, and in Norwich in 
1980-1. 
" Non co-operation was also adopted by the NALGO 
NDAM as a response to legislation which 
required local government officers to set a rate or 
balance budgets in non-complying authorities. The 
practicality of this tactic bears analogy with the non return of 
information, discussed in Chapter Six, as 
the seniority of officers involved would mean that they were unlikely 
to belong to a trade union, 
comply with their instruction, or risk illegality. 
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Blunkett as a point where the campaign of non-compliance could be escalated. [1985b: 
3J 
The third form of industrial action considered and approved as part of the 
campaign of non-compliance involved supportive or solidarity strike action. This 
tactic was more problematic than the previous examples discussed, due to its potential 
implications for campaign unity. Such action could, for example, be justified as 
meeting the criteria laid down by NALGO for industrial action with any chance of 
success: widespread national strike action by all local government trade 
unions. [NALGO, 1981: 6] On the other hand, the action could have a detrimental 
effect on local authorities who, as part of a united labour movement campaign, were 
actively pursuing a position of non-compliance[NALGO, 1984b: 4], and the 
withdrawal of services in those authorities would risk alienating the support of people 
who depended on them. [TUC, 1984: 10; Blunkett, 1994] Nevertheless, this tactic was 
approved through NALGO's NDAM and RCLGM structures. 
An NDAM held in October 1984, for example, approved a motion from Camden 
Branch that identified `wide ranging solidarity action by all NALGO members in hit 
list boroughs at the point when any one of the branches has taken all-out strike action 
against cuts arising from Rate-Capping' as the `key to an effective defence against the 
attack on jobs services and local democracy'. [NALGO NDAM, 16.10.84] A similar 
position was adopted by an RCLGM in November 1984 when all NALGO branches 
were requested to submit motions to AGMs or appropriate Branch meetings for the 
instigation of solidarity action if strike action was called in any NALGO 
Branch. [NALGO RCLGM 1984-85,20.11.84] Finally, the position was reiterated in 
February when motions moved by Hackney Branch were approved, and required: all 
branches to strike regardless of the position of their employer, when one Branch takes 
strike action because of their position; and, for solidarity action to be instigated if 
Hackney Branch took industrial action as a result of the court case brought against the 
local authority's no rate position. [NALGO RCLGM 1984-85,27.2.85] 
The NDAM and RCLGM approval of a prescriptive approach, whereby specified 
action was to be staged in response to predetermined triggers, 
is in contrast to 
NALGO's NLGC recommendation that decisions on tactical industrial action 
be taken 
as the campaign develops and as the political circumstances 
become clearer. [NALGO, 
1984b: 4& 6] Thus, a difference in approach between local activists and national 
leaders and full-time officers is evident; one that reflects the prescriptive and 
non- 
prescriptive approaches discussed in relation to the 
LPAC in Chapter Four. As 
Chapter Six notes, however, NDAMs and RCLGMs 
involved national figures, full- 
time officers and local activists and therefore 
indicates the influence of activists in 
these bodies. 
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The similarity between the motions cited above, and the resolution submitted to the 
organising conference of NLACC on 30.3.85 provides further evidence of the position 
adopted by activists. As an activist body, for example, NLACC proposed that 
motions be submitted, simultaneously, to branch meetings of all trade unions in rate 
capped and penalised authorities for immediate action if. compulsory redundancies 
were threatened; services privatised; or, any member of a trade union disciplined or 
faced legal action for non co-operation with rate-capping, abolition, refusing to 
implement cuts or cover for vacancies. [NLACC 1985,23.2.85] There are obvious 
analogies between the provisions of the NLACC motion and that of the NALGO 
RCLGM 20.11.84 discussed above. 
Delegations to NLACC, however, were not subject to uniform representative 
practices or constitutional remit from affiliates, and activists were allowed to affiliate 
as individuals. [Burgess, 1994; Lowes, 1994] The similarity between the positions 
adopted by NLACC and the NALGO NDAM and RCLGM structures, raises the 
question of how far the latter delegates were taking decisions agreed by their local 
membership. This question is especially pertinent as the delegates from the NDAM 
and RCLGM were unable to deliver the decisions they adopted[Burgess, op. cit. ], and 
therefore repeats councillors' failure to deliver the decisions adopted at the LGCU; 
discussed earlier in the Chapter. 
The development of local labour movement structures, the decisions they 
supported, and their democratic practice were therefore crucial to the success or 
failure of the campaign. Of the authorities attending the inaugural meeting of 
NLACC, for example, only nine of those participating in the campaign of non- 
compliance were represented by delegates from a JSSC or JTUC. While this does not 
indicate the absence of structures in those attending from the other campaigning 
authorities, or affirm the representative structures of those JSSCs and JTUCs present, 
it raises the question of who the non JSSC and JTUC delegates were representing. 
In contrast to the bold positions adopted by activist structures, 
for example, 
NALGO's NLGC recognised that the success of industrial action depended on the 
resolve of the membership[NALGO, 1984b: 5], and the TUC viewed 
bold policies 
and unco-ordinated or inadequately prepared industrial action, 
backed by inadequate 
understanding, to be a recipe for defeat. [TUC, 1984: 9-10] 
Discussion of all options 
between those involved in the campaign, including 'the community generally', and 
only after all information was available, was therefore recommended; 
as was the 
adoption of tactical responses according to the 
degree of support engendered. [loc. cit. ] 
As the previous section demonstrated, however, there was an absence 
local structures 
to facilitate the consistent participation and mobilisation of 
interested groups in such a 
process. 
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The question of against whom industrial action would be directed, had implications 
for the mobilisation of support. Action against authorities engaging in cuts would, for 
example, had an obvious rationale, and may have engendered support from those 
affected by reductions in service provision. Alternatively, the withdrawal of services 
through strike action in authorities where no cuts were made, would have risked 
alienating service users. Any action, unless directed against the authority, was 
therefore recommended to be undertaken only with the consent of the local authority, 
and that of its service users. [TUC, 1984: 9] 
The adoption prescriptive resolutions also ignored the extent to which structures 
had been developed in individual authorities, and the motivations of those involved. 
Much emphasis appears to have been placed on calls for action, but the ground work 
for that action was, if the final collapse of the campaign is to be taken at face value, 
unsuccessful or non-existent. While mobilisation and participation required a lead, 
the passing of worthy resolutions proved to be no substitute for disciplined 
organisation. The adoption of such motions therefore demonstrates the 
epistemological limitation of those advocating the positions adopted. The 
specification of universal, rigid, preconceived tactics in response to predetermined 
events, regardless of individual circumstances or preparations undertaken, represents a 
separation of practice and theory; a dogma of pre-ordained principles attempting to 
determine practical responses. 
Although national labour movement policy and practice accepted and promoted the 
imposed dichotomy between industrial and political activity, 14 and the campaign 
coincided with, and was therefore affected by, the unsatisfactory end to the Miners 
strike in 1985[Blunkett, 1994], the failure of the industrial action tactic is not 
attributable to a lack of national leadership or commitment. The evidence presented 
here, suggests that the tactic did not develop as a consequence of theoretical and 
analytical limitations that failed to recognise: local variations; the inadequate 
structural development of local labour movements; and, the commitment of the 
members concerned. The commitment, resolve, and analysis of activists therefore 
failed to recognise or overcome the nature of rate capping, as a 
long term 
constitutional and abstract threat, as opposed to an immediate 
decimation of jobs and 
services. [Blunkett, ibid. ] 
14 Following the general strike of 1926, for example, 
labour movement organisations generally 
accepted restrictions placed on the political activity of 
trade unions by the Trades Dispute Act 
1927. [Wainwright, 1987: 115] Similarly, in 1974, the TUC and 
Labour Party were still insisting that 
areas maintaining a Trades Council and 
Labour Party organisation separate into individual trades 
council and Labour Party bodies. [Wainwright, 
ibid: 107] Furthermore, 
and 
R H1983Sl1 y8] was totally 
opposed to the use of industrial action for 
`political' purposes[Gyford 
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The observation made by Duncan and Goodwin, and discussed in Chapter Four, 
that opposing particular legislation focuses resistance on the parliamentary process, 
can now be afforded new meaning. At one level, for example, the focus on the Rates 
Act abstracted the defence of local government services, jobs, and local democracy 
from local practice to the defeat of a particular piece of legislation. Defeat of the 
Rates Act, the removal of targets and penalties, the return of RSG to 1979 levels, and 
the defence of jobs, services, and local democracy all became synonymous; abstracted 
from local labour movement practice. 
On an adjacent level, the tactical focus of non-compliance on councillors, and the 
determination of decisions for industrial action on the commitment and analysis of 
activists, also abstracted opposition and resistance from local labour movement 
practice. While an emphasis on participation and mobilisation was present in both 
areas, the distance between the statements, aims, and actions of councillors and 
activists, and those they sought or claimed to represent proved to be too great. The 
absence of effective representative structures, particularly at the local level, through 
which the constituent elements could interact and the direction of the campaign be 
decided in accordance with membership wishes and resolve, was therefore a weakness 
the campaign was unable to overcome. 
Finally, the element of truth in Mclaverty's assertion that the campaign failed 
because it attempted to defend local government, and mobilise support for the 
defiance of councillors[ 1989: 4], can also be retrieved and developed. The crucial 
point is that the mobilisation of sustained popular or labour movement support was 
not possible because the development of local labour movement representative 
structures and practice emulated the abstracted nature of state structures. In other 
words, decisions relating to the campaign were taken by activists and councillors, and 
a reliance on the commitment and resolve of those groups reflect the parliamentary 
and council practice whereby decisions are taken independently of constituents. 
Paradoxically, therefore, one of the campaign's main aims, that of defending local 
democracy, was undermined by a failure to recognise the nature of 
bourgeois 
democratic practice, and transcend it through representative local structures 
based on 
strict mandates and delegation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In accordance with the research aims outlined in the introductory chapter, the 
thesis interrogates labour movement opposition and resistance to central government 
policy and practice toward local government in the 1980s. A distinctive feature of 
this approach is the use of society as a framework within which to interrogate the 
campaigns; as opposed to artificially constructed frameworks or models such as the 
`New Urban Leff. Furthermore, the imbalance created by accounts that concentrate 
on Labour Party activity is redressed through the identification and exploration of 
trade union involvement, locally and nationally, in the said campaigns. By 
understanding the campaigns as labour movement activity in the context of society as 
a whole, the thesis provides a comprehensive and reciprocal exploration of campaign 
principles and practice, and assesses their impact on the outcome of the campaign. 
The societal framework is established in keeping with the original research aims, 
by exploring the genesis of relevant labour movement conceptual principles and 
practices within an historical context that runs from the early 1960s to the mid 1980s. 
In keeping with the practice of immanent critique, however, the subject selects the 
categories and areas of exploration. Labour movement conceptual principles and 
practice are therefore identified and explored in relation to those areas the campaigns 
claimed to be defending, namely local government jobs, services, and local 
democracy; hence the title of the thesis. The meta-theoretical and empirical aspects of 
these categories are not treated as separate entities, but as a totality. Conceptual 
principles are therefore validated in reference to practice and vice versa, as part of a 
reciprocal process that identifies and explores determinate abstractions. 
Chapter One introduces the historical period within which the campaigns are 
studied by exploring: the rapid expansion of local government service provision and 
employment; changes in the structure, organisation and therefore democratic practice 
of local government in England and Wales; and, the changing economic 
fortunes that 
precipitated the retrenchment of the 1970s and 1980s. These developments 
influenced 
and were influenced by changes in labour movement organisation, outlook, and 
practice, and exploration of their interrelations is begun with 
Chapter Two's 
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consideration of: the growth of activism in trade unions and Labour Party; the 
recomposition of Labour Party membership; and, the struggles for democracy and 
accountability within the Labour Party. In both areas a movement toward local 
control by activists was evident, and these factors contributed to the conceptual 
principles and practices evident in the campaigns of the 1980s. 
The move toward greater accountability of leaders to activists within the Labour 
Party and trade unions facilitated and contributed to the kind of campaigning activity 
undertaken during the 1970s and 1980s; the nature of which is examined from 
Chapter Three onwards. In particular, this development constituted a means by which 
the gap between councillors, MPs, officials, leadership figures, and society as a 
whole, created by labour movement acceptance and imitation of abstracted political 
and state structures, could be breached, and democratic practice founded on 
mobilisation and participation. A major weakness of the campaign was that this 
development ceased at the activist level, and in too many instances structures through 
which activists and broader populace could interact were either unused or not 
developed. 
The practice and implications of conducting campaigning activity detached from 
society, through abstracted labour movement and state structures, are explored 
throughout the thesis and summarised here in reference to labour movement defence 
and conceptualisation of local government jobs, services, and local democracy. This 
is achieved by affording brief consideration to the most important aspects of practices 
aimed at protecting service provision and local authority employment, and by 
exploring the significance of democratic practice for the defence of jobs, services, and 
local democracy. 
Local Government Services 
A striking feature of the period considered is the consistency between the areas of 
service provision evident in labour movement demands for, and Labour governments' 
involvement in, expansion and improvement, and those areas that were the subject of 
retrenchment and defence in the 1970s and 1980s. Reciprocal consideration and 
interrogation of demands, expansion and improvement, and attempts at 
defence 
constitutes the process of validating meta-theoretical and empirical categories 
in 
reference to each other. A link is evident, 
for example, between the expansion of 
housing and transport under Labour governments 
in the 1960s, outlined in Chapter 
One, and the campaign against the Housing 
Finance Act 1972 and South Yorkshire's 
dispute with central government over the 
funding of its transport policy, both 
considered in Chapter Three. In the cases of 
Clay Cross and South Yorkshire, the 
opposition and resistance practised were 
justified in reference to definitions of local 
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democracy and autonomy, namely the right of local authorities to vary levels of local 
service provision and taxation. 
As Chapter Four records, the provision of local authority housing and transport 
were also the subject of central restrictions in the 1980s, as a consequence of the 
Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, the Housing Act 1980, and the 
Transport Acts of 1980 and 1983. Local examples of opposition and resistance tended 
to be isolated, however, and restricted to councillors and officers. Both areas were 
also subject to pressure in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as a consequence of central 
attempts to restrict the growth of local government spending. Attempts to oppose and 
resist such initiatives, prior to the Rates Bill 1983, involved the protection of service 
provision by ameliorating the implications of financial restraint by increasing local 
taxes, and developing financial devices to avoid centrally devised targets and 
penalties. As opposed to campaigns involving broad-based mobilisation and 
participation, opposition and resistance depended on the practice of councillors and 
professionals through abstracted structures and mechanisms of the state; in ways that 
were not easily accessible to electors, trade unionists, or Labour Party members. 
Examples of local resistance in the 1980s, most notably those considered in Chapter 
Four in relation to the privatisation of local service provision, tended to be restricted 
to the involvement of employees and therefore trade union members directly affected. 
Such campaigns were mounted in Basingstoke, Gloucester, Wandsworth, and in 
Liverpool where, as Chapter Five records, the campaign to oppose the proposed 
privatisation of cleansing services formed a feature of the local election campaign in 
1983. Nevertheless, the localised nature of activity, its restriction to particular service 
areas, and its focus on local elections, MPs, councillors, and labour movement 
activists and members, militated the conduct of broad based campaigning activity. 
Inherent difficulties in identifying reductions in service quality, as opposed to 
wholesale reductions in or withdrawal of services, worked against the mobilisation 
and participation of a broader constituency, and made the mounting of sustained 
campaigns difficult. There was therefore a focus on particular apparatus such as 
local 
elections, councillors, and council chambers. As chapters 
Six and Seven demonstrate, 
this problem is also manifested in the subsumption of the 
defence of services in the 
campaign against rate capping, and the associated ultimate aims. 
In other words, the 
defence of services became synonymous with the campaign against 
the Rates Act 
1984 and its provisions, and day to day struggles were relegated 
to matters of local 
authority decision making in accordance with 
Labour Party NEC advice to minimise 
the effects of central policy and to blame the 
Government for less palatable measures. 
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Local Authority Employment 
Service expansion and retraction affected, and was affected by, employment 
patterns in public and private sectors, and within local authorities. In particular, the 
move toward mass unemployment, attempts at local regeneration, and labour 
movement demands for remedial action, considered in Chapter One, identify 
conceptual principles, and help explain why importance was attached to maintaining 
local authority employment in the 1980s. Chapters One, Three, and Four, for 
example, illustrate the correlation between the expansion and retraction of service 
provision and fluctuations in local authority employment, and chapters Four and Six 
record various estimates made as to the numbers of jobs lost due to the practice of 
financial restraint and privatisation of local government services in the 1980s. 
Throughout the period studied attempts were made to assuage the impact of 
economic decline and recession through local economic regeneration. As chapters 
One and Four record, however, such practices were inevitably small scale, and during 
the 1980s were shaped much more by central government prescriptions and 
intervention. Furthermore, an emphasis on subsidising investment in plant and 
machinery as opposed to the employment of labour, and measuring success in terms 
of the number of factories opened rather than new jobs created or transferred from 
existing enterprises, were common feature of such activity. 
The value attached to levels of local employment also concentrated on overall 
totals, as opposed to the type and conditions of employment. Chapters One and 
Three, for example, identify the trend in local government employment whereby 
numbers employed remained relatively stable, but at the expense of full-time 
employment being replaced by part-time jobs. Similarly, attempts to avoid the threat 
of privatising jobs and services in the 1980s, discussed in Chapter Four, involved 
negotiated reductions in the working conditions of local authority employees. The 
abstract category of jobs became the all important by-word, at the expense of 
conditions of employment and levels of pay. 
As with the defence of services, the struggle to protect 
jobs faced difficulties in 
mobilising resistance. Reductions in employment conditions and 
job numbers were 
achieved under the threat of even greater reductions, and through piecemeal 
tactics 
such as the non-filling of vacancies, early retirement, and voluntary redundancy 
as 
opposed to wholesale compulsory redundancies. 
As with opposition to financial 
restraint, activity was localised, and focused on councillors, 
as those with the 
opportunity to save local authority jobs. 
The defence of jobs therefore became 
synonymous with the aims of the campaign against rate capping, 
explored in chapters 
Six and Seven. 
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Democratic Practice 
Ultimately, the success or failure of the campaigns, both localised and broader 
activity, depended on the mobilisation and participation of labour movement officers, 
leaders, activists, members, and the broader populace. The extent to which such 
mobilisation and participation was effected, and the reasons for it, forms the central 
explanation propounded by this thesis. Essentially, the labour movement's acceptance 
of, or failure to recognise, the limitations of bourgeois abstraction influenced such 
campaign practice. 
Labour movement opposition to the introduction of a business veto, discussed in 
Chapter Six for example, was based on the principle of one person one vote, but failed 
to acknowledge the abstract nature of the equality afforded by universal suffrage. 
Similarly, the theoretical independence and equivalence associated with judicial, 
legislative, and executive functions of the state apparatus, by virtue of their 
abstraction from a society founded on inequality, was used as an argument for the 
independence of local government. The impact of such ideological forces on 
campaign practice are summarised here in reference to the struggles to overcome the 
more obvious elements of abstraction, and indicate how the concomitant research aim 
identified in the introductory chapter is addressed. 
There is a paradox in the parallel development of struggles to defend the 
constitutional practice of local democracy and autonomy, based on the ability to raise 
local taxes and vary local service provision, alongside the struggle for democracy and 
accountability within the labour movement. This latter factor involved a threat to 
abstracted structures and practice through an interaction between various geographic 
and functional strata evident in the structures, organisation, and practices employed by 
the labour movement, and therefore the reciprocal interrelation and interaction 
between activist, councillors, full-time officer, leadership, membership, 
parliamentarians, and general public. In contrast, the defence of constitutional 
democracy involved the perpetuation of abstracted structures. 
The struggle for democracy and autonomy within the 
labour movement is 
epitomised by relations between: Labour governments and 
Labour local authorities, 
discussed in Chapter Three; parliamentary leadership and local parties, discussed 
from 
Chapter Two onwards; and, local parties and Labour groups, also considered 
from 
Chapter Two onwards. Each of these relations, and the 
disputes that resulted, 
revolved around the honouring of manifesto commitments and 
the validity of 
mandates; while the first area, demonstrated 
in reference to South Yorkshire's 
transport policy in Chapter Three, involved the added 
factor of local authorities 
financing variations in service provision through 
local taxes. 
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The struggle between Labour governments and local parties was evident in the 
1960s, but acquired new significance with the PLP's abandonment of the 1973 Party 
programme, and the acceptance of monetary economic theory. A particular feature of 
this struggle was the emergence of the CLPD, identified in Chapter Two, and its 
demands for greater accountability within the Labour Party; particularly between MPs 
and local parties, and between the PLP and LPAC. The struggles were accompanied 
by similar developments at the local level where attempts to make Labour groups 
accountable to local parties were undertaken. Significantly, the issue of democratic 
practice within the Labour Party demonstrates a paradox between the practice and 
principles of the PLP. 
Chapters Three and Four, for example, record the PLP view that local Labour 
groups and parties could not be instructed by the national Party to carry out particular 
policies, and how disciplinary action was taken against local parties that adopted 
trenchant positions to oppose cuts in public expenditure; such as North East 
Derbyshire in the 1970s, and Manchester, Bristol, and Coventry in the 1980s. 
Similarly, Chapter Five notes that the PLP sought to influence local policy and 
practice in Liverpool in the 1980s to avoid confrontation with the Conservative 
Government. In effect, therefore, the PLP used central intervention to maintain the 
abstraction of Labour Group practice from local parties and manifesto commitments 
to local electorates. 
These developments and struggles contributed to, and were consequences of, the 
growth of activism within the labour movement; first identified in Chapter Two. That 
such struggles sought to make the PLP accountable to activists within the Labour 
Party, and that activist movements within trade unions sought to secure lay control 
over local policy and practice, indicates the limitations of campaign practice. In sum, 
the move toward activism sought to overcome one aspect of abstraction affecting 
democratic practice within the labour movement, but resulted 
in another form of 
abstraction, described in chapters Four, Six, and 
Seven, whereby labour movement 
activists, councillors, and officers were separated 
from the labour movement 
membership and broader populace. 
The concentration of opposition and resistance on councillors 
is noted in relation to 
the protection of jobs and services, 
but such practice acquired even greater importance 
in relation to non-compliance with the rate capping; 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Despite an early emphasis on participation and mobilisation, 
for example, the practice 
of non-compliance and the agreement of changes 
in that practice, took place through 
Labour groups, and at the LGCU 
Strategy Sub-Group. Furthermore, local support 
only y had a significant 
bearing where councillors were selected on the 
basis of their 
commitment to policies; as 
Chapter Five notes in relation to Liverpool. In other 
224 
words, the focus and practice of the campaign emulated the abstract nature of 
constitutional democracy; a consequence of accepting the validity of bourgeois 
political democracy, theoretical equivalence, and abstracted state structures. 
Attempts to overcome these abstractions were mitigated by the focus of structures 
and theoretical positions on the immediate objectives of defending jobs, services, and 
constitutional local democracy, rather than attempting to transcend constitutional 
practices through the establishment of enduring, broad based participatory structures. 
Tactics, such as publicity, parliamentary lobbying, demonstrations, and days of action, 
identified and discussed from Chapter Three onwards, offered means by which 
campaigning activity could surpass abstracted practice and develop links between 
parliamentarians, councillors, full-time officers, activists, and the broader membership 
and populace, but the links and activities developed proved to be transient. Similarly, 
the structures and tactics developed in and through campaign committees, delegate 
conferences, and annual party and trade union conferences in the campaigns of the 
1970s and 1980s, identified and discussed from Chapter Three onwards, proved to be 
equally short-term. 
The greatest potential to overcome the restrictions of abstraction were exhibited by 
Clay Cross in the 1970s, discussed in Chapter Three, Liverpool in the 1980s, 
discussed in Chapter Five, and the acceptance of sustained industrial action as a 
means of progressing the campaign, discussed in Chapter Seven. As Chapter Five 
records, for example, democratic practice within the Liverpool labour movement 
depended on the involvement of activists for the mobilisation and participation of 
labour movement members and broader populace through rallies, demonstrations, and 
mass meetings and sought validation and approval of activist decisions at general and 
mass meetings. In the final analysis, however, the structures and practices developed 
in Liverpool proved also to be transient and not representative of the broader labour 
movement. 
The threatened resistance to Parliament through the use of industrial action, 
considered in Chapter Seven, indicates the extent to which the practice of 
bourgeois 
abstraction was threatened. For the tactic to be effective, however, an unprecedented 
level of mobilisation and participation was required through effective and 
durable 
representative structures. The development of structures within 
NALGO in the form 
of NDAMs and RCLGMs facilitated only activist involvement, 
however, too many of 
whom failed to undertake the ground work necessary to ensure 
that industrial action 
was a feasible option. Thus, although the tactic required a 
lead to be taken, the 
passing of worthy resolutions proved to be no substitute 
for disciplined organisation. 
The evidence considered in Chapter Seven, and the 
developments outlined in 
workable due earlier chapters, indicate that the tactic was un 
to theoretical and 
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analytical limitations that failed to recognise the inadequate structural development of 
local labour movements, or secure the commitment of the members concerned. 
Activists failed to recognise or overcome the nature of rate capping, as a long term 
constitutional and therefore abstract threat, as opposed to an immediate decimation of 
jobs and services. Similarly, issues of representation and delegation were not 
addressed and allowed activists at delegate conferences or other bodies to adopt 
untenable positions. In the final analysis, such practices replicated the abstract 
practice of democracy in society, where representatives in parliament or the council 
chamber take decisions according to their interpretation of the will of the people 
supposedly divined from elections. In other words, the extent to which activists were 
able or concerned to engage in dialogue with those that they sought to mobilise is an 
important factor for the explanation of the eventual demise of the campaign. 
Ultimately, the tactical focus on councillors, and the determination of decisions for 
industrial action according to the commitment and analysis of activists, abstracted 
opposition and resistance from local labour movement practice. While the need for 
participation and mobilisation was recognised, the gap between the statements, aims, 
and actions of councillors, activists, and those they claimed to represent, was too great 
to deliver the commitment necessary for the effective execution of the campaign. 
This was essentially the result of activist failure to utilise and develop effective 
representative structures, particularly at the local level, through which the constituent 
elements could interact and the direction of the campaign be decided in accordance 
with membership wishes and resolve. 
Particularly in the area of democratic practice is the interaction of labour 
movement principles and practice, in the development and use of campaign structures 
and tactics, important for the realisation of desired ends. An element of continuity 
is 
evident between the conceptual principles, structure, and tactics employed in opposing 
rate capping and in earlier labour movement campaigns, but the crucial 
factor 
identified in Chapter Seven, was the extent to which local labour movement 
representative structures and practice emulated the abstracted nature of state 
structures. Decisions relating to the campaign were taken 
by activists, councillors, 
and full-time officers, and therefore relied on the commitment and resolve of 
those 
groups. Paradoxically, the campaign's aims of defending 
local government services, 
jobs, and local democracy were undermined by a 
failure to recognise the limitations 
of bourgeois democratic practice, and transcend 
it through representative local labour 
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Consideration the practice and processes of abstraction is undertaken because 'all 
theorising employs abstractions'[Gunn, 1989: 105], and because such usage affects 
and indicates the processes through which men and women attempt to understand, 
interpret and transform the practical social world. In other words, the kind of 
knowledge developed through the theoretical process is influenced by the way 
abstractions are employed and, at the same time, the process of theorisation conditions 
the way abstractions are used. For these reasons, it is necessary to explain what is 
meant by the term 'abstraction', how related practice shapes knowledge, and 
demonstrate how theoretical approaches abstract in different ways. ' 
These goals are addressed over three sections entitled: Knowledge; Labour; and, 
Practical Abstraction. The first section provides a brief account of the type of 
abstractions used in the formulation of knowledge and associates them with the 
theoretical approaches discussed in the Introduction. The tendency toward 
formulating knowledge in terms of dualism and dichotomy is also addressed at this 
point. In the following section the concept of 'labour' is introduced, defined, and used 
to demonstrate how the process of abstraction can be practised in a manner which 
acknowledges the internal relations of a 'world in development and flux'[Held, 1980: 
26] as opposed to separate and distinct categories. The style of theorising appropriate 
to this use of abstraction is also identified. Finally, those processes of abstraction that 
are evident in the practical world are identified and their implications explored. 
Knowledge 
The assertions made in the opening paragraphs require clarification. 
This is 
achieved by summarising: the forms of abstraction employed 
in the formulation of 
knowledge; their fit with particular theoretical approaches; and, the use of 
dichotomy 
' Together with Appendix Two, the consideration of abstraction 
demonstrates the flaws inherent in 
theoretical approaches that depend upon a separation of theory 
from practice. 
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and dualism in abstraction and theorising. This section proceeds by defining and 
discussing the relative merits of specific forms of abstraction. In building on the 
conclusions of this discussion, the focus of attention then moves on to consider the 
compatibility of the practices identified with the findings of the Research Practice 
section. The process is concluded by considering the limitations inherent in those 
approaches that seek to interpret the practical social world in terms of dichotomy and 
dualism. 
In the first instance, two forms of abstraction can be identified. Gunn, for 
example, distinguishes between 'empiricist' and 'determinate' forms[1989: 105], and 
Colletti makes a similar distinction between 'indeterminate or generic abstractions, as 
compared to the determinate specific ones. '[1975: 26] The difference between the two 
forms of abstraction lies, therefore, in their recognition of categories as generic or 
universal, rather than specific to a given epoch. As an example of empiricist or 
generic abstraction, Gunn cites Marx's description of 'Production in general' as an 
abstraction which 'fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition'. [op. cit: 
105-6] 'This general category' Marx continues 'is itself segmented many times over 
and splits into different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, 
others only to a few. '[1973: 85] 
The discussion of the concept of 'labour', conducted in the next section, provides 
further illustration of the different types of abstraction. For the moment, however, 
consideration is afforded to the dangers that accompany the indiscriminate use of 
empiricist abstraction. The main danger is that identified by Dobb as 'hypostatising 
one's concepts'. [Colletti, op. cit: 26] In other words, the process of 'regarding the 
postulated relations as the determining ones in an actual situation'. 
[loc. cit. ] In 
reference to economics, for example, Dobb argues that the abstraction of aspects of 
exchange relations from social relations of production 'is given an 
independent 
existence as though it represented the essence of reality, 
instead of a contingent facet 
of reality. '[loc. cit. ]; a point explored further in the final section. 
If this process of hypostatisation is considered 
in reference to the conclusions of 
the Research Practice section, the validation of categories and concepts employed 
in 
such a process requires clarification. Given the generalised and unreal 
nature of this 
type of abstraction, however, it defies reciprocal validation 
in reference to the 
practical world; a process of validation can only take place at 
the meta-theoretical 
level. A consequence of their general nature, therefore, 
is that hypostatised concepts 
can only be applied to empirical categories as an external 
means of validation. 
' 
2 This theme is developed further in Appendix Two with regard 
to the use of models and frameworks. 
and the separation of theory and practice. 
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Duncan and Goodwin explain how the unvalidated practice of abstraction distorts 
reality when they describe how, in relation to apparently general processes such as de- 
industrialisation, an 'artificial distinction between general and local emerges from a 
conflation of our mental processes of abstraction with what actually happens in 
reality. '[1988: 56] In other words, they identify a theoretical blind spot that results 
from the false distinctions made between general and local processes or between 
macro and micro. [loc. cit. ] Unfortunately, this kind of conflation is all too evident in 
the literature that purports to explain aspects of phenomena related to this thesis. ' For 
the purposes of this discussion, however, attention is concentrated on one example. 
Cawson and Saunders[1983] attempt to distinguish between state functions and 
politics according to given levels of the state, and therefore employ false distinctions 
of the kind referred to above. ' Such problems are evident in attempts to distinguish 
between the state's consumption and production functions, and are acknowledged by 
O'Connor[1973], Duncan and Goodwin[1982], and by Saunders himself when he 
admits that: 
Since most state policies will involve some relevance for both production and 
consumption, it can be difficult to disentangle the two and to distinguish empirically 
between primarily- production orientated and primarily-consumption orientated 
interventions. [Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 35] 
Interpreting the practical world in terms of false dichotomy and dualism, prevents 
study of the interaction and interrelation of the elements involved. Thus, in addition 
to the problems of validating the categories employed, the separation of theory from 
practice obstructs interrogation of the practical social world. Some of these problems 
are associated with the practice of employing models and frameworks as a means of 
theorising, and are addressed in Appendix Two. Further consideration of the question 
of dichotomy and dualism is undertaken in the next section, however, where the 
consequences of Cawson and Saunders attempt to distinguish between production and 
consumption[op. cit. ] is interrogated in reference to the category of 
labour as 
determinate abstraction. In particular, the validity of their correlation of class politics 




Consideration of the conceptual status of 'labour' 
fulfils three functions. First of 
all, the discussion acts as an adjunct to the previous section 
by providing further 
clarification of the issues discussed there. 
Secondly, it serves to identify the central 
Distinctions between national and local politics, discussed 
in Chapter One, are a case in point. 
4 The authors' approach was outlined in a joint article[1983], 
but Saunders[ 98 
to both 
984] uses this 
authors. 
approach in other articles. Responsibility for the approach is, 
however, afforded 
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importance afforded to the category of 'labour' as the selected subject of the research 
programme. ' When taken as a whole, however, the discussion also demonstrates how, 
in reference to the concept of 'labour', the totalisation of empirical and philosophical 
levels of theory is effected. 
As a first step in the fulfilment of these functions a clear definition of `labour' 
needs to be provided. In meeting this requirement, the distinction between 
determinate and empiricist forms of abstraction are addressed once more and receive 
further elucidation. The next task entails the provision of an explanation of how the 
pitfalls of dichotomy and dualism are overcome by 'theorising that operates in terms 
of determinate abstraction'. [Gunn, 1989: 107] This is achieved by demonstrating how 
the problems identified in the theorising of Cawson and Saunders[1983] are resolved 
through an understanding of 'labour' as a constitutive and internal contradiction of 
capital. The conclusions drawn from this analysis therefore serve to indicate how the 
different perspectives identified within the labour movement in the 1980s can be 
interrogated and explained without recourse to dichotomy and dualism. 
Perhaps the simplest definition of 'labour', in this context, is that of productive 
activity. To be more specific, 'useful labour' can be defined as 'productive activity of 
a definite kind and exercised with a definite aim. '[Marx, 1954: 49] Proceeding in this 
manner, however, runs the risk of hypostatising the concept as a general term without 
specific historical significance. Thus, Marx explains that although: 
Labour seems quite a simple category. The conception of labour in general form - 
as labour as such - is also immeasurably old. Nevertheless, when 
it is economically 
conceived in this simplicity, 'labour' is as modern a category as are the relations 
which create this simple abstraction. '[ 1973: 103] 
In other words, there is a danger that wage labour, where individuals are required to 
sell their labour-power as a commodity in order to survive, is identified with 
labour in 
general; whereby the 'specific form of modern productive work' is reduced 
'to labour 
pure and simple'[Colletti, 1975: 28] 
Gunn also expresses the required distinction in the following terms: 
Labour as an empiricist abstraction is the genus under which 
historically specific 
forms of labour fall. Labour as a determinate abstraction 
is an historical (a capitalist) 
species of labour while remaining no less abstract than the genus 
for its part-[op. 
cit: 106] (original emphasis) 
Thus, by conceiving of labour as a category that 
is historically specific, as wage 
labour, we are moving towards an understanding that recognises 
it as 'constitutive in 
practice of its social world'(original emphasis), and as 
having 'practical roots, 
practical effects' and 'practical existence as well'. 
[Gunn, ibid: 107] Further 
Selection of the research topic was influenced 
by my view that organised Labour and the processes 
of class struggle offer the most realistic opportunities 
for the transformation 
t 
the social % orld. 
Marcuse, for example, argues that Labour represents 
theory's ultimate gro [Held, 
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clarification of this assertion is provided by the example cited below, which 
demonstrates how understanding the category of labour as determinate abstraction, 
and therefore in a practically reflexive manner, avoids the pitfalls of dichotomy and 
dualism. 
First of all, there is a need to explain how the abstract category of labour is 
understood as a constitutive force in the contradiction of capital. Bonefield, for 
example, states this relation in the following terms: 'the fundamental contradiction of 
capital is its dependence on labour as the substance of value, and hence surplus 
value'. [ 1993: 119] The basis of the contradiction lies in the exploitative process 
whereby 'The use value of labour-power for the industrial capitalist is that labour- 
power creates more value (profit) in its consumption than it possesses itself, than it 
costs. '[Marx, 1959: 351] In other words, labour is a constitutive force in the 
contradiction of capital due to the unequal practical relation between capital and 
labour; whereby capital needs labour in order to exist but the labourer receives less 
than an equal share of the proceeds. An important aspect of this process is that its 
continuation depends on the 'dull compulsion of the economic'[Eagleton, 1991: 114]; 
whereby people are forced to work because 'having no means of production of their 
own, (they) are reduced to selling their labour-power in order to live'[Engels and 
Marx, 1973: 67] 
The significance of labour as determinate abstraction lies in the potential that the 
contradiction holds for the development of an understanding of the role played by the 
state in capitalist society; an understanding which avoids the dichotomies imposed by 
Cawson and Saunders. [op. cit. ] This potential can be acknowledged, again in 
reference to Bonefield, through the recognition that: 
The displacement of the contradictory unity of surplus value production (in its mode 
of existence as formal freedom and equality) to the state specifies the state as a 
moment of the social relations of production that preserves the condition's of 
capital's existence: living labour. [op. cit: 119] 
The state's 'mode of existence as formal freedom and equality' are 
discussed in the 
following section, but for the moment attention is afforded to another aspect of 
the 
state's role as 'a mode of existence of labour 
in capitalism'[Bonefield, ibid: 120], 
namely that of reproduction. 
The states role in this area can be understood as 
fulfilling two simultaneous 
functions. In the first instance, the provision of a 'social wage' 
by the state, in the 
form of welfare facilities, can be seen as a product of 
the demands of organised 
labour; as 'the working through of the antagonistic 
tendency of the abstract category 
of labour'[Bonefield, ibid: 119] At the same time, 
however, such welfare facilities can 
also be seen as a subsidy to surplus value production 
by reducing the costs of 
reproduction and thereby helping to limit the wage 
demands of those in work. To 
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attempt to understand these processes in terms of dichotomy or dualism would, 
however, be to fall into the same trap as Cawson and Saunders. The two processes 
can and should be understood, therefore, in terms of the internal relation; as capital's 
dependence on labour for its existence. 6 
When viewed from this perspective the type of dichotomy created by Cawson and 
Saunders[op. cit. ], relating class politics to production functions and sectoral politics 
to consumption functions, becomes tenuous. Under their dualistic approach, for 
example, there is as much difficulty involved in attempting to decide whether the 
demands of trade unionists for improvements in the 'social wage' amount to class or 
sectoral politics, as there is in deciding which aspects of transport, housing or 
education provision amounts to a production or consumption function. 
Dualistic simplifications result in obfuscation and are therefore of no help in 
attempting to understand the internal relations between demands for better transport 
facilities, or for improved welfare provision, and their subsidisation of capital 
accumulation. On the contrary, the imposition of dichotomy and dualism conceals 
these dimensions, prevents analysis of the very processes that hold the key to 
understanding the world in development, and therefore produce a distorted knowledge 
of the world. As was explained in the Research Practice Section of the Introduction, 
the solution to these problems lies with forms of theorising and critique that are 
practically reflexive and immanent in their mode of operation. Thus, only by 
evaluating conceptual principles in reference to practice, and vice versa, can the 
internal nature of 'The contradictory mode of existence of the state' and the 
'contradictory constitution of the dependence of capital upon labour'[Bonefield, op. 
cit: 120], be identified and understood. 
Practical Abstraction 
To conclude this discussion consideration is afforded to two examples of 
abstraction that are evident in the practical social world: money as symbolised 
exchange value[Marx, 1973: 148]; and, the state's ratification of 
'the mode of 
existence of exploitation as a social relationship of 
formal freedom and 
equality. '[Bonefield, 1993: 119] These particular examples are examined 
here due to 
their relevance to the subject matter of the thesis. 
In the first instance, the period 
studied encompasses a move by both Labour and 
Conservative governments from a 
measurement of local service provision 
in terms of employment levels, or employee - 
service user ratios, to a monetary evaluation. 
Secondly, the acceptance of abstracted 
political equality within the labour movement, as 
practised through the state, 
The discussion of the reasons for expanding service provision, 
undertaken in Chapter One, 
is 
informed by this approach. 
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influenced democratic practice and therefore the conduct and success of the 
campaigns studied. 
Both of the areas referred to demonstrate the manner in which `Bourgeois 
society.... makes the dissimilar comparable by reducing it to abstract 
quantities. ' [Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 7] Money, for example, is the medium of 
exchange, universal equivalent, through which commodities relate to each other; `that 
which expresses the relation of equality between all exchange values' [Marx, op. cit: 
189] In other words, it represents a separate, external, third party expression of the 
relation between individual commodities. [Marx, ibid. ] 
Furthermore, through processes of abstraction accountancy techniques transform 
commodities into value symbols, exchange values; an ideal measure limited only by 
imagination. [Marx, ibid. ] Such processes are evident in the arguments over, and 
practice of, local government finance during the period studied. In particular, the 
calculation of central funding allocation in reference to preconceived formulae, and 
the manipulation of such formulae through creative accountancy techniques during the 
1980s, indicates the extent to which this area of activity was detached from the 
practical social world. 
Similarly, the way 'crucial social and economic differences and relations between 
social groups.. . are transformed 
into legal relations of supposedly individual and equal 
citizens'[Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 39], is evident in two spheres that have 
relevance to the conclusions of this thesis. First of all, 'In the political arena.. . all men 
and women are abstractly equal as voters and citizens; but this theoretical equivalence 
serves to mask their concrete inequalities within "civil society. "[Eagleton, 1991: 125] 
In the second instance, the juridical principle of all individuals being equal before the 
law transmutes, among other relations, the inequality between employer and employee 
into an apparently equal contractual relation. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 40] 
In order to preserve the appearance of equality, however, both these spheres have 
to remove conflict and decision making processes from the practical social world. 
Thus, the political and legal structures of the state perform this function through the 
council chamber, parliament, and law courts, whereby responsibility 
for certain 
political and economic decisions are transferred from supposedly equal citizens 
to 
elected or appointed representatives. Labour movement reliance upon, together with 
its acceptance and replication of their abstracted nature, for example, 
form central 
facets of the explanation provided in this thesis for the conduct and success 
of the 
campaigns studied. 
A fundamental paradox between the two processes of abstraction considered 
here 
is that monetary abstraction has been used to negate the evaluation 
of services in 
terms of human worth, while the revolutionary principle of general 
human equality is 
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preserved through political and legal state structures which mask the real inequalities 
that pervade society. In specific terms, the formal legal relations between the 
supposedly equal parties of employer and employee disguise the reality that in selling 
the 'right of disposition' over labour-power the worker forfeits the right to self- 
determination, to liberty, during the period of work. [Nicolaus, 1973: 46] Similarly, as 
the guarantor of abstract equality in the form of electors, or as legal citizens, the state 
serves to legitimise 'the mode of existence of exploitation as a social relationship of 
formal freedom and equality. '[Bonefield, op. cit: 119] 
The matters discussed in this appendix demonstrate the importance of avoiding 
dichotomy or dualism in the formulation of knowledge. In other words, the 
exploration and interrogation of interrelations holds the key to developing a 
comprehensive understanding, and therefore knowledge of the events studied. Forms 
of conventional abstraction, for example, presuppose a distance between subject and 
object[Adorno and Horkheimer, op. cit: 7]; they separate theory from practice by 
formulating concepts in an environment that is detached from, and therefore unable to 
interact with, the practical social world they seek to interpret. Such processes also 
have implications for the formulation, understanding and practice of theory, and are 




This discussion of theoretical practice complements the assertions made in 
Appendix One by identifying and discussing forms of theorising that are inimical to 
the rigorous interrogation of subject matter. In particular, attention is afforded to 
theoretical practice that precludes reciprocal interaction and validation between 
categories employed and the practical social world that the theory purports to explain. 
The first section considers conventional attempts to define theory, identifies 
limitations exhibited by those definitions, and thereby illustrates the characteristics of 
orthodox theorising. In sections entitled 'Causality', and 'Models and Frameworks' 
specific examples theoretical practice that correspond to conventional definitions of 
theory are interrogated and specific weaknesses demonstrated. Taken as a whole, 
therefore, appendices One and Two contribute to the explanation of research practice 
begun in the introductory chapter. 
Thy 
A multiplicity of interpretations are evident in attempts to provide definitions of 
the term 'theory'. Judge, Stoker and Wolman, for example, assume that by identifying 
characteristics that are attributable to a given theory, i. e. normative, deductive, 
inductive, empirical, or prescriptive qualities, they are providing a definition of 
'theory'. [ 1995: 1-4] Such a descriptive approach is of limited use, however, because a 
given theory might exhibit more than one of the stated qualities, and any one 
characteristic is applicable to many different theories or forms of theoretical practice. 
Judge et al therefore fail to say what theory is. In relation to this thesis, theory 
is 
understood as a set of explanatory concepts[ Silverman, 1993: 1], but with a 
recognition that the probity of a given theory depends on the way the concepts relate 
to each other, and to the practical social world they seek to explain. 
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary(NSOED), for example, provides two 
definitions that demonstrate fundamental flaws inherent in orthodox approaches 
to 
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theoretical practice. Descriptions of theory as: 'the knowledge or exposition of the 
general principles or methods of an art or science, as distinguished from 
practice'[NSOED, 1993: 3274]; and, 'a system of ideas or statements explaining 
something, especially one based on general principles independent of things to be 
explained'[loc. cit. ] are similar to the definition adopted for this thesis, but exhibit a 
diametrically opposed approach to the interaction of categories. The common and key 
element of both definitions is their dependence on a moment or process of separation. 
In the first definition, for example, general principles or methods are held to be 
separate from practice, and in the second, ideas or statements are considered to be 
separate from the things they explain. ' 
This process of separation is of vital importance, because it is on this movement 
that the external or internal operation of a given theory depends. Where theory and 
practice are separated, for example, the validity of categories is either assumed or 
affirmed externally, but in both cases the consequence is an inability to identify or 
challenge value systems that prevail in society. This, point is demonstrated in the 
following sections where specific examples of external forms of theorising are 
identified and interrogated. These discussions begin with the second NSOED 
definition, and explore the implications of its mode of separation for theoretical 
explanations that depend on the identification and exposition of causal relations. 
Causali 
The definition of theory as the separation of ideas or statements from the thing 
explained implies a causal approach. This is evident, because where causal relations 
are applied the avoidance of a tautological explanation is only achieved if that which 
explains is reciprocally independent and distinct from that which it explains. 
[Gunn, 
1989: 94-5] For some theorists this kind of separation does not appear to 
be 
undesirable, but the reader is never told whether the theorist 
is aware of the limitations 
affecting a process that leaves unaffected the terms between which 
the relation of 
explanation obtains. In such circumstances, the theoretical objectives are 
limited to 
ones of monological explanation because causality 
does not arise `in the objects and 
their relationship, but solely in inescapable subjective thought. 
' [Adorno, 1973: 248] 
In contrast, an internal approach seeks to affect and constitute 
the related terms and 
therefore afford the opportunity for the understanding and 
the meanings of the terms 
to be challenged. [Gunn, op. cit: 94-5] 
By proceeding in an internal manner, and 
The NSOED also defines theory as: hypothesis confirmed 
or established by observation or 
experiment and accepted as accounting 
for known facts; formulation of abstract 
knowledge or 
-41 
speculative thought; systematic conception of something; 
or, unsubstantiated hypothesis. 
[ 199 
asons of 
Each of these definitions imply a separation 




measuring conceptual principles and practice in reference to each other, a theory or 
critique is able to expose and explore 'The contradictions' that Marcuse considers to 
exist 'between that which is and which is possible and ought to be'. [Held, 1980: 75] 
Recognising and exploring the interrelation between terms therefore allows a more 
comprehensive explanation than does their enforced separation. 
The extent to which causal relations are used as a means of explanation can be 
obtained by referring to two examples; the first of which involves Judge et al's narrow 
definition of empirical theory being concerned with establishing causal 
relationships. [ 1995: 2] Despite admitting that their definition is a narrow one, Judge 
et al provide an indication of the diverse use of causal explanations by citing 
examples of the deductive approach to empirical theory that emanate from opposite 
ends of the political, if not theoretical, spectrum. Public Choice theory, for example, 
is depicted as starting from an economistic premise that all individuals seek to 
maximise utility, and as attempting to deduce causal relationships from that premise 
to explain political behaviour. [loc. cit. ] Similarly, some Marxists attempt to deduce 
causal relationships based on `the premise that capitalism cannot guarantee its own 
reproduction because it has prerequisites that the market cannot secure and produces 
conflicts which need to be regulated. [Judge, et al, ibid: 2-3] 
A second example of the use of causal relationships is provided by Duncan and 
Goodwin's consideration of attempts to explain variations in local service 
provision. [ 1988] In discussing the 'demographic approach' to explaining local 
variations in service provision, for example, they expose weaknesses associated with a 
dependence on quantifiable data to construct causal relations. First of all, a circularity 
is evident whereby the use of quantifiable data conditions the research 
findings. [Duncan and Goodwin, ibid: 14] Secondly, a reliance on quantifiable data 
excludes questions about: the distribution of power; the role of the state in that 
distribution; and, the processes involved in policy formation. [loc. cit. ] These 
conclusions bear analogy with those of the introductory chapter of this thesis, 
in 
relation to studies conducted by Dahl and Hunter, and therefore serve to 
demonstrate 
the weaknesses of theoretical approaches that depend on separate validation of 
empirical and meta-theoretical categories. 
For Duncan and Goodwin, however, concerns are directed at the shift 
from 
correlation to causation[ibid: 12], rather than the 
inherent flaws in using causal 
relationships as means of explanation. They recognise that 
the data used by the 
demographic approach conditions the findings, but 
fail to realise that the weakness 
affects all explanations that employ causal relations, 
because the terms and categories 
are prevented from interaction and validation as part 
of the theoretical process. 
Duncan and Goodwin are therefore content to refer 
to specific social relations that 
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existed in Sheffield as a determining factor in the higher than average levels of 
council housing built in that area. [ibid: 57-61] Thus, while they do not depend on, or 
offer causality as the sole source of explanation, they do afford it a role in the 
theoretical process and thereby encompass the limitations identified. 
In other words, because causality or a causal relation is a `subjective idea' imposed 
on the practical world it seeks to explain, it amounts to a false picture of reality. The 
enforced separation of the term that explains from that it seeks to explain, is a product 
of human abstraction which denies interaction between related terms, and between 
them and the practical social world. This form theoretical practice therefore risks a 
tendency toward dogma and doctrine because, as a consequence of their separation, 
the terms employed, the value systems of the researcher, and those of the practical 
social world are not open to reciprocal challenge during the theoretical or critical 
process, but are maintained as external truth claims. 
Models and Frameworks 
Following on from the previous discussion of theoretical practice that relies on the 
separation of ideas or statements from that which is explained, it now remains to 
identify and explore the inherent weaknesses that affect the practice of theory as 
something distinguished from practice. In other words, this section explains what is 
meant by the phrase 'separation of theory and practice', when used in this thesis, and 
demonstrates the theoretical weaknesses associated with such separation. This is 
achieved by referring to the use of models and frameworks which, though described 
by Judge, Stoker, and Wolman as `more relaxed interpretations of theory'{ 1995: 3], 
provide tangible examples of the separation of theory from practice. As a first step in 
this process, however, the meaning and usage of the term 'practice' needs to be 
understood clearly. 
In this thesis, the term `practice' refers to the practical social world inhabited and 
shaped by human beings. Separation of theory from practice therefore implies a 
separation of theory from the concrete social world that the theory claims to 
interpret 
or explain. When practice is understood in this manner, the process of applying a 
theory as a means of explaining or interpreting particular phenomena, though a 
form 
of practice in itself, is not sufficient to overcome the separation of theory and practice. 
The decisive factor is that where theory and practice are separated the relation of 
correspondence is external. 
For theory and practice to be united, a theory must acknowledge 
its presence in the 
practical social world it seeks to explain. Where this unity 
is not achieved the theory, 
as Horkheimer argues, will be unable to: 'make a question out 
of the way in which 
society proffers, as ideologies, categories whose seeming 
obviousness suggests that 
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they only have to be understood to be endorsed'. [Gunn, 1989: 97] As the introductory 
chapter explains, the concomitant processes of practically reflexive theorising and 
immanent critique overcome the separation of theory and practice by operating in an 
internal manner. In this thesis, for example, such processes are evident in the 
reciprocal interrogation of campaign practice, conceptual principles, aims, and values. 
In contrast, the consequences of separating theory from practice can be 
demonstrated, by considering the use of theoretical models and conceptual 
frameworks as aids to theoretical practice. Theoretical models, for example, 
construct: `representations or stylised and simplified pictures of reality' that `include 
the most important components or categories'. [Judge et al, op. cit: 3] The external 
selection of categories and components, and abstracted representations of reality, 
amount, however, to a separation of theory from the social world it purports to 
explain. In other words, where a version of reality is constructed in order to facilitate 
research the link between the resultant theory and the practical world is inevitably 
tenuous. Hence, Neumann's assertion that models try to grasp a reality as yet 
unrealised. [Held, 1980: 62] 
Nevertheless, the value of theoretical models is a contested issue. Judge et al, for 
example, take the view that models can contribute to explanation and 
understanding. [op. cit: 3] By selecting 'important' categories or components that 
constitute a particular model, however, researchers risk presupposing what they are 
attempting to show and therefore of falling prey to the circularity of validating 
findings in relation to the methods employed. 2 Furthermore, because models 
represent only a simplified or stylised version of reality, the process of validating a 
model's findings embodies an external relation between theory and practice. 
In other words, the relation of correspondence between the model's 
findings and 
the practical social world it seeks to explain, is between separate and 
distinct terms 
that do not interact to define or transform each other. As a consequence of 
this 
separation, the value system of the researcher can 
influence the selection of criteria, 
but remains unchallenged outside the theoretical and critical processes. 
Similarly, the 
use of models means that value systems operating within the practical social 
world are 
safe from identification and challenge, because, as 
Neumann contends, it is impossible 
to derive the boundaries of a given social order from the analysis of prevailing 
trends 
within another system. [Held, op. cit: 62] 
Cockburn's model of the capitalist state provides an example 
of the limitations 
inherent in such theoretical practice. Despite taking account 
of the roles of social 
reproduction and ideological domination[Duncan 
and Goodwin, 1988: 33], for 
2 Examples of such circularity are discussed 
in the introductory chapter and are elaborated 
in Judge's 
discussion of the disputes over research practice within 
pluralism. [ 19951 
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example, Cockburn's model is based on tenets identified in the early writings of Marx: 
the state as specific to the mode of production; the state as an instrument of class 
domination; and, repression as a characteristic function of the state. [Cockburn, 1977: 
41-2] The model adopted by Cockburn, however, is based on observations that were 
developed during the nineteenth century; a period without universal suffrage, 
ostensibly working class parties in parliament, and labour movement involvement in 
the state. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 33] 
As a result, her model fails to take account of these developments, and therefore 
represents the state as a given thing; as opposed to a historically emerging, changing 
and contradictory class relation. [loc. cit. ] In other words, Cockburn hypostatises the 
concept of the capitalist state and employs external categories and criteria against 
which to evaluate its performance. Her approach therefore precludes any interaction 
and interrelation between the identified tenets and the practical social world that they 
are supposed to explain. 
The use of conceptual frameworks as an aid to theorising presents a different 
problem to that of theoretical models, because the description and identification of 
phenomena can only count as fact within a given framework. [Gunn, op. cit: 109] The 
point at issue here, however, is that what counts as fact depends on how the 
phenomena are theorised. Thus, although conceptual frameworks can provide a 
language and frame of reference through which reality can be examined and lead 
theorists to ask questions that might otherwise not occur[Judge et al, op. cit: 3], the 
crucial question is whether this framework is constituted by an a priori, external, 
allocation of categories, or by the practical social world as a whole. 
In similar fashion to the defence of theoretical models, the value attached to 
constructed conceptual frameworks is premised on their heuristic nature. [Cawson and 
Saunders, 1983; Judge et al, op. cit. ] As has already been noted in reference to 
theoretical models, however, there are major problems with forms of theory that 
depend on `a reality as yet unrealised' for the formulation of questions. 
[Held, op. cit: 
62] Thus, by defending the use of models and conceptual frameworks, Judge et al 
fail to recognise that the reality being examined is the creation of 
the researcher, not 
the practical social world. 
The `Dual State Thesis', propounded by Cawson and Saunders, 
for example, rests 
on an a priori allocation of functions between national and 
local states, and on the 
assumption that given functions produce, 
in a causal way, specific political 
processes. [Duncan and Goodwin, op. cit: 
35] The reality constructed by separating 
central functions and politics from local versions, relies 
on a separation of theory from 
practice which denies any interaction 
between categories. Similarly, the 
manufactured reality rests on an understanding of 
capital and labour as externally 
1) {I 
related dichotomy. Instances of class politics acknowledged within the framework are 
restricted to issues of production, where organisations representing opposing sides 
meet, and the implications of the internal relation between capital and labour for the 
pervasion of class struggle are thereby obfuscated. 
As has been explained, this thesis overcomes the separation of theory and practice, 
and the separation of explanatory terms, through the concomitant processes of 
practically reflexive theorising and immanent critique. To paraphrase Horkheimer. 
this means that the existent is confronted, in its historical context with the claims of its 
conceptual principles, in order to criticise the relation between the two and thus to 
transcend them. [Held, op. cit: 183] By operating in this way, the implications and 
consequences of the labour movement's conceptual principles are unfolded and its 
practice reassessed in the light of the said implications and consequences. The theory 
or critique therefore operates from within the practice of the social world it seeks to 
explain, and avoids the imposition of irrelevant criteria of observation by the 
researcher. [Held, ibid: 184] 
In this thesis the process, described above, is evident in the identification of 
conceptual principles, aims, and values espoused by the campaigns studied. The 
criteria identified are then interrogated to examine the impact they had, together with 
other influences, on the development of the campaigns. In this manner, campaign 
practice is interrogated in reference to principles, aims, and values, and through the 
exploration of their practice conceptual principles are similarly interrogated. Theory 
therefore operates within the practical world it seeks to explain and is able to validate 
all categories, both empirical and philosophical, employed within the framework of 
the practical social world. By operating in a critical manner, that 
is to say by 
assessing the validity of categories against each other and against their manifestations 





The presentation of the sources, catalogued below, is structured according to the 
organisations from which they originate, as opposed to their presence in the particular 
sets or collections of records accessed. This is an inclusive list that indicates the range 
and breadth of primary sources consulted in the course of the research programme; 
sources not cited in the thesis are therefore identified here. 
ASSOCIATION OF LONDON AUTHORITIES/ASSOCIATION 
OF METROPOLITAN AUTHORITIES 
Letters 
To Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment, 22 March 1985 and 10 
April 1985. 
Papers 
17 April 1985, entitled: Proposition from the AMA and ALA, (regarding solution to 
impasse over rate capping); 
'background' to concerns expressed in letter, 22 March 1985, over 'the impasse 
reached by members of the Association because of government policies in respect of 
local government finance'. 
Press Briefing 
29 October 1985, Solution to Liverpool Budget Crisis. 
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 
Letters 
From Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment to: 
David Blunkett, Chairperson LGCU, 21 February 1985 - 20 March 1985; 
Jack Cunningham, Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, 
30 January 1985 - 24 April 1985. 
Norman Willis, General secretary of the TUC, 3 April 1985. 
Press Notices 
19 June 1980: Local Authority Current Spending 1980-81; 
4 August 1981: Local Authority Current Expenditure 1982-83. 
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LABOUR PARTY 
Annual Conference reports, 1964-1987. 
Letters 
From Jack Cunningham, Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment to: Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment, 14 January 1985 - 12 April 1985; 
members of Liverpool Labour Group, 21 November 1985. 
Motions 
To: 
the Local Government Sub-committee of the NEC, by Eric Heffer MP, March 1985, 
and by David Blunkett, Leader of Sheffield City Council, undated; 
Parliament - Resistance to Rate-Capping, 25 and 26 March 1985; 
Liverpool DLP, 5 September 1985, and 27 February 1986; 
NEC welcoming Liverpool's decision to balance budget, undated. 
Minutes 
Liverpool Labour Group, 26 January 1986. 
News Release 
NEC, 7 January 1985. 
Reports and Papers 
NEC Statement on Rate Control, 23 November 1983; 
Merseyside County Council Labour Party, untitled discussion document prepared by 
Keva Coombes, Leader of the Council and Labour Group, and presented to the 
County Labour Party 3 March 1985. 
LIVERPOOL CITY COUNCIL/LABOUR GROUP 
Campaign Working Party - Terms of Reference and Composition, undated. 
'Campaigning for Jobs and Services', undated booklet. 
'Rates, Services and Jobs: The Campaign in Liverpool', 1983. 
Bulletins 
Local Government Campaign Bulletin, issues one to three January 1984; 
Liverpool Council Worker, 1985; 
Liverpool News. 
Letters 
Draft Letter from Liberal Leader to Prime Minister, November 1980. 
From Campaign Unit to all stewards, labour movement organisations, and trade union 
bodies in Liverpool area, 23 January 1985. 
From Chair of Finance Committee to Liverpool NALGO 
Branch, 23 October 1985. 
From Chief Executive to Liverpool Branch NALGO, 5 December 
1985. 
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From City Solicitor to: 
Liverpool Branch NALGO, 9 January 1984; 
Secretary Liverpool Branch NALGO, 17 December 1985. 
From Director of personnel and Management services to: 
NALGO Branch Secretary, 13 December 1983; 
NALGO Branch Chairperson, 13 March 1984; 
all departmental stewards and staff representatives, 12 February 1986; 
Secretary Liverpool Branch NALGO, 12 February 1986. 
From Office of Leader of the Council to: 
all District and Regional Trade Union Offices, 18 October 1983; 
full time trade union officers, 13 February 1984 and 22 February 1984; 
officers of Labour Group, DLP, full-time trade union officers, and JSSC executive, 
28 March 1984; 
Liverpool Branch of NALGO, 21 May 1984; 
all City Council stewards, 2 September 1985; 
Chairperson Liverpool Branch of NALGO, 7 March 1986. 
LIVERPOOL JOINT SHOP STEWARDS COMMITTEE 
Leaflets 
Demonstration: 19 November 1983; 
Jenkin Visit - Demonstration, 7 June 1984; 
'Liverpool Charter Petition', undated; 
Press Releases 
Dissenting Labour Councillors, 9 March 1984. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN UNIT 
Briefings and Bulletins 
February 1984 - April 1985 
Letters 
To Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment, 
5 February 1985 - 15 March 1985. 
From North Tyneside Labour Group Campaign Organiser, 2 April 1985. 
Minutes 
Management Committee Meetings 4 June 1984 - 15 April 1985; 
Management Group Meetings 18 December 1984 - 12 March 
1985; 
Meeting with the Secretary of State for the Environment, 
4 February 1985; 
Strategy Sub-Group Meetings 3 April 1985 - 18 April 1985. 
Local Authority Motions 
authorities involved in the Submitted to Council budget meetings 7-8 March 
1985, by 
campaign against rate capping. 
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Papers and Reports 
January 1985, entitled: Groupwork Report: Conclusions and Applications, issued to campaign officers and public relations officers; 
16 January 1985, entitled Programme of Work, presented to Management Committee: 
4 February 1985, entitled The Local Authority Case, presented at the meeting with the Secretary of State for the Environment, 4 February 1985; 
12 April 1985, entitled The Way Forward, submitted to Strategy Sub-Group; 
15 April 1985, entitled Government Returns, submitted to Management Committee; 
16 April 1985, entitled: Possible Deficit Budgeting, prepared by David Blunkett; 
19 April 1985, entitled: No Rate Tactic Prospects and Problems, prepared by 
David Blunkett; 
Undated, entitled: Not Making a Budget, author not identified; 
Undated, entitled: Rate Support grant - 1985/86, issued to all unit subscribers and 
campaign teams. 
Press Release 
4 February 1985 
MERSEYSIDE TRADES UNION AND LABOUR MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 
COMMITTEE 
Leaflets 
Re: demonstration 19 November 1983; 
'Merseyside Fights back' Rally and Organisational Conference, February 1984; 
'Half Day Stoppage 28 February and Rally and Conference, 27 February 1984'; 
Organising Council Statement, 4 April 1984; 
'National Fightback Conference, June 1984; 
'Support Liverpool City Council/Victory to the Miners', February 1985; 
Activists Meeting, February 1985. 
Letters 
To all shop stewards committees, February 1984, and March 1985. 
Minutes 
Merseyside in Crisis Organising Meeting 4 November 1983(forerunner of 
MTULMCC). 
MTULMCC: 
20 January 1984 and 10 February 1984. 
NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
Campaign Pack, 1984. 
Constitution and Rules Booklet 
Bulletins and Circulars 
National: 
'Fight to Defend Local Democracy' 8 November 1983 - 
13 March 1985. 
Liverpool City Branch: 
'Our City Our fight' Campaign Bulletin, 15 December 
1983 - 13 July 1984; 




From Assistant General Secretary, Service Conditions to: Branch Secretaries in Hit List authorities and Metropolitan Counties, 23 January 1984; 
Branch Secretaries in Hit List authorities and Metropolitan Counties, 2 February 
1984; 
Liverpool Branch Chairperson, 31 May 1984. 
From Deputy General Secretary to Liverpool Branch Chairperson, 3 April 1984. 
From District Organisation Officer to all Branch Secretaries, 27 October 1983; 
From General Secretary to : 
Secretaries of Local Government Branches, District Councils, Sectional and 
Professional Societies, 15 September 1981; 
Branch Secretaries in Hit List authorities and Metropolitan Counties, 30 April 1984; 
all members of the Liverpool City Branch involved in not co-operating with the 
District Auditor, July 1985. 
From Liverpool Branch to: 
Leader of Liverpool Labour Group, 3 April 1980; 
all members, 30 June 1980; 
NALGO District Organisation Officer: 24 October 1983,9 November 1983, and 
8 March 1984; 
Secretary Liverpool Trades Council, 9 November 1983; 
Assistant General Secretary, Service Conditions, 14 November 1983; 
NALGO Research Section, 22 November 1983; 
NLGC members and national officers, 18 January 1984; 
J Straw Labour MP and opposition spokesperson on Environment, 10 February 1984; 
members, 26 March 1984; 
councillors opposing Labour Group budget, 29 March 1984; 
all NALGO local government branches, April 1984; 
Deputy Leader of Labour group, 2 April 1984; 
Secretary of North West and North Wales District Council, 2 April 1984; 
Assistant General Secretary, Service Conditions, 9 April 1984; 
all members of the NEC, 13 April 1984; 
Islington NALGO Branch, 29 June 1984; 
Chair of Finance Committee, 2 August 1985,10 October 
1985,11 October 1985 and 
10 March 1986; 
Labour Party Conference Delegates 1985; 
District Officer, October 1985; 
District Officer, 18 October 1985; 
Avon County Branch, 17 January 1986 
Director of Personnel and Management Services, 
26 March 1987. 
To Liverpool City Branch from: 
Glasgow District Branch, February 1984; 
South West District, 14 March 1984; 
Sefton Branch, 15 March 1984 
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Merseyside County Branch, 19 March 1984; 
Norfolk Branch, April 1984; 
West Midlands NALGO, April 1984; 
Islington Branch, 23 June 1984; 
Knowsley Branch, 6 November 1985; 
Avon County Branch, 9 January 1986; 
North East District Council, undated - 1984. 
Minutes 
Liverpool City Branch: 
Branch Executive Council, January 1979 - October 1987; Campaign Committee, 14 December 1983 - 16 September 1985; 
Finance and General Purposes Committee, 11 October 1979 - 22 May 1986; Service Conditions Committee, 21 June 1979 -1 October 1987. 
London Hit-List Branches, 10 August 1983. 
North West and North Wales District Council Meeting, 3 December 1983. 
National Delegate Advisory Meetings - Rate Capping: 
30 November 1983, and 16 October 1984. 
Rate Capping Liaison Group Meetings: 
20 November 1984 and 13 March 1985. 
Motions/Agenda 
Liverpool Branch SGM, 26 June 1980; 
Liverpool Branch SGM, 10 March 1981; 
Liverpool Branch SGM, 6 March 1984; 
GLC/Metropolitan Liaison Committee, 24 August 1985; 
Liverpool Branch EGM, 24 September 1985; 
Liverpool Branch SGM, 26 March 1986. 
Papers and Reports 
NLGC: 
'Public Expenditure Cuts - National Strategy for Reconvened 
Group Meeting', 
15 September 1981; 
'Campaign In Defence of Local Government', 20 March 1984; 
'Campaign in Defence of Local Government: Rate Capping and 
Penalties Industrial 
Action Strategy', 7 December 1984; 
National Delegate Advisory Meeting Report to Rate Capping Liaison 
Group Meeting, 
27 February 1985. 
Liverpool City Branch: 
'The Rate, the Cuts and the Government', 11 February 
1980; 
'The Fight Against Cuts and Redundancies in Liverpool', 
Branch Negotiators, 
17 June 1980; 
'Capitalisation: Summary of Major Points', 19 September 
1985; 
'Liverpool NALGO - Notes on the Legal 
Position', 26 September 1985; 
'Stonefrost Report: A Summary', 1 November 1985; 
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'The Liverpool Crisis - an explanation for other NALGO Branches', undated; 'Liverpool's Budget 1986-87: Balancing the Books', undated; 'From a Deficit to a Legal Budget: How was it Done', undated; 'Liverpool's Crisis: The Legal Background', undated; 
'Capitalisation: Setting the Context', undated; 
'Capitalisation: Explaining the Implications', undated; 
Handwritten record of events 13 September 1985 - 21 November 1985, undated. 
Liverpool City Branch Organiser: 
'No Redundancy Agreement 1980-81' to District Organisation Officer; 
Meeting 1 April 1984 between full-time trade union officers, JSSC executive, DLP 
officers and Councillors, addressed to District Organisation Officer; 
Events 5-12 September 1985 addressed to District Organisation Officer. 
Merseyside County Branch: 
'An Attack on Merseyside', January 1984. 
Press Releases 
Liverpool Branch: 
Support Council Stance, 4 February 1985; 
Strike 29 March 1984,5 March 1984; 
Budget Analysis 1985-86,15 January 1985; 
Call for balanced budget, 14 November 1985. 
NATIONAL LOCAL AUTHORITIES CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE 
Draft affiliation form, undated. 
Draft Constitution, undated. 
List of authorities participating at inaugural conference held 30 March 1985, undated. 
Letters 
advising of first meeting in Sheffield, 13 April 1985, undated; 
publicising NLACC, undated. 
Minutes 
Sheffield, 13 April 1985; 
Leicester, 2 May 1985; 
Report 
Northern Region Affiliation Report, undated. 
TRADE UNION CONGRESS 
Annual Congress Reports, 1960-1987. 
Letters 
To Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment, 
from Norman Willis, 
General Secretary, 1 April 1985, and 3 April 1985. 
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Local Government Committee 
Statement in support of the Rate-capped Authorities, 14 January, 1985. 
Minutes 
Local Government Committee, 5 December 1983. 
Papers and Reports 
'National Consultative Conference on the Rates Act and the Defence of Local Government', 4 December 1984. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Agenda for mass meeting of NUT members, March 1984. 
City of Sheffield Information Pack: Rates, Services and Jobs, undated. 
Transcript of Interview with Secretary Liverpool City Branch, 23 February 1984. 
Letters 
To Colleagues, TGWU, March 1984; 
To all organisations from Communist Party of Great Britain, 14 March 1984; 
To Regional Officials of NUPE, NALGO, GMBATU, TGWU, NUT, District 
Secretary of DLP and Liverpool Bishops, from CSEU, 9 April 1984; 
To all local authority stewards from GMBATU full time officials, 15 November 1985. 
Leaflets 
Natfhe Liaison Committee - Mass Meeting, 14 March 1984; 
Local Government in Crisis Conference 1 November 1980 
Draft Statement, 17 October 1980; 
Report of Liverpool NALGO Branch Delegate, 20 November 1980. 
Minutes 
Hand-written records of meetings between Liverpool City Councillors and 
full-time 
trade union officials 28.2.84,24.1.85, and of a meeting with the 
CSEU, MPs and 
Liverpool Bishops 4.5.84; 
Joint Trade Union Forum, 17 March 1986. 
Motions 
NUPE, calling for balanced budget on basis of AMA recommendations, 
1985; 
TGWU, calling for balanced budget on basis of 
AMA recommendations, 1985. 
Reports 
'A Less Painful Route through Stonefrost', David Blunkett, 
18 November 1985; 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES 
Interview questions for Trade Unionists 
1. In general terms can you describe what you see as the most important developments that affected local government trade unions during the 1970s and 80s ? 
2. How far did such factors influence the approach of GMBATU/NALGO in 
Liverpool during the campaigns for more resources ? 
3. What do you consider to be the most important characteristics of 
GMBATU/NALGO structure in Liverpool during the period ? 
4. What was the significance of the role played by GMBATU/NALGO 
activists/Officers in JTUCs at local, district, and national levels ? 
5. How far was the alliance of trade unions and local authorities, and therefore the 
campaign in Liverpool, shaped by the involvement of trade union activists in the 
local Labour Party ? 
6. Which authorities were most active during the anti rate capping campaign and 
why ? 
7. What do you consider to be the main differences between the tactics and approach 
adopted by the Liverpool labour movement and other 'left' Labour authorities 
involved in the campaign ? 
8. How far was the labour movement the prime agent of the campaign in those 
authorities? 
9. How do you think the national leadership of the Labour movement viewed the 
prospect/use of industrial action to pursue the aims of the anti rate-capping 
campaign ? 
10. Do you think that there was an important difference between the approach of 
local 
activists and national leadership ? 
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r Byrne, Blunkett and Livingstone(with the 
ý. ý... ava ya LG JuI 1. In general terms, can you describe how you see the Labour Party's approach to local government, and related issues changing during the 1970s and 80s ? 
2. The campaign to defend local government involved, to varying degrees, both the industrial and political wings of the labour movement. Would you draw any distinction between the tactics/approaches adopted by each wing ? 
3. Which authorities were most active in the campaign and why ? 
4. How far was the labour movement the prime agent of the campaign in those 
authorities ? 
5. How do you think the national leadership of the labour movement viewed the 
prospect/use of industrial action to pursue the aims of the anti rate-capping 
campaign ? 
6. In 1984 national Labour Party figures (Cunningham and Straw) were involved in 
arranging meetings between Liverpool representatives and the Secretary of State. 
Was such intervention common practice or part of a desire to avoid confrontation ? 
7. What do you consider to be the main differences between the tactics and approach 
adopted by the Liverpool District Labour Party, the Liverpool Labour Group, and 
other 'left' Labour authorities involved in the campaign ? 
8. How far was the alliance of trade unions and local authorities, and therefore the 
campaign in Liverpool, shaped by the involvement of trade union activists in the 
local Labour Party and vice-versa ? 
9. Do you think there was an important difference between the approach of local 
activists and national leadership ? 
Questions sent to Blunkett 
1. In "Democracy in Crisis... " (p. 168) you argue that "The hit list of Labour 
controlled authorities were forced into national action.... 
because the parliamentary 
Labour Party offered no lead. " This process is described as resulting 
from the 
leadership's fear that defiance of legislation could undermine its future authority. 
Why do you think the Parliamentary leadership "Failed", as you put 
it: "... to 
distinguish between.... illegal action and.... dissent in defence of both an important 
constitutional convention and of people whose 
interests the Labour Party existed 
to support" 9 
2. Local Labour Parties, shop stewards and some community groups are 
described as 
the real driving force behind the anti-rate capping campaign 
in Sheffield. (pp. 178- 
9) This description suggests that there are differences in the approaches 
of local 
activists and national Leaders. What reasons would you 
give for their differing 
approaches and would you attribute any extra significance 
to the role played by 
local authority trade unionists in Sheffield's anti-rate capping 
campaign or in the 
Sheffield Labour Party at the time ? 
3. Was the Sheffield joint union campaign group, established 
in January 1985, the 
initiative of the Labour Group or did a local authority 
joint trade union committee 
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exist prior to this campaign group ? The fact that such a group was not formed until January 1985 suggests a certain weakness in the organisation of Sheffield's local authority unions; particularly when compared to Sheffield Trades Council. Would you agree with this assertion and, if so, what were the consequences for the campaign in Sheffield ? 
4. Liverpool's 1984 campaign for more resources is characterised as representing a close alliance between the local Labour Party and the local authority's work-force. The alliance was at that time maintained through regular meetings between councillors, officers of the local authority Joint Shop Stewards Committee, and mass meetings of the work-force. Was such unity evident in other authorities during the anti-rate capping campaign (please identify! ) and what effect did the 
presence or absence of such links have on the way their respective campaigns developed ? 
5. You claim that by 16 May 1985, five out of the seven authorities who were still deferring a rate decision were doing so by tactical manoeuvring. (p. 182) Who 
were the two authorities not dependent on tactical manoeuvres and what factors, 
such as trade union support, contributed to their resolve ? 
6. "Democracy in Crisis... " does not discuss the role anticipated for industrial action 
in the anti-rate capping campaign. Livingstone, for example talks about ten to 
twenty authorities refusing to set a rate with the support of local authority trade 
union industrial action. NALGO's national strategy also made provision for 
industrial action. Was this ever a realistic part of the campaign in Sheffield, or 
elsewhere, and how did the national Labour Party and trade union leadership view 
the prospect of such a development ? 
Questions sent to Livingstone 
1. In your book "If voting changed anything... " you describe the national Labour 
Party leadership as distancing itself from the GLC until opinion polls showed the 
GLC and its policies to be popular. Would you agree that the Labour leadership 
adopted a similarly cautious approach to the anti-rate capping campaign and how 
would you explain the leadership's behaviour in these matters ? 
2. How far was the strategy of between ten and twenty local authorities refusing to set 
a rate with the support of local trade unions prepared to take industrial action to 
defend jobs and services, a realistic option for the rate-capped London boroughs ? 
Which Boroughs did you expect to be successful in this tactic and what was the 
response of national Labour Party and trade union leaders to this approach 
? 
3. David Blunkett, in his book "Democracy in Crisis", identifies local Labour Parties, 
shop stewards and some community groups as the political 
driving force behind 
the anti-rate capping campaign in Sheffield. In which, 
if any, London boroughs 
do you think such factors were prominent and what was the 
importance of the role 
played by shop stewards in the Labour Parties of those 
boroughs and in their wider 
anti-rate capping campaigns ? 
4. Liverpool's successful campaign for more resources in 1984 was 
based on a close 
alliance between the Liverpool Labour Party, Liverpool 
Labour Group and the 
local authority trade unions. The alliance, was at that stage, maintained 
through 
regular meetings between councillors, officers of the 
local authority Joint Shop 
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Stewards Committee, shop stewards, and mass meetings of the work force. Can 
analogies be drawn between Liverpool and any of the London boroughs (please 
identify! ) in the prominence of the labour movement in their campaigns, and how 
far do you think such an approach contributed to, or detracted from, the success of 
their campaigns ? 
5. "... the rate-capping campaign failed because it remained mired in the shadow 
boxing of parliamentary and council chamber politics, with the work-force being 
wheeled on as a stage army when required. " These concluding remarks from 
chapter 9 of your book are a damning assessment of the campaign. What 
approach, with the benefit of hind-sight, would you have taken given the time- 
scale involved in preparing and activating the campaign ? 
